What A Fall -- Friends?

(By K. Ramakumar, Sr. Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

Seniority in every walk of life is a proud achievement, which undoubtedly has to be earned or acquired and not adjured or canvassed. Like respect, it has to be commanded and not demanded. Unfortunately, even in one of the oldest professions in the world and considered honourable and learned there is open pettifogging for recognition of seniority at official levels. To aggravate the situation, Writ Petitions have been filed not only in the Supreme Court but in Meghalaya, Karnataka and Kerala High Courts questioning the designation of some Lawyers as Seniors, of-course by other Lawyers.

What a pitiable and piffling predicament? Intensely distressed no less a person than our venerable Chief Justice of India had declared in open Court “We are open to correct the system, but challenging past designation is not good for the Bar. There should be some comity at the Bar”. The Hon’ble Chief Justice was making comments at the time when the Apex Court was dealing with a petition questioning the very mechanism of designation of Lawyers as Senior Advocates by the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice also suggested that Lawyers should “place some confidence in the collective wisdom of the Bench”.

However, the most significant observation made by the Hon’ble Chief Justice is as follows: “Some time, even we are surprised that someone has emerged successful (in getting designated).”

How could this happen in an institution primarily established to uphold the rules and the rule of law. Lawless law Courts are beyond the imagination of an ordinary citizen. Ultimately the Hon’ble Chief Justice said “Whatever has happened has happened. Intervene and argue on what should be the system of designation we are open to correcting the system”.

The Hon’ble Chief Justice was candid enough to concede “there are no statutory norms for designating Advocates”. This indeed raises a piquant and pertinent question, ‘how can the Apex Court and the High Courts engage in entangling themselves with a crucial issue touching the very dignity and prestige of the Bar, in the absence of statutory rules’? It appears only the High Court of Bombay has firm and definite rules regarding designation of Advocates as Seniors. No other High Court has framed rules so far. This definitely will lead to misuse, for which indubitably some sections of the Bar are prone to. Seniority is not only sought after but also fought after. Coteries, caucuses and cliques never do any good to the noble profession. How do the learned Judges who are not expected to be familiar with the antecedents, capacity, character, knowledge, and maturity, etc., of all lawyers practicing before them, fix upon one of them as a Senior Advocate without any norms to guide them in that matter. It must be said to the credit of one of the prominent chartered High Courts of the country, the Mumbai High Court that it has not only stuck to the rules framed by it but by and large has been sagacious in the matter of choosing Lawyers to be conferred with the honour of Senior designation. In all other High Courts including in the Apex Court absence of Rule has led to lobbying and the consequent discontentment among a wide section of the Bar. It gives no credit either to the givers or to the takers. Absence of parameters always paves the way to arbitrariness. Like in any other field unmeritorious often queue up and finally make it as the Hon’ble Chief Justice had the courage to admit.

In no other profession there exists the system of conferring seniority. There are no Senior Doctors, no Senior Architects, no Senior Scientists and no Senior Engineers. The very system, which often works out to invidious discrimination therefore, needs a second look. In a democratic country we need not blindly copy the pattern of English Courts. We can make a beginning to charter our own course. Sooner it is done the better, for ensuring the integrity and credibility of judicial institutions.

Judges on Strike: Lessons to Learn

(By Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate, Supreme Court and  Kerala High Court)

The total bedlam in the Telangana judiciary has left an indelible scar in the country’s legal history.  Very many Judges across the new State behaved abominably when they called for ‘High Court bandh’ (a new brand indeed) and threatened of availing mass casual leave (which the service rules are unable to tackle).  The advocates fulsomely supported the Judges and they could practically lock the court premises scattered over the ten districts in Telangana.  Altogether eleven Judges are suspended by the High Court at Hyderabad.  The effrontery by the bar and the bench reflected a peculiar category of judicial jingoism that refuses to share even a common High Court for the two States which enjoyed geographical and political syncretism till the bifurcation in 2014.

The “Bangalore principles of judicial conduct” is a fine instrument of Indian origin that captured international recognition.  It was accepted in its revised form at the Round Table Conference of the Chief Justices held at The Hague in 2002.  The principles require the Judges of all ranks to ‘exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct, in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary” and to “avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety” and “accept personal restrictions”.  The Telangana episode is apparently antithetical to the grandeur of the ‘Bangalore values’.  Winston Churchill put it pithily: “A form of life and conduct more severe and restricted than that of ordinary people is required from Judges”.

One should not however, underestimate the concerns expressed by the agitators at the grass root level.  The Subordinate judiciary is the supreme judiciary for the majority of the people in India.  In All India Judges Association case (1991), the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of district judiciary which performs the sovereign functions of the State.  In essence, every Judge is bound to be an epitome of the Constitution.

The Telangana Judges’ Association seems to have a genuine concern about the provisional allocation of Judges between the two States.  As against the cadre strength of 335 Judges in Telangana, only 190 are ‘natives’ and others are from Andhra Pradesh, it is bemoaned.  The protesters  demanded the “Andhra Judges” to “quit Telangana”.  Also they demand a separate High Court for the newly formed State.

Article 3 of the Constitution enables “formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing State”.  The State of Telangana is formed by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014.  The statute envisaged a clear bifurcation of the State in the executive and the legislative realm.  However, Section 30 of the Act in a consolatory gesture said that, for the time being, the High Court at Hyderabad would remain as the common High Court for both the States.  Section 31, on the other hand,   by way of a predictive note, prescribes separate High Courts for both the States.  Thus the political division which the Telangana could attain was not translated to judicial level.  The judiciary at Telangana, for a variety of reasons, finds itself uncomfortable with the control exercised by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

Judicial federalism is a constitutional virtue. The High Courts in the country are older than the Supreme Court.  Article 214 of the Constitution only says that “there should be a High Court for each State”.  It does not make it mandatory that each State has to have a separate High Court.  Democratic harmony in Indian Federalism has however materialised common High Courts for a few States.  Gauhati High Court exercises jurisdiction over Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland and Mizoram.  Punjab and Haryana share a single High Court.  Bombay High Court encompasses Maharashtra, Goa, Dadra, Daman and Diu. Lakshadweep is under the Kerala High Court and the Andaman Nicobar Islands are under the Calcutta High Court.   Puducherry,  a different terrain, subjects itself to Madras High Court.

However, the story of Telangana is ostensibly different.  People in the new State can have legitimate reasons and justifications to demand judicial autonomy and independence.  But the means to  attain the end also needs to be equally legitimate.  The judicial tinderbox in Telangana is the manifestation of the deeper fissure between the two States at political, economic and cultural levels.   But the method of agitation by the robed brethren had only exacerbated the situation.  The suspension orders by the High Court, which refused to strike a code with the political and historical sentiments emanated from the judicial citizenry in Telangana has only aggravated the judicial dismemberment. Federalism and decentralisation do not halt with the powers accrued on the High Court.  It should travel further, down to earth.  A separate High Court for Telangana would help maintaining the quintessential relation between the court and the people.

(The above article was originally published in Deccan Herald dated 2.7.2016).

sXmgnen \nbat`ZKXnIÄ

(By Thampan Thomas, Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Kerala High Court)

C´ybn \nehnepÅ 54 tI{µ sXmgn \nba§-fpw 100 ]cw kwØm\ \nba§fpw X§fpsS hyhkmb kwcw`§fpsS hfÀ¨bv¡v hne§pXSnbmbn \n¡p¶p;  Ah t`ZKXn sN¿Wsa¶XmWv C´ybnse sXmgnepSaIfpsS \nc´camb Bhiyw. BtKmfoIcW {]{Inbbn sXmgn taJebn \nb{´W§Ä¡v Øm\ansöpw, Xpd¶ hn]W\ taJebn aXvkc¯n\mWv {]m[m\ysa¶pw, BbXn\m DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIsf A\nb{´nXambn NqjWw sN¿m³ X§Ä¡p IgnbWsa¶pw AhÀ hmZn¡p¶p. sXmgnemfnIsf \nban¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\papÅ AhImiw, X§Ä¡v kzbm¯amsW¶pw, aÕc It¼mf¯n GXpXcw DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIfmWv D]tbmKnt¡IsX¶v Xocpam\n¡m\pÅ AhImihpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡msW¶XpamWv AhcpsS Imgv¨¸mSv. tImÀ¸tdäpIfpsS k½À±¯n\v hg§n C´ym Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ ]pXnb sXmgn \nba ]cnjv¡mc§Ä ASp¯v Xs¶ ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v AwKoIcn¡phm\nSbpIv. CXnt\mSIw CXn\mbn _nÃpIfpsS IcSpcq]hpw, XrI£n NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv Ìm³Un§v I½ÁnbpsS \S]Sn {Ia§fpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn. C´ybnse sXmgnemfn, sXmgnepSa, Kh¬saâv {]Xn\n[nIfS§p¶ D¶X A[nImc kanXnbmb C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³knsâ ip]mÀiIÄ adnIS¶p sImImWv Cu \o¡w. DXv]mZ\ {]{Inbbnse Xpey]¦mfnbmb sXmgnemfn CtXmsS k¼qÀ®ambn ]mÀizhXv¡cn¡s¸SpIbmWv. ]p¯³ kmt¦XnI  hnZyIfpw, LS\m]camb amähpw sXmgn taJebpsS a\pjy apJw Xs¶ ]msS amÁn.

hmPvt]bn Kh¬saânsâ Im-e-¯v 2002 2-mw sXmgn I½oj\mbn \nban¨ {io. Pn.cho{µhÀ½ I½oj³ \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfpsS ad]änbmWv ]p¯³ sXmgn  \nba t`ZKXnIÄ. {io. Pn. cho{µhÀ½bpsS ip]mÀiIfn AkwLSnX taJe Hgn¨pÅ FÃm   ip]mÀiIfpw   C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³kv  \ncmIcn¨XmWv. PkvÁnÊv KtP{µ KUvIÀ sNbÀam\mb 1-mw sXmgn I½oj³ 1967 \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfmWv sXmgnemfnIÄ¡v \nehnepÅ tkh\ thX\ hyhØ \nba ]cnc£bneqsS Dd¸phcp¯nbXv.

sXmgn \nba§fpsS ASnØm\ ZÀi\w \½psS  `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§fnepw, \nÀtZiI XXz§fnepw AS§nbncn¡p¶p. A´ÀtZiob  sXmgn am\ZÞ§Ä \nÝbn¡s¸«n«pÅ ILObpsS 189 I¬h³j\pIfpw, 200 ]cw ip]mÀiIfpw, {]tab§fpw temIs¯¼mSpapÅ sXmgn \nba§fpsS \nba XXz kwlnX (Basic Jurisprudence)BWv. C´ybnse ap³ Kh¬saâpIÄ C¶v \ne\n¡p¶ sXmgn \nba§Ä cq]s¸Sp¯pt¼mÄ Chbmbncp¶p AhcpsS amÀ¤tcJ. sXmgn \nba§Ä Hcp Welfare\nbasa¶ \nebn {]tXyI ]cnKW\IÄ \ÂIn kwc£n¡s¸«ncp¶p. sXmgn AhImi§sf am\pjnI Ah-Imi§fmbn ]cnKWn¡pIbpw a\pjys\ NqjWw sN¿p¶ k{¼Zmb§Ä \nb{´n¡phm³ Ch D]bpàamhpIbpw sNbvXp.

C¶v Xpd¶ It¼mf¯n hnIk\¯nsâ adhn sXmgnemfnIsf \nkmchXv¡cn¨v aqe[\w sXmgnemfn¡v ta k¼qÀ® B[n]Xyw Øm]n¨ncn¡pIbmWv. AXn\m ]c¼cmKXambn A\phÀ¯n¨p h¶ncp¶ kwLS\m kzmX{´yhpw, Iq«mb hnet]iepw, \nba ]cnc£bpw Hgnhm¡phm\mWv sXmgnepSaIfpw, Kh¬saâpw B{Kln¡p¶Xv.

hyhkmb _Ô \nbaw (Labour Code on Industrial Relations 2015)

1947se sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbahpw, 1928se t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbahpw, 1948se C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSpw t{ImUoIcn¨v Hcp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n\v Kh¬saâv cq]w sImSp¯ncn¡p¶p. Cu \nba¯nsâ IcSp  hyhØIsfIpdn¨v cIv XrI£n  NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv sXmgnÂImcy kaXnbpsS NÀ¨Ifpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn«pIv. Hcp ]s£ Cu _nÃv F{Xbpw thKw ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v  \nbaw B¡s¸Sphm\nSbpIv. sXmgnemfnbpw, sXmgnepSabpw, Dev]mZ\ taJebnse Xpey ]¦mfnIsf¶ AwKoIrX kahmIyw Xncp¯n¡pdn¨v sXmgnepSabv¡p taÂssI \evIp¶XmWv hyhkmb _Ô tImUv. sXmgnepSabv¡pw, sXmgnemfnbv¡pw, at²y kÀ¡mcnsâ \n£v]£X F¶Xv amän Kh¬saâv sXmgnepSa ]£¯v tNcp¶p. t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbaw d±v sNbvXv ]pXnb tImUn bqWnb\pIfpsS cq]oIcWw t]mepw Akm[yam¡n¯oÀ¡p¶p.  ]pdta \n¶pw, bqWnb\p IÄ¡v t\Xm¡Ä ]mSnÃ. DsI¦n Xs¶ AXv AkwLSnX taJebn am{Xw. A§s\ HcmÄ¡v `mchmlnbmIp¶ bqWnb\pIÄ cIp am{Xw. Øm]\§fn \n¶pw, s]³j\mb hÀ¡v t\XrXz Øm\§Ä GsäSp¡m³ AtbmKyX, sXmgnemfn bqWnb\pIÄ¡v Political Fund  cq]oIcn¡m\hImianÃ. bqWnb\pIÄ cPnÌÀ sN¿m³  Npcp§n-b-Xv 100 t]À AsÃ-¦n 10 iXam\w Poh\¡mÀ At]£n¡Ww. ]WnapS¡pIÄ ]qÀ®ambpw \nb{´W hnt[bw. \nba hncp² ]WnapS¡pIÄ¡v Pbn in£.  sXmgnepSaIÄ sXmgnemfnIfpambn t\cn«v IcmÀ DIm¡mw. Iq«mb hnet]ien\pw kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯n\p ta I¯n hbv¡p¶ GÀ¸mSv. CXv `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§-fnÂs¸Sp¶ 19mw A\ptOZw A\phZn¡p¶ kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯nsâbpw, ILObpsS 87, 98 F¶o tImÀI¬h³j\pIfp sSbpw \Kv\amb ewL\w. sXmgnemfnIÄ Poh³ sImSp¯v t\SnsbSp¯ am\pjnImhImi §Ä Cu t`ZKXnbneqsS FSp¯p Ifbp¶p. ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n Aenªp tNcp¶ asämcp \nbaamWv  C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSv.  \nehn Cu \nbaw hyhkmb Øm]\§fnse Poh\¡mcpsS tkh\ hyhØIÄ \nÀ®bn¡p¶p. Poh\¡mÀ s¡XnscbpÅ A¨S¡ \S]SnIÄ, {]tamj\pIÄ, ^mIvSdnbn A\phÀ¯nt¡INpaXeIÄ, ØeamÁ§Ä XpS§nbh ]qÀ®ambpw sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw  \evIp¶ XmWv t`ZKXn sN¿s¸« \nbaw. CXnse XrI£n _Ôhpw, Kh¬saânsâ CSs]Sepw ]msS CÃmbva sN¿pIbmWv. sXmgnepSabv¡p A\nb{´nXamb A[nImcw  \evIp¶ \nba ]cnjv¡mcw. Hire and Fire(\nban¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\pw) sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw \evIp¶ \nba t`ZKXn. Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSnsâ \ntj[§Ä tNmZyw sN¿phm³ sXmgnemfnbvt¡m, bqWnb\pIÄt¡m AhImianÃ. Dev]mZ\ Imcy£aXbv¡p thI]cnjv¡mc§Ä hcp¯p¶Xn\v DSabv¡p ]qÀ® kzmX{´yw DImbncn¡pw. sXmgn k{¼Zm-b-¯n 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mcpÅ hyhkmb Øm]\w kÀ-¡mÀ A\phmZanÃmsX AS¨p]q«m³ ]pXnb \nbaw sXmgnepSasb A\phZnbv¡p¶p. ap¶dnbn¸panÃmsX amä§Ä hcp¯mw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfnsbbpw, \nÝnX kab sXmgnemfnsbbpw \nban¡mw.

sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbaw t`ZKXn  sNbvXp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô tImUv \nehn hcpt¼mÄ, Gsd hÀjambn \½psS tImSXnIÄ  \ÂInbn«pÅ hn[nIfpw, XymtKmÖzeamb kac§fneqsS t\SnsbSp¯ t{SbvUv bqWnb³ AhImi§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw thX\hpw, Xpeyamb ]¦mfn¯w F¶ ASnØm\ XXzhpw hnS]dbpIbmWv.  sXmgnemfnIÄ  A\p`hn ¡p¶ \nba ]cnc£IÄ CtXmsS CÃmXmIpw. Dev]mZ\ hÀ²hn\mbn sXmgnemfnIÄ ASnaIfpw sXmgnepSaIÄ   kÀÆm[nImcnbpw kÀ¡mÀ Hcp t\m¡pIp¯nbpw Bbn-¯ocpw.

thPv tImUv (Labour Code on Wage Bills, 2015)

thX\ kw_Ôamb \nba§Ä kwtbmPn¸n¡pIsb¶ Dt±it¯msS Minimum Wages Act, Bonus Act, Equal Remuneration Act, Payment of Wages ActXpS§nb \nba§Ä GIoIcn¨v sXmgn–thX\ \nba§sf t{ImUoIcn¡p¶ ]pXnb \nba \nÀtZiamWv Labour Code on Wage Bill, 2015.\nehnepÅ  thX\w Ipdbv¡p¶Xn\v bmsXmcp  sXmgnepSabv¡pw  AhImianÃ. Ct¸mÄ Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ sXmgn \nba t`ZKXnIfneqsS  aWn¡qdpIÄ¡pw, DZv]mZ\¯n\pw Iqen IW¡m¡n an\naw thX\w \nÝbn¡mhp¶XmWv. F¶m \nehnepÅ \nba§Ä A\pkcn¨v \ntXym]tbmK km[\§fpsS hne, Hcp sXmgnemfnbpsS Bhiy§Ä, DXv]mZ\ Nnehv XpS§nbhsbÃmw XrI£n  kanXnbneqsS hnebncp¯nbmWv an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡p¶Xv. C¯cw Hcp \nba¯n\v {]m_eyansöpw ]Icw sXmgn sN¿p¶ kab¯nsâbpw DXv]mZ\¯nsâbpw ASnØm\¯n an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡Ww F¶v ]dbp¶Xv `cWLS\ \ÂIp¶ Dd¸pIfpsS ewL\amWv. BonusF¶Xv kmÀÆ{XoIhpw, \o¡nhbv¡s¸« thX\hpamsW¶v sXmgnemfnIÄ Bhiys¸Spt¼mÄ Bonus \nba¯nsâ ]cn[nbn  \n¶pw AwKkwJybpsS ASnØm\¯n Øm]\§sf Hgnhm¡m\pÅ AhImiw ]pXnb Bonus Act\ÂIp¶p.  AXv Hcp sXmgn XÀ¡ambn D¶bn¡phm\pÅ AhImihpw \ntj[n¡s¸Sp¶p. Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\sa¶Xv \nÀ_ÔaÃmsX hcpt¼mÄ hyXyØamb thX\w Htc Xcw sXmgnen GÀs¸Sp¶hÀ¡p \ÂIphm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v AhImiw \ÂIpIbmWv. CXv `cWLS\ hmKvZm\w sN¿p¶ auenImhImi§-fmb 14Dw, 16Dw A\ptOZ§Ä¡v FXncmWv. thX\sa¶Xv  hyàn]camb Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n \ÂIm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v ]pXnb \nbaw Ahkcw \ÂIp¶p. CXv \nc¦piamb NqjW¯n\v hgn hbv¡pw. Hmtcm \nba§fpsSbpw DtZiye£y§Ä a\knem¡msX Ah Hcpan¨v Iq«nt¨À¯v Hcp GIoIrX \nbaam¡p¶Xv A-imkv{XobamWv. an\naw thX\w Gäw Npcp§nb thX\amWv. ]Wn¡p-Å Iqen ]eXnsâbpw ASnØm\¯n emWv \nPs¸Sp¯nbn«p-Å-Xv, AXv \ÂIp¶ coXn XpS§nbh hyhØ sN¿p¶XmWv Payment of Wages Act. BonusF¶Xv ASnØm\]cambn \o¡n hbv¡s¸« thX\w F¶ \ne-bn GÁw Npcp§nb BonusDw em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w F¶ \nebn Balance Sheetsâ ASnØm\¯n ]¦nSp¶ hnlnXhpamWv t_mWÊv. Wage Codet\mSv _Ôs¸Sp¯n Kh¬saâv t`ZKXn \nÀtZin¡p¶ asämcp \nbaw Equal Remuneration ActBWv. kv{XoIÄ¡pw, ]pcpj³amÀ¡pw Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pÅXv kmÀÆtZioIambn AwKoIcn¡s¸«n«pÅ XXzamWv.

C´y³- `cWLS\bpw, ILOI¬h³j\pIfpw sXmgn cwK¯v hnthN\w ]mSnÃm sb¶pw, Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pw, Npcp§nb thX\w Pohn¡m\mhiyamb thX\ambncn¡Wsa¶pw \njv¡Àjn¨n«pIv. `cWLS\bpsS 14 Dw, 39 Dw, 43 Dw A\ptOZ §Ä Ch Dd¸p Xcp¶p. Chsb Bkv]Zam¡nbmWv Iqen kw_Ôamb hyXykvX \nba§Ä ]mÀesaâv AwKoIcn¨n«pÅXv. ]pXnb thX\ \nbaw \S¸m¡p¶tXmsS Iqen  sXmgnepSabpw, sXmgnemfnbpw X½n D­m¡p¶ Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n aWn¡qdpIÄ¡v IW¡m¡n Bbncn¡pw. 12 ap-X 131/2 aWn¡qÀ hsc sXmgnemfnsb ]WnsbSp¸n¡mw. Npcp§nb Iqensbt¶m, PohnXm[njvTnX an\naw Iq-en F¶tXm _m[Iambncn¡pIbnÃ. hnIknX cmPy§fn Atacn¡ DÄs¸sS Hcp aWn¡qdn-\v 1500 U.S. Dollar(10,000 cq]) hsc an\naw thX\w Bhiys¸«mWv Ct¸mÄ sXmgnemfnIÄ ]WnapS¡p¶Xv.  C´ybn aWn¡qdn\pÅ icmicn thX\w tI-h-ew 40 Dw 50 Dw cq]m am{XamWv. CXv cq]bpsS A`y´c hym]mc aqey¯nsâ t]cnemsW¶v kÀ¡mÀ hmZn¡p¶p. ChnsS tI{µ t{SbvUv bqWnb\pIÄXs¶ Bhiys¸«ncn¡p¶ Npcp§nb {]Xnamk th-X-\w 15000 cq]bmWv. kÀ¡mÀ IcmÀ sXmgnemfn IÄ¡v sImSp¡Wsa¶v Bhiys¸Sp-¶-Xv 10000 cq] am{Xhpw. kp{]ow tImSXnbpsS hn[nb\pkcn¨v C´ybn \nbam\pkrXamb  an\naw thX\w \evIm³ Ignbm¯  sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v  hyhkmbw \S¯phm³ AhImianÃ. \h DZmchXv¡cW \b§Ä¡v A\pkrXamb GIoIrX ]p¯³ thX\ \nbaw \S¸nem¡p¶tXmsS `cWLS\bpw, kp{]owtImSXn hn[nIfpw A{]kàambn¯ocpw. t_mWÊv \nbaw amdp¶tXm-sS 8 iXam\¯n Ipdbm¯-Xpw
20 iXam\¯n IqSm¯Xpamb em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w am{XamIpw t_mWÊv.

^mIvSdokv BIvSv t`ZKXn \nbaw 2016

hnIk\¯n\v hnLmXambn C´ybnse sXmgn \nba§Ä \nesImÅp¶psh¶pw, {]tXyIn¨pw kpc£nXXzhpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£a {]hÀ¯\hpw (Safety, Health and Welfare)  em¡mbpÅ  ^mIvSdokv BIvSv s]mfns¨gpXWsa¶pw, FICCI, ASOCHEM, Chamber of Commerce, Manufactures Association XpS§nb sXmgnepSa kwLS\IÄ apdhnfn Iq«m³ XpS§nbn«v Imew Gsdbmbn. F¶m Cu \nbaw t`ZKXn sN¿msX Xs¶ h³ hnIk\-amWv sI«nS \nÀ½mWw, J\\w, F©n\obdn§v XpS§nb hyhkmb¯nepImbn«pÅXv. 1948\p tijw 1954, 1976, 1987 F¶o hÀj§fn \S¯nb aq¶p t`ZKXn am{XamWv. 1987 se t`ZKXn t`m¸m Zpc´¯nsâ ASnØm\¯nemWv. BtcmKy kpc£bpw, A]IS \nhmcW¯n\pw A\nhmcyamWv.  C´ybn Hcp aWn¡q-dn 46 acW§Ä hyhkmb A]IS§Ä DIm¡p¶p F¶mWv IW¡v.  Cu kmlNcy¯n IqSpX ]cnc£IÄ hcpt¯It`ZKXnbv¡p ]Icw, XeXncnª asämcp t`ZKXnbmWv tamZn kÀ¡mÀ sImIphcp¶Xv. 40 Ipdhv BfpIÄ sXmgn sN¿p¶ hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ ]cn[nbn Hgnhm¡p¶p. CXp h-gn 80% hyhkmb Øm]\§Ä \nb{´W hnapàcmbn¯ocpw. ]pXnb  kmt¦XnI hnZyIÄ D]tbmKn¨v h³InS hyhkm-b-§Ä 40 Ipdª am\htijnsImIv \S¯mhp¶ XmWv. tdmt_m«pIfpw, BÁanI F\ÀPnbpw DÅnSt¯mfw, hyhkmb D]m[nIsf hnLSn ¸n¡phm³ Ignbpw. IqSpX sXmgnemfnIÄ bmsXmcp hyhkmb¯nepw Bhiyambn hcnÃ. ]pXnb t`ZKXn {]-Im-cw 14 hbÊmb Ip«nIsf ^mIvSdnIfn tPmen sN¿n¡mw. CXv Child Labour Act\p hncp²amWv. \nc´cambn DImbns¡mIncn¡p¶ hyhkmb A]IS§Ä,  sXmgnemfn IÃm¯hcpsS kpc£ Cu t`ZKXnIÄ aptJ\ Dd¸p hcp¯p¶nÃ.  F³tUmkÄ ^m³, shSns¡«]ISw, sI«nSw XIÀ¶p hogÂ, kvt^mS\w, tdUntbj³ {]kcWw, Ch \nb{´n¡p¶Xn\p ]Icw A\phZn¨ncn¡pIbmWv. Kh¬saânsâ ]cntim[\IÄ iàns¸Sp¯n. Hcp ka{Kamb ^mIvSdnkv \nbaw sImIphcmsX ]Icw P\§fpsSbpw, sXmgnemfnIfpsSbpw Poh\pw kz¯n\pw kpc£nXXzw \ÂIp¶, Pohn¡m³ AhImiw \ÂIp¶  `cWLS\bp-sS  21 mw A\ptOZw ewLn¡p¶ `cWLS\m hncp² t`ZKXnbmWv ]pXnb ^mIvSdokv BIvSv.  kpc£bpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£ahpw Dd¸p hcp¯p¶ILO\nÀtZi§Ä B-sI 18 I¬h³j\pIfn AS§nbncn¡p¶p. Ah C´y Kh¬saâv {]mhÀ¯nIam¡Ww. ‘Make in India’Blzm\{]Imcw P\§sfbpw, sXmgnemfnIsfbpw ]´mSphm³ A´ÀtZiob Ip¯IIÄ¡v A\paXn  \ÂIcpXv.

kvtamÄ FâÀss{]knÊv BIvSv

(THE Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (Amendment) Bill, 2015)

\nehnepÅ tjm]vÊv Bâv  FÌm»njvsaâv BIvSv  t`ZKXn sNbvXv kvtamÄ FâÀ ss{]knÊv BIvSv  F¶ ]pXnb \nbaw sImIphcp¶Xv sNdpInS hyhkmb Øm]\§sf  ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ  ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡m\mWv.  AXnep]cn {][m\s¸« kmaqly kpc£bpw, BtcmKy ]cn]me\hpw \nb{´W§fpw adnI-S-¶v 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mÀ am{XamWv DÅsX¦n {][m\-s¸« 14 sXmgn \nba§fn \n¶pw sXmgnepSaIÄ Hgnhm¡s¸Spw. kz´w IW¡pIÄ kzbtah kÀ«nss^ sNbvXv sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v kaÀ¸n¡mw. Kh¬saâv ]cntim[\IÄ DImInÃ. k¼qÀ® kzmX{´yhpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡p e`nbv¡p¶p. Hcp henb ImÀ Dev]mZ\  ^mIvSdn t]m-epw 40 Xmsg sXmgnemfnIÄ AS§p¶ hnhn[ ^mIvSdnIfmbn Xcw Xncnbv¡s¸Spw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfn k{¼Zmbw \nehn hcpt¼mÄ  sXmgnepSaIÄ   \nba§Ä¡v AXoXcmIpw.

A{]âoÊv BIvSv

sXmgn ]cnioe\¯nsâ adhn ZoÀL¡mew sXmgnemfnIsf \nba]camb B\pIqey §Ä A\phZn¡msX A{]âoÊvIfmbn \nban¡phm³ A\phZnbv¡p¶XmWv A{]âoÊv BIvSv. CXnsâ ASnØm\-¯n 18 hbÊn XmsgbpÅ Ip«nIsf XpSÀ¨bmbn A{]âoÊpI fmbn \nban¡mw. CXv _methe \ntcm[\w adnIS¶v lo\amb sXmgn k{¼Zmb¯n\v (Precarious Job)Ahkcsamcp¡p¶p.

80% hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ]e \nba§fpsSbpw ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡pt¼mÄ C´y AwKoIcn¨n«pÅ LabourInspectionI¬h³j³ A{]kàamIpw.  U.N. AwKoIcn¨ anÃn\obw tKmÄ, IqSpX sXmgnehkc§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw F¶ Decent Work Agenda (DWA)bmWv. AXv ChnsS C\n Hcp acoNnI. C´ybn \nÀ½n¡pI (Make in India)Blzm\ {]Imcw, hntZiIp¯IÄ¡v Ipdª Iqen¡v sXmgnemfnIsf ASnaIfm¡n hyhkmbw XpS§m³ A\phZn¡p¶XmWv ]pXnb \nba t`ZKXnIÄ.

sXmgnen \nbat`ZKXnIÄ

(By Thampan Thomas, Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Kerala High Court)

C´ybn \nehnepÅ 54 tI{µ sXmgn \nba§-fpw 100 ]cw kwØm\ \nba§fpw X§fpsS hyhkmb kwcw`§fpsS hfÀ¨bv¡v hne§pXSnbmbn \n¡p¶p; Ah t`ZKXn sN¿Wsa¶XmWv C´ybnse sXmgnepSaIfpsS \nc´camb Bhiyw. BtKmfoIcW {]{Inbbn sXmgn taJebn \nb{´W§Ä¡v Øm\ansöpw, Xpd¶ hn]W\ taJebn aXvkc¯n\mWv {]m[m\ysa¶pw, BbXn\m DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIsf A\nb{´nX ambn NqjWw sN¿m³ X§Ä¡p IgnbWsa¶pw AhÀ hmZn¡p¶p. sXmgnemfnIsf \nban ¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\papÅ AhImiw, X§Ä¡v kzbm¯amsW¶pw, aÕc It¼mf¯n GXpXcw DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIfmWv D]tbmKnt¡IsX¶v Xocpam\n¡m\pÅ AhImihpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡msW¶XpamWv AhcpsS Imgv¨¸mSv. tImÀ¸tdäpIfpsS k½À±¯n\v hg§n C´ym Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ ]pXnb sXmgn \nba ]cnjv¡mc§Ä ASp¯v Xs¶ ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v AwKoIcn¡phm\nSbpIv. CXnt\mSIw CXn\mbn _nÃpIfpsS IcSpcq]hpw, XrI£n NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv Ìm³Un§v I½ÁnbpsS \S]Sn {Ia§fpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn. C´ybnse sXmgnemfn, sXmgnepSa, Kh¬saâv {]Xn\n[nIfS§p¶ D¶X A[nImc kanXnbmb C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³knsâ ip]mÀiIÄ adnIS¶p sImImWv Cu \o¡w. DXv]mZ\ {]{Inbbnse Xpey]¦mfnbmb sXmgnemfn CtXmsS k¼qÀ®ambn ]mÀizhXv¡cn¡s¸SpIbmWv. ]p¯³ kmt¦XnI hnZyIfpw, LS\m]camb amähpw sXmgn taJebpsS a\pjy apJw Xs¶ ]msS amÁn.

hmPvt]bn Kh¬saânsâ Im-e-¯v 2002 2-mw sXmgn I½oj\mbn \nban¨ {io. Pn.cho{µhÀ½ I½oj³ \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfpsS ad]änbmWv ]p¯³ sXmgn \nba t`ZKXnIÄ. {io. Pn. cho{µhÀ½bpsS ip]mÀiIfn AkwLSnX taJe Hgn¨pÅ FÃm ip]mÀiIfpw C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³kv \ncmIcn¨XmWv. PkvÁnÊv KtP{µ KUvIÀ sNbÀam\mb 1-mw sXmgn I½oj³ 1967 \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfmWv sXmgnemfnIÄ¡v \nehnepÅ tkh\ thX\ hyhØ \nba ]cnc£bneqsS Dd¸phcp¯nbXv.

sXmgn \nba§fpsS ASnØm\ ZÀi\w \½psS `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§ fnepw, \nÀtZiI XXz§fnepw AS§nbncn¡p¶p. A´ÀtZiob sXmgn am\ZÞ§Ä \nÝbn¡s¸«n«pÅ ILObpsS 189 I¬h³j\pIfpw, 200 ]cw ip]mÀiIfpw, {]tab§fpw temIs¯¼mSpapÅ sXmgn \nba§fpsS \nba XXz kwlnX (Basic Jurisprudence)BWv. C´ybnse ap³ Kh¬saâpIÄ C¶v \ne\n¡p¶ sXmgn \nba§Ä cq]s¸Sp¯pt¼mÄ Chbmbncp¶p AhcpsS amÀ¤tcJ. sXmgn \nba§Ä Hcp Welfare\nbasa¶ \nebn {]tXyI ]cnKW\IÄ \ÂIn kwc£n¡s¸«ncp¶p. sXmgn AhImi§sf am\pjnI Ah-Imi§fmbn ]cnKWn¡pIbpw a\pjys\ NqjWw sN¿p¶ k{¼Zmb§Ä \nb{´n¡phm³ Ch D]bpàamhpIbpw sNbvXp.

C¶v Xpd¶ It¼mf¯n hnIk\¯nsâ adhn sXmgnemfnIsf \nkmchXv¡cn¨v aqe[\w sXmgnemfn¡v ta k¼qÀ® B[n]Xyw Øm]n¨ncn¡pIbmWv. AXn\m ]c¼cmKXambn A\phÀ¯n¨p h¶ncp¶ kwLS\m kzmX{´yhpw, Iq«mb hnet]iepw, \nba ]cnc£bpw Hgnhm¡phm\mWv sXmgnepSaIfpw, Kh¬saâpw B{Kln¡p¶Xv.

hyhkmb _Ô \nbaw (Labour Code on Industrial Relations 2015 )

1947se sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbahpw, 1928se t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbahpw, 1948se C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSpw t{ImUoIcn¨v Hcp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n\v Kh¬saâv cq]w sImSp¯ncn¡p¶p. Cu \nba¯nsâ IcSp hyhØIsfIpdn¨v cIv XrI£n NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv sXmgnÂImcy kaXnbpsS NÀ¨Ifpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn«pIv. Hcp ]s£ Cu _nÃv F{Xbpw thKw ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v \nbaw B¡s¸Sphm\nSbpIv. sXmgnemfnbpw, sXmgnepSabpw, Dev]mZ\ taJebnse Xpey ]¦mfnIsf¶ AwKoIrX kahmIyw Xncp¯n¡pdn¨v sXmgnepSabv¡p taÂssI \evIp¶XmWv hyhkmb _Ô tImUv. sXmgnepSabv¡pw, sXmgnemfnbv¡pw, at²y kÀ¡mcnsâ \n£v]£X F¶Xv amän Kh¬saâv sXmgnepSa ]£¯v tNcp¶p. t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbaw d±v sNbvXv ]pXnb tImUn bqWnb\pIfpsS cq]oIcWw t]mepw Akm[yam¡n¯oÀ¡p¶p. ]pdta \n¶pw, bqWnb\p IÄ¡v t\Xm¡Ä ]mSnÃ. DsI¦n Xs¶ AXv AkwLSnX taJebn am{Xw. A§s\ HcmÄ¡v `mchmlnbmIp¶ bqWnb\pIÄ cIp am{Xw. Øm]\§fn \n¶pw, s]³j\mb hÀ¡v t\XrXz Øm\§Ä GsäSp¡m³ AtbmKyX, sXmgnemfn bqWnb\pIÄ¡v Political Fund cq]oIcn¡m\hImianÃ. bqWnb\pIÄ cPnÌÀ sN¿m³ Npcp§n-b-Xv 100 t]À AsÃ-¦n 10 iXam\w Poh\¡mÀ At]£n¡Ww. ]WnapS¡pIÄ ]qÀ®ambpw \nb{´W hnt[bw. \nba hncp² ]WnapS¡pIÄ¡v Pbn in£. sXmgnepSaIÄ sXmgnemfnIfpambn t\cn«v IcmÀ DIm¡mw. Iq«mb hnet]ien\pw kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯n\p ta I¯n hbv¡p¶ GÀ¸mSv. CXv `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§-fnÂs¸Sp¶ 19mw A\ptOZw A\phZn¡p¶ kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯nsâbpw, ILObpsS 87, 98 F¶o tImÀI¬h³j\pIfp sSbpw \Kv\amb ewL\w. sXmgnemfnIÄ Poh³ sImSp¯v t\SnsbSp¯ am\pjnImhImi §Ä Cu t`ZKXnbneqsS FSp¯p Ifbp¶p. ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n Aenªp tNcp¶ asämcp \nbaamWv C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSv. \nehn Cu \nbaw hyhkmb Øm]\§fnse Poh\¡mcpsS tkh\ hyhØIÄ \nÀ®bn¡p¶p. Poh\¡mÀ s¡XnscbpÅ A¨S¡ \S]SnIÄ, {]tamj\pIÄ, ^mIvSdnbn A\phÀ¯nt¡INpaXeIÄ, ØeamÁ§Ä XpS§nbh ]qÀ®ambpw sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw \evIp¶ XmWv t`ZKXn sN¿s¸« \nbaw. CXnse XrI£n _Ôhpw, Kh¬saânsâ CSs]Sepw ]msS CÃmbva sN¿pIbmWv. sXmgnepSabv¡p A\nb{´nXamb A[nImcw \evIp¶ \nba ]cnjv¡mcw. Hire and Fire(\nban¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\pw) sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw \evIp¶ \nba t`ZKXn. Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSnsâ \ntj[§Ä tNmZyw sN¿phm³ sXmgnemfnbvt¡m, bqWnb\pIÄt¡m AhImianÃ. Dev]mZ\ Imcy£aXbv¡p thI]cnjv¡mc§Ä hcp¯p¶Xn\v DSabv¡p ]qÀ® kzmX{´yw DImbncn¡pw. sXmgn k{¼Zm-b-¯n 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mcpÅ hyhkmb Øm]\w kÀ-¡mÀ A\phmZanÃmsX AS¨p]q«m³ ]pXnb \nbaw sXmgnepSasb A\phZnbv¡p¶p. ap¶dnbn¸panÃmsX amä§Ä hcp¯mw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfnsbbpw, \nÝnX kab sXmgnemfnsbbpw \nban¡mw.

sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbaw t`ZKXn sNbvXp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô tImUv \nehn hcpt¼mÄ, Gsd hÀjambn \½psS tImSXnIÄ \ÂInbn«pÅ hn[nIfpw, XymtKmÖzeamb kac§fneqsS t\SnsbSp¯ t{SbvUv bqWnb³ AhImi§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw thX\hpw, Xpeyamb ]¦mfn¯w F¶ ASnØm\ XXzhpw hnS]dbpIbmWv. sXmgnemfnIÄ A\p`hn ¡p¶ \nba ]cnc£IÄ CtXmsS CÃmXmIpw. Dev]mZ\ hÀ²hn\mbn sXmgnemfnIÄ ASnaIfpw sXmgnepSaIÄ kÀÆm[nImcnbpw kÀ¡mÀ Hcp t\m¡pIp¯nbpw Bbn-¯ocpw.

thPv tImUv (Labour Code on Wage Bills, 2015 )

thX\ kw_Ôamb \nba§Ä kwtbmPn¸n¡pIsb¶ Dt±it¯msS Minimum Wages Act, Bonus Act, Equal Remuneration Act, Payment of Wages ActXpS§nb \nba§Ä GIoIcn¨v sXmgn –thX\ \nba§sf t{ImUoIcn¡p¶ ]pXnb \nba \nÀtZiamWv Labour Code on Wage Bill, 2015.\nehnepÅ thX\w Ipdbv¡p¶Xn\v bmsXmcp sXmgnepSabv¡pw AhImianÃ. Ct¸mÄ Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ sXmgn \nba t`ZKXnIfneqsS aWn¡qdpIÄ¡pw, DZv]mZ\¯n\pw Iqen IW¡m¡n an\naw thX\w \nÝbn¡mhp¶XmWv. F¶m \nehnepÅ \nba§Ä A\pkcn¨v \ntXym]tbmK km[\§fpsS hne, Hcp sXmgnemfnbpsS Bhiy§Ä, DXv]mZ\ Nnehv XpS§nbhsbÃmw XrI£n kanXnbneqsS hnebncp¯nbmWv an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡p¶Xv. C¯cw Hcp \nba¯n\v {]m_eyansöpw ]Icw sXmgn sN¿p¶ kab¯nsâbpw DXv]mZ\¯nsâbpw ASnØm\¯n an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡Ww F¶v ]dbp¶Xv `cWLS\ \ÂIp¶ Dd¸pIfpsS ewL\amWv. Bonus F¶Xv kmÀÆ{XoIhpw, \o¡nhbv¡s¸« thX\hpamsW¶v sXmgnemfnIÄ Bhiys¸Spt¼mÄ Bonus \nba¯nsâ ]cn[nbn \n¶pw AwKkwJybpsS ASnØm\¯n Øm]\§sf Hgnhm¡m \pÅ AhImiw ]pXnb Bonus Act\ÂIp¶p. AXv Hcp sXmgn XÀ¡ambn D¶bn¡phm \pÅ AhImihpw \ntj[n¡s¸Sp¶p. Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\sa¶Xv \nÀ_ÔaÃmsX hcpt¼mÄ hyXyØamb thX\w Htc Xcw sXmgnen GÀs¸Sp¶hÀ¡p \ÂIphm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v AhImiw \ÂIpIbmWv. CXv `cWLS\ hmKvZm\w sN¿p¶ auenImh Imi§-fmb 14 Dw, 16 Dw A\ptOZ§Ä¡v FXncmWv. thX\sa¶Xv hyàn]camb Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n \ÂIm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v ]pXnb \nbaw Ahkcw \ÂIp¶p. CXv \nc¦piamb NqjW¯n\v hgn hbv¡pw. Hmtcm \nba§fpsSbpw DtZiye£y§Ä a\knem¡msX Ah Hcpan¨v Iq«nt¨À¯v Hcp GIoIrX \nbaam¡p¶Xv A-imkv{XobamWv. an\naw thX\w Gäw Npcp§nb thX\amWv. ]Wn¡p-Å Iqen ]eXnsâbpw ASnØm\¯n emWv \nPs¸Sp¯nbn«p-Å-Xv, AXv \ÂIp¶ coXn XpS§nbh hyhØ sN¿p¶XmWv Payment of Wages Act. BonusF¶Xv ASnØm\]cambn \o¡n hbv¡s¸« thX\w F¶ \ne-bn GÁw Npcp§nb BonusDw em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w F¶ \nebn Balance Sheetsâ ASnØm\¯n ]¦nSp¶ hnlnXhpamWv t_mWÊv. Wage Codet\mSv _Ôs¸Sp¯n Kh¬saâv t`ZKXn \nÀtZin¡p¶ asämcp \nbaw Equal Remuneration ActBWv. kv{XoIÄ¡pw, ]pcpj³amÀ¡pw Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pÅXv kmÀÆtZioIambn AwKoIcn¡s¸«n«pÅ XXzamWv.

C´y³- `cWLS\bpw, ILOI¬h³j\pIfpw sXmgn cwK¯v hnthN\w ]mSnÃm sb¶pw, Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pw, Npcp§nb thX\w Pohn¡m\mhiyamb thX\ambncn¡Wsa¶pw \njv¡Àjn¨n«pIv. `cWLS\bpsS 14 Dw, 39 Dw, 43 Dw A\ptOZ §Ä Ch Dd¸p Xcp¶p. Chsb Bkv]Zam¡nbmWv Iqen kw_Ôamb hyXykvX \nba§Ä ]mÀesaâv AwKoIcn¨n«pÅXv. ]pXnb thX\ \nbaw \S¸m¡p¶tXmsS Iqen sXmgnepSabpw, sXmgnemfnbpw X½n D­m¡p¶ Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n aWn¡qdpIÄ¡v IW¡m¡n Bbncn¡pw. 12 ap-X 13 1/2 aWn¡qÀ hsc sXmgnemfnsb ]WnsbSp¸n¡mw. Npcp§nb Iqensbt¶m, PohnXm[njvTnX an\naw Iq-en F¶tXm _m[Iambncn¡pIbnÃ. hnIknX cmPy§fn Atacn¡ DÄs¸sS Hcp aWn¡qdn-\v 1500 U.S. Dollar(10,000 cq]) hsc an\naw thX\w Bhiys¸«mWv Ct¸mÄ sXmgnemfnIÄ ]WnapS¡p¶Xv. C´ybn aWn¡qdn\pÅ icmicn thX\w tI-h-ew 40 Dw 50 Dw cq]m am{XamWv. CXv cq]bpsS A`y´c hym]mc aqey¯nsâ t]cnemsW¶v kÀ¡mÀ hmZn¡p¶p. ChnsS tI{µ t{SbvUv bqWnb\pIÄXs¶ Bhiys¸«ncn¡p¶ Npcp§nb {]Xnamk th-X-\w 15000 cq]bmWv. kÀ¡mÀ IcmÀ sXmgnemfn IÄ¡v sImSp¡Wsa¶v Bhiys¸Sp-¶-Xv 10000 cq] am{Xhpw. kp{]ow tImSXnbpsS hn[nb\pk cn¨v C´ybn \nbam\pkrXamb an\naw thX\w \evIm³ Ignbm¯ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v hyhkmbw \S¯phm³ AhImianÃ. \h DZmchXv¡cW \b§Ä¡v A\pkrXamb GIoIrX ]p¯³ thX\ \nbaw \S¸nem¡p¶tXmsS `cWLS\bpw, kp{]owtImSXn hn[nIfpw A{]kàambn¯ocpw. t_mWÊv \nbaw amdp¶tXm-sS 8 iXam\¯n Ipdbm¯-Xpw 20 iXam\¯n IqSm¯Xpamb em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w am{XamIpw t_mWÊv.

^mIvSdokv BIvSv t`ZKXn \nbaw 2016

hnIk\¯n\v hnLmXambn C´ybnse sXmgn \nba§Ä \nesImÅp¶psh¶pw, {]tXyIn¨pw kpc£nXXzhpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£a {]hÀ¯\hpw (Safety, Health and Welfare)em¡mbpÅ ^mIvSdokv BIvSv s]mfns¨gpXWsa¶pw, FICCI, ASOCHEM, Chamber of Commerce, Manufactures Association XpS§nb sXmgnepSa kwLS\IÄ apdhnfn Iq«m³ XpS§nbn«v Imew Gsdbmbn. F¶m Cu \nbaw t`ZKXn sN¿msX Xs¶ h³ hnIk\-amWv sI«nS \nÀ½mWw, J\\w, F©n\obdn§v XpS§nb hyhkmb¯nepImbn«pÅXv. 1948\p tijw 1954, 1976, 1987 F¶o hÀj§fn \S¯nb aq¶p t`ZKXn am{XamWv. 1987 se t`ZKXn t`m¸m Zpc´¯nsâ ASnØm\¯nemWv. BtcmKy kpc£bpw, A]IS \nhmcW¯n\pw A\nhmcyamWv. C´ybn Hcp aWn¡q-dn 46 acW§Ä hyhkmb A]IS§Ä DIm¡p¶p F¶mWv IW¡v. Cu kmlNcy¯n IqSpX ]cnc£IÄ hcpt¯It`ZKXnbv¡p ]Icw, XeXncnª asämcp t`ZKXnbmWv tamZn kÀ¡mÀ sImIphcp¶Xv. 40 Ipdhv BfpIÄ sXmgn sN¿p¶ hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ ]cn[nbn Hgnhm¡p¶p. CXp h-gn 80% hyhkmb Øm]\§Ä \nb{´W hnapàcmbn¯ocpw. ]pXnb kmt¦XnI hnZyIÄ D]tbmKn¨v h³InS hyhkm-b-§Ä 40 Ipdª am\htijnsImIv \S¯mhp¶ XmWv. tdmt_m«pIfpw, BÁanI F\ÀPnbpw DÅnSt¯mfw, hyhkmb D]m[nIsf hnLSn ¸n¡phm³ Ignbpw. IqSpX sXmgnemfnIÄ bmsXmcp hyhkmb¯nepw Bhiyambn hcnÃ. ]pXnb t`ZKXn {]-Im-cw 14 hbÊmb Ip«nIsf ^mIvSdnIfn tPmen sN¿n¡mw. CXv Child Labour Act\p hncp²amWv. \nc´cambn DImbns¡mIncn¡p¶ hyhkmb A]IS§Ä, sXmgnemfn IÃm¯hcpsS kpc£ Cu t`ZKXnIÄ aptJ\ Dd¸p hcp¯p¶nÃ. F³tUmkÄ ^m³, shSns¡«]ISw, sI«nSw XIÀ¶p hogÂ, kvt^mS\w, tdUntbj³ {]kcWw, Ch \nb{´n¡p¶Xn\p ]Icw A\phZn¨ncn¡pIbmWv. Kh¬saânsâ ]cntim[\IÄ iàns¸Sp¯n. Hcp ka{Kamb ^mIvSdnkv \nbaw sImIphcmsX ]Icw P\§fpsSbpw, sXmgnemfnIfpsSbpw Poh\pw kz¯n\pw kpc£nXXzw \ÂIp¶, Pohn¡m³ AhImiw \ÂIp¶ `cWLS\bp-sS 21 mw A\ptOZw ewLn¡p¶ `cWLS\m hncp² t`ZKXnbmWv ]pXnb ^mIvSdokv BIvSv. kpc£bpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£ahpw Dd¸p hcp¯p¶ ILO\nÀtZi§Ä B-sI 18 I¬h³j\pIfn AS§nbncn¡p¶p. Ah C´y Kh¬saâv {]mhÀ¯nIam¡Ww. ‘Make in India’Blzm\{]Imcw P\§sfbpw, sXmgnemfnIsfbpw ]´mSphm³ A´ÀtZiob Ip¯IIÄ¡v A\paXn \ÂIcpXv.

kvtamÄ FâÀss{]knÊv BIvSv

(THE Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (Amendment) Bill, 2015)

\nehnepÅ tjm]vÊv Bâv FÌm»njvsaâv BIvSv t`ZKXn sNbvXv kvtamÄ FâÀ ss{]knÊv BIvSv F¶ ]pXnb \nbaw sImIphcp¶Xv sNdpInS hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡m\mWv. AXnep]cn {][m\s¸« kmaqly kpc£bpw, BtcmKy ]cn]me\hpw \nb{´W§fpw adnI-S-¶v 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mÀ am{XamWv DÅsX¦n {][m\-s¸« 14 sXmgn \nba§fn \n¶pw sXmgnepSaIÄ Hgnhm¡s¸Spw. kz´w IW¡pIÄ kzbtah kÀ«nss^ sNbvXv sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v kaÀ¸n¡mw. Kh¬saâv ]cntim[\IÄ DImInÃ. k¼qÀ® kzmX{´yhpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡p e`nbv¡p¶p. Hcp henb ImÀ Dev]mZ\ ^mIvSdn t]m-epw 40 Xmsg sXmgnemfnIÄ AS§p¶ hnhn[ ^mIvSdnIfmbn Xcw Xncnbv¡s¸Spw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfn k{¼Zmbw \nehn hcpt¼mÄ sXmgnepSaIÄ \nba§Ä¡v AXoXcmIpw.

A{]âoÊv BIvSv

sXmgn ]cnioe\¯nsâ adhn ZoÀL¡mew sXmgnemfnIsf \nba]camb B\pIqey §Ä A\phZn¡msX A{]âoÊvIfmbn \nban¡phm³ A\phZnbv¡p¶XmWv A{]âoÊv BIvSv. CXnsâ ASnØm\-¯n 18 hbÊn XmsgbpÅ Ip«nIsf XpSÀ¨bmbn A{]âoÊpIfmbn \nban¡mw. CXv _methe \ntcm[\w adnIS¶v lo\amb sXmgn k{¼Zmb¯n\v (Precarious Job) Ahkcsamcp¡p¶p.

80% hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ]e \nba§fpsSbpw ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡pt¼mÄ C´y AwKoIcn¨n«pÅ LabourInspectionI¬h³j³ A{]kàamIpw. U.N AwKoIcn¨ anÃn\obw tKmÄ, IqSpX sXmgnehkc§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw F¶ Decent Work Agenda (DWA)bmWv. AXv ChnsS C\n Hcp acoNnI. C´ybn \nÀ½n¡pI (Make in India)Blzm\ {]Imcw, hntZiIp¯IÄ¡v Ipdª Iqen¡v sXmgnemfnIsf ASnaIfm¡n hyhkmbw XpS§m³ A\phZn¡p¶XmWv ]pXnb \nba t`ZKXnIÄ.

Need for Sanction before Passing an Order for Investigation
under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

(By Justice U.L. Bhat (Former Chief Justice, High Court of Madhya Pradesh and  Gauhati  High  Court))

Chapter XII of the Code of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, the Code) deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate. The Chapter deals, so to say, with A to Z of first information given to the police (in cognizable or non-cognizable cases), and police investigation leading to final report under Section 173 of the Code. Section 156 specifically deals with police officer’s power to investigate cognizable cases. A Station House Officer can investigate any cognizable case arising within the local jurisdiction of his police station (sub-section (1)). His jurisdiction is co-terminus with the jurisdiction of the local Criminal Court as indicated in Chapter XIII of the Code. Under sub-section (3) of Section 156, any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as mentioned in sub- section (1) of Section 156. Section 190, in turn empowers any Magistrate of the First Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2) of Section 190 to take cognizance of any offence. Thus the Magistrate referred to in Section 190, can direct police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. This power under Section 156(3) is a special power conferred on the Magistrates while their ordinary power is indicated in the provisions in Chapter XV of the Code (Section 200 to Section 203). Commencement of proceedings before Magistrate is covered by Chapter XVI of the Code, commencing with Section 204. Incidentally the first step is to issue process to the accused; but that is only in case where the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In the absence of any such sufficient ground, the private complaint filed under Chapter XV is required to be dismissed under Section 203 of the Code.

2. It is important to bear in mind the difference between “information” or “first information” given to police followed by F.I.R. under Section 154 in Chapter XII of the Code finally leading to the report of the police officer on completion of investigation into the case registered under the F.I.R. on the one hand and a “complaint’ or a “private complaint” as defined in Section 2(d) of the Code and dealt with in Chapter XV of the Code (heading is “Complaints to Magistrate”) on the other hand. Both the final report in the case of “information” to the police and the conclusion of the Magistrate in the case of a complaint to Court are required to be dealt with under Chapter XVI of the Code dealing with “commencement of proceedings before Magistrate.” Procedure for trial is indicated in the subsequent Chapters of the Code.

3. In this connection provisions of Chapter XV assume some importance. This Chapter relates to private complaints (see definition of “complaint “ in Section 2(d) of the Code) filed directly in Court as distinct from “information” furnished to police under Section 154 of the Code leading to registration of an F.I.R. The requirement of Section 200 is that a Magistrate who is deciding to take cognizance on a complaint is to examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and to reduce to writing the substance of such examination. The statements so recorded are required to be signed by the complainant and the witnesses respectively as also by the Magistrate. Section 200 has two provisos which have not much relevance for the purpose of the present discussion. Section 202 deals with postponement of issue of process to the accused which is the requirement of Section 204 in Chapter XVI of the Code. The purport of Section 202, in so far as it is relevant for the present purpose, is that the Magistrate may postpone the issue of process and either (a) enquire into the case himself, or (b) direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as the Magistrate thinks fit. Such enquiry or investigation is to be directed for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The rest of Section 202 is not relevant for the present purpose. If on consideration of all the materials referred to in Section 200 and 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, briefly recording his reasons for doing so. If, on the contrary, from such materials, the Magistrate taking cognizance is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall issue a summons /warrant whichever is appropriate in the given case. The remaining Sections in Chapter XVI refer to the further requirements/proceedings. Proceedings for Trial etc. are prescribed in the later chapters.

4. Section 202(1) of the Code makes it clear that even after recording the statement of the complainant and witnesses present, the Magistrate is empowered to conduct an enquiry himself or to direct police or other investigation. Section 202 does not provide for such a police investigation at any stage before taking cognizance. Sections 200 to 203 are applicable only if the Magistrate takes cognizance. Power of a Magistrate to order Police investigation without or before taking cognizance of the cognizable offence in a given case can be traced only to Section 156(3) of the Code and such power is not in any way referable to Chapter XV of the Code.

5. The heading of Chapter XII is “Information to the Police and their powers to investigate”. Such information to the Police relating to cognizable cases is dealt with in Section 154. Information has to be recorded, read over to the informer and signed by him. The substance of the information shall be entered in the F.I.R. Book and the General Diary of the Police Station. The Station House Officer’s power to investigate the case is traceable to Section 156(1) of the Code. The heading of Section 156 is “Police Officers Power to investigate cognizable case”. Sub-section (1) grants the Station House Officer power to investigate the case (if within his territorial jurisdiction), without an order of the Magistrate concerned. This plenary power is clearly distinguishable from the power he may derive by virtue of a specific direction which may be issued by a competent Magistrate under Section 202 in Chapter XV of the Code. Such a direction can be issued by a Magistrate only on a private complaint filed in Court and only after examination of the complainant and witnesses present under Section 200 of the Code.

6. Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code reads thus:-

“Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.”

“Investigation as above mentioned” is the one contemplated in Section 156(1), namely, investigation of a cognizable case. This power of a Magistrate is totally different in its nature from the power contemplated in Section 203 of the Code. The power under Section 156(3) is specific power conferred on jurisdictional Magistrate to order Police investigation independent of Chapter XV and without following the procedure prescribed by Section 200 of the Code. Power under Section 202 is to be exercised only if the Magistrate feels the need for such investigation for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding, that is, for issuing process under Section 204 (Chapter XVI) of the Code.

7. There is a purpose underlying the distinct power under Section 156(3) of the Code vesting in a Magistrate to order investigation by the SHO of a Police Station without following the procedure under Section 200 of the Code. The purpose is to provide for a situation where the Magistrate concludes that he should not take cognizance of an offence alleged in a compliant filed in his Court and that following the requirements of Section 200 etc., would be a tortuous process which might result in wasting the valuable time of the Court or the enquiry may require exercise by the Police of their power to locate, trace out and question witnesses, conduct searches of offices, residences and hotels and evidence to be collected may be voluminous and the process is likely to be time consuming. In such cases, the Magistrate, instead of taking cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(i) in Chapter XIV of the Code, (which shall be a prelude to following Section 200 and 202 of Code), may, without taking such cognizance, directly invoke Section 156(3) of the Code and order investigation by the police. The above is not exhaustive of situations calling for invocation of the power under Section 156(3) of the Code.

8. Section 19(1) of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988 mandates that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7,10,11,13 and 15 of the Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of Central Government, State Government or appropriate authority mentioned in Section 19(1)(a, b and c) respectively. In order words, no Court can take cognizance of any one of the above offences without the prior sanction of the appropriate government or authority. Assuming that accused is a public servant and the offence alleged falls within the scope of the Sections of the P.C. Act referred to in Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act, cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code can be taken only if sanction had been obtained earlier. Without taking cognizance or if it is impossible to take cognizance for want of sanction, no Court can act under Section 190(1)(a) or  Section 200 and 202 of the Code.

9. It, therefore, become necessary to understand the true meaning of the expression “Taking Cognizance”, which act alone requires sanction. Dictionary meaning of “Cognizance” is “knowledge or notice, judicial or private”. The above meaning must be considered in the light of the answer to the question “take cognizance for what purpose?” In the context of Court proceedings, the answer could only “be take notice for the purpose of doing an act which logically and lawfully follows the mental state of taking cognizance.” When a complaint is filed before a criminal Court, the question of taking cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint arises only and solely for the purpose of treating it as a regular criminal case and for following the procedure indicated in Chapter XVI. (Sections 200 to 204 and so on). Taking cognizance of an offence must be followed by judicial action under the above provisions. Section 156 of the Code, occurring in Chapter XII, is the statutory provision relating to power of police officers to investigate cognizable offences. Sub-section (1) of Section 156 declares the power of any station house officer to investigate such an offence. This is statutory power vested in such officers with reference to information received at the police station of the commission of cognizable offence within the limits of the station. Sub-section (3) of Section 156 states that “any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned”. This special power is granted to such Magistrates, obviously to deal with complaints filed in Court in which the Magistrates do not proceed to take cognizance of the offence involved and feel the need to straight away order police investigation.

10. An order to be passed under Section 156(3) of the Code is not an order which could be passed after the Court takes cognizance of an offence as required under Section 200 of the Code. That is an order which could be lawfully passed before or instead of invoking Section 200 of the Code. As such previous sanction of the appropriate authority is not required for passing an order for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. Passing of an order for police investigation under Section 202 of the Code is conditional on observing the requirements of Section 200, which is conditional on the Court taking cognizance of the offence, which is conditional on the previous grant of sanction by the appropriate authority. It explains the vesting of the different types of power in the Court.

11. The question of the need for sanction before an order for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code could be passed was decided in the early days of our Republic in the decision of a three- Judge bench of the Supreme Court in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. (AIR 1951 SC 207). The Supreme Court quoted with approval the following dictum laid down by Justice Das Gupta of Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal affairs, W.B. v. Abani Kumar Banerjee (AIR 1950 Cal 437)-

“It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal P. C., he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, -proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for enquiry and or report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.”        (emphasis applied)

12. It has to be noticed that the above dictum by Justice Das Gupta of the Calcutta High Court was adopted by the three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court. No bench superior to a three  Judge Bench of Supreme Court has differed from the above dictum. In Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam (AIR 1961 SC 986), another three Judge bench of Supreme Court has reiterated the dictum of the earlier bench. So also did Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors v. V. Narayana Reddy & Ors (AIR 1976 SC 1672), Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Sah (AIR 1964 SC 1541) and Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh ((1977) 4 SCC 459).

13. There is a two Judge bench decision of Supreme Court Anil Kumar & Ors v. Aiyyappa & Ors. (2013 (4) KLT 125 (SC) = (2013) 10 SCC 705) which took the view that “cognizance” means taking “notice” for any purpose and a Court is precluded from taking notice of a complaint or exercising jurisdiction in respect of offences requiring sanction for ‘taking cognizance’ and hence no order under Section 156(3) of the Code can be passed without prior sanction as taking “notice” is inevitable in such a case. Anil Kumar & Ors did not refer to the earlier larger bench decisions or the coequal bench decisions and this crucial circumstance renders such a decision per incuriam.