• Rural India v. Development : Role of Panchayat Raj Institutions

    By V.N. Haridas, Advocate, High Court of Kerala

    10/09/2007
    V.N. Haridas, Advocate, High Court of Kerala

    Rural India v. Development : Role of Panchayat Raj Institutions

    (By V.N. Haridas, Advocate)

     

    “ Panchayat in this case has raised a contention that excessive use of ground water by the petitioner is creating acute water shortage in the area and under such circumstances the Panchayat has taken steps to cancel the license. Panchayat, in our view, has no jurisdiction in the matter of issue or renewal of license to the petitioners factory since the legislature in its wisdom has excluded the area in question, from the purview of the Panchayat Raj Act in view of sub-s.(2) of S.1 of the Act. Courts cannot be blamed for this predicament, the legislature and the executive in their wisdom excluded the industrial area from the purview of the Act with the result that the Panchayat cannot take steps under the Act”. (Pepsi Co India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2007 (2) KLT 835).

     

    There are two Indias. One globalized India on the verge of entering the first world, the other one is of helpless peasants committing suicides, tribals dispossessed of land and livelihoods, poverty ridden children, women being victims of sexual exploitation and gender discrimination. Studies reveal that 120-160 out of 607 districts in India are extremist Naxalite Movement inflicted areas. This is not only the question of inequality or widening gulf between the two Indias but, on the other hand points to worst results of a paradigm shift in the policy of governance.

     

    Development is to be for the benefit of the marginalized people. But in converse what we witness today is destruction of livelihoods and displacement of the poor in the name of Industrialization, big dams for Power Generation and Irrigation, Corporatisation of Agriculture, despite farmers suicides, modernization and beautification of our cities by demolishing slums etc. from Sardar Sarovar, Thehridam, Nandigram, Singur to Plachimada and now to Khamam at Andhra Pradesh showing every day how development can turn perverse.

     

    Of course development is politics. However politics of development is not the concern of this short essay. What I am trying to point out is how far these state policies are contravening the constitutional principles regarding Panchayat Raj and decentralization.

     

    The Panchayats are supposed to be the institutions of local governments. The internationally accepted principles of sustainable development are enshrined in the Constitution by formulating the provisions on the basis of economic development on the one hand and social justice on the other hand. The milestone in the history of decentralization in India, after being republic, was the incorporation of Part IX to the Constitution by the 73rd amendment in 1992. According to Art.243 G of the Constitution, a State Government may, by law endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self governance and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to:

     

    (a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice;

     

    (b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the XIth Schedule. In lieu of this constitutional provision Kerala Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 has been enacted.

     

    The object of the Act is to establish a three tier Panchayati Raj institution for securing a greater measure of participation of the people in planned development and in local government affairs. It envisages the Panchayats with such powers and authority to enable them to function as institutions of self-governance and entrusting such Panchayats for economic development and social justice including the implementation of schemes in relation to the matters listed in the XIth schedule of the Constitution.

     

    Thus, people must have a high say in what; how; when; and by whom their developmental needs are to be determined. The contemporary conflicts can be resolved if these provisions are effectively implemented. In converse what we see today is that the Central and State Governments are dictating economic and developmental policies which turn to be against the interests of the rural people. As a result massive land grabbing by large Corporations is going on in various guises, aided and abetted by the land acquisition policies of both the Union and State Governments. State Governments, aided and emboldened by the Union Governmental Policies, are acquiring land to give way to Corporations. The law relating to SEZ are surpassing not only Panchayati Raj Act but many other Central and State legislations also. 

     

    The recent Kerala High Court decision in Pepsi Co. India holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2007 (2) KLT 835) seeks special attention in this regard. The issue in this case is that whether Panchayat has got authority either to issue or cancel license granted to the petitioner (the company) for setting up the factory at Kanjikode situated at an industrial area notified as industrial township, Palghat by the Government of Kerala in exercise of powers conferred by Cl.(f) of Ss.2 and 5 of the Kerala Industrial Single Window Clearance Boards and Industrial Township Area Development Act, 1999. The Panchayat has cancelled the license of the company for alleged over exploitation of ground water by the company. The Panchayat has contended that the development act would not take away the rights of the Panchayat under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act in the matter of issuance or cancellation of license. Further it was pointed out that S.166 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act provides authority for the Panchayat for maintenance of traditional drinking water sources in the Panchayat as one of its mandatory duties to safeguard public interest. Further it is also stated that under S.243C of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, the Panchayat is vested with the power to implement and maintain water supply and sewage schemes within the Panchayat area. The Panchayat pointed out that one of the important functions required to be discharged by the Grama Panchayats under the provisions of the Constitution of India read along with the Panchayat Raj Act is to ensure and maintain supply of pure drinking water to the people in the Panchayat area. The main contention of the petitioner company is that since the petitioner unit situated at Kanjikode was notified as an industrial area under the Integrated Industrial Township, Palghat, the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj act cease to have application to the industrial area in question by virtue of sub-s. (2) of S.1 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Accepting the contention of the petitioner company the Court held that the Panchayat has no jurisdiction in the matter of issue or renewal of license to the petitioner’s factory since the legislature in its wisdom has excluded the area in question from the purview of the Panchayat Raj Act in view of sub-s.(2) of S.1 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act.

     

    Thus we can see that the predicament is often created by legislature and executive for which judiciary is continuously blamed. Judiciary is not a forum for you to produce judgments of your choice. Judges can decide only on the basis of existing laws and evolved principles. Decentralization and people’s participation on one hand exclusion of more areas from the province of Panchayat Raj Act will no longer go together. To conclude, the development of India is, of course necessary. However, development cannot take place at the cost of displacement of villagers, in violation of the Indian Constitution, destruction of unique local cultures and causing harm to local religious sentiments, severe environmental damage to a unique eco-system, and above all threatening the livelihood of the rural people. So what we need today is an alternative path of development where the local self government institutions have power and financial autonomy to implement it; transparency and accountability in governance at all levels and pro-people development has to be energized by a genuinely decentralized structure of governance. With that vision of development, it is time to judge the actions of the ruling class by this criterion, and not by their rhetoric. 

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  • Anticipatory bail for a period -- Whether a second arrest is necessary

    By M.P.R. Nair, Bar-at-Law, Sr. Advocate

    03/09/2007

    Anticipatory bail for a period -- Whether a second arrest is necessary

    (By Barrister M.P.R. Nair, Sr. Advocate, Ernakulam)

     

    We, the people of India, are governed by a written Constitution which guarantees certain inalienable natural rights incorporated in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. These are freedoms reserved by the people for themselves. Hence all the functionaries and agencies under the Constitution have to respect those freedoms and, ex hypothesi, no functionary or agency can destroy them. Personal liberty is a guaranteed right under the Constitution that cannot be taken away “except according to procedure established by law”. Refreshingly, this noble principle finds eloquent expression in a recent judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Basant of the Kerala High Court in Jyothish v. State of Kerala reported in 2007 (3) KLT 176. The questions considered and decided in this case are by far very important from the point of view of an accused person facing arrest for the commission of a non-bailable offence. The more important question is whether an arrest is necessary in all cases where an accused person has allegedly committed a bailable offence.

     

    Brief facts of the case may be necessary to appreciate the law laid down in the case cited above. The petitioner who is an accused in Crime No. 158/05 of Koratty Police Station for offences punishable under Ss. 452, 324, and 308 of IPC, apprehended arrest and obtained an order from the High Court that, in the event of arrest, he should be released on bail for a period of one month on certain conditions. Within the period of one month, the petitioner appeared before the police, was arrested and released in terms of the order of the High Court. In the final report, allegations have been made that the petitioner has committed offences punishable under S.453, 324 and 308 of IPC.

     

    The petitioner did not seek or obtain regular bail under Ss.437/439 of the Cr.P.C. Apparently, he apprehended arrest as he did not obtain regular bail within the period of one month. He further apprehended that the Magistrate might remand him to custody if he appeared before the Magistrate. It was in these circumstances, he applied to the High Court for issuance of further directions under S.438 of the Cr.P.C. contending that since he had been granted anticipatory bail, arrested and released, it was not necessary for him to apply for regular bail in the absence of any specific direction in this regard in the order granting anticipatory bail. The prosecution contended that a bail granted under S.438 of the Cr.P.C. has to be followed by a regular bail under Ss.437/439 and in the absence of such an order, the petitioner was liable to be arrested.

     

    Both sides argued their respective contentions forcefully citing precedents. Is the Court granting anticipatory bail invested with the power to limit the time ? In a case where the superior Court granting bail does not issue a direction that regular bail must be sought under Ss.437/439, is it necessary that the accused should apply for regular bail? If regular bail was not applied for and obtained, should an arrest follow as a matter of course? Is the accused arrested and released on bail entitled to get further directions under S.438 of the Cr.P.C. from the Court which granted the anticipatory bail?.

     

    Justice Basant gave anxious consideration to each of the contentions in the light of the decisions cited and submissions made before him. The learned Judge held that it was permissible for the Court granting anticipatory bail to restrict the period of operation of the order even though the normal rule is that there should be no such limitation. As regards regular bail, the learned Judge held that in cases where there is no direction in the order granting anticipatory bail that regular bail should be applied for and obtained, the accused who was arrested and released need not apply for regular bail. Regarding the arrest of an accused like the petitioner who had earlier been arrested and released, the Court held that he need not be arrested after the expiry of the period of the anticipatory order. But on this point regarding arrest of an accused person, the Court rose to commanding heights in expanding the horizons of the concept of personal libery. The Court made the following observations. 

     

    “It follows that a Police Officer has to alertly consider in every case whether it is necessary to effect arrest. An arrest entails traumatic consequences. The polity dreads arrest by a police officer. The prospect is frightening. There must therefore be a proportionately onerous and sublime responsibility on the police officer to consider whether such an arrest is necessary. Only if necessary, such arrest ought to be effected..... Nay, I would even insist that reasons for exercise of such discretion must be recorded in the case diary by the police official concerned..... The Case Diary in every case must show that this sublime discretion was exercised by the police official after adverting to the circumstances and only thereafter on the basis of valid reasons the power of arrest was invoked and exercised against an accused person. A system which values and cherishes the right to freedom and liberty zealously must insist on such informed exercise of discretion by the Police Officer before he effects the arrest.”  (Italics supplied) Vide Para.42 of the Judgment.

     

    In this view, the Court gave further directions under S.438 of the Cr.P.C granting him bail on certain conditions.

     

    The law laid down by the learned Judge is in accord with the provisions contained in Article 22(1) of the Constitution which says that “no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest.....”. The present decision which goes a step forward mandates the Police Officer to advert to all relevant circumstances and form an honest opinion before arresting an accused person. An onerous and sublime duty has thus been cast on the Police Officers before making an arrest. One hopes that the Police Officers would take note of the requirement of law enunciated in this decision that highlights the sweep and scope of personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed by the Constitution. 

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  • Three Judges More — I Welcome Them

    By V.R. Krishna Iyer, Judge Supreme Court

    03/09/2007

    Three Judges More — I Welcome Them

    (By V.R. Krishna Iyer)

     

    I salute them, the three Addition new brethren on the Bench, in the optimistic expectation that they will reduce the avalanche of docket arrears, which are escalating despite the larger disposals by judicial speedsters and forensic activists. But robed brethren fail in their sublime function if they prefer speedy injustice to slow justice. “There are two things against which a Judge ought to guard precipitancy and procrastination.” (Quote It-I p-296).

     

    The curial newly sworn-in trinity are an indubitable exception to the disparaging implications of Parkinson’s Laws and Peter Principle. When these legal luminaries were elevated I had received an invitation for the august function. Since I could not attend because of physical disablement I sent a letter to the Hon’ble Chief Justice expressing my grateful sentiments. I reproduce it here since I wish to share those ideas with the Bench and the Bar. The proper medium, of course, is the popular law journal KLT which has gracefully agreed to my request. Here is my letter:

     

    I am thankful to you for inviting me for the swearing in ceremony of three Additional Judges of the High Court on the 1st August 2007. Under your leadership, this significant event will strengthen the administration of justice especially because heavy arrears of dockets and unhappy delays in delivery of judgment have become an incurable pathology in every State and also in the Supreme Court. I am sure the three new Judges will be an asset to the Bench in eliminating undue procrastination and promoting dignified performance, giving a sense of confidence to the people that socially sensitive justice, free from fear, influence and other prejudices will prevail. The foremost consideration is being the implementation of justice, social and economic, in the milieu of our Socialist Secular Democratic Republic. May the Kerala High Court be the paradigm of ubiquitous excellence in the judicial process with access to the humblest have-nots who hunger for justice according to law.

     

    We have a High Court of Law and Justice because humanity is the end and legality is the means. My point is best expressed by Lord Justice Scrutton in an address delivered to the University of Cambridge Law Society on 18 November 1920.

     

    Where are your impartial Judges? They all move in the same circle as the employers, and they are all educated and nursed in the same ideas as the employers. How can a labour man or a trade unionist get impartial justice? It is very difficult sometimes to be sure that you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial position between two disputants, one of your own class and one not of your own class.

     

    Ever you the members of the Bench and the Bar, do ever remember the key words of the Preamble to our Constitution. We, the People of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a (Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic) and to secure to all the citizens: Justice, social, economic and political.

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  • Obituary : Advocacy

    By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court, Ernakulam

    13/08/2007
    T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court, Ernakulam

    Obituary : Advocacy

    (By T.P. Kelu Nambiar)

     

    The caption is based on a learned borrowing from Prof. A.L.Goodhart’s inimitable expression.

     

    Though I hate being so old, eighty summers have come and gone after the day I breathed first; and fifty-three years have elapsed after I ‘advocated’ first. From a childhood in the tiny village Puzhathy, Kannur, commuting to school on a ‘judka’, to a Senior Advocate in the High Court of the State, is quite a transformation. I am slowly becoming a tragic twilight. And, now my age is weak.

     

    With the privilege of antiquity upon me, I should say, with little hesitation, something has gone terribly wrong with advocacy; and the legal profession has crashed. This bomb which has now exploded, I was carrying on my mind for sometime now. I should speak with the valour of my tongue, lawyers are becoming strangers to themselves. We have to grin and bear the misfortunes and tortuous trail of the legal profession. It would not be too hasty to say that advocacy is ars magna: the great art; it is worship for lawyers; and advocates do not purchase tickets from touts.

     

    Let me rewind to an era of pristine advocacy; where integrity and industry were the lawyer’s capital; where lawyers and Judges were partners; and not mere participants, without transferring their problems to each other, and without exploiting Judge-lawyer mismatch. Advocacy was no redemption song in those days; “bits and pieces” advocacy was shunned. Advocates tried to conquer the Judge by perseverance.

     

    Listening skill was there in Judges. The man behind the name ‘Judge’ knew the importance of being a silent, attentive listener, without interrupting learning, making learned approbation of the grammar and idiom of advocacy, with cloistered detachment.

     

    Today the legal profession seems to suffer from an institutional paralysis. I see the picture of a profession in crisis. Advocacy beckons advocacy. A lawyer wears many hats, so that it is cautioned: “Beware of Lawyers”. Lawyers are arrested, incarcerated, or murdered. Criticism of the judiciary enjoys a free play.

     

    Digital lifestyle seems to be the order of the day. Much importance is attached only to the coronation of lawyers and Judges. Advocates seem to suffer from lawyer’s block. The proud, constitutional impatience of the Judges is often talked about.

     

    The eloquent Indian, by name Sri.V.R.Krishna Iyer, said that the Court is not the proprietor of the lawyers. That mesmeric voice exhorted lawyers to meet Kipling’s Triumph and Disaster and treat them just the same, without resembling the portrait of a tragedy.

     

    What makes a judiciary is Judges, not structures. Judges should be conscious of their functions and duties, not only powers, said that legal democrat, an inspiring stimulator and clarifier, Sri.V.R.Krishna Iyer, a man with a broad mind and lofty soul, who never says anything in discouragement; and who commands fundamental respect. 

     

    ‘Sravanam’ seems to be in bad shape in advocacy. Pardon me for saying some pretty unkind things about the legal profession. But ‘the man who cries is the man who feels’. Make no mistake, the legal profession is still noble. The High Court/Supreme Court is the melting pot of justice.

     

    Superfast lawyers and Judges face the risk of derailment.

    Lawyers and Judges seem to suffer from English dialogue blues.

    A good lawyer works sixteen hours in the twenty-four.

     

    Consulting my ‘Commonplace Book’, I find that Sri Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer, who speaks as Homer wrote, once made the immortal statement that an institutional paralysis has gripped the legal profession. A mere receipt of a black jacket does not make a lawyer. A perceptive lawyer should sell his soul to the grammar and idiom of advocacy; remembering that there is certainly ability even in disability.

     

    Lawyers should be earnest to plead for their clients, not to please the Judge.

     

    Let me tell those who are listening to me, without taking my secrets to the grave. And, firstly, of the first: Be possessed of the ingredients of a true lawyer. A lis is unlike the controversy between Robinson Crusoe and Friday, the Savage. Advocacy is not use and mis-use of law. Do not displease a Judge with your familiarity. Law book is the only weapon that is fit for a lawyer’s hands. Lawyers are not cross-dressing robbers. 

     

    My life has been full and fruitful, with defeats and triumphs, experiencing bitter-sweet emotions. I have reached the last mile in advocacy. I am braving disabilities. My inner fire has been extinguished. I am slowly giving up Pollock and Mulla, Wade, etc. in exchange for Shakespeare, Hazlitt, Milton etc. And I feel myself much happier sometimes, indeed, to be in the Old Curiosity Shop section in my library.

     

    Lawyers need to reinvent themselves. Lawyers should live with honourable mind.

    A word to the junior friends, in the Shellian tune, though. Remember, “hard studies and youthful pleasures will not go hand in hand”. Do not spread the pain of advocacy. Advocacy is not a short-term course. Do not expect pole-to-flag win in the professional race. Do not think of portable property alone in the profession.

     

    A lawyer should be a man of miscellaneous education.

     

    There can be opponents in advocacy, but not enemies.

     

    Try to enrich Kerala’s lawyer capital, especially in these days when it looks as though the legal profession has migrated to Delhi.

    Try to attain lawyer maturity. 

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  • Doctors vis-a-vis Industrial Law

    By K.P. Radhakrishna Menon, Judge

    30/07/2007

    Doctors vis-a-vis Industrial Law

    (By Justice K.P.Radhakrishna Menon)

     

    Can a doctor who in legal parlance is called a professional, be termed as a workman under the Industrial Law?

     

    This question no more is res integra in view of the authoritative rulings of the Apex Court; (1) Workmen D.T.E. v. Manager D.T.E. (AIR 1958 SC 353) wherein the Supreme Court has declared the law thus: “In the case before us, Dr.K.P.Banerjee was not a workman. He belonged to the Medical or technical staff - a different category altogether from workmen; and (2) the latest pronouncement in Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Limited v. Swayam Prakash Srivastava and another, reported as Case No.31 in Short Note Part of 2007 (1) KLT at Page 25. Relevant part of this ruling reads: “Furthermore if we draw a distinction between occupation and profession we can see that an occupation is a principal activity (job, work or calling) that earns money (regular wage or salary) for a person and a profession is an occupation that requires extensive training and the study and mastery of specialized knowledge, and usually has a professional association, ethical code and process of certification or licensing. Classically, there were only three professions: Ministry (theology), Medicine and Law. These three professions each hold to a specific code of ethics, and members are almost universally required to swear some form of oath to uphold those ethics, therefore “professing” to a higher standard of accountability. Each of these professions also provides and requires extensive training in the meaning, value and importance of its particular oath in the practice of that profession........... A member of a profession is called professional ............Therefore it is clear that respondent No.1 (Legal Assistant) herein is a professional and never can a professional be termed as a workman under any law”.

     

    It is trite knowledge that a doctor is bound to take Hippocratic oath that he will observe the code of professional ethics and behaviour. Not only that a doctor shall obtain the prescribed license before he/she starts practice. They can be proceeded against for professional misconduct.

     

    The inference irresistible from the dictum of the Supreme Court and the discussion just above is that a doctor is a professional and as such he cannot be termed as a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act or any other law.

     

    However, the Kerala High Court in Mar Baselius Medical Mission Hospital v. Joseph Babu (2007 (1) KLT 783) has held that “a doctor who performs the duties of examining patients, diagnosing their diseases, prescribing medicines, whatever designation by which he is called, would certainly be doing work of a ‘skilled and technical’ nature and therefore would be a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of The Industrial Disputes Act”. This conclusion is based on the finding namely: “The only duties he performs in the hospital is of examining the patients, diagnosing their diseases and prescribing medicines for them. This would certainly come within the ambit of the words “skilled and technical”. Going by this finding even judicial functionaries who belong to the noble profession ‘Law’, can be said to be doing work of a skilled and technical nature as they are hearing the cases, issuing interim orders and pronouncing judgments which judgments are nothing but legal opinions, however enforceable because they bare the stamp of approval of the sovereign, and hence workmen.

     

    While holding so, the learned Judge explained and distinguished the ruling of the Supreme Court in A.Sundarambal case ((2005) 3 SCC 510) where the Supreme Court has found that teachers employed by educational institution, whose main function is imparting of education “cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work, or supervisory work or technical work and as such ‘workmen’. Similarly the declaration of the law discernible from the ruling in In Re S.K.Maini ((1994) 3 SCC 510), that Legal Assistant is not a workman also, the Judge has explained and distinguished to enter the finding that a doctor is a workman.

     

    Restating the legal principles discernible from the above rulings In Re A.Sundarambal and S.K.Maini, the Supreme Court in Re Muir Mills' case (reported as Short Notes in 2007 (1) KLT page 25) has held that “classically, there were only three professions Ministry, Medicine and Law. These three professions, each hold to a specific code of ethics and members are almost universally required to swear some form of oath to uphold those ethics, therefore “professing” to a higher standard of accountability. Each of these professions also provides and requires extensive training in the meaning, value and importance of its particular oath in the practice of that profession. A member of a profession is termed a professional....... and never can a professional be termed as a workman under any law”.

     

    The ruling of the learned Judge, it is submitted, therefore warrants review or reconsideration.

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