All About Finger Prints

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

As we skip over the pages of the Indian Evidence Act and come to S.46, we find the word 'finger impressions' in brackets in that section. The portion in brackets was added by S.3 of Act V of 1899. The statement of objects and reasons of that Act contains the following paragraph:

"The system of identification by means of such impression is gaining ground and has been introduced with considerable success in the Lower Provinces of Bengal. It seems desirable that expert evidence in connection with it should be admitted and with that object it is proposed by the third clause of the Bill to amend the law on the subject."

Years have rolled by; still no Indian criminal is found doing his job with gloves oh, or in any way afraid of leaving his fingerprints at the scene of the crime, for the very plain reason that in India unlike Scotland Yard and FBI, analysis of finger prints have not reeived the due regard it should have in the detection of crime.

It is very interesting to trace the back ground of the history of finger print legislation. In China and the East, the finger and thumb print have been used for centuries as a form of signature, to seal official documents and legal claims. A twelth century Chinese romance describes the finger printing of two women arrested for murder. The finger prints of an early Briton on a pick haft at Brandon, Suffolk, are at least five thousand years old.

In the West, a most important early record of the legal awareness of the fingerprints is the Major Declamations, the addresses of a Roman Lawyer. One of them is a case which centres on the planted evidence of bloody handprints and this is used by the defending lawyer of the innocent man to break down the real murderer, who then confesses. During the middle ages, in Europe seals were also impressed by the finger print as a sign of one's 'act and deed'. Marcello Malpigi, an Italian Physiologist of the seventeenth century was the European to consider scientifically the ridge patterns on the skin. His contemporary Nehemiah Grew, Secretary of the Royal Society, similarly studied the pores of the hand and feet. Other scientists followed up these studies over the next two centuries. In 1823 Johann Purkinje, Professor of Anatomy at Breslau, suggested the first system for the classification of finger prints. In the 1880's too, there is evidence that others in the West were becoming very conscious of the significance of fingerprints. In two contemporary detective stories of Mark Twain, 'Life on the Mississippi' and Pudd'nhead Wilson', fingerprinting plays a crucial role. In 1892, Juan Vucetich, later director of the fingerprint bureau in Buenos Aires and formulator of a classification system, achieved the first conviction of a murderess on the evidence of finger-prints.

In 1890, Edward Richard Henry, Inspector General of Police in Bengal, simplified and made really workable achievements hitherto made in the field of finger printing system. In 1897 he published a book "Classification and uses of Fingerprints" which became an official text book and his system was accepted by many European countries and the United States. In 1901 Henry was made the Assistant Commissioner at Scotland Yard and in the same year the Central Finger-print Branch was created. In 1902, on Derby Day, fifty-four men were arrested on the Epsom Race Course and fingerprinted. By next morning, an Inspector was ready with the records of twenty-nine old offenders amongst those charged. In the autumn, a burglary at the Denmark Hill provided the first trial to accept fingerprint evidence at the Central Criminal Court. Jackson, the accused, whose finger-prints were already in F.B.I. records received seven years.

The first murder case in which fingerprint testimony placed a serious role was the celebrated 'Straton trial'. On a rainy Monday morning, in 1905 an elderly couple named Farrow, was found battered in a chandler's shop. The husband was dead and his wife died three days later in hospital. The motive had obviously been robbery and two black masks made of silk stockings were found in the shop. Aright thumbprint was found on the tray of the cash box which did not correspond with any of the victims or a policeman who admitted having touched the tray. The robbery committed under a delusion that the Farrows were fabulously rich and kept a large sum of money in the premises. Actually, they were only employees of the shop and had only a few pounds in the cash-box. A careful police check finally led suspicion to fall on two young hooligans named Alfred and Albert Straton. On the Sunday after the murder, a police officer heard that Alfred was in a public house. With some courage, he went in along (the place was full of petty criminals and prostitutes) and ordered Alfred to come outside where he arrested him for murder. 'The thumbprint on the tray was found to have eleven points of resemblance to Alfred's thumb print. Albert also was arrested later. Mr. Justice Channel in his summing up, was cautious about the thumbprint evidence but admitted the extraordinary resemblance. The Stratons were found guilty and sentenced to death.

The Bhowal Sanyasi Case

(T.G. John, Advocate, Thrissur)

Appearing and disappearing with bewildering rapidity, the facts of the Bhowal Sanyasi case (Bibhabati v. Ramendra Narayan - AIR 1947 P.C. 19) have the disjointed quality of a surrealist movie. It has all the thrills and twists of a fictional whodunit-all the dramatic portents ofa melodrama; it is a true life story of mystery, crime, love and adventure. It will seem that a dead man has walked out of his funeral pyre-a sequence which can only be imagined as a product of trite fiction of the class of Marie Corelli's immortal work 'Vendetta'. But still that was what really happened on that fateful night at Darjeeling in the year 1909.

Raja Bajendra Narayan Roy, the Zemindar of Bhowal, one of the largest landed proprietors of East Bengal died on 26-4-1901. The family was regarded as the premier Hindu Zemindar family of Dacca and the annual rent-roll of the estate was about six lakhs of rupees. The Raja was survived by his widow, three sons and three daughters.

Ramendra Narayan Roy was his second son. The three sons were mentioned in order of seniority as Bara Kumar, Mejo Kumar and Choto Kumar.

Though born with silver spoons in their mouth, the three Kumars neglected their studies in such away that though placed under the tutelage of the best educationists, they never got beyond their Bengali and English alphabets. The Kumars were busy otherwise. They were thriving in other fields; at the age of 18, when his father died. Ramendra Narayan - the hero of our story - was a confirmed debanchee visiting prostitutes and haunting low dens of vice. In 1902 he married Bibhabati, a beautiful girl of 13. Even after his marriage, he kept on sowing wild oats and at some date subsequent to 1905 the second Kumar had gummatous ulcers on or about both the elbows and on his legs, being the tertiary stage of syphilis.

Bhibabati had a brother Satya Babu who was studying for law about the year 1908. He was a very cunning man and he proposed to the second Kumar the idea for visit to Darjeeling. Ramendra set out to Darjeeling with a party consisting of Satyababu, his wife Bhibabati, a retinue of servants and a doctor. Sixteen days after reaching Darjeeling, Ramenra fell ill and on May 8, 1909, he died a little before midnight. The body lay in the house 'the entire night and was cremated the next morning'. On 10th May, Bhibabati with the rest of the party left Darjeeling for Jaidebpur where she had her ordinary residence until April 1911, where she left for Calcutta to live there permanently with her mother and brother Satyaendra. She began to enjoy her widow's estate in the undivided one third" share of the Bhowal estate, which her husband the second Kumar had owned, and she recovered the proceeds amounting to Rs.30,000/-, of a life policy taken out by the second Kumar, the necessary certificates of death having been provided. By 1910, the first Kumar died and in 1913 the third Kumar also died, all due to dissipation and fast living. The Bhowal family was practically extinct.- And then things began to happen December 1920. One cold morning in December an unusually lean sanyasi alighted at the usually crowded railway Station of Dacca. He was later found sitting on the Buckland Bund on the river. There he sat night, and day, rain or shine, for nearly four months till April 5,1921. But for a loin cloth, he was naked. He had a fairly long beard and his hair fell behind his back, malted into a mass of cords reaching down to his knees, his body besmeared with ashes from head to foot. Buckland Bund was a public walk on the margin of a river where people promenade morning and evening for pleasure or health. All were struck by the close resemblance of this ascetic with the second Kumar of Bhowal. He was later taken to Jaidebpur where all his tenants and his relatives after close scrutiny, deliberation and questioning were finally convinced that he was none other than the second Kumar of Bhowal. Bhibabati through her brother Satya Babu resisted and maintained that the sanyasi was only a pretender. On April 24, 1930 the second Kumar instituted a suit for declaration that he is Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy, the second son of the late Rajah Narayan Roy of Bhowal and that his possession should be confirmed in respect of the one third share of the properties described in the schedule, or if from the evidence and under the circumstances plaintiff s possession thereof should not be established, then possession thereof should be given to him. He further asked for injunctions against obstruction to his possession. Bhibabati contested denying inter alia the identity of the plaintiff with Kumar Paramendra Narayan Roy. The rest of the story could be pieced out from the large volume of evidence which was forthcoming in this case. The defence maintained that the second Kumar died shortly before midnight and that the following morning his body was cremated with the usual rites at the new sasan at Darjeeling. The plaintiff admitted that there was a funeral procession and cremation on the morning of 9th of May hut maintained that the body so cremated was not of the second Kumar; his case being that the second Kumar was taken for dead at about dusk between seven and eight O' clock in the evening of 8th of May, that arrangements were at once made for cremation, that the body was taken in funeral procession to the old sasan and placed in position for cremation, when a violent storm and rain caused the party to take shelter, and that on their return after the rain had abated the body was no longer there, that thereafter another body was procured and was the subject of the procession and cremation, the following morning. The plaintiff s further case was that while the funeral party were sheltering from the storm, he was found to be still alive by four sanyasis who were nearby and had heard certain sounds from the sasan and who released him and took him away, looked after him, and took him with them in their wanderings, that when he had recovered from an unconscious state, he had lost all memory of who he was, where he came from and of past events. Some eleven years later he recalled that he came from Dacca, and that was how he took up a position on Buckland Bund on the margin of the river Bunganga at Dacca.

Before the First Additional District Judge of Dacca, the trial lasted for 608 days. 1042 witnesses testified for the second Kumar and 433 for the defence. On 24-8-1936, the judgment of the Court was delivered which ran into 532 foolscap pages the limit of judicial endurance! The plaintiff was declared to be the second Kumar and entitlted to an undivided orte third share in the properties in suit. The appeal from the trial Court's decree was heard by a special bench of the Calcutta- High Court consisting of Costello, Biswas and Lodge JJ (Lodge J. dissenting) and was dismissed confirming the trial court's decree. The appeal from the Calcutta High Court to the Privy Council was heard by Lord Thankerton, Lord Du Pareq and Sir Madhavan Nair, Mr. D.N. Pritt appeared for the respondent. On 13thof July 1946 Lord Thankerton advised his majesty that the decision of the High Court should be affirmed.

Strangely enough on 3-8-1946 four days after the Privy Council judgment, the second Kumar died at Calcutta. There was a funeral procession; there was a funeral pyre-there was cremation; and it really did rain on that day. But on that fateful day he could never walk out of the funeral pyre as he did previously; and no sanyasi came to his rescue. Corpses cannot walk.

The flames of the pyre became longer than long and with one violent crackle of the skull, the curtain was finally rung down on one of the strangest sagas of human history once more flaunting the fact that truth is always stranger than fiction.

Sweet and Sour!

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

The court room is often likened to a stage, with the Judge, the lawyer and the litigant as the leading lights of the play. A layman cannot just comprehend the many technicalities, the tactical niceties and the hair splitting commonly associated with the temples of justice.

Unpremeditated humour often sends the audience into peals of laughter. Once an eminent advocate of our country was arguing a case before a Judge who had risen from the bar. The Judge was in the habit of snubbing his erstwhile collegues. One day while a case was being argued, the lawyer referred to a book of which there was only one copy which was the one in his hands. The Judge asked for it and it was passed on to him. While going through the book, the Judge found a bug. Addressing the lawyer he said "There is a bug in your book". The lawyer replied at once. "Sir, it is one of those ambitious bugs which have gone from the bar to the bench.

Readers of Serjeant Robinson's 'Bench and Bar' may recall a pleasant story he tells of Danby, a former wigmaker in the Temple. One day, says Robinson, a legal friend went to Danby's to have his hair cut, and while the operation was in progress, he noticed a small boy of about ten years playing in the shop. The customer asked Danby whether the boy was his. "Yes Sir" was the reply "to the best of my knowledge and belief. "And what do you mean to make him?" was the next question. "Well, Sir, as at present advised and without prejudice, if he turns out a sharp clever fellow I mean to bring him to my own business, but if he should prove to be, in the efflux of time, a dull, idle, blockhead -- as I think it is not unlikely he will -- I shall send him to the Bar". Apart from the humour of the little incident and its sly hit at the profession, it amusingly exhibits the love of legal expressions which the wig-maker had managed to pick up in the course of his work and his daily contact with lawyers, 'To go bail for', 'to join issue with', 'a moot point', 'possession is nine points of the law', are only a few of the idioms which the law has presented to our current English.

Here is a fascinating story of a Judge who was not very alert to the arguments advanced at the bar. The Judge while the argument was progressing suddenly noticed that a donkey had started braying outside the court room. He enquired 'what is this noise?' Pat came the reply from the lawyer arguing the case "Sir, this is the echo of the court". The witty retort elicited laughter in the court room. The Judge became very attentive thereafter. Soon he got the better of the lawyer, The donkey started braying again and the Judge comically remarked "Please don't both of you speak at the same time".

Some times an affable insolence heard in the court relieves its tedium., The story goes of a prisoner who was an old offender not unknown to the Judge who was trying him 'It is time you checked in your carrer of crime' said His Lordship. "How many times have you been convicted of this offence before?" 'Five' was the man's unruffled reply. "Five" said His Lordship. "Then this time I shall give you the maximum sentence laid down by the law".

'Maximum?' echoed the prisoner "Don't the regular customer get a discount?"

Before electric fans came in vogue punkhas used to be tied to long ropes which were constantly pulled by coolies and some times by peons. One hot sultry day in the Madras High Court, the Judge went to sleep. The late Mr. Norton, who was arguing the case before him found himself in awkward position. It so happened that the peon was also enjoying a nap. Mr. Norton felt very annoyed. He thumped the table with his books as a result of which both the Peon and the Judge woke up with a start. The Judge asked the counsel, 'Why what is the matter?' Mr. Norton's crushing retort had the telling effect. "Oh, nothing my Lord --it is only the impertinence of the peon to think that he can go to sleep in the open court, as if he is also a Judge".

Mr. Justice Khosla, the former Chief Justice of Punjab High Court, recounts the story of a lawyer who was not very particular about his dress and appearance. One day unexpectedly, he appeared in court meticulously dressed. He was well groomed wearing a new gown. The Judge slyly sizing him up said, 'it seems you got a lottery'. The lawyer repaid in the same coin at once and retorted "My Lord, how can I be so lucky as you are. Your Lordship gets a lottery on the first day of each month".

An eminent lawyer who had made a significant contribution to court room humour was an Irish Barrister John Carran, considered to be the high priest of the scintillating repartee. An Irish Judge had trained a small dog to sit beside him in the court. One day when Curran was arguing the case, the Judge turned his eyes from him in contemptuous indifference and started fondling the dog. The barrister stopped, 'Go on' said the Judge. 'I beg your pardon' answered Curran 'I thought your Lordship was in consultation'.

The same Judge once said to Curran, 'Oh Sir if that is the law, I may burn all the law books'. 'Oh no my Lord, better read them' came the witty reply.

Tailpiece:

'The greater the number of laws and enactments, the more thieves and robbers there will be'. LAOT ZU Chinese philospher.

The Rule of Law

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

"Let all things be done decently and in order", said St. Paul to the Corinthians, and from the beginning man's desperate struggle, for order and justice has given force to the law. It gave force to the divinely inspired canons for human conduct of Moses; it gave force to the rule of the Hindu Manu, the 'Babylonian Hammu Rabi, the Roman Numa and the Greek Lycurgus; it gave force to the law as a human science in the Digest of the Roman Emperor Justinian; it gave force to the common law of England, based on principle, shaped by experience, controlled by reason. That force survived and beat down the political absolutism of the 17th and 18th centuries which held that the law was no more than the will of the sovereign. Sir Edward Coke immortalised Bracton's words "Rex non debet esse sub homine Deo at lege". (The King ought not to be under man, but under God and the law) - by flinging them in the furious face of absolutist James-1 of England. Then Coke fell to his knees in terror of losing his head -yet his doctrine lives today as the well-spring of the rule of law.

According to Hindu Legal theory, Law is intended to promote Dharma or Righteousness which in turn is conducive to secure 'moksha'. The concept of Dharma as the basis of validity of all laws is deeply embedded in the Indian mind. Dharma is a higher law which the king himself is bound to respect and enforce. The Smritis hold that every deviation from Dharm, if brought to the notice of the king, will be punished by him. According to Manu, the king who harasses his Subjects loses his family, life and kingdom. "The people should take courage and kill a cruel king who does not protect his subjects, merely robs their wealth who extracts taxes and who gives no lead. Such a king is Kali (evil and strife) incarnate". (Anusana Parva). Mitra and Varuna are declared to be "lovers and cherishers of the law". They are invoked as "lords of the shining light" to protect men not only from their enemies but from the forces of nature. "The winds waft sweets; the rivers pour sweets for the men who keeps the law; may be plants be sweet for us. Sweet be the night and sweet the dawns, sweet the terrestrial atmosphere, sweet be our Father in Heaven to us". (Rig. Veda. Book I, Hymn 90).

According to Savingny, Law is the organ of folk right; it moves and grows like every other expression of the life of the people; it is formed by custom and popular feeling,' through the operation of silent forces and not by the arbitrary will of a Legislature. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall unarmed except for the force of law, determined the right of judicial review over legislative decision, gave breath and blood to the American precedent, as "a Government of laws and not of men". So it was also that at the testing time of that Republic, Abraham Lincoln was a man who knew only two basic books - the Bible and Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law. Richard Hooker has stated that law can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is in the bosom of God; her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and on earth do her homage-each in a different sort and manner admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.

The guiding principle of the American Constitution (in fact the motto of the constitution of every civilized nation) has been explained:-If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. In framing a Government which is to be administered by men, over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the Government to control the Government; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. The origin of the rule of law is based on certain fundamental propositions founded on certain natural rights inviolable and inviolate and which have emerged in the process of the evolution of the human being due to the development of culture and refinement. The origin of the ideas of individual liberty, freedom and private property are all milestones on the way from savagery to civilization. Prof. Lasky says: "From the Rule of Law, in a word, there is imposed on the State, the obligation to assume to each and all its citizens the means to enable them to contribute all it is in them to give to the fullest realization of social solidarity. It is because of this obligation that the State is entitled to use force for the achievements of its end. For all the matter that is essential for the purpose, there should be constitutional guarantees in the ultimate framework of the State. In such an attitude we have all the materials for the full the theory of the State. Experience is to suggest in terms of social solidarity a rule of right conduct and the aim of the State is its realization. The State clearly is bound by the rule, that is to say, bound by law, for by every definition, it is an instrument and not an end".

With all this, sometimes we do feel really concerned about public morality. It is our chief and indeed our only protection against tyranny and exploitation. If we could not rely on our politicians to give an honest account of their official conduct and intentions, if we could not rely on our civil servants to administer affairs impartially, if we could not rely on our magistrates and judges, to enforce equality before the law, if we could not rely on the police not to practice torture and not to manufacture evidence, if we could not rely on the Press to make an honest attempt to ascertain the facts and to report them fairly, not only should we be deprived of any control over the conduct of public affairs but we should be denied the security which is essential for our private well being. Among all forms of official wickedness, the perversion of justice outrages us most. Not that the egoism, or even the stupidity of a politician or the corruption of a civil servant may not do more harm. But we look on the law as our protection against the infringement of what we take to be our rights. Even though the laws themselves may be oppressive or discriminatory there is some safeguard in their being honestly applied. And we feel most deeply threatened and wounded when a miscarriage of justice arises out of political, racial or communal prejudice.

A Comment on Leelamma v. Dilip Kumar alias Kochaniyan –

1992 (1) KLT 651

(K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai, B.Sc.(Ker.); LL.M. (Del.); LL.M., S.J.D. (Michigan), Professor of Law, CUSAT, Kochi-682022)

The decision handed down by Justice Chettur Sankaran Nairin Leelamma v.Dilip Kumar alias Kochaniyan (O.P. No. 1074/1987 and O.P. No. 1470/1992 --1992 (1) KLT 651) assumes much importance for several reasons.

It is for the first time that such a ease came up for decision in the Kerala High Court. The facts are quite interesting; the points decided are quite relevant; the reasoning innovating and refreshing and the law laid down is of some consequences.

Leelamma belonging to a Roman Catholic family was married on 2-3-1986 according to custom followed by the Roman Catholics, Dilip Kumar alias Kochaniyan who represented to her that he belonged to a traditional Christian family and that his name was Philip Joseph. After the marriage the husband and wife spent some days in the wife's house. Thereafter they went to the husband's house. It was then that the wife came to know that her husband did not belong to a Christian family. In fact he belonged to an Ezhava family and his father and mother continued to be Ezhava though he was reported to have undergone baptism ceremony before marriage. By the time, the wife's jewellery were misappropriated and she was compelled to have sexual intercourse with his friends. She went back to her parent's house and did not live with her husband thereafter.

The wife petitioned the High Court for a declaration that the marriage is a nullity by reason of fraud practised on her to obtain her consent. Though initially the husband contested the petition after an order of interim alimony he withdrew from the proceedings.

The husband did not care to appear in his O.P. filed for restitution of conjugal rights. Thus there was total withdrawal from the proceedings by the husband. It was in these circumstances that the honourable High Court appointed Shri. Sebastian Champappilly, the author of 'Christian Law' amicus curiae.

The judgment does reflect the adequate homework done by the Court. Its reasoning is appropriate and convincing. It signifies the caution with which the Court arrived at its conclusion (See how the judge reasoned out the conclusion that there was fraud, in his observation extracted at n.23 infra.). It is a good piece reflecting the judicial craftsmanship of Justice Sankaran Nair.

The first question that arose for decision is as to the law applicable to the case. The court found that the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 was not in force in the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin areas of Kerala as has been noticed by the Travancore and Travancore-Cochin High Courts in a series of cases (See Eapen Punnen v. Koruthu Maria, 10 TLR 95, Cheriya Varkey v. Ouseph Thresia, AIR 1955 TC 255, Sirkar v. Mathu Kuruvilla, 11 TLR 33 (FB). Also see S.1 of the Act.) Though in Sirkar v. Mathu Kuruvilla (11 TLR 33) the Full Bench of Travancore High Court opined that the customary law had predominance over canon law in the case of followers of the protestant churches, it seems that the courts had been taking the view that the canon law coupled with customary law applied to the Roman Catholic Christians in Kerala in the matter of marriages. In the case of Christians in other parts of India also it has been accepted that the personal law, which governs Roman Catholics is the Law of Church of Rome (See Lopez v. Lopez, ILR 12 Cal. 706, Lucas v. Lucas, ILR 32 Gal. 187, Saldhana v. Saldhana, AIR 1930 Bom. 105). Here the petitioner is undoubtedly governed by canon law. The husband was converted into Christianity and moreover, opted to undergo the ceremony according to the custom of Roman Catholics. As such the law that should govern the marriage in this case is undoubtedly the canon law applicable to the community to which the wife belongs. This accords well with the position obtaining in private international law. This principle is echoed in Lakshmi Sanyal v. S.K. Dhar, AIR 1972 SC 2667. Also see the reasoning in Jude v. Jude, (AIR 1940 Cal. 75), wherein the Supreme Court pinpointed this aspect thus:

"The question of capacity to marry and impediments in the way of marriage would have to be resolved by referring to their personal law. That, for the purpose of deciding the validity of marriage, would be the law of the Roman Catholic Church, namely, the canon law of that church." (Ibid at 2672).

Thus, judged by the canon law the court found that an error concerning the person renders the marriage invalid. Here, there was indeed an error concerning the person inasmuch as he was not the person of the background which she thought him to be. According to the wife he misrepresented to her that he belonged to a traditional Syrian Christian family. It was on this belief that she consented to the marriage. (See at p.3 of the judgment). Thus an erroneous belief was induced in the wife by the husband 'concerning a quality of his', namely religious faith or religious status. This is what the court found to be fraud in the meaning of S.19, and certainly in canon law, that made the wife to consent to the marriage. The court cited T.O. Aykut v. M.O. Aykut, (AIR 1940 Cal. 75) to support its stand that misrepresentation of the religious status might amount to fraud. In Jude v. Jude (AIR 1949 Cal. 503) also the Calcutta High Court found such misrepresentation to be fraud. The court has therefore declared the marriage null and void.

Looked in this perspective it was not necessary for the court to express any opinion as to who is a Christian. Indeed, the court has not gone beyond what the Allahabad and Madras High Courts had ruled (See Maharam v. Emperor, AIR 1918 All. 168, Pakiam Solomon v. Ohelliah Filial, AIR 1924 Mad. 18). However, it may be pointed out that the determining factor of a person being Christian should not either be baptism or professing the Christian religion but his being accepted by the community as Christian. This has to be the definition atleast for the purpose of marriage inasmuch as it is a social institution and it is the society's acceptance which is material for the ceremonies like marriages. Indeed, the declaration of nullity of the marriage in question may be accepted by the church and the wife permitted to contract a second marriage. But suppose, the eparchial tribunal does not recognise the verdict of the High Court and does not permit her to contract second marriage. The whole exercise of the High Court then goes a waste of time and energy.

Quite often Christian marriages are dissolved under the canon law by the eparchial tribunals in our country if there was any defect in the essentials of a marriage. However," though our courts have been maintaining that it is the canon law which applies in such cases, they have been denying jurisdiction to eparchial tribunal to declare the marriage null and void. They have been insisting that they alone have jurisdiction.

Many reasons are mentioned in support of this view. In Saroja David v. Christie Francis (AIR 1966 AP. 178), the A.P. High Court traced the history of this jurisdiction. It has been pointed out by the Court that originally this jurisdiction rested with the ecclesiastical courts in England and from them the Supreme Court in India inherited it. From the Supreme Court our High Courts came to inherit this jurisdiction. The High Court's jurisdiction has been reiterated by Delhi High Court also in J. F.S. Eric D' Souza v. Florence Martha (AIR 1980 Del. 275).

The Kerala High Court has also been rendering a series of decisions on the question of jurisdiction of eparchial tribunal. In Kurian v. Alphonsa (1986 KLT 731) Justice Sreedharan disregarded the Eparchial Tribunal's order dissolving the marriage on the ground of defect of wife's consent due to insanity and ruled that Eparchial Tribunals cannot adjudicate upon dissolution of marriage so as to affect the civil rights of the parties to the marriage. He observed:

"Whatever be the jurisdiction of Eparchial Tribunal in ecclesiastical matters it cannot affect the civil rights of the parties. Rights flowing out of a legal marriage cannot be interfered with by the Eparchial Tribunal". (Ibid at 733).

It was a case where the wife's claim for maintenance was resisted by the husband on the ground that the marriage was declared null and void by the Eparchial Tribunal. Still the court described it as a legal marriage from which flowed the civil liability to maintain the wife. In other words it refused to recognise the declaration by the Eparchial Tribunals.

In Gabriel Antony v. Thresya Grace, (1987 (1) KLT 690) Thomas, J. ventured to examine the legal position. According to him a Christian marriage becomes void under S.19 only when a High Court decrees so. His Lordship argues that the word Void' inS.19 of the Divorce Act shall subject to the context means "voidable" as well. And as such it is only when on the option of either parties, the High Court passes a decree on the nullity of the marriage, a marriage becomes null and void. The Eparchial Tribunal does not have any say in the matter. He distinguished the decisions in Yamuna Bai Anantrao's case (The Bombay High Court's decision reported in 1983 Crl. LJ. 259 (FB). Later it was affirmed by the Supreme Court, ((1988) 1 SCC 530) saying that S.11 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 by itself declares certain marriages null and void even without the requirement of a decree passed by the High Court whereas S.19 of the Divorce Act requires such a decree.

The decision in Gabriel was followed in Jose v. Alice (1988 (2) KLT 890), in which also the Eparchial Court gave a declaration of nullity on the ground of defect of consent, The court observed:

If either of the parties does not choose to file a petition as contemplated by S. 18 the marriage is not rendered void even if any of the grounds capable of invalidating the marriage is present and available to the parties to have recourse to the procedure established by the Act. When S. 18 gives only an option to the parties to present a petition for a decree declaring the marriage null and void, it cannot be said that the marriage is ipse jure for the reason of ground 2 to 4 mentioned in S.19 of the Act. It is also not correct to say that these grounds do not postulate any adjudication." (Ibid at 896. The court has relied on supra n.11 and 12).

In this connection it may be pertinent to point out that the Jose court has taken the marriage as solemnized in accordance with S.5 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 (See para.11 of supra n. 18). The Kurien Court has also taken the marriage to be a legal one on the ground that it was solemnized in accordance with customary law. (see supra n.14). It is however to be noted that the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 is not applicable to erstwhile Travancore and Cochin States. As such, it would be appropriate to say that the above courts took the position that the validity of marriages is to be determined under the customary law applicable to Christians in these areas. It is indeed the correct position.

Be that as it may, it appears that the Indian Christian Marriage Act and the Indian Divorce Act may act as a code complementing each other. As such if the Marriage Act is not applicable and the validity of marriage is determined by church law the Divorce Act may not work well. In this view, the relevant part of Divorce Act should not have been applied in the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin areas inasmuch as divorce or nullity out of the church was unheard among Travancore-Cochin Christians because of the pivotal role the church plays in marriage and divorce.

At present while in the case of dissolution of a Christian marriage on the ground of its being null and void, a decree by the District Court/High Court is insisted upon, in the case of certain Hindu marriages, no such decree is insisted upon on the gound that such marriages are declared null and void by the statute itself (See discussions in Gabriel's case supra n.16). In fact if this argument is extended to the case of Travancore-Cochin Christians it becomes clear that the declaration of nullity of their marriages should be done by their church because the validity or otherwise of such marriages is 'declared' by their customary law through the instrumentality of Eparchial Tribunals.

Viewed in this perspective, it can be argued that if the court is ready to concede jurisdiction of civil/criminal courts to take cognizance of the nullity of a Hindu marriage by virtue of the declaratory language employed in S.11 of the Hindu Marriage Act nothing should stand in the way of a court to accept a nullity order given by an eparchial court which must have, in the light of the circumstances and its experiences, gone into all aspects of the case, to accept the latter's decision on the nullity question.

There is no dispute that the capacity to marry, the essentials of marriage and the rules of ceremony etc. are governed by the church in Kerala. The impact of the courts' decisions is that while the church has the right to determine whether a marriage is to be solemnized, if subsequently something goes wrong such as defect in consent, only because the Divorce Act is made applicable, its validity can be decided by the District Court/High Court. The sum part of this argument becomes evident when a person whose marriage has been declared null and void by the Court is seeking remarriage. The church in Kerala may not allow him to remarry. He can of course go through a civil marriage. Church may not recognise it. If on the other hand, the High Court does not recognize the dissolution granted by the Church and the person remarries through the church, he faces the threat of prosecution for bigamy by the first spouse. Thus, the Christians in the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin areas seem to be in a dilemma.

Since the Christians in these parts constitute a separate class for the purposes of marriage and divorce having regard to the tight grip of the church on them it would be in the fitness o* things if Ss. 18 & 19 of the Divorce Act are not made applicable to them. The eparchial court being the custodian of canon law may be conferred with the jurisdiction to decide the question concerning dissolution of Christian marriages.

In the context of the facts presented in the case under comment, the High Court was perfectly justified in declaring' the marriage null and void. (The Court observed: "Having heard the evidence and watched her demeanour, I am inclined to accept the evidence of the wife, and I do so. I find that the husband had made a false representation, knowing it to be so and obtained consent of the wife to marriage, by practising fraud.) However, as mentioned earlier, it is doubtful whether the church would permit the petitioner to remarry. Thus the very purpose of obtaining a declaration maybe defeated. It is therefore felt that a thorough revision of the Saw in this sector by the Parliament is the desideratum. The court has again provided a chance for rethinking. It is now for the reformers to take up the challenge.