Debtor Defeats Surety

(By S.A. Karim, Advocate, Thiruvananthapuram)

In a legal borrowing there are minimum three parties, creditor, debtor and surety. With solvent sureties a debtor can secure loan either from government schemes, financial institutions, semi-government and government controlled institutions. Private party uses the same principle in lending and borrowing.

The liability of debtor and surety is joint and several. It means creditor can realise the principal amount and interest either from the debtor or the surety or both. This is the law on the point. Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 reads :-

"The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract."

This is the most abused and misused section in a loan transaction. Under this section, the surety cannot say, realise the amount from the debtor first and then turn against surety. The choice is with the creditor.

Using this legal position, clever debtor escapes liability and it becomes a death knell to the surety. In all the borrowing the beneficiary is the debtor and the surety is the name lender. But in effect the surety becomes the principal debtor because the liability is joint and several. The section is not expected to benefit one and defeats another. So, the law of joint and several liability must go lock, stock and barrel. The debtor has to be fixed for the liability he makes.

Courting a Strange Predicament 

(By Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate, Ernakulam)

A lawyer who performed too well for his client was jailed for that reason, during the French revolution. This is what Jacqueline Donnelly said in her short account of the ‘palace of justice’ in Paris. It was an 18th Century episode. A strange remnant of pre democratic vintage.

This year, a lawyer in Kerala was put to a stranger predicament. It occurred in the court of the 1st Class Judicial Magistrate, Chittoor. An application for bail was moved on behalf of an accused in an abkari case. The accused was denied bail and remanded in jail. However, the man soon escaped from Police custody. Thereupon the lawyer who moved the bail application was remanded in jail. An application for bail was moved on 13th of April, the date of remand itself. For taking a decision in the application the Magistrate took four days and ultimately the bail was denied.

This incident reflects the nature of our justice delivery system at the lower level. The accused escaped from the police custody, and in the words of the Magistrate, “there was failure on the Head constable’s part”. But the constable was spared and case was registered against the lawyer !. The offences alleged are under Sections 224, 225, 120(B)(1) r/w S.34 of IPO. Again, the District Sessions Judge did not take a prompt decision on the application for bail filed by the lawyer. Ultimately, justice K.T.Sankaran of the Kerala High Court intervened and passed an order on 19.4.2007 directing release of the lawyer.

I do not propose to deal with the sustain ability of the allegations against the counsel. The Magistrate order ran to 6 pages, there were sentences on the commission of offence and the eligibility of the accused for leniency’. The Magistrate, took himself as a centre of power, where the accused should pray for ‘mercy’. It is a well known principle of adversial practice that while deciding the question of bail, the court should not enter a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused.

The High Court convened a special sitting to undo the injustice. It said that “it is interesting to note that no case has been registered against the police constables who are primarily answerable for the escape of the accused”. The Court took note of the submission that the only material for the Magistrate was the testimony of the police. Advocate’s robes were seized as material objects in the case; the High Court said that it was unusual. It also directed transfer of the case from the present court.

This is what the Magistrate said in his order-

“In any view of the matter, the alleged facts show that he has intentionally aided the rescue of the 1st accused”. 

Thus allegation becomes the proof.   It becomes ‘finding’.   Even Iraq under Bush or Taliban under fanatics were unfamiliar with this kind of ‘judicial’ reasoning. 

The Magistrate further said -

“ The allegation that this petitioner had received a mobile call immediately before the escape of the 1st accused and immediately after the receipt of such call he had told something to the 1st accused and 1st accused had run away and the further act of the petitioner herein going away as if nothing had happened is a very grave allegation”.

Again, allegations and findings are recklessly mixed, by doing violence to law and language. 

The entire judicial action is based on a statement given by a Head Constable. Another circumstance to presume the guilt of the lawyer is that “he (the advocate) is said to have been present in court premises”. Brilliant reasoning, indeed !

The manner in which the Magistrate has dealt with the case shows the negation of Article 22 of the Constitution which says about the right of an arrested person to consult the lawyer. The order also ignores the spirit of Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act which talks about the confidential nature of professional communication. (“ The counsel had told something to the 1st accused”, the Magistrate said).

If this is how a lawyer attending the criminal court is dealt with, the unreported and unnoticed predicament of the ordinary people at the mofussil level is a matter of concern. There is no evaluation or criticism regarding the way in which the lower judiciary functions. It should be ensured that navity is not celebrated in the court of initial jurisdiction, at the cost of the public.       

Mr.Haridas is more an illustration, than a victim. It is not the lawyer, but individual liberty and professional freedom, that are jailed. It is high time that the day to day function of lower judiciary is put to administrative and judicial scrutiny.

The High Court, in a recent decision in Biju S.Praveen’s case, 2007  (2) KLT 280, held -

“criminal courts should always be careful while passing orders on bail applications which in effect deal with personal liberty. In cases where the court decides to send an accused to custody pending trial, it must be ensured that the court applies   its   mind  judicially   and judiciously  with  particular reference to the facts and circumstances of the case............ The bail application moved has to be considered and orders should be passed on the same day itself since personal liberty of an accused cannot be curtailed in a whimsical or disdainful manner.

“The above observations have been made to alert the subordinate courts to ensure that the accused in criminal cases are not condemned to custody as a matter of course without a proper application of mind. Judicial process has to be blended and tempered with humaneness. Personal liberty guaranteed to every citizen has to be respected”. 

The above judgment was published in Kerala  Law Times dated April 23, 2007.

Liberty has become a causalty. Jail is the rule and bail, an exception.  Lawyers too are not exceptions. 

A COMMENT ON MATHEW JOSEPH v. JANAKI

(By Dr. Mariamma A.K., Lecturer in Law, Government Law College, Calicut)

The decision of the Kerala High Court in Mathew Joseph v. Janki (2007 (1) KLT 742 (F.B.) assumes great importance due to various reasons, The point of law laid down by the court does not clear the law or the interpretation but it was a judgment delivered on a misconception of facts based on the erroneous reference order of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court.

The reference order as reported in KLT 2007 (1) page 748 reads as follows:-

“ The Apex Court in the above decisions just followed the decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani & Others (2003 (1) KLT 165 SC) and stated that statutory policy will not cover the death or bodily injury suffered to gratuitous passengers. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Asha Rani’s case (supra) and submitted that Asha Rani’s case (supra) related to coverage of passengers in a goods vehicle. However, it classifies the claims into three categories i.e.

(1) Cases covered under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

(2)  Cases covered under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 prior to amendment in 1994, and

(3) Cases covered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 after the amendment in 1994.

It was pointed out that in Tilak Singh’s case (2006 (2) KLT 884 SC), the accident occurred on 23-3-1989. i.e. before the 1988 Act came into force on 01-07-1989 when the 1939 Act was in force and it will come under the first category and there is no dispute that in the first category cases passengers are not covered even as per earlier decisions of the Apex Court. However, there is no decision with regard to the second or third categories for liability of Insurance Company for passengers in a private vehicle after the introduction of new 1988 Act which came into force with effect from 1-7-1989 and after the amendment of the above Act in 1994. Since already there is a Full Bench decision of this Court and large number of cases are pending and Insurance Company is taking the stand that in view of the decision in Tilak Singh’s case (supra) the Full Bench decision is no more good law, we are of the opinion that the matter should be considered by the Full Bench. Hence, we adjourn the matter to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders”. 

But in United India Insurance Co v. Tilak Singh (supra), the third paragraph reads like this:-

“ 3. On 23-3-1989 the scooter was admittedly sold by Respondent 5 to Respondent 1 Tilak Raj. It is also an admitted position that the registration certificate of the scooter was transferred in the name of Tilak Raj but no notice there too was given by the transferor, Respondent 5 to the appellant Insurance Company for transfer of the insurance policy and the insurance certificate in the name of the transferee i.e. Respondent 1. With effect from 1-7-1989 the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (here in after referred to as “the 1939 Act” ) was replaced and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (here in after referred to as “the 1988 Act” ) came into force. On 31-10-1989 one Rajinder Singh, who was riding as a pillion rider while the scooter was being driven by Respondent 1, died as a result of an accident..................”

From the above, it is very clear that on 23-3-1989 the scooter was sold and on 31-10-1989, Rajinder Singh, who was the pillion rider died as a result of an accident.

But the Reference Order states that the accident occurred on 23-3-1989. That means, it is an error, i.e. instead of 31-10-1989, 23-3-1989 was treated as the date of accident. The date in this case has got great significance because Motor Vehicles Act 1939 was repealed with effect from 1-7-1989 and the 1988 Act came into effect. When 23-3-1989 was treated as the date of accident, provisions of the 1939 Act will be applicable. But in fact the accident occurred only after the 1988 Act came into force. The same was clarified in the Tilak Singh’s case (supra) itself. Paragraph 13 reads as follows:-

“In our view, it is not the transfer of the vehicle but the accident which furnishes the cause of action for the application before the Tribunal. Undoubtedly, the accident took place after the 1988 Act had come into force. Hence it is the 1988 Act which would govern the situation.”

Therefore, the decision of the Full Bench in Mathew Joseph v. Janaki (supra) is no longer good law as it has mistaken the Supreme Court decision. The Motor Vehicles Act 1994 amendment came into effect on 14-11-1994 and the accident in this case had taken place only on 9-1-1995. In the reference report itself it is stated that: 

“however, there is no decision with regard to the second or third categories for liability of Insurance company for passengers in a private vehicle after the introduction of new 1988 act which came into force with effect from 01-07-1989 and after the amendment of the above Act in 1994”.

After the 1994 amendment Act, Section 147(1)(b) reads as follows:-

(i) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub Section (2)-

(i) against any liability which may be incurred by hi™ in respect of the death of or bodily [ injury to any person including owner of the good* or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle ] or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

The amendment to Section 147 makes it very clear that all the passengers including the owner of the vehicle are well within the coverage of insurance policy. More over, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.V.Nagaraju v. M/s Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (1996 (3) CPR 222), held that exclusion term of the Insurance Policy must be read down so as to serve the main purpose of policy that is, Indemnify the damage caused. The above judgment reads as follows:-

“Not withstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule usually referred to as the ‘Main Purpose Rule’, which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor’s contractual obligations. For example, in Glynnn v. Margetson & Co. (1893 AC 351, 357 ) Lord Halsbury, L.C stated: It seems to me that in construing the document, which is contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument and seeing what one must regard... as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract.

Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suissee Atlantique Societed’ Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Contrale (1967) 1 A C 361. Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose or object of the contract”. 

Supreme Court held that in accord with Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan & Others  ((1987) 2 SCC 654) the exclusion term of the Insurance policy must be read down so as to serve the main purpose’ of the policy that is indemnify the damage caused to the vehicle, which we hereby do”.

Again in the case of M/s.  Modern Insulators Ltd. v. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2000 (1) C P R 93 ), Supreme Court held that “in case where the exclusion clause not included in policy nor disclosed to insured, the insured not responsible to call for terms and conditions and the Insurance Company cannot claim benefit of exclusion clause.

In that case, the insured was supplied with a cover note and the schedule of the policy. The other terms and conditions containing the exclusion clause were not communicated to the insured. Supreme Court held that it is the fundamental principle of Insurance Law that utmost good faith must be observed by the contracting parties and good faith forbids either party from non-disclosure of the facts which the parlies known. The insured has a duty to disclose and similarly, it is the duty of the Insurance Company and its agents to disclose all material facts in their knowledge since obligation of good faith applies to both equally.

As the above terms and conditions of the standard policy where in the exclusion of the clause was included, were neither a part of the contract of insurance nor disclosed to the appellant, the respondent ( Insurance Company) cannot claim the benefit of the said exclusion clause.”

The reasoning given in the case Mathew Joseph v. Janaki (Supra) is uncomfortable and against public policy. The whole exercise undertaken by the Pull Bench of High Court of Kerala seems to give a clean chit to Insurance Companies from paying compensation to the injured by forgetting the basic object of introducing statutory insurance of vehicles or the Main Purpose Rule. In paragraph 9 Court states as follows:

“ 9. The Act by S. 146, generally requires coverage of compulsory insurance as against third party risks. Additionally, in view of S.147, insurance coverage is mandatory, as far as specified groups and claims are concerned. No doubt the owner of the vehicle will have to compensate loss arising out of a variety of circumstances, but the statute does not interfere with his discretion to cover or not to cover such risks in a manner he decides. He can be confident of meeting the claims from his own funds: he may get insurance protection for any such contingencies. The decision is expected to be taken by him, and an insurer can be answerable only to the risk about which coverage has been sought far and secured, of course in consonance with public policy and accepted parameters.....”

The above said observation made by the Court does not stand to logic or reasoning as the owners do not take policies with special coverage to pillion riders and gratuitous passengers in private vehicles, either because of their ignorance about the technicalities of insurance and decisions of courts on that point or due to the knowledge that they need not pay anything from their pocket by transferring their assets if they are solvent or simply pleading ‘no means’ in case of insolvent. Virtually the hapless victims or legal heirs are the loosers simply by holding an award in favour of them but impossible to execute. In short, owners’ confidence will never save the victims/ legal heirs.

More over, the finding of the court that United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Appukuttan (1995 (1) KLT 807) to be deemed as wrongly decided’ was with out assigning sufficient reason for that. In that case it was held that Insurance Company is not absolved from the liability in respect of pillion rider of a motor cycle.

By applying these principles, all the passengers including the owner are included in the 1994 amendment. When owner who is a gratuitous passenger is included, it is implied that the legislative intention was to provide compensation to ‘any person’ who is injured irrespective of whether he is gratuitous or non gratuitous passenger, other wise it would have been provided in the Act itself.

The expression ‘any person’ was decided by the High Court of Rajastan in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hulasi Devi (2003 (1) KLT (SN) 83 ). The Court held that any person other than the insurer and the insured is third party and the insurance policy covers liabilities for death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of third party caused by or arising out of the use of motor vehicle in public place. The expression ‘any person’ would include an occupant of the car/motor cycle who is gratuitously travelling in the car/motor cycle (vide Amrit Lal Sood v. Kaushalya Devi Thapar (1998 ACJ 531 SC) and the Insurance Company is held liable for death off pillion rider.

The term ‘Gratuitous Passenger’ was also considered in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Daniel ( 2000 (1) KLT 526). Court held that Gratuitous passenger travelling in a motor vehicle involved in the accident will be third party with in the meaning of policy of insurance covering third party risks and so the insurer is liable to indemnify the owner. In so far as gratuitous passengers are concerned there is no limitation in the policy as such. Hence, under the terms of the policy, the insurer is liable to satisfy the award passed in favour of the claimant. The Tariff Advisory Committee, a statutory body on 13-3-1978 issued instruction requiring the insurance companies to mandatorily incorporate a clause in the insurance contract reading “death of or bodily injury to any person including the occupants carried in the motor car provided that such occupants are not carried for hire or reward”. The above instructions were brought into force with effect from 25-3-1977. It has to be observed that the Tariff Advisory Committee had stated that “all existing policies should be deemed to incorporate this amendment automatically”. That means the instructions of the Committee would apply to all existing policies whether it may be an “act policy’ or a ‘comprehensive policy’.

Therefore, the Full Bench could have decided the present case purely on the basis of the 1994 amendment bearing in mind the ever increasing number of accidents and the death toll in our state as well as the beneficial legislation being the objective of Legislature in introducing such an amendment.

In result, the above judgment needs correction in the light of the mistaken facts and also on the basis of the dicta of the Supreme Court of India in the above referred cases along with the plight of poor litigants whose cases are decided by various tribunals by applying the said principle. 

hn[n¡p¶hÀ hn[n¡s¸ScpXv

(X¼m³ tXmaÊv)

tIÊpIfn I£nIfmbn tImSXnbn hcp¶hÀ X§fpsS tIÊv FXncmbn hn[n¡s¸Spt¼mÄ hn[n\ymbw FgpXnb PUvPnamsc Ipdn¨v s]cpamäZqjyw Btcm]n¨v \S¯p¶ ]cky {]kvXmh\Ifqw NÀ¨Ifpw A\pNnXhpw A\mimkyhpamWv. CXv \oXn \ymb hyhØbpsS ASn¯d Xs¶ CÃmXm¡pw. PUvPnamsc]än am[ya hnNmcW \S¯p¶hÀ, PUvPnamÀ¡v asämcp s]mXp {]hÀ¯Is\tbm, Dt±ymKØs\tbmt]mse adp]Sn ]dbphm\pw, \ntj[nbv¡p hm\pw, {]Xntcm[n¡phm\pw AhImianÃm¯hcmW F¶Xv ad¡cpXv. ChÀs¡Xnsc Bsc¦nepw ]ckyambn D¶bn¡p¶ Btcm]W§Ä Xncp¯s¸SmsX P\a\Ên \ne\n¡pw. A]hmZ¯n\ncbmIp¶ hyàn F¡mehpw \oXn \ntj[n¡s¸«, GI]£obamb Btcm]W ¯n\p hnt[b\mb, tXtPmh[w sN¿s¸« hyànbmbn XpScpw. CXv kmam\y\oXnbpsS ewL\amWv. a\pjyXzclnXamWv.   

tImSXnIfpsS am\yXbpw, A´Êpw \ne\nÀt¯­Xv \½psS P\m[n]Xy¯nsâ \ne \nÂ]n\v A\nhmcyamWv. tImSXnIÄ¡v \ÂInbncn¡p¶ Hu¶yXzhpw, A[nImc§fpamWv sXäpIsf in£n¡phm³ Ahsc AÀlcm¡p¶Xv. P\{]Xn\n[nIÄ cq]w \ÂIp¶ \nba§sf hymJym\n¡p¶Xpw \S¸m¡p¶Xpw tImSXn aptJ\bmWv. kaql¯nsâ k´penXhpw \oXn]qÀÆhpamb hfÀ¨bpw \ne\n¸pw tImSXn hn[n\ymb§fneqsS kwc£n¡s¸Sp¶p. tImSXnIfpsS hnizk\obXbv¡p tIm«w X«nbm XIcp¶Xv hyhØm]nXamb PohnXNcybmbncn¡pw. C¡mcW¯memWv tImÀ«e£y\nba¯nepw, Iogvhg¡§fnepw PUvPnamcpsS s]cpamä§Ä ]ckyhnNmcW sN¿cpXv F¶v \nÀt±in¡p¶Xv. 

ASp¯bnsS ]mÀesaâwKoIcn¨ tImÀ«e£y \nba t`ZKXnIfn kXymhØ tImÀ«e£y Ipä¯n\v \ymboIcWambn sImSp¯n«. F¶ncp¶mepw `cWcwK¯v `cWþ{]Xn]£§Ä X½n \S¯p¶ Btcm]W {]Xymtcm]W§Ä t]mse tImSXnbpsS Imcy¯n hnaÀi\§Ä Agn¨phnScpXv. `cWcwK¯v \S¡p¶ ]ckymt\zjW§Ä t]msebpÅ hyhØIÄ PUvPnamcpsS s]cpamäs¯ Ipdn¨v A\phZn¨n«nÃ. tImSXnIÄ¡p t\sc BÀ¡pw F´pw ]dbmw F¶ AhØ, C¶v Aev]w _m¡n \n¡p¶ \·bpsS Awi§Ä kaql¯n CÃmbva sN¿pw. 

tImSXnIfpsS A´Êv \ne\nÀ¯p¶Xn tImSXnIÄ¡p Xs¶ Hcp henb ]¦v hlnbv¡m\p­v. D¶X§fn Ccn¡p¶hÀ D¶Xambn Xs¶ s]cpamdWw. {]tXyI A{]Xnam[nXz sam¶pw Hcp PUvPn¡pw CÃ. AhÀ am\pjnIamb _elo\XIÄ¡v hnt[bcpamWv. tNmZyw sN¿m\mhm¯ A[nImc§Ä X§Ä¡psI¶ [mcWbn ]et¸mgpw NneÀ \S¯p¶ s]cpamä§Ä Nn´n¡p¶hsc \ncmis¸Sp¯nbn«pIv. PpUojy BIvSnhnk¯nsâ t]cn s]mXp XmÂ]cy lÀÖnIfnepw cmjv{Sob t{]cnXamb tIÊpIfnepw, \S¯nb A[nImc It¿ä§Ä hnaÀi\mßIamWv. ]mÀesaânsâbpw \nbak`bpsSbpw ]cam[nImcs¯ tNmZyw sN¿p¶ `cWLS\mhncp²amb tImSXn CSs]SepIÄ ]eXpw ASp¯bnsS DImbn. A¯cw D¯chpIsf taÂtImSXnbn tNmZyw sN¿p¶Xn\pw adnIS¡p¶Xn\v \nba\nÀ½mW§Ä sImIphcm\pw Ignbpw. Ipsdsbms¡ hn[n\ymb§Äs¡Xnsc \S¯p¶ NÀ¨IÄ hgnXncp¯s¸Sm\pw, F¶m PUvPnamÀs¡Xnsc \S¯p¶ hyàn]camb Btcm]W§Ä A`nejWobaà F¶p am{XaÃ, A]ISIchpamWv.

1988 ]mÀesaân\pÅ ]cam[nImchpw kwc£Whpw D]tbmKn¨v PUvPnamcpsS tkh\ thX\ hyhØIsf¡pdn¨pÅ \nba\nÀ½mW thfbn Hc`n`mjIs\¶ \nebn F\n¡v tImSXnbn DImbn«pÅ A\p`h§Ä hnebncp¯n, AhcpsS s]cpamä§sf \nb{´n¡phm³ \nba\nÀ½Ww sImIp hcWsa¶mhiys¸Sphm³ Ahkcw e`n¨p. A¶v tI{µ\nba a{´n Bbncp¶ {io. G.sI. sk³ Xsâ adp]Sn {]kwK¯n Fsâ hnaÀi\§tfmSv tbmPn¡p Ibpw, F¶m ]mÀesaân\v DÅ ]cnanXnIÄ hniZoIcn¡pIbpw, PUvPnamÀ Xs¶bmWv X§fpsS s]cpamä N«w D­ണ്ടmt¡ണ്ടsX¶v \nÀt±in¡pIbpw sNbvXp.

C¶v PUvPnamcpsS s]cpamä§sf \nco£n¡phm\pw, AhÀs¡Xnsc \S]SnIÄ kzoIcn¡phm\pw Ct¸mÄ hyhØm]nXamb amÀ¤§Ä DIv. ]mÀesaânsâ Cw]o¨vsaâv aptഖ\bpÅ PUvPnamsc \o¡w sN¿epw, kp{]owtImSXnbpsS {]tXyI kanXnbpsS At\zjWhpw, in£m\S]SnIfpw Hcfhphsc CXn\v klmbIcamWv. F¶m NnÃptaSbnte¡p IsÃdnbp¶Xpw, taSbnencp¶v IÃv Fdnbp¶Xpw Cu _nw_s¯¡pdn¨pÅ k¦Â¸§Ä CÃmbva sN¿pw.

tImSXnIÄ `cWXe¯nse Ht«sd AgnaXnIÄ ]pd¯psIm­ph¶n«p­v. \nb{´WanÃm¯ A[nImc tI{µ§sf \nebv¡p\nÀ¯nbn«pIv. {Inan\epIfmb ]e P\{]Xn\n[nItfbpw PbneneS¨n«pIv. tImSXnIsf ]mÀizhXvIcn¡p¶Xv C¯cw BfpIÄ¡v hnlcn¡phm³ hoണ്ടpw Ahkcw \ÂIpw. `bs¸Sp¶ tImSXnbv¡v \oXn \nÀÆln¡m\mhnÃ. tImSXnIÄ¡v \nÀ`bambn \oXn \S¯m³ Ahkcw D­ണ്ടmIWw.

PUvPnamÀ hn[n¡p¶hcmWv. AhÀ I£nIfpsS am²ya hnNmcWbneqsS hn[n¡s¸Sp¶Xv A]lmkyamWv. PUvPnamcpsS s]cpamä§fpw {]hÀ¯\§fpw s]mXpP\§Ä AhÀs¡Xnsc hn[nsbgpXphm³ CSbm¡cpXv. kpXmcyhpw, hnaÀi\clnXhpamb s]cpamäw PUvPnamÀ Dd¸phcp¯Ww. \nÀ`bambn \oXn \nÀhln¡m\pÅ kmlNcyamWv Dcn¯ncntb­Xv. GXp hn[n \ymb§sfbpw hnaÀin¡phm³ GhÀ¡pw AhImiapIv. F¶m PUvPnamcpsS s]cpamäs¯ hnNmcWbv¡v hnt[bam¡phm³ ]mSnÃ.