• Art.348 Imbroglio

    By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court, Ernakulam

    11/02/2008
    T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court, Ernakulam

    ARTICLE 348 IMBROGLIO

    (By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

     

    Article 348 (1) of the Constitution of India says:

    “Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until Parliament by law otherwise provides -

    (a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court,

    (b) the authoritative texts -

    (i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State,

    (ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor of a State, and

    (iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State, 

    shall be in the English language”.

     

    It was at a time when I was worried by lack of worries, I noticed the recommendation of the Committee of Parliament on Official Language that “Article 348 of the Constitution may be amended to enable the Legislative Department to undertake original drafting in Hindi; and after such amendment, High Courts/ Supreme Court should be asked to start delivering their judgments and decrees etc. in Hindi so that large number of Government Departments, who are carrying out judicial/ quasi-judicial functions, could be able to deliver orders in Hindi; at present, these departments are unable to pass orders in Hindi, because the appeal against their orders in High Courts/Supreme Court would have to be conducted in English”. The subject-matter of this recommendation is as sensitive and important today as it was in 1949, when Art.348 was born. 

     

    Whenever I am to study an aspect relating to any provision in the Constitution of India, my mind travels back to the Constituent Assembly for the discussion on the corresponding Draft Article. Turning the pages of the Constituent Assembly Debates, I found that the Debates on the corresponding draft Articles took place on 12th, 13th and 14th September 1949.

     

    When the Constituent Assembly re-assembled in the afternoon ‘at Four of the Clock’, on 12th September 1949, Mr.President (The Honourable Dr.Rajendra Prasad), took up Part XIV-A-'Language’. 

     

    Dr.Rajendra Prasad stated:

     

    “We have now to take up the articles dealing with the question of language. I know this is a subject which has been agitating the minds of Members for sometime...... There is no other item in the whole Constitution of the country which will be required to be implemented from day to day, from hour to hour, I might even say, from minute to minute in actual practice....... I have found that there are some three hundred or more amendments to these articles. If each one of the amendments is to be moved I do not know how many hours it will take ..................”

     

    The main speaker of the day on the subject was the Honourable Shri N.Gopalaswamy Ayyangar. Shri Ayyangar started with a bang:

    “Opinion has not always been unanimous on this question. There was, however, one thing about which we reached a fairly unanimous conclusion that we should select one of the languages in India as the common language of the whole of India, the language that should be used for the official purposes of the Union........ I for one did not easily reach the conclusion that was arrived at the end of these discussions, because it involved our bidding good-bye to a language (meaning, English) on which, I think, we have built and achieved our freedom. Though I accepted the conclusion at the end that that language should be given up in due course and in its place, we should substitute a language of this country, it was not without a pang that I agreed to that decision”.

     

    Shri Gopalaswamy Ayyangar went on to say that we could not afford to give up the English language at once. “We had to keep the English language going for a number of years until Hindi could establish for itself a place, not merely because it is an Indian language, but because as a language it would be an efficient instrument for all that we have to say and do in the future and until Hindi established itself in the position in which English stands today for Union purposes”. Shri Ayyangar continued:

     

    “We then proceeded to consider the question of the language that should be used in our Legislatures and the highest courts of justice in the land and we came to the conclusion after a great deal of deliberation and discussion that while the language of the Union ‘Hindi’ may be used for debates, for discussions and so forth in the Central Legislature, and where while the language of the State could be used for similar purposes in the State Legislature, it was necessary for us, if we were going to perpetuate the existing satisfactory state of things as regards the text of our laws and the interpretation of that text in the courts, that English should be the language in which legislation, whether in the form of Bills and Acts or of rules and orders and the interpretation in the form of judgments by Judges of the High Court—these should be in English for several years to come. For my own part I think it will have to be for many years to come. It is not because that we want to keep the English language at all costs for these purposes. It is because the languages which we can recognise for Union purposes and the languages which we can recognise for State purposes are not sufficiently developed, are not sufficiently precise for the purposes that I have mentioned, viz., laws and the interpretation of laws by Courts of law”.

     

    The Honourable Member concluded, with a whimper:

     

    “I would only appeal to the House that we must look at this problem from a purely objective stand point. We must not be carried away by mere sentiment or any kind of allegiance to revivalism of one kind or another. We have to look at it from the stand point of practicability. We have to adapt the instrument which would serve us best for what we propose to do in the future and I for one agree with you, Sir, that it will be a most unhappy thing, a most disappointing illustration of our inability to reach an agreed conclusion on so vital a matter if on this point we have to divide the House. I am sure that good sense will prevail”.

     

    I should think that even at present the apprehension voiced by Shri Gopalaswamy Ayyangar has not ceased to exist. According to me, we have not still reached the stage at which Hindi language could substitute English. The position as on today has to be continued for a long time. It is not yet time to amend Art.348 of the Constitution as recommended by the Committee of Parliament on Official Language. It is not yet time at all to ask the High Courts/Supreme court to start delivering their judgments and decrees, etc. in Hindi.

     

    What is the position of Hindi language now. What is today’s standard of education in Hindi. How much has Hindi grown up to stand up to face the situation involved in the recommendations of the Committee. I do not find any scholarly allure in the suggestion. It would be too hasty to agree with the suggestion. The question is not one concerning filling up the blank pages of the law. The question is a loaded one. I regret my embarrassment, but I have to say, with humble apologies to the Committee though, that there should not be any amendment on the lines suggested by the committee in a hurry, only for the reason that the Legislature/Parliament suffers from Constitutional impatience. One fault leads to the next. Serious thought should be bestowed on the question of constitutional amendments in relation to ‘Language’, especially when legislation is not a pastoral letter; and, further, English language is an enticing treasure. The situation in 1949 is different from that in 2007. Technology has changed our brains, in this clicking, bleeping, flashing world of screens. These are days of E - learning, and globalisation. Even Russia and China have changed their views on language. There is change on all fronts-social, political, educational, regional etc. India does not consist only of Hindi-speaking areas. The Constitutional corridor is not the preserve of Hindi. Regional languages have grown; in fact, over-grown. Here, States re-organisation based on language, has played a great part, and that, against the Hindi language. The situation of the Constitutional Courts delivering their judgments in Hindi, is unimaginable, in these days. Anybody concerned with the administration of justice by High Courts and the Supreme Court, would be prepared, with little hesitation, to release his opposition to the suggestion. When we take note of the constitution, organisation, and method of appointment of judges, of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, we may have no difficulty to perceive the utter impossibility of judges delivering judgments in Hindi, especially judges with honourable ignorance of the language. Let not the inhabitants of the Constitutional Courts be disturbed.

     

    At the end of the day, I could formulate only one conclusion; and that is, it is not yet time to act on the lines of the recommendation of the Committee of Parliament on Official Language, in regard to “Language”, especially Article 348 of the Constitution. The period of 15 years stipulated in Article 343 of the Constitution can never be adhered to in the changed situation, making it impossible for a long time from now to adhere to the said stipulation. Times have changed against the stipulation. Situation has not improved in favour of the stipulation. It remains Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. The soft sobs of forgotten statesmen/politicians on the question of language will not abate for a long time to come.

     

    It is not virtuous to be obstinate.

    view more
  • Some Thoughts on Appeals, Decree and Court Fee

    By K.G. Balasubramanian, Advocate, High Court of Kerala

    11/02/2008
    K.G. Balasubramanian,  Advocate,  High  Court  of  Kerala

    SOME  THOUGHTS  ON  APPEALS,  DECREES  AND COURT  FEE

    (K.G. Balasubramanian, Advocate, Ernakulam)

     

    Sarada Amma and others v.  Eachukutty Nair and others -- 2007 (3) KLT 35 - set off another chain of thoughts. The Hon’ble Court, referring to Ss.37 and 52 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (“the Act”), was pleased to hold, inter alia, that: “Though the final decree is passed in an Interlocutory Application, such decree directing division of shares by metes and bounds would satisfy the requirement of a decree under S.2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. A final decree for partition is appealable under S.96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appeal against the final decree for partition is an appeal from a decree and not an appeal from an order and that the Appeal shall be valued and court fee paid under S.37 read with S.52 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act”.

     

    “The Act” does not, I would suggest, coalesce the nature of proceeding and the result thereof, whether it be decree or order, for the purpose of taxation. Court fee is payable on a document u/s 4 read with Ss.6 and 21 of “the Act”, and not on the product of adjudication thereon viz., order or decree. Ss.22 to 50 and 53 enumerate court fee payable on plaints in various suits and Schedule II to “the Act” enumerates appeals/applications before various authorities/courts and fee payable thereon. The legislature deliberately differentiated between plaints on one hand and applications/petitions/appeals on the other and hence incorporated Schedule I as regards documents to be charged ad valorem and Schedule II as regards documents to be charged at fixed rates. Being a fiscal statute, this intentional distinction has to be strictly construed. S.52 does not provide any distinction between order and decree, but provides only that the fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the court of first instance on the subject matter of the appeal.

     

    In 1969 KLT 69, it was held that “S.52 of the Act applies only to cases where the court fee is computed on the subject matter of the appeal. It does not apply to proceedings that are charged fixed fees irrespective of the subject matter involved. In that view, there is no contradiction between S.52 and Schedule 2 of the Act. A comparison of Art. 11 with Art 3 of Schedule 2 shows that in many cases the court fee prescribed for an application is different from the fee for an appeal therein. It cannot be that by such provisions the legislature meant to create disharmony between them and S.52".

     

    On the scope of S.52, there cannot be any controversy. In 1993 (1) KLT 528 Narayanan Ragavan v. Noordeen, it was held that “A reading of the first proviso and the Explanation would show that S.52 is attracted to cases where court fee is payable in the court of first instance. If court fee is not so payable in the court of first instance, S. 52 cannot be applied".

    Plaints in suits for partition are taxed at fixed rates, valuation being shown essentially for determining pecuniary jurisdiction and forum of appeal. Fee on the said plaint and on the memorandum of appeal from the ensuing decree need not be, and cannot be, computed on the basis of value of the subject matter. The provision to give credit for the fee (paid in any appeal pending against the preliminary decree) on a memorandum of appeal against a final decree by the same appellant conveys the idea only that if he is successful in his pending appeal, he need not be taxed on an appeal which has become otiose.

     

    Moreover, the phraseology “appeal from a decree” seems to be an inconsequential surplus after the amendment to O. XLI R.1 C.P.C. whereby the necessity to produce copy of the decree has been obviated. The situation appears to be that an aggrieved person is appealing from a judgement, the decree being good and necessary only for execution and statistics. Consequently, the reference to “decree” in S.52 of “the Act” and Ss.96/100 C.P.C. appears to be not relevant.

     

    An application for passing a final decree is certainly not a plaint coming under S.37, but only an application coming under Art.11 Schedule II. It cannot be taxed on par with a plaint. “The Act” does not, according to me, demand of the applicant to pay the same fee again on that application. Consequentially, his appeal has to be taxed at fixed rate as on the application in the trial court.

     

    Sarada Amma does deserve a second look! 

    view more
  • Ministers, ‘Beware’

    By V.G. Govindan Nair, Advocate, TVM

    11/02/2008
    V.G. Govindan Nair, Advocate, TVM

    Ministers, ‘Beware’

    (By V.G.Govindan Nair, Advocate, Trivandrum)

     

    ‘State’ is at the top. It is manned by Ministers. It has its own functionary wings. They are Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. These wings are to function as supreme in their field. Not to transgress each other.

     

    State is responsible to act according to law. Law is supreme. State is to see that its wings, Legislature, Executive and Judiciary are functioning in their field in accordance with law. People are the beneficiaries. Any wrong done by any of the wings of the State, State is vicariously liable. Hence it is the responsibility of the State to see that its wings are properly and legally functioning. Any wrong done by any person in the discharge of any of its functions is personally liable to the wronged, in addition to the vicarious liability of the State. State is liable for the wrong committed by any person in any of its wing unless law is made otherwise.

     

    Judicial Officers Protection Act is one law made to protect the Judicial officers from personal liability if the act is done in discharge of his duty in good faith. But State is liable for the wrong committed by the judicial wing of the State, though Judges are not personally liable because of the Judicial Officers Protection Act. Hence it is the duty of the State and its counsel to see and guide the Judges to pass proper and legal orders in the matters before Court. State responsibility is to be discharged through its counsel before Court. Hence merit and efficiency of the counsel representing the State is very heavy. Public prosecutor/attorney representing the State is to help the court to find out the truth in the matters in dispute and to see that the Judges are guided properly in the administration of justice. Of course the duty of the defence lawyer also is to see that the Judges are guided properly and justice is done to the parties. Supreme Court in its Judgement 1999 (7) SCC 467, says that it is the duty of a Public Prosecutor to conduct the case for the crown fairly. His object should be not to obtain conviction by any means fair or foul. If the accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit, the Public Prosecutor should make it available to him or inform the court even if the defence counsel overlooked it. It is the responsibility of the lawyer to help the court in the administration of Justice so that the legal system in the society will prevail at its glorious height. 

     

    Persons in various official positions in the State are to discharge their duty strictly in accordance with law. Any sort of deficiency either by illegal action or inaction of the persons (public servant) is liable for action. By any wrong act of a public servant (illegal act, inaction and any sort of abuse) an injury is caused, then the wrong doer is liable to the wronged. The wrong doers will be personally liable and the State is vicariously liable. If any action is taken by the wronged against the wrong doer and the State, the State being vicariously liable is to pay compensation to the wronged and then the State is to recover the same from the wrong doer (Public Servant). Thus the State is indemnified. So every public servant acting in positions must take care to act according to law and if otherwise done he will be personally liable to the wronged. So let the persons in position ‘Beware’. This is an area where the Public servant is to be cautious in discharging his duty. Wrong use (abuse) of the power vested in him (from top to bottom) is liable for action and he is to compensate to the wronged in law. Hence all the persons in various positions in the State are to take care to see that they discharge their function strictly in accordance with law. Ministers are public servants and they have to act as per law. Moreover, the State is manned by Ministers and they are responsible to law and public. Ministers are selected from elected representatives. They have to be responsible and accountable to people at large in Democracy. Ministers must be models in acting according to law. Law is supreme and nobody is above law.

     

    “How high so ever you be 

    Law is above you”

    “This doctrine is reminded by the Supreme Court of India on many occasions.”

    Merchistan land dealings and Munnar issues are to be viewed in the light of Law.

    Hence the persons in official positions, especially Ministers, “BEWARE”

    view more
  • The Quest

    By B. Jayasankar, Advocate, Thiruvananthapuram

    11/02/2008

    The Quest

    (By B. Jayasankar, Advocate, Thiruvananthapuram)

     

    Belonging to the legal fraternity, I always find advocates so interesting. The black robes and the peeping white within always intrigued me. I perceive that the black absorbs it all and the white reflects only that much in commensurate with the requirement. An advocate sweating over a case in a court is a feast for the eyes. He always appeared to me as a versatile juggler, who is the champion of rights. Different advocates fight differently and valiantly in a legal battle. Just that the approach, the armoury and mode of attack differ. But can there be an epitome of advocacy? Some one who can be looked up to? The quest took me to a different plane.

     

    The search yielded no results. It proved to be a tough nut to crack and led me to a pertinent question. Who is an advocate? The Advocates Act told me that an advocate means an advocate entered in any roll under the provisions of the Act. The Act is silent on who an Advocate is. I turned to my favourite dictionary and found out that an advocate is some one who advises people about law and speak for them in courts. But will that suffice? Can such a person epitomize the values inherent in the profession? I went on till I stumbled upon an idea. Why can’t the word ADVOCATE be treated as an acronym and be interpreted in such a fashion depicting the qualities of a true lawyer? I got inspired from the word POLICE which is often seen elaborated in such a way though the word has been derived from the Greek word “Politeia”. So I gave it a try and came out with something, which I believe, can be attributed to the epitome of advocacy and I coined ADVOCATE  as:

     

    assiduous 

    dependable

    Virtuous

    optimistic

    courageous

    assertive

    tactful

    efficient

     

    And, there, my quest came to an end. Without doubt, I can say that these qualities can make one a true lawyer. Whether we all can conform to those ideals is a ticklish question. But irrespective of that we all should strive for perfection and rejuvenate the old profession making it noble than ever, if not the noblest.

    view more
  • Court Attire : History, Myth and Law

    By Jacob P. Alex, Advocate, HC

    21/01/2008
    Jacob P. Alex, Advocate, HC

    COURT ATTIRE : HISTORY, MYTH AND LAW

    (Jacob P. Alex, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

     

    We see Judges and Advocates wearing black robes an bands but seldom do we ask why. This paper explores the history, myth and law behind the unusual attire by which the legal profession adorns itself today.

     

    Story  of  the  Gown:

     

    Wearing the gown in its present shape is most certainly a legacy of colonialism1 and the reasons behind it can be learned only by tracing the origin of the British practice of wearing it.

     

    Long robe was counted as a symbol of nobility in all early civilizations especially Roman and Greek. Most of the early illustrations of kings, priests and learned men are with long robes of one kind or other. In olden days, administration and religion were in the hands of these nobles who considered themselves superior to common men. The dignity and distinction of these noble men were maintained, among other things, by wearing separate attire. Gowns of various fashions were worn by them for this purpose. Matters pertaining to the law or administration of justice were originally handled either by kings or by the clergy. By virtue of their nobility they used to wear long gowns. Historically, Judges used to be members of the upper echelons of nobility, since they were the people considered capable of making sound decisions. As such, naturally they always wore the fanciest possible clothes to show off their status.

     

    In one of the earliest illustrations of barristers, Judicium Essoniorum - a thirteenth century legal treatise, they are depicted wearing the tunica, a plain sleeved ankle-length fur coat, closed at the front.2 In the centuries that follow, examples of this peculiar garment can be seen specifically in relation to the legal profession. The Whaddon Hall illuminations (so-called because they were found at Whaddon Hall, Buckinghamshire) vividly reveal barrister’s belted tunica as party-coloured in blue and-mustard and green-and-blue with diagonal stripes.3 During early days, barristers’ robes were party-coloured - that is, divided vertically and of two different colours; and one of the colours is usually rayed -that is, made of cloth of one colour with contrasting parallel lines or rays, through the cloth, of another colour. The current costume of Commonwealth Judges was more or less established by the time of Edward III (1327-77) and was based on the correct dress for attending the royal court4. The material for these robes was originally given to Judges as a grant from the Crown, and included ermine and taffeta or silk. The colours were violet for winter, scarlet for autumn and green for summer. Red was reserved for special occasions.

     

    In the early Tudor period (1485-1603) the long robe that closed at the front came to be replaced in general fashion by a long open gown, and monumental brasses from the period reveal that barristers followed this fashion. In the same period, the vivid colours of the barristers’ party-coloured and rayed robes were replaced by more somber, muted ones as documented in the two Wills of Readers of the Middle Temple5. It is also to be noted that there were account to the effect that wearing a gown was treated as “foolish pride” and lawyers were cautioned not to wear it6. But there are costume historians7 who opined that ‘only requirement during these days for barrister’s dress is sobriety’. From 1531 onwards a number of regulations were issued to members of all the four Inns of Court to this effect8. This is considered to be the first ‘rules’ that prescribed uniform for barristers. In 1557, for example, it was agreed by all the Inns that ‘none of the companions, except knights or benchers, should wear in their doublets or hose any light colours, except scarlet and crimson, nor wear any upper velvet cap, or any scarf, or wings, i.e. folds of cloth on the sleeves, in their gowns’. In the same year there was a regulation against cloaks (veil or cover) so that gowns were encouraged, and between 1580 and 1600, it was ordered to be worn.9 However, by the sixteenth century lawyers were required to wear gowns in accordance with the regulations of the Inns of Court where they studied.10 In this context it is relevant to mention that during these times, black gowns were not in use.

     

    Lawyers  are  still  mourning!  History  of  the  Black  Gown:

     

    In most countries Judges and lawyers wear black, or at the very least garments with some black trim or lining. It may be noted that black colour is identified with death, sadness and mourning. This tradition of wearing black gown is said to have begun in 17th Century England. In 1685 all Judges in the British Empire attended the funeral of King Charles II dressed in black robes as a sign of mourning.11 (Ancient British custom demanded mourning for years together the death of Kings/Queens. During this mourning period, the subjects were expected to wear black costumes as mark of respect to the departed ruler.) Mourning the death of King Charles II continued on account of the deaths of Queen Mary in 1694 and of Queen Anne in 1714. The official period of mourning thus lasted many years and overlapped with much of Britain’s colonial adventures in other countries. Since the Law Lords/Judges were officially mourning, they continued to wear the black gown. The black robe tradition spread around the world and still persists today. Since then, the practice of wearing of black gown was retained, despite early opposition. The Judges in many ex-British colonies however have never bothered to change their costumes. Even after gaining independence, the practices of wearing mourning robe in Court continued though it has nothing to do with tradition.

     

    Folded  piece  of  cloth  on  the  back  of  Gown:

     

    The piece of cloth, ‘the shape of which is not easy to describe in words nor easy to draw clearly’12, and hangs on the left back side of a gown also has an interesting historical connection. One of the most enduring theories is that it represents a convenient purse or bag. Historically, barristers never technically accepted explicit payment for their work (so the theory goes). Since their fee was honoraria, their clients were free to clandestinely slip money into the purse carried on their gowns, literally behind their back, ‘without ruffling the susceptibilities or offending the dignity of the learned counselor.13 Another theory says that performance of lawyer in court depends upon the constant ‘filling’ of back pocket by the client. In Shakespeare’s ‘Troilus and Cressida’ Ulyss says “Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back, wherein he puts alms for oblivion...” (Act III Scene 6) shows that the theory of pouring coins in pocket extents to the realm of literary criticism too. Some says that the strip is having some connection with mourning dress14.

     

    Wisdom  behind  the  bands

     

    Bands are a form of formal neckwear worn by clergy and lawyers15 (two strips of linen about 5" by 1" hanging down the front of the neck). They take the form of two oblong pieces of cloth, usually white, which are tied to the neck. The word “Bands’ usually referred in plural because it requires two similar parts and did not come as one piece of cloth. The exact origins of bands is obscure but some have speculated that it represent the twin tablets of the Ten Commandments that were carried by Moses. In the Bible it is stated that ‘when Moses came down from Mount Sinai with the two tablets of Testimony in his hands, he was not aware that his face was radiant because he had spoken to Lord’ (Exodus 34: 29). Words of wisdom were inscribed in the twin tablets and in order to symbolize this wisdom, bands are used - so goes the myth. Bands are considered to be a symbol of wisdom.16

     

    Bands were adopted in England for legal, official, ecclesiastic and academic use in the mid-seventeenth century.17 Bands did not become academically significant until they were abandoned as an ordinary lay fashion after the Restoration in 1660. They were identified as specifically applicable to clerical, legal and academic individuals in the early eighteenth century, when they became longer and narrower in form.18 From the eighteenth century Judges and barristers took to wearing lace jabots instead of bands at courts. They continued in ecclesiastic use well into the nineteenth century in the smaller, linen strip or tab form- short-bands19. These were retained by Church of England ministers, academics, and non-conformist ministers till comparatively recently.20 Members of legal profession are continuing with the tradition of wearing bands.

     

    Law  that  mandates  Uniform  for  Advocates

     

    An ‘advocate’ as defined in S. 2(1)(a) of the Advocates Act, 1961 (the Act) has to confirm to regulations in the matter of robes. S.34 of the Act enables the High Court to make rules laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and in the courts subordinate thereto. The High Court of Kerala has, in exercise of the powers vested in it under S.34, framed rules as early as on 10-07-1969.21 R.12 of these Rules prescribes the dress to be worn by advocates. Similarly S. 49(1)(gg) of the Act, permits the Bar Council of India to frame rules regarding the uniform of lawyers. Exercising powers under this section, the Bar Council prescribed the relevant Rule as follows:

                           "Form of Dress or Robes to be Worn by Advocates

                           (Rule under S. 49 (1) (GG) of the Advocates Act, 1961)

    Advocates, appearing in the Supreme Court, High Court, subordinate courts, tribunals or authorities shall wear the following as part of their dress which shall be sober and dignified:

     

    Advocates  other  than  lady  advocates:

    1. (a) a black buttoned-up coat, chapkan, achkan, black sherwani and white bands with advocate’s gown, or

    (b) a black open breast coat, white shirt, white collar, stiff or soft, and white bands with advocates’ gowns.

    In either case long trousers (white, black, striped or grey) or dhoti.

     

    Lady  advocates:

    2. (a) black and full or half-sleeve jacket or blouse, white collar, stiff or soft, and white bands with advocates’ gowns:

    (b) sarees or long skirts (white or black or any mellow or subdued colour without any print or design) or flares (white, black or black-striped or gray):

    Provided that the wearing of advocate’s gown shall be optional except when appearing in the Supreme Court or in a High Court.

    Provided further that in court other than the Supreme Court, High Court, District Court, Sessions Court or City Civil Court, a black tie may be worn instead of bands.”

     

    Rules framed by the Kerala High Court as well as the Bar Council of India are similar with regard to male advocates and in case of lady advocates it varies very minutely. It is in compliance with these rules that advocates today are wearing the dress they do. Thus, it is clear that the present uniform worn by advocates is based on the law laid down by the Act. As is evident from the historical evolution of the attire worn by the legal profession, this law is a crystallization of the custom and practices that have evolved over the past many years.

     

    Anecdote: The rules framed under Ss.34 and 49(1)(gg) of the Act, prescribe the same uniform for all the advocates irrespective of whether they are designated Senior Advocates or other advocates. In spite of it Senior Advocates wear special type of gown known as Queen Counsel’s (QC) or King Counsel’s (KC) gown - ie; silk gown with a flap collar and long closed sleeves (the arm opening is half-way up the sleeve) along with the QC/KC black coat, known as a court coat - a cut like 18th-century court dress, and the sleeve of the QC/KC court coat or bar jacket has a turn-back cuff with three buttons across. Wearing QC/KC attire is a special British tradition. It is interesting to note that there is no rule or law that prescribes the wearing of the QC/KC attire for designated Senior Advocates in India. At best, the explanation could be that it is a custom that is being followed in England. In the light of rules framed under the Act which prescribed the uniform for all advocates without giving any exemption to Senior Advocates, is it appropriate to wear separate attire citing a long standing British tradition / custom that are no longer applicable in India?22 This question assumes more significance in the light of pronouncements from Supreme Court to the effect that ‘no custom can prevail over law’.23Any how, author wish to leave this question open.

     

    Need  to  follow  the  legalized  custom

    “Through tatter’d clothes small vices do appear: Robes and furr’d gowns, hide all”

    William Shakespeare. King Lear; Act IV Scene 6

     

    Court dress definitely inspires respect for the law and its practitioners. It adds to the solemnity of the profession. ‘An advocate’s robe is steeped in tradition and has a class of distinction. It is worn when one practices as an advocate, not before he is borne in that profession or after he ceases to practice. It is not a casual wear. It is for serious occasion. Outside court, it has no place; it shall have none. Inside court, it represents cause; the cause of client. When there is no counsel, there is no robe’.24 It is for this reason that Advocates appearing in personal capacities were not allowed to argue in robes25 . Justice can best be administered when legal proceedings are conducted with decorum and a certain degree of formality. ‘The place of justice’ as Francis Bacon remarked, ‘is a hallowed place’ and those seeking its aid either for themselves or those whom they represent should so conduct themselves as to uphold its dignity. The trappings of a court room and the costume specially meant for court and its officers invest the Court with a sort of dignity which is not without its effect. The traditional prescribed dress of an Advocate gives him certain aloofness wherefrom his submissions come with added force.26

     

    From a purely practical point of view, robes are great levelers so far as the Bar is concerned. In robes, the most poverty-stricken junior will not be put out of place by a fashionable opponent. Because everyone looks the same, there can be no discrimination based on clothing. It is also a permanent reminder of professional discipline (though not a guarantee of good behavior it is a great aid to it) and a constant reminder of the nobility of profession. It also provides some anonymity. The robes speak of continuity of development and responsibility. ‘In the first place they distinguish an Advocate from a litigant. In the second place it induces a seriousness of purpose and sense of decorum, conducive to the dispensation of justice’27 If the rule is relaxed, in all probability, it will precipitate sartorial inelegance and judicial indecorum. It is also not unlikely that in which event Advocates may start to dress more scantily and even indiscreetly.28 After all, “dress”, according to A G Gardener, “has its spiritual and moral reactions. It may seem absurd, but it is true that we are in a real sense the creatures of our clothes”.

     

    Foot Note :

     

    1.  “...In England, earlier and now, a person appearing as an attorney in a court has a special place and a special robe. The same was adopted in India...” Jose v. Nandakumar(1993 (2) KLT 342 para. 10).

    2.  See Generally “Legal Habits: A Brief Sartorial History of Wig, Robe and Gown”Published by Ede and Ravenscroft.

    3.  Ibid.

    4.   In his summary of the history of judicial attire, US Law Professor, Charles Yablon, also dates the judicial robe and barrister’s gown back to the time of Edward III (1327-77) when the fur and silk-lined robes were the mark of high judicial office.

    5. Robert Pynkney’s will, dated 20 May, 1508 and that of Thomas Jubbes’s, dated 3July 1528.

    6.   Secondary Kempe of the King’s Bench noted in 1602:. . . in tymes past the counsellors wore gowns faced with satten, and some with yellowe cotten, and the benchers with jennet furre; now they are come to that pride and fanstasticknes that every one must have a velvet face, and some soe tricked with lace that Justice Wray (Christopher Wray, 1524-92) in his tyme spake to such an odd counsellor in this manner ... ‘Get you from the barre, or I will put you from the barr for your folish pride.’

    7.   Prof. J H Baker; see supra 2.

    8.   Supra 2.

    9.   Ibid.

    10. Ibid.

    11.   See the entry dated 30 October 1697 in A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714 (printed 1854) compiled by Narcissus Luttrell (1657-1732) and also the manuscript account of the mourning followed the death of Charles II by the antiquary James Wright (1643-1713), who became a barrister in the Middle Temple in 1675.

    12 .  Per Prof. JH Backer.

    13.   See Supra2.

    14.   See generally Ibid

    15.   See <http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bands>. Bands worn by clergy are often called preaching bands, tabs or Geneva bands; those worn by lawyers are called barrister’s bands.

    16.   The same collar is worn by high-ranking clergy within the Anglican church. Therefore it could be presumed that it clearly has some form of religious origins.

    17.   See generally Supra 15

    18.   Ibid.

    19.   Mayo, Janet, A History of Ecclesiastical Dress (Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1984)

    20. See Generally Hargreaves-Mawdsley, WN, A History of Legal Dress in Europe until theend of the Eighteenth Century (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1963) and Cunnington, C Willett & Phillis, Handbook of English Costume in the 17th Century (3rd ed Faber & Faber, London, 1972, first published 1955).

    21.   Jose v. State of Kerala(1990 (1) KLT 483).

    22.   K.L. Rathee “Parody of Justice” Dress of Advocates Appearing in Courts of Higher Judiciary Aping of British Colonial System Continued, Indian Rules Ignored With Impunity (2004) PL WebJour 5.

    23.   See N.Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board (2002 (3) KLT 615 (SC).

    24.   Muraleedharan Nair v. Antoney (1985 KLT 1).

    25.   SeeGenerally: Smt Vidya Varma v. Dr. Shiv Narain Varma ( AIR 1956 SC 108), T.Venkanna v. The Hon’ble High Court of Mysore, (AIR 1973 Mysore 127).  R v. Evans (1961 (1) All. ER 319).

    26.   Prayag Das v. Civil Judge (AIR 1974 All. 133 para. 17)

    27.   Ibidpara. 18

    28.  Ibid.

    view more
  • Prev
  • ...
  • 353
  • 354
  • 355
  • 356
  • 357
  • 358
  • 359
  • 360
  • 361
  • 362
  • ...
  • Next