A Comment on Leelamma v. Dilip Kumar alias Kochaniyan –

1992 (1) KLT 651

(K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai, B.Sc.(Ker.); LL.M. (Del.); LL.M., S.J.D. (Michigan), Professor of Law, CUSAT, Kochi-682022)

The decision handed down by Justice Chettur Sankaran Nairin Leelamma v.Dilip Kumar alias Kochaniyan (O.P. No. 1074/1987 and O.P. No. 1470/1992 --1992 (1) KLT 651) assumes much importance for several reasons.

It is for the first time that such a ease came up for decision in the Kerala High Court. The facts are quite interesting; the points decided are quite relevant; the reasoning innovating and refreshing and the law laid down is of some consequences.

Leelamma belonging to a Roman Catholic family was married on 2-3-1986 according to custom followed by the Roman Catholics, Dilip Kumar alias Kochaniyan who represented to her that he belonged to a traditional Christian family and that his name was Philip Joseph. After the marriage the husband and wife spent some days in the wife's house. Thereafter they went to the husband's house. It was then that the wife came to know that her husband did not belong to a Christian family. In fact he belonged to an Ezhava family and his father and mother continued to be Ezhava though he was reported to have undergone baptism ceremony before marriage. By the time, the wife's jewellery were misappropriated and she was compelled to have sexual intercourse with his friends. She went back to her parent's house and did not live with her husband thereafter.

The wife petitioned the High Court for a declaration that the marriage is a nullity by reason of fraud practised on her to obtain her consent. Though initially the husband contested the petition after an order of interim alimony he withdrew from the proceedings.

The husband did not care to appear in his O.P. filed for restitution of conjugal rights. Thus there was total withdrawal from the proceedings by the husband. It was in these circumstances that the honourable High Court appointed Shri. Sebastian Champappilly, the author of 'Christian Law' amicus curiae.

The judgment does reflect the adequate homework done by the Court. Its reasoning is appropriate and convincing. It signifies the caution with which the Court arrived at its conclusion (See how the judge reasoned out the conclusion that there was fraud, in his observation extracted at n.23 infra.). It is a good piece reflecting the judicial craftsmanship of Justice Sankaran Nair.

The first question that arose for decision is as to the law applicable to the case. The court found that the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 was not in force in the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin areas of Kerala as has been noticed by the Travancore and Travancore-Cochin High Courts in a series of cases (See Eapen Punnen v. Koruthu Maria, 10 TLR 95, Cheriya Varkey v. Ouseph Thresia, AIR 1955 TC 255, Sirkar v. Mathu Kuruvilla, 11 TLR 33 (FB). Also see S.1 of the Act.) Though in Sirkar v. Mathu Kuruvilla (11 TLR 33) the Full Bench of Travancore High Court opined that the customary law had predominance over canon law in the case of followers of the protestant churches, it seems that the courts had been taking the view that the canon law coupled with customary law applied to the Roman Catholic Christians in Kerala in the matter of marriages. In the case of Christians in other parts of India also it has been accepted that the personal law, which governs Roman Catholics is the Law of Church of Rome (See Lopez v. Lopez, ILR 12 Cal. 706, Lucas v. Lucas, ILR 32 Gal. 187, Saldhana v. Saldhana, AIR 1930 Bom. 105). Here the petitioner is undoubtedly governed by canon law. The husband was converted into Christianity and moreover, opted to undergo the ceremony according to the custom of Roman Catholics. As such the law that should govern the marriage in this case is undoubtedly the canon law applicable to the community to which the wife belongs. This accords well with the position obtaining in private international law. This principle is echoed in Lakshmi Sanyal v. S.K. Dhar, AIR 1972 SC 2667. Also see the reasoning in Jude v. Jude, (AIR 1940 Cal. 75), wherein the Supreme Court pinpointed this aspect thus:

"The question of capacity to marry and impediments in the way of marriage would have to be resolved by referring to their personal law. That, for the purpose of deciding the validity of marriage, would be the law of the Roman Catholic Church, namely, the canon law of that church." (Ibid at 2672).

Thus, judged by the canon law the court found that an error concerning the person renders the marriage invalid. Here, there was indeed an error concerning the person inasmuch as he was not the person of the background which she thought him to be. According to the wife he misrepresented to her that he belonged to a traditional Syrian Christian family. It was on this belief that she consented to the marriage. (See at p.3 of the judgment). Thus an erroneous belief was induced in the wife by the husband 'concerning a quality of his', namely religious faith or religious status. This is what the court found to be fraud in the meaning of S.19, and certainly in canon law, that made the wife to consent to the marriage. The court cited T.O. Aykut v. M.O. Aykut, (AIR 1940 Cal. 75) to support its stand that misrepresentation of the religious status might amount to fraud. In Jude v. Jude (AIR 1949 Cal. 503) also the Calcutta High Court found such misrepresentation to be fraud. The court has therefore declared the marriage null and void.

Looked in this perspective it was not necessary for the court to express any opinion as to who is a Christian. Indeed, the court has not gone beyond what the Allahabad and Madras High Courts had ruled (See Maharam v. Emperor, AIR 1918 All. 168, Pakiam Solomon v. Ohelliah Filial, AIR 1924 Mad. 18). However, it may be pointed out that the determining factor of a person being Christian should not either be baptism or professing the Christian religion but his being accepted by the community as Christian. This has to be the definition atleast for the purpose of marriage inasmuch as it is a social institution and it is the society's acceptance which is material for the ceremonies like marriages. Indeed, the declaration of nullity of the marriage in question may be accepted by the church and the wife permitted to contract a second marriage. But suppose, the eparchial tribunal does not recognise the verdict of the High Court and does not permit her to contract second marriage. The whole exercise of the High Court then goes a waste of time and energy.

Quite often Christian marriages are dissolved under the canon law by the eparchial tribunals in our country if there was any defect in the essentials of a marriage. However," though our courts have been maintaining that it is the canon law which applies in such cases, they have been denying jurisdiction to eparchial tribunal to declare the marriage null and void. They have been insisting that they alone have jurisdiction.

Many reasons are mentioned in support of this view. In Saroja David v. Christie Francis (AIR 1966 AP. 178), the A.P. High Court traced the history of this jurisdiction. It has been pointed out by the Court that originally this jurisdiction rested with the ecclesiastical courts in England and from them the Supreme Court in India inherited it. From the Supreme Court our High Courts came to inherit this jurisdiction. The High Court's jurisdiction has been reiterated by Delhi High Court also in J. F.S. Eric D' Souza v. Florence Martha (AIR 1980 Del. 275).

The Kerala High Court has also been rendering a series of decisions on the question of jurisdiction of eparchial tribunal. In Kurian v. Alphonsa (1986 KLT 731) Justice Sreedharan disregarded the Eparchial Tribunal's order dissolving the marriage on the ground of defect of wife's consent due to insanity and ruled that Eparchial Tribunals cannot adjudicate upon dissolution of marriage so as to affect the civil rights of the parties to the marriage. He observed:

"Whatever be the jurisdiction of Eparchial Tribunal in ecclesiastical matters it cannot affect the civil rights of the parties. Rights flowing out of a legal marriage cannot be interfered with by the Eparchial Tribunal". (Ibid at 733).

It was a case where the wife's claim for maintenance was resisted by the husband on the ground that the marriage was declared null and void by the Eparchial Tribunal. Still the court described it as a legal marriage from which flowed the civil liability to maintain the wife. In other words it refused to recognise the declaration by the Eparchial Tribunals.

In Gabriel Antony v. Thresya Grace, (1987 (1) KLT 690) Thomas, J. ventured to examine the legal position. According to him a Christian marriage becomes void under S.19 only when a High Court decrees so. His Lordship argues that the word Void' inS.19 of the Divorce Act shall subject to the context means "voidable" as well. And as such it is only when on the option of either parties, the High Court passes a decree on the nullity of the marriage, a marriage becomes null and void. The Eparchial Tribunal does not have any say in the matter. He distinguished the decisions in Yamuna Bai Anantrao's case (The Bombay High Court's decision reported in 1983 Crl. LJ. 259 (FB). Later it was affirmed by the Supreme Court, ((1988) 1 SCC 530) saying that S.11 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 by itself declares certain marriages null and void even without the requirement of a decree passed by the High Court whereas S.19 of the Divorce Act requires such a decree.

The decision in Gabriel was followed in Jose v. Alice (1988 (2) KLT 890), in which also the Eparchial Court gave a declaration of nullity on the ground of defect of consent, The court observed:

If either of the parties does not choose to file a petition as contemplated by S. 18 the marriage is not rendered void even if any of the grounds capable of invalidating the marriage is present and available to the parties to have recourse to the procedure established by the Act. When S. 18 gives only an option to the parties to present a petition for a decree declaring the marriage null and void, it cannot be said that the marriage is ipse jure for the reason of ground 2 to 4 mentioned in S.19 of the Act. It is also not correct to say that these grounds do not postulate any adjudication." (Ibid at 896. The court has relied on supra n.11 and 12).

In this connection it may be pertinent to point out that the Jose court has taken the marriage as solemnized in accordance with S.5 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 (See para.11 of supra n. 18). The Kurien Court has also taken the marriage to be a legal one on the ground that it was solemnized in accordance with customary law. (see supra n.14). It is however to be noted that the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 is not applicable to erstwhile Travancore and Cochin States. As such, it would be appropriate to say that the above courts took the position that the validity of marriages is to be determined under the customary law applicable to Christians in these areas. It is indeed the correct position.

Be that as it may, it appears that the Indian Christian Marriage Act and the Indian Divorce Act may act as a code complementing each other. As such if the Marriage Act is not applicable and the validity of marriage is determined by church law the Divorce Act may not work well. In this view, the relevant part of Divorce Act should not have been applied in the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin areas inasmuch as divorce or nullity out of the church was unheard among Travancore-Cochin Christians because of the pivotal role the church plays in marriage and divorce.

At present while in the case of dissolution of a Christian marriage on the ground of its being null and void, a decree by the District Court/High Court is insisted upon, in the case of certain Hindu marriages, no such decree is insisted upon on the gound that such marriages are declared null and void by the statute itself (See discussions in Gabriel's case supra n.16). In fact if this argument is extended to the case of Travancore-Cochin Christians it becomes clear that the declaration of nullity of their marriages should be done by their church because the validity or otherwise of such marriages is 'declared' by their customary law through the instrumentality of Eparchial Tribunals.

Viewed in this perspective, it can be argued that if the court is ready to concede jurisdiction of civil/criminal courts to take cognizance of the nullity of a Hindu marriage by virtue of the declaratory language employed in S.11 of the Hindu Marriage Act nothing should stand in the way of a court to accept a nullity order given by an eparchial court which must have, in the light of the circumstances and its experiences, gone into all aspects of the case, to accept the latter's decision on the nullity question.

There is no dispute that the capacity to marry, the essentials of marriage and the rules of ceremony etc. are governed by the church in Kerala. The impact of the courts' decisions is that while the church has the right to determine whether a marriage is to be solemnized, if subsequently something goes wrong such as defect in consent, only because the Divorce Act is made applicable, its validity can be decided by the District Court/High Court. The sum part of this argument becomes evident when a person whose marriage has been declared null and void by the Court is seeking remarriage. The church in Kerala may not allow him to remarry. He can of course go through a civil marriage. Church may not recognise it. If on the other hand, the High Court does not recognize the dissolution granted by the Church and the person remarries through the church, he faces the threat of prosecution for bigamy by the first spouse. Thus, the Christians in the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin areas seem to be in a dilemma.

Since the Christians in these parts constitute a separate class for the purposes of marriage and divorce having regard to the tight grip of the church on them it would be in the fitness o* things if Ss. 18 & 19 of the Divorce Act are not made applicable to them. The eparchial court being the custodian of canon law may be conferred with the jurisdiction to decide the question concerning dissolution of Christian marriages.

In the context of the facts presented in the case under comment, the High Court was perfectly justified in declaring' the marriage null and void. (The Court observed: "Having heard the evidence and watched her demeanour, I am inclined to accept the evidence of the wife, and I do so. I find that the husband had made a false representation, knowing it to be so and obtained consent of the wife to marriage, by practising fraud.) However, as mentioned earlier, it is doubtful whether the church would permit the petitioner to remarry. Thus the very purpose of obtaining a declaration maybe defeated. It is therefore felt that a thorough revision of the Saw in this sector by the Parliament is the desideratum. The court has again provided a chance for rethinking. It is now for the reformers to take up the challenge.

Lady Chatterley's Lover

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

One of the most important teachings of the early Christian fathers was that sex was sinful and it was better to marry than to be consumed with lust. A glorification of virginity resulted in chastity being virtually identified with absolute celibacy. And yet only 700 years ago Saint Thomas Aquinas did permit pre-marital intercourse between those who were formally betrothed - on the understanding that they would not desert afterwards.

This sexual attitude lasted well past Shakespeare's day and is precisely the morality which some have adopted today. The great hardening of this Western attitude-apart from a temporary rigour under Cromwell when adultery was made a capital offence-came when the Victorian middle classes set the moral tone in English society.

Some civilizations - among the Asians as well as the Eskimos -frown heavily on adultery, but offer the company of a host's wife to an over-night guest because they do not believe that it impairs anyone's chastity. In other communities unlimited sexual intercourse is permitted as most natural to young people before marriage and strict monogamy expected afterwards.

Are ideals of continence and virginity to be permanently abandoned in a long orgy of sexual licence -or are they merely cast up for re-examination, new thinking and responsible decisions on accepted morality?

It could have been only against such a background of diverse moral notions existing in different parts of the globe that two diverse judicial pronouncements were made, one in England and the other in India regarding a common issue:

"Whether the controversial novel 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' literary masterpiece of the celebrated author D.H. Lawrence - is obscene literature or not."

The novel earned a general reprieve in the Central Criminal Court in London in November 1960 when it was held that to read of the exploits of Constance (Lady Chatterley) would not 'deprave and corrupt' the reader. The contention of the prosecution that the book commended sensuality' almost as a virtue' was rejected. In May 1961, the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate of Bombay held that the book is obscene, in an eighteen page judgment in a case in which four partners of a bookstall in South Bombay were charged for having been in possession of unexpurgated copies of the novel.

It is not my purpose to criticise these judgments but some considerations mainly pertaining to literary criticism might be advanced. It is difficult to say where frank literature ends and pornography begins. In the controversial novel we come across intimate descriptions of about a dozen sexual intercourses in the minutest detail where the heroine Constance (Lady Chatterley) commits adultery with their game-keeper. The book by itself is said to be a satire on the upper class aristocracy. Nevertheless, its potentiality as one of the best literary pieces of the present era could not be underrated.

What is pornography? A serious attempt has been made in America to distinguish between acceptable books which contain passages of erotic realism and sheer pornography which sets out simply to titillate. The stream of smut books in France makes no attempt to describe life as it is really lived, even in the most depraved circumstances. Its chief feature is its deliberate unreality. Psychiatrists analysing the structure of such stories find the writers deliberately seizing on our strongest taboos, religious and otherwise. They detect wishful thinking, an exaggerated revolt against all the social rules of sex. In the American analysis' Pornography and the Law' by Dr. Eberhard the two categories of books appear quite unmistakably different - the one true to life and the other full of sex - fantasy and Freudian Nightmare. But the law still makes no clear distinction between these two classes of writings. Both types tend to be lumped together.

Coming back to that amiable young lady, Lady C, many famous books of the past are open to the objection now advanced against the novel of D.H. Lawrence. The 'Memoirs of Casanova' and even 'Candide' of Voltaire and some of Anatole France's novels are, a Puritan would say, tarred with the same brush. Yet no liberal education could be complete without these books. The very task of regulating literature is repugnant to the far-ranging human spirit; it is clearly inadmissible that Authority should be entrusted with the task of regulating literature. To crib, cabin and confine literature is clearly inadvisable.

The arms of Law, are very long; but then let Her Majesty, the Law think twice before it touches the sanctum - sanctorum of the Goddess of Literature.

On War Crimes

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

A war is on - a clash between Islamic fundamentalism and American oil-grabbism. Whatever may be the final outcome, after some years both the countries will rue the passing of the final hours in which both would have averted the war. As an inevitable sequel, there will be many prisoners of war, an economic fall-out on the developing countries and finally a dramatic trial of ‘war criminals’?

War crimes and trial of war criminals are not anything new in the history of mankind.

During the 1939-45 World War, it was estimated that the Germans killed twelve million people which the allied victors considered had made them responsible for the most appalling crime against humanity. For, these people were 'liquidated' by the most unimaginable methods. Total technological resources were called into play, Scientists, Engineers, Doctors, indeed a whole nation, in order to achieve this. At the Nuremberg trial of the twenty two major German war-criminals, a competent observer has emphasised that there was seldom a hint of contrition, on the contrary every effort was made to justify these deeds. There seemed no consciousness of responsibility and in fact given the chance 'they would go through it all again'.

The four charges were (1) the common plan or conspiracy (2) crimes against peace (3) war crimes (4) crimes against humanity. The first two charges were generally concerned with the planning and waging of wars of aggression in violation of international treaties. Charges three and four concerned systematic murder, torture and forced labour, death marches, gas chambers, crematoria, concentration camps etc. At many of the concentration camps, the motto of the action groups was "He*who enters this camp shall leave it only by the chimney of the crematorium!' Four million people were exterminated at Auschwitz camp; one and a half million at the Majdenek concentration camp. Entire villages were shot or burned alive. Thousands of tons of fertilizers were made from the crushed bones of the burnt corpses.

In Hitler's presence doubt, questions and anxieties dissolved before the simplicity of his actions, that primal simplicity of destruction and annihilation. He followed a course which brought him to the summit of power and an even more helpless dependence. In the war years skulking in deep retreat and in the early march with Hindenberg, one of the first to run. And at the end, in the Berlin bunker not even Germany meant anything to him! Only death, destruction, the whole world in flames and the saving of his own ego. 'Having known men, I prefer dogs!' said Hitler near the end. Of the thousands who took part in the Jewish massacres, very few have been tried; in fact the great majority of technicians, medical experts etc. who had taken part in the extermination programme have simply vanished, let alone be tried. It is said that the German firm of Tesch and Stabenow from Hamburg made a gross profit of 1,28,000 marks in 1943 for the supply of Cyclone B. Gas. 'My conscience is the Fuhrer', Goring had said, General Ohlendroff, in charge of the Ukranian massacres had predicted 'The future would find my firing squads as efficient as the press-button killers of the atom bomb'.

Though lacking the technological implementation of the Germans that resulted in the extermination of millions of human beings the Japanese war crimes were unsurpassed in sheer horror, brutality, ferocity and blood carnage. The path of the invading Japanese army was one of humiliation, degradation, sadism, rape regardless of age or sex, prisoner of war or civilian.

As with the Germans, these war crimes were backed by a certain and indeed very similar ideology, and were quite purposefully planned by those at the top. The leaders were convinced of and preparing for Japan's divine mission to rule the world. Methods used during the war in China which dragged on throughout the 30's were a foretaste of things to come. The climax was reached with the "Rape of Nanking" in 1937. Within three days of its occupation by Japanese tropps, 12000 men, women and children had been slaughtered. Rape was the order of the day. The gutters streamed with blood and the streets were strewn with mutilated corpses. Twenty thousand men were marched outside the city walls, machine-gunned and bayonetted. Another 30000 were lined up of the Yangtse and machine-gunned.

Regarding the treatment of POWs during the 1939-45 war, the Japanese were still signatories to the Hague Convention of 1907 which quite unambiguously lays down a minimum of human decency to which such captured troops are entitled. But just as Germany's paganism proved far stronger than its X'tianity, the deep seated national-religious currents prevalent in Japan, proved far stronger than the Hague Convention. To construct the Burma-Siam Railway the lives of 42000 coolies and 16000 POWs were sacrificed. The hellish conditions were reminiscent of the German Concentration Camps in their last stages. Thousands of living skeletons putrefying with rampant tropical disease and ulcers that stripped the flesh from knee to ankle almost naked, were made to work or starve.

For whom are the bells tolling every New Year? About half a century has rolled away after the last great war. Outside on the international scene, we hear the din of the charging youth and angry young men who swear that the old order should change and yield peace to new. But what is the change-except L.S.D. visions and skirts that are going up and down-mini and maxi? The major crimes of humanity are the same and continue with added velocity. The old Neros and Hitlers atleast stopped fiddling when Rome and Berlin burnt down, but modern leaders with dictatorial leanings continue fiddling even after the event!

An Epistle from Charles Dickens

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

“Base and shameful England! There is no justice in this country”

The words rang like a clear bell and the packed Court hall of Old Bailey which had witnessed many a criminal trial swayed a hit at the electrifying statement which came from the slender woman dressed, severely in black satin standing in the dock. On the Bench Mr. Justice Cressel (who pronounced the death sentence on this woman) squirmed restlessly.

"I tell you, my lord", she continued "this verdict the jury has returned will rest on their consciences hereafter. I am not treated like a Christian but like a wild beast of the forest."

She was still shouting when the Judge pronounced the death sentence.

England-1849...It was the same old story of two men and a woman; a saga that had trailed humanity ever since Adam had tasted the forbidden fruit. The prisoner in the dock was Maria De Reuxa Swiss maid employed by the Duches of Sutherland. She was indicted for the murder of Pat O' Connor, an Irishman. The meeting of Maria and Pat had ripened into friendship and with the relentless arrows of Cupid, the friendship ripened into something else. But for Patrick O' Connor, the Swiss lady meant business and business meant marriage. In a fit of pique and to cure a growing sense of frustration she switched her continental charms from Pat O' Connor to one Fred Manning and they became man and wife at St. James Church, Piccadilly. Manning was a railway guard; but subsequently he was out of employment and also turned out to be a pauper. And then 'ideas' began to take shape! Together they invited Pat O'Connor. Maria's old flame. And when Pat came he had a wad of securities with him as good as spot cash. A crow-bar, a shovel and some quicklime did the rest of the business. Pat O' Connor was murdered and his body was buried in the scullery of the house of Fred. Fred Manning sold the first batch of securities for 110 and when Fred returned with the second batch unsold, Maria knew that the police was on their trial. And when the next day Fred returned after his ramblings Maria was gone with everything worth taking! Left on his own Fred also panicked and hurriedly he caught the boat train to Jersey.

Meanwhile all Britain was looking for Fred and his wife. Detectives trying to trace the missing Irishman had found Manning's home deserted. Their search ended when they dug up some freshly cemented flagstones in the scullery. They found the late Mr. O' Connor very dusty with quicklime and minus his clothes. Maria was arrested in Scotland trying to dispose of some railway bonds.

xx                        xx                               xx                                    xx           

The aforesaid outburst of Maria, the woman who donned black satin, during the course of her trial earned her a great gathering for the public hanging. Ten thousand Londoners watched the slim woman in black satin keeping her appointment with the hangman!

In the crowd that watched was Charles Dickens, the immortal English novelist. He had no liking for what he saw and wrote a seething letter to the press. That letter started an outcry that twenty years later, resulted in the abolition of public hangings.

The End of an Era

(T.G. John, Advocate, Thrissur)

In July last, Thurgood Marshall, the only Afro-American ever to serve as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court gave up the seat he had held since 1967. He was approaching his eighty third birthday.

Thurgood Marshall was the only member of the U.S. Supreme Court who knew how it felt to be called a 'nigger'. In the 1940's and 1950's when he roamed the Court rooms of the South as Chief Counsel for the Legal Defense Fund for the advancement of coloured people, Marshall suffered all the indignities of segregation. He once told a Judge in North Carolina he had eaten the same meal in the same restaurant where the Judge dined the night before, with one difference. "You had yours in the dining room" said Marshall", I had mine in the kitchen".

Very little about the law was abstract to Marshall He not only suffered its worst failure, the long reign of legal segregation, but he was also the architect of one of its greatest triumphs. He was the victorious attorney in Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 landmark decision prohibiting racial segregation in public schools. As a judge, Marshall helped to change American law. As a civil right lawyer he changed America. In 1967, when Lyndon Johnson chose him as the first ‘black’ Supreme Court Justice, Marshall was a man resolved to continue the revolution he had helped to set in motion.

Thurgood Marshall was born in Baltimore, Maryland in 1908 when the city was segregated, as any in the deep South. Because the University of Maryland law barred blacks, Marshall gave up hope of attending there. He went instead to the all-black law school of Howard University which in the 1930's was being transformed into a training ground for lawyers who could challenge segregation in the courts. After graduation Marshall worked as a lawyer. One of his first major cases forced the integration of the same University of Maryland law school which he was unable to attend. As he travelled through the South, Marshall was routinely threatened. More than once he found himself facing a white racist with a gun. Undaunted, Marshall and his team of lawyers laid the legal groundwork" for the celebrated case Brown v. Board of Education. Marshall convinced the court that the 14th amendment of the American Constitution would not allow segregation. His problem was the Court's long-held view that separate but equal facilities were constitutional. But Marshall convinced the Court that there was no such thing as equality in a system of separation and that the very act of separation stigmatised individuals.

It was due to failing health that Thurgood Marshall retired at the age of 83. His last words from the Bench were a stinging rebuke to the court's conservative majority. His dissenting judgment in a 6 to 3 decision was like thunder: 'Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decision making...... Cast aside today are those condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's victims may be minorities, women or the indigent'.