Privilege and Immunity of  Lawyers  --  Need for Legislation

(By O.V. Radhakrishnan, Senior Advocate)

 The privilege of an Advocate under the laws in India and in the Courts of Justice and the need for providing professional immunity to lawyers is  a subject much of topical importance. The privilege expressly conferred upon an advocate is the right to practise throughout the territories to which the Advocates Act extends, namely, in all Courts including the Supreme Court, before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence and before any authority or person before whom an Advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise under S. 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.   The above right is fortified in S. 33 of the Act by injuncting any person who is not enrolled as an Advocate under the Act to practise in any Court or before any authority or person. In carrying out his duties, an Advocate enjoys broad powers but he cannot claim immunity from legal consequences in the discharge of his duties and obligations while acting for his client. 

S. 126 of the Evidence Act has put an embargo on the Advocate against disclosure of any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as an Advocate and he is not permitted to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment.  S. 126 of the Indian Evidence Act does not confer any privilege on an advocate in the sense of exempting from a liability or burden to which others are subject. No protection is given to an advocate in ‘acting’ for his client under the Indian Evidence Act or under the Advocates Act or any other law for the time being in force. It only limits the power and authority in the exercise of his professional functions and cannot be regarded as a privilege in the real sense. All the same, an advocate has a professional duty to promote and to protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means his client’s interest regardless of his interest and without fear of any consequences. 

S.179 of the Indian Penal Code on the other hand makes it a penal offence to refuse to answer any question demanded of him touching a subject on which he is legally bound to state the truth to any public servant. The liability to state the truth under S. 179 is qualified by the Indian Evidence Act under which certain exemptions are made applicable to witnesses. The witnesses are not bound to answer questions covered by exemption granted by the Evidence Act. Under S.161(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person shall not be bound to answer questions to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. Compelling a person accused of any offence to be a witness against himself is prohibited under Art.20(3) of the Constitution of India. The privilege conferred upon the witnesses under the Evidence Act is not extended to the Advocate appearing for the party and his refusal to answer the questions may constitute an offence under S. 179 of the Indian Penal Code. There is an apparent conflict between S.179 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 126 of the Indian Evidence Act in regard to the right of disclosure. Under S. 126 of the Evidence Act an advocate is not permitted to disclose any communication made to him without his client’s express consent. It is a bar and not a privilege which can be put up as a defence against prosecution under S.179 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Under Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India right to practise the profession of law is a fundamental right which can be regulated under Art.19(6). Nevertheless, no privilege is conferred on the advocates as in the case of legislators under Art.105 and 194 of the Constitution of India.  The Judges and the Magistrates enjoy immunity under S. 121 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides that no Judge or Magistrate shall, except upon the special order of some Court to which he is subordinate, be compelled to answer any question as to his own conduct in Court as such Judge or Magistrate or as to anything which came to his knowledge in court as such Judge or Magistrate. The Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 was enacted for the greater protection of Magistrates and others acting judicially. The above Act continues to be in force under Art.372 of the Constitution of India. S. 1 of the Act relates to non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially for official acts done in good faith and of officers executing warrants and orders.  Lack of such protective law in respect of lawyers has hamstrung the right and authority of lawyers which has a debilitating effect on the functioning of lawyers.  It is necessarily to be provided to maintain the integrity and efficiency of our legal system.

According to the Common Law, absolute privilege is attached to any statement made by Judges, witnesses and the advocates during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The parameters of the doctrine of absolute privilege were laid down in the locus classicus decision in R v. Skinner by Lord Mansfield in 1772 as  “neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or judge, can be put to answer civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office”. The only exceptions are with respect to perjury, contempt of court and perverting the course of justice. In 1892 the English Court of Appeal affirmed the rule of absolute privilege as an essential requirement for the proper administration of justice. The ‘absolute privilege’ has been conceived on the grounds of public policy to ensure freedom of speech meaningful. Justice Foong in R v. Skinner emphatically stated that “it (a relevancy restriction to absolute privilege) contradicts their Lordship’s basic rationale of preventing any pressure on counsel or parties when they present their case before the Court. Any exception or  proviso attached to this rule on the freedom to advance a prosecution or defence without fear of an action for libel and slander will certainly defeat this concept on administration of justice as a public policy. In my view there must be no restriction placed in the way of this principle”. The ratio decidendi in R v. Skinner was adopted in 1993 by the High Court of Australia in Jamieson v.. The Queen and in Brugmans v. The Queen. 

The Australian High Court settled the law by declaring that the privilege would even protect false statement. “In the case of a party or a lawyer, the phrase ‘words spoken in office’ (from R. v.. Skinner) at least encompasses ‘anything said ..... In the ordinary course of any proceedings in a Court of justice’, ‘although falsely and maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause”. The doctrine of absolute privilege is founded on public policy. It serves public interest by protecting a person who is taking part by prosecuting or defending a party in a litigation to speak freely to bring out the truth by effectively cross- examining witnesses. It may be necessary to correctly assess the credibility of witnesses to put certain questions which are unpalatable to them and border on defamation. While discharging those solemn duty if the advocate is hesitant to put questions for fear of action for defamation or for tortious liability he is certainly failing in playing an independent and fearless role in the administration of justice. Therefore, freedom of speech without fear of consequences is a fundamental right to be conferred upon advocates.  

In Malaysia, the Government have recognised and respected the right of freedom of speech for lawyers while defending and advocating.  As stated by Brette, M.R. in Munster v. Lamv: “a counsel has a special need to have his mind clear from all anxiety. A counsel’s position is one of the utmost difficulty. He is not to speak of that which he knows; he is not called upon to consider whether the facts with which he is dealing are true or false. What he has to do is to argue as best he can, without degrading himself; in order to maintain the proposition which will carry with it either the protection or the remedy which he desires for his client. For, more than a judge; infinitely more than a witness, he wants protection on the ground of benefit to the public. The rule of law is that what is said in the course of the administration of the law is privileged; and the reason of that rule covers a counsel even more than a Judge or a witness. If the rule of law were otherwise the most innocent, counsel might be unrighteously harassed with suits, and therefore, it is better to make the rule of law so large that an innocent counsel shall never be troubled, although by making it so large counsel are included who have been guilty of malice and misconduct”. Therefore, long-drawn process of reasoning is not required to establish that absolute privilege shall be conferred upon lawyers in order to effectively and zealously perform the duties he/she owes to clients.  Needless to say, subjecting lawyers to action for defamation or sedition would definitely impair the independence and his right to carry on his profession of law fearlessly. Absence of privilege to advocates in regard to his professional acts would certainly play with or pervert the due course of justice. The only exceptions that can be culled out from professional privilege are  penal offences, perjury, contempt of court and perverting the course of justice in any manner. The warp and woof of our experience is that the right and duty of a lawyer to represent the best interest of his client could not be exercised at times effectively and conscientiously for fear of consequences of civil/criminal action, Governmental interferences, Police intimidation and harassment and the like. The legislation should usher in a law providing privilege and immunity to lawyers. It is the need of the day to secure and maintain the independence of advocates for playing a fearless and non-servile role. 

It is an irrefragable truth that adequate protection of the Human Rights and the fundamental freedoms to which all persons are entitled requires that all persons shall enjoy effective and easy access to legal services through lawyers who are honestly anxious to arrive at right decision in playing the part of the judicial business. To ensure an independent bar, the advocates must be freed from the present day handicaps by armouring them from action for defamation both civil and criminal and other penal offences. If that is not done, the efficient and dynamic functioning of advocates would be crippled reducing them to a subservient tail-wagging appendage to the judicial branch which is an anathema to a healthy democratic judicial system.

BUILDING LEASE LAW IN KERALA -- AT THE CROSS ROADS  ?

(By C.S. Mohit, Munsiff, Aluva)

“There is nothing permanent except change -- Heraclitus”.

Introduction

Act 2 of 1965 which came into force with effect from 1.4.1965 was enacted by the legislature primarily for regulating the leasing of buildings and for controlling the rent of buildings in Kerala. The preamble of the statute bears testimony to these noble objectives which the legislature in its wisdom considered appropriate panacea for solving the social problem of acute shortage of accommodation, residential and non residential in the State. Forty two summers hence the statute struggles in its quest for social significance considering the radical changes in the socio economic mosaic of the State. Thanks to the vibrant progressive and realistic judicial pronouncements of our Hon’ble High Court, the contemporary relevance of the statute has been enlivened from time to time. The time has come for the legislature to do its part, to usher in a new legislation in tune with the contemporary socio-economic milieu. 

Judicial  Impetus  for  Change  through  Case  Laws

Needless to state the most remarkable achievement of the statute has been the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants. Unreasonable eviction of tenants is considered the third prime objective of the statute, see Standard Cashew Industries v. Krishnan (1980 KLT 897). S. 11 of the Act has been the very heart, soul and arm of the statute. Judicial creativity and sensitivity are writ large in a plethora of decisions and in particular with respect to the interpretation of the term “bona fide need” the very store house of judicial discretion contained in S.11(3) of the Act. Even a cursory/perusal of the case laws with respect to “ bona fide need “and its four provisos and in particular the 2nd proviso will portray the shift in emphasis of the legislation from “tenant centric” to “landlord centric”. Ironically the landlord oriented approach in interpretation vis a vis “bona fide need” recently witnessed a path breaking exposition. In Muhammed Basheer v. Mujib Rahman (2005 (4) KLT 697) it was held that every petition invoking “bonafide need” need not be preordained to culminate in eviction. The Judiciary in its wisdom though it fit to apply its interpretative brakes of self restraint, given the objective and scope of the statute aforesaid.

In fact our Hon’ble High Court has been very vibrant and socially sensitive in its interpretation of the statute. It has even gone to the extent of judicial legislation in order to make the statute relevant in the contemporary context. The reinduction of S.5(1) in the statute took in Edger Ferus v. Abraham Ittycheria (2004 (1) KLT 767) is a classic example of judicial impetus for change in the statute. (At the time when this article is penned the decision is stayed by the Hon’ble Apex Court) In Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala (1995 (2) KLT 848) our Hon’ble High Court struck down as unconstitutional Ss. 5,6 & 8 of the Act all relating to “fair rent”. In fact fixation of fair rent under S.5 and prohibiting the levying of “unconscionable rent” from tenants by unscrupulous landlords were two of the cardinal objectives of the Act. Issac Ninan gave a fatal blow to the concept of “fair rent” the very edifice of the Act. In Edger Ferus the court reviewed Issac Ninan and reinducted S.5(1) in the statute inter alia on the ground that without S.5(1) the intention and object of the Act would be defeated and the statute would be rendered socially irrelevant. The court’s genuine concern to make the statute contemporary is very conspicuous in the judgement. The court even laid down guidelines to be adopted by the Rent Control Court for fixing the fair rent of buildings. Right of Quinquennial revision of rent at the instance of the landlord or tenant even dehors provision in the lease deed has been granted by the court. Further demanding Pakidi has been made an illegal and immoral act vide the aforesaid judgement on the ground that it is opposed to public policy. The aforesaid decision is revolutionary as it rightly signals the impelling need for change through legislation in the realm of building lease law.

Act 2 of 1965 seeks to regulate the leasing of buildings through a statutory authority styled as “Accommodation Controller”. The inefficiency of the statutory provisions relating to accommodation controller and the manner in which the authority has been exercising its statutory duties and in particular the maintenance of the register under S.4 of the Act is by now known to everyone. In Varghese Eapen v. Varghese (2001 (2) KLT 263), our Hon’ble High Court has lamented about the manner in which the statutory functionary worked. The ritualistic non maintenance of the occupancy register and the certificates issued thereunder devoid of truth and reality speak volumes about the “hollowness” and “inefficiency” of the statutory mechanism pertaining to regulation of lease of buildings. 

Hence it is clear as day light that all the three facets of the legislation are at the cross roads. Change through legislation at the instance of the legislature is the need of the hour.

Archaic Statutory Provisions Yearning for Change

Even a cursory scan of the statutory provisions in Act 2 of 1965 will reveal the obsoleteness of a majority of the provisions. In fact barring a few grounds for eviction in S.11 most of the other provisions yearn for change. S.29 which stipulates the penalties under the Act is a pointer in this regard. The Act envisages Inspectors who are appointed under S.28 to launch prosecution. These provisions exist as dead letters in the statute. Further the provisions pertaining to the Accommodation Controller also are without teeth in the present milieu ie. Ss. 4, 13 and 17. Ss.6 &8 and the provisions of S.5 excluding S.5(1) no longer exist in the statute book pursuant to Issac Ninan In short barring S.11 and the reinducted S.5(1) (subject to the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court) aforesaid all the other provisions remain largely defunct. Even under S.11 the provision contained in S.11 (17) relating to tenants in continuous occupation from 1st April, 1940 has become obsolete more so since the protection is not a heritable right as held in Narayanan v. Shalima (2003 (2) KLT 317). The provisos under S.11 (4) (iv) pertaining to reconstruction also requires drastic amendment considering the changed socio-economic backdrop. A complete overhauling of the statute is the need of the hour.

Legislation in the Pipeline -- The Kerala Buildings Lease Bill -- 2002

The legislation in the pipeline ie., the Kerala Buildings Lease Bill, 2002 strives to cater to the rights of the landlord and tenant as is evident from the preamble of the bill. The statement of objects and reasons highlights the fact that the existing provisions have become unreasonable and unsuitable with the change in circumstances. The bill conspicuously omits the concept of “fair rent” and also the institution of “Accommodation Controller”. It highlights contractual freedom and defines rent as rent agreed between the landlord and tenant under a contract. It incorporates “flats” within the definition of building and seeks to constitute Tribunals for administering the provisions in place of Rent Control Court. Though the concept of statutory tenant is retained it casts a statutory duty on the tenant to handover physical vacant possession of the building to the landlord immediately after the expiry of the period of tenancy at will or as per contract. Incorporation of the rights and duties of landlord and tenants enumerated under S.108 of the T.P. Act, 1882 is a notable feature of the bill. Though the bill retains the major grounds of eviction it has pruned the provisions in a realistic manner. The adjudicatory powers presently vested with the Accommodation Controller with respect to interference with amenities have been conferred on the Tribunal. In sum the provisions in the bill are realistic, progressive and modernistic. However the blanket exclusion of regulatory provisions relating to rent control and leasing of buildings is undesirable considering the social importance of such mechanisms. Edger Ferrus reinforces the need for regulation of rent periodically, a vital facet of building lease law. The proposed bill however remains in the cold storage of the legislature presently and is yet to see the light of day.

Conclusion

Justice delayed is justice denied. Legislation delayed is legislation denied. Act 2 of 1965 was enacted by our Legislature due to the societal necessity for continuance of the Kerala Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act 1959, the precursor of the present Act. The mischief of shortage of accommodation was sought to be remedied by regulating the leasing of buildings and by controlling the rent of buildings in the State. An incisive analysis of the precedents in this realm of law will reveal that the paramount catalyst for change in interpretation ie., from tenant oriented interpretation to landlord oriented interpretation has been the exposition of Art.19 (1) (g) of the Constitution whereby it was held that construction of buildings and leasing of buildings would be a “business activity” in the sacred nature of a fundamental right. See. Edger Ferrus v. Abraham Ittycheria (2004 (1) KLT 767). This path breaking elevation to the realm of fundamental rights calls for a balanced legislation which strikes a just, fair and reasonable balance between the contemporary interests of the landlord and the tenant.

A new legislation has to imbibe the spirit and essence of Edger Ferrus (subject to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court) and in particular it should make provision for periodical revision of agreed rent de hors the terms of the lease contract. It should also enlist the rights and duties of landlord and tenant in a progressive and modernistic manner. Being a special statute the adjudicatory mechanism should be foolproof and effective unlike the present S.23 which is sketchy and inadequate for effective adjudication. The new law can also take note of the need for new penalties like demand or acceptance of pakidi held to be illegal and immoral in Edger Ferrus and which practice is widely prevalent in society. Let us hope that the legislature will usher in a new law which conjugates legislative and judicial wisdom in this realm of law at the earliest. A paradigm shift in statutory perspective, statutory content and statutory application in tune with the contemporary milieu is the crying need of the hour. 

 Delay in administration of Criminal Justice

(By M.P.R. Nair, Bar-at-Law, Senior Advocate)

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer once said :

“Man lives in the short run, but litigation lives in the long run”. In this country, it is common knowledge that litigation takes several twists and turns and literally crawls in the long run. When this happens in criminal cases, the consequence invariably is that criminals are left without any punishment for several years and dispensation of justice gets unduly delayed justifying the axiom “Justice delayed is justice denied”.

A very interesting case of such inordinate delay of several years in the administration of criminal justice came up for consideration recently before the High Court of Kerala. The decision is reported in 2007 (4) KLT 739 (Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, C.B.I.).

“Those who want lessons on how a criminal trial can be protracted can have no better school on that aspect and they must visit the facts of this case. In the course of arguments before the learned Sessions Judge whose order in revision is challenged in these criminal miscellaneous cases, it was reported that a national agency from North India has forwarded a request to the Public Prosecutor for perusal of the records in this case for enabling them to conduct a research as to how a criminal trial can be deleted (defeated?). This case can certainly claim that dubious distinction of offering lessons in the attempt for protraction of criminal proceedings”. (Quoted from the order of the High Court dated 12-1-07 in Crl.M.C. 3708 and 3737/2006). With the above observation, the Court directed the Trial Court to dispose of the case itself that originated in the year 1987, within a period of six months. (Quoted from the Order of the High Court dated 12-01-07 in Crl.M.C. 3708 and 3737/2006.) 

The above-quoted observation speaks volumes as to how a criminal case gets protracted for very many years abusing the process of various courts. The six months’ period stipulated in the above order expired on 12-07-07. Yet, nothing happened. 

Facts:

The de facto complainant was a famous journalist Maniyeri Madhavan who is now no more. He was the Editor, Printer and Publisher of an evening daily by name ‘Sudinam’ printed and published from Cannanore. Annoyed by certain reports that appeared in ‘Sudinam’ against the police and particularly against an I.P.S. Officer, Premshanker, who was then the District Superintendent of Police at Kannur, the police officers were waiting for an opportunity to wreak vengeance on Maniyeri Madhavan.

While so, a news item appeared in ‘Sudinam’ dated 2-2-1988 to the effect that a 16 year-old adivasi girl by name Manha was raped by one Rajan in his house at Kannur where Manha was working as a maid-servant. Manha and her parents (Chandran and Ammini) preferred a complaint in the office of Superintendent of Police, Wynad which was later transmitted to Kannur Police Station. Crime No.50/1988 was registered against Maniyeri Madhavan & Ors. by K.A.Abdul Gafoor, Sub-Inspector of Police, for offences under S. 228 A of the I.P.C. and S. 7 (1) (d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

Under the guise of investigating Crime No.50/1988, Maniyeri Madhavan and his trainee reporter were taken into custody and were physically assaulted. The printing press and other allied properties of Maniyeri Madhavan were also damaged. This incident gave rise to Crime No.52/1988 of Kannur Police Station in which the aforesaid K.A.Abdul Gafoor and other six or seven identifiable policemen were the accused. In the meantime, the case against Maniyeri Madhavan and others in Crime No.50/1988 before the Kannur Town Police Station was quashed by the High Court as he was found entitled to the protection of sub s.(2) of S.228A of I.P.C. Maniyeri Madhavan thereafter moved the High Court of Kerala for a direction to entrust the investigation of Crime No.52/1988 of Kannur Police Station with the C.B.I. The High Court directed investigation by D.I.G. of Police, Northern Range. Dissatisfied with the order of the High Court, Maniyeri Madhavan approached the Supreme Court. On 22-12-1989, the Supreme Court passed an order directing Maniyeri Madhavan to submit a representation before M.G.A.Raman, the D.I.G. of Police, Central Range, who in turn was directed to register a case on the basis of such representation and to supervise the investigation which was directed to be completed within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of such representation. On 3-2-1990, Maniyeri Madhavan filed a detailed complaint before the D.I.G., Central Range. This was forwarded to the Kannur Police Station where it was registered as Crime No. 151/1990 against 13 accused persons including Premshanker I.P.S. for various offences.

Dissatisfied with the conduct of the D.I.G., Central Range, in not completing the investigation as directed by the Supreme Court in the order dated 22-12-1989, Maniyeri Madhavan moved the Supreme Court once again. By order dated 24-9-1992, the Supreme Court directed that the investigation of the case be entrusted with the C.B.I. and further directing the C.B.I. to file a report within four months. The C.B.I. filed a report before the Supreme Court based on which the Supreme Court on 22-9-1993 directed the C.B.I. to file a report before the appropriate Court.

On 27-4-1995, the C.B.I. charge-sheeted 12 accused persons in which Premshanker was the first accused. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and registered the case as C.C.513/1995. Thereafter, Premshanker began questioning each and every order passed by the Magistrate’s Court before the Sessions Court, High Court and Supreme Court. This process was repeated and ultimately, the question that fell for the consideration of the Court in Crl.R.P No. 981/2007 filed by Premshanker, was whether there was proper sanction to prosecute Premshanker for offences punishable under Ss.323, 342, 357, 27, 465 and 201 read with S.120-B  I.P.C. 

Disposing of the case on 4-10-07, Justice V.Ramkumar observed as follows:

“.... The facts unravelled by the various stages of the chequered career of this seemingly interminable case, reveal the shockingly disturbing manner in which an investigation ordered by no less a court than the highest Court of this country and the consequent prosecution, have been attempted to be sabotaged by an I.P.S.Officer by grossly abusing the process of various Courts. He was resorting to a tiring out process in which the de facto complainant who had exhibited tremendous courage to fight his case up to the Apex Court had to give up his battle by bidding farewell to this world when the Providential call came in the meanwhile.....”

(See Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, C.B.I. reported in 2007 (4) KLT 739.) The Court directed the Trial Court to commence the trial of the case forthwith and dispose of the same within 7 months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.

Nineteen long years have elapsed and yet, the trial of the case which originated in the year 1988 against Premshanker is yet to be concluded. It is often said that justice delayed is justice denied. The case against Premshanker bears ample testimony to the long delay in the administration of criminal justice. Dispensation of justice becomes a mockery if it gets delayed and if litigation becomes a long-drawn out process making it patently unjust and unfair to all concerned. The very faith in the system would be shaken, nay, eroded, if inordinate delay hinders the process of administration of criminal justice. Such delays will also result in multiplication of number of people taking to criminal acts. 

‘Q’ DOCUMENT OF ADVICE

(By T.P.Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

At a time when a practising lawyer is being elevated as Judge, an octogenarian lawyer tendered the following advice to the Judge-designate, remembering, with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, that ‘ to accept good advice is but to increase one’s own ability’, and, at the same time, not forgetting Samuel Johnson’s cliche: “Advice is seldom welcome. Those who need it most, take it least.”

The following ‘unasked advice’ was given with the stipulation to forget the adviser, and, not to forget to remember the advice.

(1) History is always written by the winners.

(2)  Do not be carried away by your majestic ascend.

(3)  Be a Judge of your own signature style.

(4)  Learn differences that make a difference.

(5)  Be a Judge who can see different parts of the elephant at the same time.

(6) Remember, Judges are not honey hunters.

(7) Judicial function is not just cheese and chocolates.

(8)  Try to see that you do not fall from grace to disgrace.

(9)  Forget not that the court is not a graveyard for litigants.

(10)  A Judge is not an avatar.

(11)  A Judge is not a lawyer’s deity.

(12) Submissions before court are not offerings to the Judge.

(13)  Showcase your function, not your power.

(14) Get your tone and tenor right.

(15)  Remember the importance of communication etiquette.

(16)  Have confidence, courage and conviction.

(17) Do not consider ‘Justice’ as a flattering epithet.

(18)  Adjudication is not the birds-and-the-bees lecture. 

(19)  Do not be a Judge with edited expressions.

(20)  Prove to be the surprise package of the judiciary.

(21)  A Judge is not a gold-coin certicard.

(22)  Do not be impolite, intemperate, or uncharitable.

(23)  A Judge should be a bright brain.

(24)  The High Court is not the proprietor of the lawyer.

(25)  The difference between lawyer and Judge is not that of man and superman.

(26)  Integrity should be your capital.

(27)  A court is not a Clearing House for mandamus.

(28)  Do not be a Judge suffering from judge’s block.

(29)  Judges are not seers, intuiting mantras.

(30)  A lawyer is not a living dead.

(31)  A Judge can not afford a millionaire’s meal.

(32)  Judges are not terror commanders.

(33)  The High Court is not Judges peculiar.

(34)  A Judge cannot afford mile-high luxury.

(35)  Avoid sudden slip of the language in court.

(36)  Justicing is not a 22-yards apart game between the Bench and the Bar.

(37)  Enter the court with a winsome smile.

(38)  Do not shun the sound of advocacy.

(39)  Do not adjudicate sans arguments.

(40)  Remember, the majority of young lawyers lead life in the margine. Encourage and help them.

(41)  Be careful about your life outside the law court.

(42)  Do not render non-cognizable judgments/orders.

(43)  It is time for Judges to think out of box.

(44)  Try to re-claim long lost judicial tradition.

(45)  A Division Bench should show power of two, not two-in-one.

(46)  Remember, you belong to a family of status, stature and traditions.

(47)  Always remember what Brutus said:

“The eye sees not itself”.

End piece: “Every man, however wise, needs the advice of some sagacious friend  in the affairs of life”:               -- Plautus.