Lok Sabha Speaker and Supreme Court
By V. Bhaskaran Nambiar, Former Judge, High Court of Kerala
Lok Sabha Speaker and Supreme Court
V. Bhaskaran Nambiar, Former Judge, HC
In 1978, to be exact, on the nineteenth of December, Parliament resolved to expel Shrimathy Indira Gandhi from Parliament. But then, in 1981 on seventh May, the 7th Lok Sabha Assembly, rescinded the 1978 resolution and also strongly condemned it as ‘wrong and erroneous and a gross distortion of privilege law’.
Does this mean (a) that Parliament has endorsed the power to expel a member (b) or that Parliament has accepted it as gross distortion or a grotesque exercise of privilege law (c) or that Parliament has acquiesced that there is no power to expel? There can be no such doubt or fear as the subsequent events reveal.
Parliament has again struck towards the end of 2005. Parliament has resolved to expel some members of Parliament on the basis of the finding of an ethics committee that some Members of Parliament had received ‘bribe’ as ‘cash for question hour’.
Aggrieved, those members or some of them approached the Supreme Court alleging violation of their constitutional rights. The apex court ordered notice to the respondents including Parliament.
Before issue of notice, the Honourable Lok Sabha Speaker is reported to have said that ‘there is no question of surrendering or submission to the jurisdiction of the judiciary. I have the highest respect for the judiciary; but I have a duty to perform as Speaker of the Lok Sabha’. After issuance of notice, it is reported that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha backed by all the presiding officers decided not to respond to the notice issued by the Supreme Court.
It is of course for the Speaker to decide whether to accept or respond to the notice. He can also decide whether it is not his duty as Speaker of the Lok Sabha to direct filing of reply to controvert the allegations of fact and answer the questions of law raised in the petition before the Supreme Court. If he does not respond and an ex parte decision is rendered, it will be as much binding as a decision on merits, made after hearing. Of course, the Supreme Court may seek the assistance of the Attorney General and other senior advocates as amicus curiae, if necessary.
If the Speaker believes that the apex court has no jurisdiction to issue notice, the Speaker can direct his office to appear through counsel and object to the jurisdiction. This submission does not affect the status and dignity of the Speaker. It is his equality that compels him to oppose the alleged transgression of his authority.
From the reports in the press, the defense seems to be
(a) that the matter is beyond judicial scrutiny in view of Article 122 of the Constitution and
(b) the power of expulsion is implicit under Article 105 when the powers and privileges of the House are protected under the Constitution.
The aspects required to be noted are
(a) If a Member of Parliament is expelled, he forfeits all his rights and privileges as a Member of Parliament and elections have to follow to fill the seats that have fallen vacant. In other words he is disqualified to continue as a member.
(b) If expulsion from Parliament is not listed as a disqualification in the Constitution; will not expulsion from Parliament be violation of the Constitution?
(c) If Parliament can punish a member whether, on the basis of the report of the ethics committee or otherwise, which jurisdiction cannot be doubted or questioned, what then is the content and contour of punishment?
I venture to submit my views on the twin questions of jurisdiction of the court to decide the dispute and the competence of Parliament to expel a member.
Court’s Jurisdiction
Article 122 provides: - Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament: - (1) The validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.
Article 122 therefore expressly permits that the validity of proceedings can be challenged; but it shall not be on the ground of irregularity of procedure. The court’s jurisdiction is thus ousted only in those cases where the claim rests only on procedural irregularity in the House. If the claim rests on other substantive rights, the jurisdiction of the court is not ousted. I think there is no challenge to the procedure adopted in Parliament, or to the constitution of the ethics committee. But the challenge is to the conclusion and decision to expel a member and not to the procedure adopted in arriving at that conclusion.
Competence to Expel
Competence to expel a Member of Parliament rests on the privileges and powers of the House under Article 105 of the Constitution wherein, the powers and privileges of members of Parliament in the House of Commons as on 1950 are preserved for the House.
The privileges of the English Parliament are based partly upon custom and precedents, which are found in the Rolls of Parliament and the journals of the two Houses and partly upon certain statutes, which have been passed from time to time. These are privileges and powers of a House in a country where there is no written constitution.
The House of Commons retains its right to decide upon the qualifications of any of its members to sit and vote in Parliament and if, in the opinion of the House, a member has conducted himself in a manner which renders him unfit to serve as a Member of Parliament, he may be expelled from the house.
Members have been expelled from the House upon various grounds e.g. as being rebels, or having been guilty of forgery, of perjury, of misappropriation of public money, of corruption in the administration of justice, or in public offices, or in the execution of their duties as members of Parliament or contempt and other offences against the House itself. In fact thus expulsion is a form of disqualification both in England and in India. The seat shall thereupon become vacant.
True, in England the House of Commons has the power to expel it’s member/members. But in India, controlled by a written constitution, we find there is no express power of expulsion conferred on the House. On the other hand, the provisions seem to indicate that at present there is no much power even impliedly conferred on the House.
The constitution enumerates in Article 101(3) the circumstances when a seat falls vacant.
Vacation of Seats- Article 101(3) --. If a member of either House of Parliament: -
(a) becomes subject to any disqualification mentioned in clause (1) or clause (2) of Article 102 or
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Chairman or the Speaker, as the case may be, and his resignation is accepted by the Chairman or the Speaker as the case may be, his seat shall thereupon become vacant.’
Article 102 provides for disqualification thus:
Disqualification for membership --
(1) A person shall be disqualified from being chosen as and for being, a member of either House of Parliament --
(a) if he holds any office of profit
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent
(d) if he is not a citizen of India
(e) if he is so disqualified under any law made by Parliament
The President can alone settle a dispute regarding disqualification after the President consults the Election Commission under Article 103. The Speaker cannot decide the dispute.
The Speaker is empowered to disqualify a member only under the Tenth Schedule where there is defection.
Parliament has power to punish erring members; but then the punishment cannot extend to expulsion. It should stop short of expulsion.
If only Parliament makes a law as contemplated under Article 102 (e) by making expulsion by the House as a disqualification, the whole problem can thus be solved. This has not been done so far.
When therefore the constitution specifies the occasions and circumstance when the seats can fall vacant, can the Parliament in these cases declare de hors Articles 102 and 103 that the seat or seats have fallen vacant and request the Election Commissioner to conduct fresh elections?
Should not a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court decide these and other far-reaching questions? If so, is it advisable for the Speaker of the Lok Sabha to keep away from contesting in court without rendering any assistance to the judiciary?
It has been held in the historic decision in Marbury v. Madison as early as 1801 and followed all over the world and by India that any dispute, whether the legislature or the executive has overstepped their jurisdictional limits, has to be resolved by the judiciary. Thus the question whether Parliament has overstepped its powers in disqualifying/expelling members of Parliament is open to judicial review and it will be ideal if the Speaker can state his case both on facts and on points of law before the apex court for a final decision on the very important constitutional questions involved.
By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court, Ernakulam
Enrollees, Your Attention Please
(By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Senior Advocate, High Court of Kerala.)
It was while I was experiencing aridity for a subject to write on, I came across a news item in the morning dailies of May 5, 2008 (Monday) that 214 law graduates were enrolled/ by the Bar Council of Kerala, as Advocates on the previous day, May 4, 2008 (Sunday). I immediately remembered that May 4, 2008 was the first Sunday of the month May; and, every year the first Sunday of the month May is considered to be World Laughter Day. So, cheers to you, the enrollees.
'Enrollee' is not a commonly used word. Oxford, Cambridge, Macrnillan, Webster, Longman, The American Heritage and Universal Dictionaries do not contain such a word. But, World Book Dictionary traces the origin of the word to Wall Street Journal, and gives the meaning as "a person who enrols in a group as a member", with hope and ambition.
So get set for advocacy, you, the two-hundred-and fourteen lawyers, the legal profession's 'Generation Next'.
You have come to the legal profession on the World Laughter Day, with great expectations. On more occasions than one, I have had the privilege of being Chief Guest at the enrolment of Advocates by the Bar Council of Kerala. I had also delivered Pre-enrolment Lecture under the joint auspices of the Bar Council of Kerala and the Indian Law Institute, Kerala Branch. I had started the Pre-enrolment Lecture, delivered on 28-3-1992, as follows: "When you wake up on the morning of tomorrow, you would say, as the hero of 'The Good Earth said: 'Today is the day'. For Wang Lung, the hero of Pearl Buck's Pulitzer-prized Novel, it was the day of his marriage; for you, tomorrow is day one, on which you go for earning from learning.....I shall today tell you what you want to know, not only what you want to hear, but the role of lawyers, their duties, manner of functioning, advocacy and accountability. It is important that you know them before you 'dress up for a pantomime and speak in a language that layman cannot understand', as David Pannick said.... Therefore the necessity to know well your position before you take to legal vernacular".
In my address, as Chief Guest, on the occasion of the enrolment of Advocates, on 28.12.1998, I said: 'Have you seen God', was the question raised by Narendra (who later became Swami Vivekananda) when he met Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, to which the reply was: 'If you take efforts, I shall try to help you'. The message of Sri Ramakrishna. was 'search for God'. Reframing Narendra's question, if you ask me: 'Have you seen Hortensius', I would venture the same reply: 'If you take efforts, I shall try to help you'. (Mark, Hortensius, according to Cicero, was the greatest of advocates).... Today is the day on which you are expected to know the rise and fall of the legal profession.... I am now delivering a carefully drawn up script. It is in the direction of an 'Operation Save Profession'. My views may be considered ponderous....."
Again, in my address, as Chief Guest, at the enrolment, held on 8.4.2001, I had said: "You are upbeat on your upcoming enrolment as advocate. This is the right time for you to know the locus of the problems facing the profession, though my expressions may not be music to your ears. I should think, everything is not hunky-dory with the legal profession.! Before venturing to gather the items in your wish-list, you have to take stock of the] profession's present position; and take steps to finetune the bar.... I should think, today; one becomes a lawyer all-on-a-sudden.....You have to work as a junior under a senior for a: tariff period.... The difference in years of practice between a senior and a junior, these days, is only a few months".
You may think I am mis-measuring the legal profession, especially at a time when, immediately after your new incarnation as advocate, you may be feeling as if you are on the roof of the world. You may hold your expectations; but make work speak for you. Set a measure for yourself. Remember, a culture of instant gratification, instant gains and instant rewards, is making the world go round. Advocacy is not a diet for fertility. Advocacy is no belly-dance. There is, indeed, heavy lawyer volume, especially, in Kerala, just as heavy traffic volume. Juniors will have to ride the opportunity. You should perform to your potential in every case, avoiding slip-ups. In due course, there will be an automatic short-listing, and one knows not how many among the 214 would find place in that list. That apart, there will be corporate hijack of lawyers also. In court, you will have to suffer more questions than answers. You should even be prepared to answer a question like; 'How the Zebra got his stripes'. Try to avoid judicial stroke. Advocacy sans legal learning will never pay.
Law is to be interpreted, understood and absorbed, both by lawyers and judges. If you, do not have your mind over matter in all cases, you nay possibly start feeling that the court is not the best place to be. Advocacy is not curative music. You do not submit your 'wish list' before court.
Set a measure for yourself; be a real winner. Feel happy if you are accused of committing 'advocacy'. Lawyers are the cast and the crew of the legal profession. A lawyer cannot expect solatium for his failure in the case. Also, there is no 'Orange Cap' for a lawyer who wins the maximum number of cases. To be a good lawyer, you do not require an apex chamber. There may be irritants in Bench-Bar relationship, resulting in Bench-Bar blues. Sometimes we see lawyers and judges making much ado about nothing. It is not the duty of a lawyer to try to please a Judge by 'as you like it' submissions. It does not pay to be a sycophant. Do not keep your pulp 'bottled'. A lawyer is not a bottom-dweller in court. There is neither Nobel, nor Oscar for advocacy. And, mark, Nobel is awarded even to the one who finds that the finding for which Nobel Prize had been awarded earlier to a person was wrong.
A lawyer's script for success is anchored in his drafting of pleadings. Preparing or settling brief is an art. So is arguing cases. Advocacy is not piercing eloquence. Some lawyers argue for eternity, in a fashion akin to wild rhino chase - unbearable onslaught of advocacy, losing stopper's stop. Be 'an honest Puck'. Do not try 'to be a Hercules', or a devil bearing a divine name. Steamy encounter in court between lawyers, or between lawyer and Judge, is no real advocacy; nor is stunning onslaught of the opposing lawyer, correct advocacy. Do not try to outperform the Judge. Do not subject advocacy to market risks. Do only what is doable.
The legal profession seems to be in hide, or ill in bed; and, if this be the state of affairs, what little lingering reputation our profession is having, will go fathoms deep.
I have indelible impressions of superb advocacy by the greats in the profession. It is difficult to explain that age to you this day, for no 'wagon-wheel' is maintained for the legal profession. Today one finds a laugh in counsel's argument, not seriousness. Today we have only the 'snapshots' of the great profession. The legal profession has started looking for a lost race-horse.
Daniel Webster, Disraeli, Sir Edward Clarke, Lord Atkin and Lord Hailsham considered the profession of law as a great profession. Lord Hailsham, especially, in his 'Sparrow's Flight', said that he had never ceased his sense of loyalty to the profession to which he belonged and that he has never ceased, to the best of his ability, to maintain its traditions and promote its interest.
I can only conclude by reiterating what I said on 8.4.2001: "Try to become a front man of the profession. And, be proud of your own calendar and culture, remembering that law practice is not a job. I wish and pray, every junior lawyer be blessed with the talent to manage his own profession in an extraordinary manner. Who dares, wins. At the end of the day, I should think that the legal profession is a great, glorious, noble profession. And, if there is a rebirth for me, and if I am asked what type of birth I would like to take next, my answer would be: 'I wish to be reborn a lawyer only' ", though I have started moving from substance to shadow.
I wish you value-added success in your tryst with advocacy.
By O.V. Radhakrishnan, Senior Advocate, High Court of Kerala
The Law and Bench of High Court under the Constitution of India
(By O.V. Radhakrishnan, Sr.Advocate)
Under the Constitution of India, High Court is the supreme judicial institution and superior court of record of the State Judiciary. Art.214 of the Constitution of India directs that there shall be a High Court for each State. All the High Courts enjoy the same status although they do not constitute a single all India judicial cadre. A Judge is appointed to a particular High Court. But the President may transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court in exercise of the power under Art.222(1) of the Constitution. A High Court is constituted on the appointment of Chief Justice no matter other Judges are appointed or not. The Chief Justice can perform his duties and also discharge his function as a Single Judge in the absence of other Judges. "The Judges of a High Court owe their responsibilities and discharge their functions in relation to that High Court only. They have no constitutional connection and no legal relationship with the body of Judges of any other High Court" (S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981 (Supple) SCC 87) per Pathak Judgment.). Therefore, there shall be only one High Court for each State and each High Court is independent and indivisible. Exception is made in Art.231 for establishment of a common High Court for two or more States or two or more States and a Union Territory. Its integrity as a court of record shall be preserved having realistic regard to the setting and scheme of the Constitution.
"High Court" is defined under Art.366(14) of the Constitution to mean any court which is deemed for the purposes of the Constitution to be a High Court for any State and includes -- (a) any court in the territory of India constituted or reconstituted under the Constitution as a High Court, and (b) any other court in the territory of India which may be declared by Parliament by law to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of the Constitution. The above definition of High Court contemplates constitution or reconstitution as a High Court under the Constitution and declaring any other Court by the Parliament to be a High Court, but does not behold a Bench of a High Court. A Bench or a Division of High Court is outside the web of the Constitution. Therefore, providing a Bench to a High Court outside the seat of a High Court is legally impermissible and has no constitutional warrant. It is above the reach of competent legislation.
Art. 130 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or in such other place as the Chief Justice of India may, with the approval of the President, appoint. Art. 130 of the Constitution also does not empower to constitute or establish permanent Bench/ Benches in such other place or places but can only hear cases in such other place or places appointed by the Chief Justice of India with the approval of the President. Identical provision is conspicuously absent in respect of High Courts in the Constitution. Necessarily, to put on the language of Arts. 214 and 216 read with Art.366(14) rational meaning, it does not need research to show that power to set up a Bench of the High Court in other places outside the seat of the High Court is pro-tanto excluded. Any interstitial law making extending to direct conflict with express provisions of the Constitution or to ruling them out of existence is a misuse of power in bad faith.
The Parliament enacted the States Reorganization Act, 1956 to provide for the reorganization of the States of India and for matters connected therein. S. 51 of the Act relates to principal seat and other places of sitting of High Courts of new States which is quoted hereunder :-
S.51 (1) - The principal seat of the High Court of the new State shall be at such places as the President may by notified order appoint.
(2) The President may, after consultation with the new Governor of the new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court of that State, by notified order, provide for the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court at one or more places within the State other than the principal seat of the High Court and for any matters connected therewith.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2), the Judges and Division of Courts of the High Court for the new State may also sit at such other place or places in that State as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor, appoint.
The above provision was designed to provide for the disposal of cases pending before certain High Courts and Benches, which under the provisions of the Act, were ceased to! function at particular places. According to S. 51 (2) of the Act 1956, it is within the province of the President to establish a permanent Bench of a High Court with a separate Registry after consultation with the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the respective High Court. In a Bench decision in Manickan Pillai Subbayya Pillai v. Assistant Registrar, High Court of Kerala, Trivandrum(1958 KLT 280.) the High Court of Kerala has held that" the Trivandrum Bench is not the High Court of Kerala is apparent from a mere perusal of S. 51(3) of the States Reorganization Act which states that the Judges and the Division Court of High Court for a new State may also sit at such other place or places in that State as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor, appoint. It is the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of Kerala and not the High Court itself that sits at Trivandrum". It has also been held therein that "the principal seat of the High Court under S. 51(1) of the Act is the place where the High Court as a whole functions in all its capacity. The High Court as such is located there, and though the word 'sit' can be used in relation to a Court to denote its location (See Art. 130 of the Constitution and S. 6 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act and the marginal notes thereto) it is ordinarily used especially in connection with 'Judge' or 'Division Court' to denote sitting for the purpose of hearing cases". The Division Bench went on to hold that "the Trivandrum Bench can only hear and dispose of such cases as are directed to be posted before it by the Chief Justice. It cannot do anything else on behalf of the High Court, and in particular, it cannot receive cases".
In State of Maharashtra v. Narayan(AIR 1983 SC 46)) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "it is difficult to comprehend how the Chief Justice can arrange for the sittings of the Judges andDivision Court at a particular place unless there is a seat at that place. It may be true in thejuristic sense that the seat of the High Court must mean "the principal seat" of such HighCourt, i.e., the place where the High Court is competent to transact every kind of businessfrom any part of the territories within its jurisdiction. It is impossible to conceive of a HighCourt without a seat being assigned to it. The place where it would sit to administer or, inother words, where its jurisdiction can be invoked is an essential and indispensable featureof the legal institution known as a Court". The Apex Court in the above decision did notapprove the view taken by Raman Nair, J. (as he then was), in Manickan Pillai's case speakingfor the Court that the Trivandrum Bench was not the High Court of Kerala and the Judgesand Division Courts sitting at Trivandrum could hear and dispose of only such cases as maybe assigned to them. The Apex Court preferred the view expressed by Chagla, C.J inManjidana's case(Seth Manjidana v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay (Civil Appeal No. 995 of 1957 (Bom.) decided on July 22, 1958).) that the Judges and Division Courts at temporary bench establishedunder Sub-s.(3) of S. 51 of the Act function as Judges and Division Courts of the HighCourt at the principal seat and while so sitting at such a temporary Bench they may exercisethe jurisdiction and power of the High Court itself in relation to all the matters entrusted tothem. In the above judgment considered and decided by the Supreme Court there was nochallenge to the vires of S. 51 of the States Reorganization Act. Therefore, the decisionrendered in Stare of Maharashtra v. Narayanan turned on the provisions in the StatesReorganization Act and the question whether S. 51 of the States Reorganization Act to theextent it permits establishment of permanent Benches of High Courts at one or more placeswithin the State other than the principal seat of the High Court, collides with the constitutionalscheme remained unaddressed and undecided.
In Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of India ((2000) 6 SCC 715.) the Apex Court observed that it is inexpedient to be provided different Benches for the High Court located in different regions. To quote "Apart from the heavy burden such a Bench would inflict on the State exchequer, the functional efficiency of the High Court would be much impaired by keeping High Courts in different regions. When the Chief Justice of the High Court is a singular office, and when the Advocate General is a singular office, vivisection of the High Court into different Benches at different regions would undoubtedly affect the efficiency of the High Court".
Art.231 begins with a non-obstante clause and empowers the Parliament to make law to establish a common High Court for two or more States or for two or more States and Union Territory. The above Article operates as an exception to Art.214 and 216 by empowering the Parliament to establish a common High Court for two or more States and a Union Territory by force of the non-obstante clause provided at the beginning of that Article. That Article at any rate, does not empower the Parliament to make law to constitute or establish a Bench/Benches of a High Court, Arts.214 and 216 notwithstanding. It is obvious that the Constitution makers did not intend to provide Bench or Benches to High Court to preserveand to protect its integrity as a Court of record. The language used in Art.216 of the] Constitution is not similar to that used in Art. 130 as found by the Apex Court in Union on India and others v. S.P. Anand & Ors ((JT 1998 (5) SC 359).)
The States Reorganization Act is made in exercise of the constitutional power under Art.3 of the Constitution of India. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction of High Courts fall outside the scope of Art. 3 of the Constitution. Constitutional powers can be exercised only in respect of matters specifically assigned in the Constitution. It may therefore, be seen that provisions in S. 51 of the States Reorganisation Act in so far as it empowers establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches to the High Court at one or more places within the State other than the principal seat of the High Court does not fall within the confines of Art.3. Hence it would be wrong, to give the impression that the constitutional provision in Art.214 got modified by S. 51 of the States Reorganization Act and the legal aspect in question covered by S. 51 of the States Reorganization Act. It cannot be legally argued that S. 51 of the States Reorganization Act is 'reasonably incidental' to or consequential upon, those things which the Constitution has authorised under Art. 3 of the Constitution.
The solution lies with the Parliament to exercise its constituent power under Art.368 of the Constitution. The only question is whether the High Courts do need different Benches in the interest of the general or litigating public?
To this question I return a negative response.
I conclude, borrowing the observations of Thomas J., in the Judgment in Federation of Bar Associations, Karnataka case ((2000) 6 SCC 715) "the question of establishment of a Bench of the High Court away from the principal seat of the High Court is not to be decided on emotional or sentimental or parochial considerations".
By G. Krishna Kumar, Advocate, Ernakulam
*Concept of Welfare State and SEZ Act, 2005
(By G. Krishna Kumar, Advocate, Ernakulam)
Compulsory acquisition of land for public purpose is well accepted procedure from the ancient days itself. The object behind such compulsory acquisition is for public purpose, based on the principle of eminent domain "Welfare of the people is supreme law". So it is well within the powers of the State to acquire compulsorily, the properties of individuals, for public welfare to provide facilities and better living conditions to the people at large.
Our's is an agrarian economy and majority of the people are engaged in agriculture or agriculture related works. Economic reforms should be implemented keeping in mind the above aspects, unfortunately which is missing in the present day legislations. For example, our legislature has enacted 'Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 to provide for establishment, development and management of special Economic Zone for the promotion of exports. As per S. 3 of the Act, a private person can establish SEZ for manufacture of goods or rendering service. Acquisition of land to allot corporate companies is a new trend which will make weaker section more weaker and will amount to concentration of wealth in corporate groups.
Whether under the colour of trade promotion, can the Government accelerate concentration of wealth in certain persons or group of persons ? Can the Government Snatch away the property of downtrodden and transfer it to the corporate giants ? Is it not reverse discrimination against the helpless persons belonging to lower strata of the society?
Before answering these questions, let us examine the concept of socialist, welfare State enshrined in the Constitution.
Preamble, which is the golden Key of the Constitution guarantees that India should be a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic, republic and assure to all its citizens, Justice: Social, Economic and Political and also assure equality of status and opportunities. Preamble embodies hopes and aspirations of the people.
Part IV of the Constitution contains directive principles which will govern the State and its instruments in it's affairs. The concept of 'welfare state' should be understood in the light of dream concept of our Father of Nation to make India a 'Ramarajya'. Art. 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law. It is settled law that equal treatment of unequal itself is denial of equality. So the State should endeavour to enact laws to protect weaker section of the society. Art. 39(c) forbids the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Art. 39(b) prescribes that the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub serve the common good. Art.39(a) prescribes that the State shall secure adequate means of livelihood to citizens. Art.41 mandates the Government to ensure right to work.
In Keshavanadha Bharathi case the Apex Court considering the constitutional validity ((1973) 4 SCC 225. ) of Land Reforms Act held that Art 39, together with other provisions of the Constitution contains one main objective, namely the building of a Welfare State and an egalitarian social order to fix certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution. It was further held that "Through such a social revolution, the Constitution seeks to fulfil the basic need of the common man and to change the structure of the society, without which political democracy has no meaning".
In Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co.Ltd. v. Bharath Cooking Coal Ltd. (AIR 1983 SC 239) the Apex Court considering the constitutional validity of Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, by upholding the Act held that Nationalisation of Coal mines, in whole or in part, is a law for implementation of Art.39(b). (See also Bank Nationalisation case AIR 1970 SC 564).
In Excel Wear v. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 25.) The Honourable Supreme Court considered the impact of the term 'Socialist' in the preamble and held that the word 'socialist' enshrined in the preamble, read with Art. 39(d), would enable the court to uphold the constitutionality of nationalisation of private property.
The Honourable Supreme Court in Hakara D.S. v. Onion Of India (AIR 1983 SC 130.) considered the sprit of the word 'Socialist' in the preamble and held that the word 'socialist' read with Art 14 of the Constitution helps to strike down a statute which failed to achieve it at the fullest extent. In Atom Prakash v. State of Haryana held the term socialist r/w. Art 14 strike down discrimination which adopts a classification which is not in tune with the establishment of a welfare society. The Apex Court further held "Whatever article of the Constitution it is that the Court seeks to interpret, whatever statute it is whose constitutional validity is sought to be questioned, the Court must strive to give such an interpretation as will promote the march and progress towards a Socialistic Democratic State",
In a land mark decision Lingappa Pochaima Appelewar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1985 SC 389 (paras. 14,16,18, 20)) the Apex Court held that the expression 'social and economic justice' involves the concept of 'distributive justice' which connotes the removal of economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice resulting from dealings or transactions between unequal's in society. It comprehends more than lessening of inequalities by differential taxation, giving debt relief or regulation of contradictable relations; it also means the restoration of property to those who have been deprived of them by unconscionable bargains; It may also take the form of forced redistribution of wealth as a means of achieving a fair division of material resources among the members of society. In Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. case ((1996) 10SCC104.) the Supreme Court re-iterated that the ideal of economic justice is to make equality of status meaningful and life worth living at its best, removing inequality of opportunity and status -Social, Economic and Political.
In Ratlam Municipal Council case (AIR 1980 SC 1622.), the Apex Court held that the courts should have regard to the directive in Art. 38 to promote welfare of the people and social justice. In a land mark decision in G.B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology v. State of U.P. ((2000) 7 SCC 109.) it was held that Democratic socialism aims to end poverty, ignorance, disease and inequality of opportunity. The socialistic concept ought to be implemented in the true sprit of the Constitution.
The Apex Court in a yet another land mark decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ambalarana Pandara Samadhi Adheenakartha ((1997) 9 SCC 313.) held that Tenants/Tillers of soil have a fundamental right to economic empowerment u/Art. 39(b) and are entitled to Ryotvari Patta".
Art. 14. 1 5, 16, 21, 38, 39 and 46 read with preamble make the equality of the life of the poor, disadvantaged and disabled citizens of the society, meaningful. Art. 38 in particular is having the object of securing a welfare state and to be read together with Part III rights.
So discrimination is possible as per the Constitution. But it should always be in favour of weaker section. Only through equality in affirmative sense, equality enshrined under the Constitution will be meaningful and fruitful in its true letter and sprit.
In a society based on democratic socialism, Law should be an effective tool to assuage and uplift the weaker section. Brihadaranyakopanishad which proclaims the supremacy of
Law is as follows:
- Brihadaranyakopanishad, 1:4:14
Which means "Law is the king of Kings, No one is above Law. Law aided by the King enables the weaker to win over the stronger including the king himself."
In other words, law is an effective tool to empower the weaker over mighty and it should not be vice versa and the State should enact laws for the welfare of people at large and cannot inflict injuries on weaker section under the guise of economic reforms.
From conjoint reading of the preamble, Art.14, Art 21 and 39 of the Constitution along with preamble , an irresistible and inescapable conclusion can be drawn that the society based on the principle of socialist and welfare state forms part of Part III rights and cannot be whittled down by statute. So it can easily be concluded that the goal of socialist, welfare State, forms part of Fundamental Rights.
In these legal back drops, the State cannot compulsorily acquire agrarian land of poor farmers and help the corporate giants to amass wealth at the cost of the poor. In majority of cases, agricultural land is the source of livelihood of poor farmers who knows no other job due to their illiteracy and living conditions. Illiterate and under privileged farmers will be thrown to streets, in case of compulsory acquisition of property to help the corporate companies, who can acquire property by using their own funds. The poor farmers will have no opportunity to get white coller jobs or skilled job, as they are uneducated, unskilled and who knows only agricultural work. Depriving their land will amounts to deprival of their livelihood and infringing their freedom of right to work and livelihood. Though the property right is not a fundamental right, in case where agricultural land of poor farmers are snatched for multi nationals, it will amount to deprival of livelihood and right to work; thereby amounts to infringement of fundamental right enshrined under Arts. 14,19 and 21. Here again tillers and farmers are subjected to discrimination and exploitation, for amassing wealth to certain corporate giants, whose sole intention is to make profit and have no public interest or public purpose.
By enacting SEZ ACT, 2005 the world's best democracy has inflicted blows on poverty sticken daridranarayanas, so as to attain the dream of "welfare state" or "Ramarajya".
Be that as it may, I conclude my thoughts by quoting Plato and Gandhiji:
I quote Plato: "I declare that justice is nothing else than that which is advantageous to stronger (V.R. Krishna Iyer, The Dialogues and dynamics in Human Rights in India, P.92)"
"One can withstand the atrocities committed by one individually. But it is difficult to cope with the tyranny perpetuated upon people in the name of people" (Gandhiji, Collected words of Gandhiji Vol. 1. P.204).
* Paper submitted at Bar Council in the Work Shop on 'Security in Society'.
By V.M. Balakrishnan Nambisan, Advocate, Taliparamba
Quick Disposal of Cases
(By V.M. Balakrishnan Nambisan, Advocate, Taliparamba)
"Justice delayed is justice denied" is an oft-quoted adage. But justice hurried is justice buried". Can we not have a via media?
In this super-fast world, we seek super-fast justice. In olden days, litigants had enough time to spare for litigations. Touts also promoted its protraction. For them, it is a milching cow. But time has changed. Everybody is busy. We have no time to wait or waste. All of us are in a hurry. Many litigants give up litigation midway for the simple reason of delay. Hence we think of dispensation of quick justice.
Formerly, after filing Vakalath for a defendant, there used to be several month - long adjournments for filing written statements, for framing issues, for summoning witnesses and documents, for examination of witnesses, for arguments etc. etc.
But when the Special List system was introduced, to some extent it quickened delivery of justice. And of late, we started Adalaths - it has two main advantages. Firstly, there will be no appeal and secondly, the litigants who had been fighting tooth and nail, when the case is settled, they shake hands, smile and part as friends (See 2008 (2) KLT SN 2 (C No. 2), T.Vineed v. Manju S.Nair). It is reported that there are about 3.50 lakhs of cases pending in various High Courts in the country. If so, what would be the volume of cases pending in lower courts? And what is the way out to reduce it?
In-Built Mechanism:-
In fact, there is an in-built mechanism in the Code of Civil Procedure (for short CPC) itself to solve the problem. It is easy. The fact is that it is not properly made use of. Some Easy ways:
1) Issue of Summons :- Even at the time of issuing summons to the defendants, the Court shall determine whether it shall be for the defendant to appear and state whether he contests or not and if contests, directing him to file his written statement and documents and also to produce his witnesses if for final disposal (0. 5 Rr. 5 to 8 of C P C). And if either party fails to produce his evidence without sufficient cause, the Court may at once pronounce judgment (0.15 R.4).
Note : Summons is issued not by Judges directly, but by the office staff. They usually don't apply their mind to it. It is therefore advisable to give a short training to them to issue summons on the lines mentioned above.
If the above procedure is followed strictly, very many cases will get terminated even on the very first day of the first hearing.
2) Settlements: Secondly, Courts are mandated to ascertain and record the admissions and denials from each party at the very first hearing and thereafter the court shall direct the parties to settle the matter outside Court through any of the forums provided in S. 89 of C.P.C viz., Arbitration, Conciliation, Adalath or Mediation (O.10 R.1A).
Even in cases wherein the Govt. or a Public Officer is a party to the suit, the Courts are duty-bound to make in the first instance itself every endeavor to assist the parties to reach settlement (0.27 R. 5 B).
But it is found that courts are loathe to do it.
3) Judgment at once when no statement: Formerly, Courts used to grant extensive time for filing written statement as said above. But by amendment in 2002, the time is restricted to 30 days, but upto a maximum of 90 days from the date of service of summons (Order 5 Rule 1, 2nd proviso and 0.8 R.1, 1st proviso). Even this is not strictly adhered to. Some Judges used to insist that application should be filed for granting time beyond 30 days. To a small extent, it is helpful. But there is a lacuna in the law. A defendant who gets 90 days' time for filing written statement, deliberately does not file it but remains ex parte. The court adjourns the case for ex parte evidence of plaintiff to another date, say, some 10 or 15 days thereafter. In the meantime, the defendant files an application to set aside the ex parte order. No time limit is prescribed for it. As such, the defendant can get the ex parte order, set aside any time before the suit is finally disposed of. This makes the 30 to 90 days' period a mere mockery. To overcome this, Court can decree the suit at once adopting the affidavit filed along with the plaint, under 0.7 R.15 as evidence of plaintiff invoking the power under 0.8 R.10 of Code of Civil Procedure. The litigants will then become more vigilant also.
4) Interlocutory applications: The above is applicable only till the parties appear before the court and put in their statements etc. But the protraction begins thereafter. Interlocutory Application (for short I.A.) comes one after another. Each I.A. is a stumbling block in the progress of the case. Sometimes, of course, they are helpful to dispose of the case quickly. But at times, it is retrogressive as well. A clever Judge therefore tries to dispose of the lA's at the earliest. Once it is done, the suit becomes ripe for trial and it can be listed for trial and the parties can expect disposal of their case soon.
5) Bench and the Bar, Co-operation: Apart from the above, for speedy disposal of cases, co-operation of the Bench and the Bar is essential. There must be a congenial atmosphere. To create -it, it is desirable to have occasional joint meetings of the Bench and the Bar, to be presided over by the senior-most member of the Bar. Let there be some sort of interaction on a cup of tea. It will definitely promote harmony which is essential for the smooth functioning of the Court.
There is yet a lot to be discussed on this subject. It is left to the good conscience of the Bench and the Bar of each locality.