BUILDING LEASE LAW IN KERALA -- AT THE CROSS ROADS  ?

(By C.S. Mohit, Munsiff, Aluva)

“There is nothing permanent except change -- Heraclitus”.

Introduction

Act 2 of 1965 which came into force with effect from 1.4.1965 was enacted by the legislature primarily for regulating the leasing of buildings and for controlling the rent of buildings in Kerala. The preamble of the statute bears testimony to these noble objectives which the legislature in its wisdom considered appropriate panacea for solving the social problem of acute shortage of accommodation, residential and non residential in the State. Forty two summers hence the statute struggles in its quest for social significance considering the radical changes in the socio economic mosaic of the State. Thanks to the vibrant progressive and realistic judicial pronouncements of our Hon’ble High Court, the contemporary relevance of the statute has been enlivened from time to time. The time has come for the legislature to do its part, to usher in a new legislation in tune with the contemporary socio-economic milieu. 

Judicial  Impetus  for  Change  through  Case  Laws

Needless to state the most remarkable achievement of the statute has been the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants. Unreasonable eviction of tenants is considered the third prime objective of the statute, see Standard Cashew Industries v. Krishnan (1980 KLT 897). S. 11 of the Act has been the very heart, soul and arm of the statute. Judicial creativity and sensitivity are writ large in a plethora of decisions and in particular with respect to the interpretation of the term “bona fide need” the very store house of judicial discretion contained in S.11(3) of the Act. Even a cursory/perusal of the case laws with respect to “ bona fide need “and its four provisos and in particular the 2nd proviso will portray the shift in emphasis of the legislation from “tenant centric” to “landlord centric”. Ironically the landlord oriented approach in interpretation vis a vis “bona fide need” recently witnessed a path breaking exposition. In Muhammed Basheer v. Mujib Rahman (2005 (4) KLT 697) it was held that every petition invoking “bonafide need” need not be preordained to culminate in eviction. The Judiciary in its wisdom though it fit to apply its interpretative brakes of self restraint, given the objective and scope of the statute aforesaid.

In fact our Hon’ble High Court has been very vibrant and socially sensitive in its interpretation of the statute. It has even gone to the extent of judicial legislation in order to make the statute relevant in the contemporary context. The reinduction of S.5(1) in the statute took in Edger Ferus v. Abraham Ittycheria (2004 (1) KLT 767) is a classic example of judicial impetus for change in the statute. (At the time when this article is penned the decision is stayed by the Hon’ble Apex Court) In Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala (1995 (2) KLT 848) our Hon’ble High Court struck down as unconstitutional Ss. 5,6 & 8 of the Act all relating to “fair rent”. In fact fixation of fair rent under S.5 and prohibiting the levying of “unconscionable rent” from tenants by unscrupulous landlords were two of the cardinal objectives of the Act. Issac Ninan gave a fatal blow to the concept of “fair rent” the very edifice of the Act. In Edger Ferus the court reviewed Issac Ninan and reinducted S.5(1) in the statute inter alia on the ground that without S.5(1) the intention and object of the Act would be defeated and the statute would be rendered socially irrelevant. The court’s genuine concern to make the statute contemporary is very conspicuous in the judgement. The court even laid down guidelines to be adopted by the Rent Control Court for fixing the fair rent of buildings. Right of Quinquennial revision of rent at the instance of the landlord or tenant even dehors provision in the lease deed has been granted by the court. Further demanding Pakidi has been made an illegal and immoral act vide the aforesaid judgement on the ground that it is opposed to public policy. The aforesaid decision is revolutionary as it rightly signals the impelling need for change through legislation in the realm of building lease law.

Act 2 of 1965 seeks to regulate the leasing of buildings through a statutory authority styled as “Accommodation Controller”. The inefficiency of the statutory provisions relating to accommodation controller and the manner in which the authority has been exercising its statutory duties and in particular the maintenance of the register under S.4 of the Act is by now known to everyone. In Varghese Eapen v. Varghese (2001 (2) KLT 263), our Hon’ble High Court has lamented about the manner in which the statutory functionary worked. The ritualistic non maintenance of the occupancy register and the certificates issued thereunder devoid of truth and reality speak volumes about the “hollowness” and “inefficiency” of the statutory mechanism pertaining to regulation of lease of buildings. 

Hence it is clear as day light that all the three facets of the legislation are at the cross roads. Change through legislation at the instance of the legislature is the need of the hour.

Archaic Statutory Provisions Yearning for Change

Even a cursory scan of the statutory provisions in Act 2 of 1965 will reveal the obsoleteness of a majority of the provisions. In fact barring a few grounds for eviction in S.11 most of the other provisions yearn for change. S.29 which stipulates the penalties under the Act is a pointer in this regard. The Act envisages Inspectors who are appointed under S.28 to launch prosecution. These provisions exist as dead letters in the statute. Further the provisions pertaining to the Accommodation Controller also are without teeth in the present milieu ie. Ss. 4, 13 and 17. Ss.6 &8 and the provisions of S.5 excluding S.5(1) no longer exist in the statute book pursuant to Issac Ninan In short barring S.11 and the reinducted S.5(1) (subject to the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court) aforesaid all the other provisions remain largely defunct. Even under S.11 the provision contained in S.11 (17) relating to tenants in continuous occupation from 1st April, 1940 has become obsolete more so since the protection is not a heritable right as held in Narayanan v. Shalima (2003 (2) KLT 317). The provisos under S.11 (4) (iv) pertaining to reconstruction also requires drastic amendment considering the changed socio-economic backdrop. A complete overhauling of the statute is the need of the hour.

Legislation in the Pipeline -- The Kerala Buildings Lease Bill -- 2002

The legislation in the pipeline ie., the Kerala Buildings Lease Bill, 2002 strives to cater to the rights of the landlord and tenant as is evident from the preamble of the bill. The statement of objects and reasons highlights the fact that the existing provisions have become unreasonable and unsuitable with the change in circumstances. The bill conspicuously omits the concept of “fair rent” and also the institution of “Accommodation Controller”. It highlights contractual freedom and defines rent as rent agreed between the landlord and tenant under a contract. It incorporates “flats” within the definition of building and seeks to constitute Tribunals for administering the provisions in place of Rent Control Court. Though the concept of statutory tenant is retained it casts a statutory duty on the tenant to handover physical vacant possession of the building to the landlord immediately after the expiry of the period of tenancy at will or as per contract. Incorporation of the rights and duties of landlord and tenants enumerated under S.108 of the T.P. Act, 1882 is a notable feature of the bill. Though the bill retains the major grounds of eviction it has pruned the provisions in a realistic manner. The adjudicatory powers presently vested with the Accommodation Controller with respect to interference with amenities have been conferred on the Tribunal. In sum the provisions in the bill are realistic, progressive and modernistic. However the blanket exclusion of regulatory provisions relating to rent control and leasing of buildings is undesirable considering the social importance of such mechanisms. Edger Ferrus reinforces the need for regulation of rent periodically, a vital facet of building lease law. The proposed bill however remains in the cold storage of the legislature presently and is yet to see the light of day.

Conclusion

Justice delayed is justice denied. Legislation delayed is legislation denied. Act 2 of 1965 was enacted by our Legislature due to the societal necessity for continuance of the Kerala Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act 1959, the precursor of the present Act. The mischief of shortage of accommodation was sought to be remedied by regulating the leasing of buildings and by controlling the rent of buildings in the State. An incisive analysis of the precedents in this realm of law will reveal that the paramount catalyst for change in interpretation ie., from tenant oriented interpretation to landlord oriented interpretation has been the exposition of Art.19 (1) (g) of the Constitution whereby it was held that construction of buildings and leasing of buildings would be a “business activity” in the sacred nature of a fundamental right. See. Edger Ferrus v. Abraham Ittycheria (2004 (1) KLT 767). This path breaking elevation to the realm of fundamental rights calls for a balanced legislation which strikes a just, fair and reasonable balance between the contemporary interests of the landlord and the tenant.

A new legislation has to imbibe the spirit and essence of Edger Ferrus (subject to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court) and in particular it should make provision for periodical revision of agreed rent de hors the terms of the lease contract. It should also enlist the rights and duties of landlord and tenant in a progressive and modernistic manner. Being a special statute the adjudicatory mechanism should be foolproof and effective unlike the present S.23 which is sketchy and inadequate for effective adjudication. The new law can also take note of the need for new penalties like demand or acceptance of pakidi held to be illegal and immoral in Edger Ferrus and which practice is widely prevalent in society. Let us hope that the legislature will usher in a new law which conjugates legislative and judicial wisdom in this realm of law at the earliest. A paradigm shift in statutory perspective, statutory content and statutory application in tune with the contemporary milieu is the crying need of the hour. 

 Delay in administration of Criminal Justice

(By M.P.R. Nair, Bar-at-Law, Senior Advocate)

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer once said :

“Man lives in the short run, but litigation lives in the long run”. In this country, it is common knowledge that litigation takes several twists and turns and literally crawls in the long run. When this happens in criminal cases, the consequence invariably is that criminals are left without any punishment for several years and dispensation of justice gets unduly delayed justifying the axiom “Justice delayed is justice denied”.

A very interesting case of such inordinate delay of several years in the administration of criminal justice came up for consideration recently before the High Court of Kerala. The decision is reported in 2007 (4) KLT 739 (Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, C.B.I.).

“Those who want lessons on how a criminal trial can be protracted can have no better school on that aspect and they must visit the facts of this case. In the course of arguments before the learned Sessions Judge whose order in revision is challenged in these criminal miscellaneous cases, it was reported that a national agency from North India has forwarded a request to the Public Prosecutor for perusal of the records in this case for enabling them to conduct a research as to how a criminal trial can be deleted (defeated?). This case can certainly claim that dubious distinction of offering lessons in the attempt for protraction of criminal proceedings”. (Quoted from the order of the High Court dated 12-1-07 in Crl.M.C. 3708 and 3737/2006). With the above observation, the Court directed the Trial Court to dispose of the case itself that originated in the year 1987, within a period of six months. (Quoted from the Order of the High Court dated 12-01-07 in Crl.M.C. 3708 and 3737/2006.) 

The above-quoted observation speaks volumes as to how a criminal case gets protracted for very many years abusing the process of various courts. The six months’ period stipulated in the above order expired on 12-07-07. Yet, nothing happened. 

Facts:

The de facto complainant was a famous journalist Maniyeri Madhavan who is now no more. He was the Editor, Printer and Publisher of an evening daily by name ‘Sudinam’ printed and published from Cannanore. Annoyed by certain reports that appeared in ‘Sudinam’ against the police and particularly against an I.P.S. Officer, Premshanker, who was then the District Superintendent of Police at Kannur, the police officers were waiting for an opportunity to wreak vengeance on Maniyeri Madhavan.

While so, a news item appeared in ‘Sudinam’ dated 2-2-1988 to the effect that a 16 year-old adivasi girl by name Manha was raped by one Rajan in his house at Kannur where Manha was working as a maid-servant. Manha and her parents (Chandran and Ammini) preferred a complaint in the office of Superintendent of Police, Wynad which was later transmitted to Kannur Police Station. Crime No.50/1988 was registered against Maniyeri Madhavan & Ors. by K.A.Abdul Gafoor, Sub-Inspector of Police, for offences under S. 228 A of the I.P.C. and S. 7 (1) (d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

Under the guise of investigating Crime No.50/1988, Maniyeri Madhavan and his trainee reporter were taken into custody and were physically assaulted. The printing press and other allied properties of Maniyeri Madhavan were also damaged. This incident gave rise to Crime No.52/1988 of Kannur Police Station in which the aforesaid K.A.Abdul Gafoor and other six or seven identifiable policemen were the accused. In the meantime, the case against Maniyeri Madhavan and others in Crime No.50/1988 before the Kannur Town Police Station was quashed by the High Court as he was found entitled to the protection of sub s.(2) of S.228A of I.P.C. Maniyeri Madhavan thereafter moved the High Court of Kerala for a direction to entrust the investigation of Crime No.52/1988 of Kannur Police Station with the C.B.I. The High Court directed investigation by D.I.G. of Police, Northern Range. Dissatisfied with the order of the High Court, Maniyeri Madhavan approached the Supreme Court. On 22-12-1989, the Supreme Court passed an order directing Maniyeri Madhavan to submit a representation before M.G.A.Raman, the D.I.G. of Police, Central Range, who in turn was directed to register a case on the basis of such representation and to supervise the investigation which was directed to be completed within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of such representation. On 3-2-1990, Maniyeri Madhavan filed a detailed complaint before the D.I.G., Central Range. This was forwarded to the Kannur Police Station where it was registered as Crime No. 151/1990 against 13 accused persons including Premshanker I.P.S. for various offences.

Dissatisfied with the conduct of the D.I.G., Central Range, in not completing the investigation as directed by the Supreme Court in the order dated 22-12-1989, Maniyeri Madhavan moved the Supreme Court once again. By order dated 24-9-1992, the Supreme Court directed that the investigation of the case be entrusted with the C.B.I. and further directing the C.B.I. to file a report within four months. The C.B.I. filed a report before the Supreme Court based on which the Supreme Court on 22-9-1993 directed the C.B.I. to file a report before the appropriate Court.

On 27-4-1995, the C.B.I. charge-sheeted 12 accused persons in which Premshanker was the first accused. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and registered the case as C.C.513/1995. Thereafter, Premshanker began questioning each and every order passed by the Magistrate’s Court before the Sessions Court, High Court and Supreme Court. This process was repeated and ultimately, the question that fell for the consideration of the Court in Crl.R.P No. 981/2007 filed by Premshanker, was whether there was proper sanction to prosecute Premshanker for offences punishable under Ss.323, 342, 357, 27, 465 and 201 read with S.120-B  I.P.C. 

Disposing of the case on 4-10-07, Justice V.Ramkumar observed as follows:

“.... The facts unravelled by the various stages of the chequered career of this seemingly interminable case, reveal the shockingly disturbing manner in which an investigation ordered by no less a court than the highest Court of this country and the consequent prosecution, have been attempted to be sabotaged by an I.P.S.Officer by grossly abusing the process of various Courts. He was resorting to a tiring out process in which the de facto complainant who had exhibited tremendous courage to fight his case up to the Apex Court had to give up his battle by bidding farewell to this world when the Providential call came in the meanwhile.....”

(See Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, C.B.I. reported in 2007 (4) KLT 739.) The Court directed the Trial Court to commence the trial of the case forthwith and dispose of the same within 7 months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.

Nineteen long years have elapsed and yet, the trial of the case which originated in the year 1988 against Premshanker is yet to be concluded. It is often said that justice delayed is justice denied. The case against Premshanker bears ample testimony to the long delay in the administration of criminal justice. Dispensation of justice becomes a mockery if it gets delayed and if litigation becomes a long-drawn out process making it patently unjust and unfair to all concerned. The very faith in the system would be shaken, nay, eroded, if inordinate delay hinders the process of administration of criminal justice. Such delays will also result in multiplication of number of people taking to criminal acts. 

‘Q’ DOCUMENT OF ADVICE

(By T.P.Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

At a time when a practising lawyer is being elevated as Judge, an octogenarian lawyer tendered the following advice to the Judge-designate, remembering, with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, that ‘ to accept good advice is but to increase one’s own ability’, and, at the same time, not forgetting Samuel Johnson’s cliche: “Advice is seldom welcome. Those who need it most, take it least.”

The following ‘unasked advice’ was given with the stipulation to forget the adviser, and, not to forget to remember the advice.

(1) History is always written by the winners.

(2)  Do not be carried away by your majestic ascend.

(3)  Be a Judge of your own signature style.

(4)  Learn differences that make a difference.

(5)  Be a Judge who can see different parts of the elephant at the same time.

(6) Remember, Judges are not honey hunters.

(7) Judicial function is not just cheese and chocolates.

(8)  Try to see that you do not fall from grace to disgrace.

(9)  Forget not that the court is not a graveyard for litigants.

(10)  A Judge is not an avatar.

(11)  A Judge is not a lawyer’s deity.

(12) Submissions before court are not offerings to the Judge.

(13)  Showcase your function, not your power.

(14) Get your tone and tenor right.

(15)  Remember the importance of communication etiquette.

(16)  Have confidence, courage and conviction.

(17) Do not consider ‘Justice’ as a flattering epithet.

(18)  Adjudication is not the birds-and-the-bees lecture. 

(19)  Do not be a Judge with edited expressions.

(20)  Prove to be the surprise package of the judiciary.

(21)  A Judge is not a gold-coin certicard.

(22)  Do not be impolite, intemperate, or uncharitable.

(23)  A Judge should be a bright brain.

(24)  The High Court is not the proprietor of the lawyer.

(25)  The difference between lawyer and Judge is not that of man and superman.

(26)  Integrity should be your capital.

(27)  A court is not a Clearing House for mandamus.

(28)  Do not be a Judge suffering from judge’s block.

(29)  Judges are not seers, intuiting mantras.

(30)  A lawyer is not a living dead.

(31)  A Judge can not afford a millionaire’s meal.

(32)  Judges are not terror commanders.

(33)  The High Court is not Judges peculiar.

(34)  A Judge cannot afford mile-high luxury.

(35)  Avoid sudden slip of the language in court.

(36)  Justicing is not a 22-yards apart game between the Bench and the Bar.

(37)  Enter the court with a winsome smile.

(38)  Do not shun the sound of advocacy.

(39)  Do not adjudicate sans arguments.

(40)  Remember, the majority of young lawyers lead life in the margine. Encourage and help them.

(41)  Be careful about your life outside the law court.

(42)  Do not render non-cognizable judgments/orders.

(43)  It is time for Judges to think out of box.

(44)  Try to re-claim long lost judicial tradition.

(45)  A Division Bench should show power of two, not two-in-one.

(46)  Remember, you belong to a family of status, stature and traditions.

(47)  Always remember what Brutus said:

“The eye sees not itself”.

End piece: “Every man, however wise, needs the advice of some sagacious friend  in the affairs of life”:               -- Plautus.

ARTICLE 348 IMBROGLIO

(By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

Article 348 (1) of the Constitution of India says:

“Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until Parliament by law otherwise provides -

(a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court,

(b) the authoritative texts -

(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State,

(ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor of a State, and

(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State, 

shall be in the English language”.

It was at a time when I was worried by lack of worries, I noticed the recommendation of the Committee of Parliament on Official Language that “Article 348 of the Constitution may be amended to enable the Legislative Department to undertake original drafting in Hindi; and after such amendment, High Courts/ Supreme Court should be asked to start delivering their judgments and decrees etc. in Hindi so that large number of Government Departments, who are carrying out judicial/ quasi-judicial functions, could be able to deliver orders in Hindi; at present, these departments are unable to pass orders in Hindi, because the appeal against their orders in High Courts/Supreme Court would have to be conducted in English”. The subject-matter of this recommendation is as sensitive and important today as it was in 1949, when Art.348 was born. 

Whenever I am to study an aspect relating to any provision in the Constitution of India, my mind travels back to the Constituent Assembly for the discussion on the corresponding Draft Article. Turning the pages of the Constituent Assembly Debates, I found that the Debates on the corresponding draft Articles took place on 12th, 13th and 14th September 1949.

When the Constituent Assembly re-assembled in the afternoon ‘at Four of the Clock’, on 12th September 1949, Mr.President (The Honourable Dr.Rajendra Prasad), took up Part XIV-A-'Language’. 

Dr.Rajendra Prasad stated:

“We have now to take up the articles dealing with the question of language. I know this is a subject which has been agitating the minds of Members for sometime...... There is no other item in the whole Constitution of the country which will be required to be implemented from day to day, from hour to hour, I might even say, from minute to minute in actual practice....... I have found that there are some three hundred or more amendments to these articles. If each one of the amendments is to be moved I do not know how many hours it will take ..................”

The main speaker of the day on the subject was the Honourable Shri N.Gopalaswamy Ayyangar. Shri Ayyangar started with a bang:

“Opinion has not always been unanimous on this question. There was, however, one thing about which we reached a fairly unanimous conclusion that we should select one of the languages in India as the common language of the whole of India, the language that should be used for the official purposes of the Union........ I for one did not easily reach the conclusion that was arrived at the end of these discussions, because it involved our bidding good-bye to a language (meaning, English) on which, I think, we have built and achieved our freedom. Though I accepted the conclusion at the end that that language should be given up in due course and in its place, we should substitute a language of this country, it was not without a pang that I agreed to that decision”.

Shri Gopalaswamy Ayyangar went on to say that we could not afford to give up the English language at once. “We had to keep the English language going for a number of years until Hindi could establish for itself a place, not merely because it is an Indian language, but because as a language it would be an efficient instrument for all that we have to say and do in the future and until Hindi established itself in the position in which English stands today for Union purposes”. Shri Ayyangar continued:

“We then proceeded to consider the question of the language that should be used in our Legislatures and the highest courts of justice in the land and we came to the conclusion after a great deal of deliberation and discussion that while the language of the Union ‘Hindi’ may be used for debates, for discussions and so forth in the Central Legislature, and where while the language of the State could be used for similar purposes in the State Legislature, it was necessary for us, if we were going to perpetuate the existing satisfactory state of things as regards the text of our laws and the interpretation of that text in the courts, that English should be the language in which legislation, whether in the form of Bills and Acts or of rules and orders and the interpretation in the form of judgments by Judges of the High Court—these should be in English for several years to come. For my own part I think it will have to be for many years to come. It is not because that we want to keep the English language at all costs for these purposes. It is because the languages which we can recognise for Union purposes and the languages which we can recognise for State purposes are not sufficiently developed, are not sufficiently precise for the purposes that I have mentioned, viz., laws and the interpretation of laws by Courts of law”.

The Honourable Member concluded, with a whimper:

“I would only appeal to the House that we must look at this problem from a purely objective stand point. We must not be carried away by mere sentiment or any kind of allegiance to revivalism of one kind or another. We have to look at it from the stand point of practicability. We have to adapt the instrument which would serve us best for what we propose to do in the future and I for one agree with you, Sir, that it will be a most unhappy thing, a most disappointing illustration of our inability to reach an agreed conclusion on so vital a matter if on this point we have to divide the House. I am sure that good sense will prevail”.

I should think that even at present the apprehension voiced by Shri Gopalaswamy Ayyangar has not ceased to exist. According to me, we have not still reached the stage at which Hindi language could substitute English. The position as on today has to be continued for a long time. It is not yet time to amend Art.348 of the Constitution as recommended by the Committee of Parliament on Official Language. It is not yet time at all to ask the High Courts/Supreme court to start delivering their judgments and decrees, etc. in Hindi.

What is the position of Hindi language now. What is today’s standard of education in Hindi. How much has Hindi grown up to stand up to face the situation involved in the recommendations of the Committee. I do not find any scholarly allure in the suggestion. It would be too hasty to agree with the suggestion. The question is not one concerning filling up the blank pages of the law. The question is a loaded one. I regret my embarrassment, but I have to say, with humble apologies to the Committee though, that there should not be any amendment on the lines suggested by the committee in a hurry, only for the reason that the Legislature/Parliament suffers from Constitutional impatience. One fault leads to the next. Serious thought should be bestowed on the question of constitutional amendments in relation to ‘Language’, especially when legislation is not a pastoral letter; and, further, English language is an enticing treasure. The situation in 1949 is different from that in 2007. Technology has changed our brains, in this clicking, bleeping, flashing world of screens. These are days of E - learning, and globalisation. Even Russia and China have changed their views on language. There is change on all fronts-social, political, educational, regional etc. India does not consist only of Hindi-speaking areas. The Constitutional corridor is not the preserve of Hindi. Regional languages have grown; in fact, over-grown. Here, States re-organisation based on language, has played a great part, and that, against the Hindi language. The situation of the Constitutional Courts delivering their judgments in Hindi, is unimaginable, in these days. Anybody concerned with the administration of justice by High Courts and the Supreme Court, would be prepared, with little hesitation, to release his opposition to the suggestion. When we take note of the constitution, organisation, and method of appointment of judges, of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, we may have no difficulty to perceive the utter impossibility of judges delivering judgments in Hindi, especially judges with honourable ignorance of the language. Let not the inhabitants of the Constitutional Courts be disturbed.

At the end of the day, I could formulate only one conclusion; and that is, it is not yet time to act on the lines of the recommendation of the Committee of Parliament on Official Language, in regard to “Language”, especially Article 348 of the Constitution. The period of 15 years stipulated in Article 343 of the Constitution can never be adhered to in the changed situation, making it impossible for a long time from now to adhere to the said stipulation. Times have changed against the stipulation. Situation has not improved in favour of the stipulation. It remains Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. The soft sobs of forgotten statesmen/politicians on the question of language will not abate for a long time to come.

It is not virtuous to be obstinate.