The Rule of Law

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

"Let all things be done decently and in order", said St. Paul to the Corinthians, and from the beginning man's desperate struggle, for order and justice has given force to the law. It gave force to the divinely inspired canons for human conduct of Moses; it gave force to the rule of the Hindu Manu, the 'Babylonian Hammu Rabi, the Roman Numa and the Greek Lycurgus; it gave force to the law as a human science in the Digest of the Roman Emperor Justinian; it gave force to the common law of England, based on principle, shaped by experience, controlled by reason. That force survived and beat down the political absolutism of the 17th and 18th centuries which held that the law was no more than the will of the sovereign. Sir Edward Coke immortalised Bracton's words "Rex non debet esse sub homine Deo at lege". (The King ought not to be under man, but under God and the law) - by flinging them in the furious face of absolutist James-1 of England. Then Coke fell to his knees in terror of losing his head -yet his doctrine lives today as the well-spring of the rule of law.

According to Hindu Legal theory, Law is intended to promote Dharma or Righteousness which in turn is conducive to secure 'moksha'. The concept of Dharma as the basis of validity of all laws is deeply embedded in the Indian mind. Dharma is a higher law which the king himself is bound to respect and enforce. The Smritis hold that every deviation from Dharm, if brought to the notice of the king, will be punished by him. According to Manu, the king who harasses his Subjects loses his family, life and kingdom. "The people should take courage and kill a cruel king who does not protect his subjects, merely robs their wealth who extracts taxes and who gives no lead. Such a king is Kali (evil and strife) incarnate". (Anusana Parva). Mitra and Varuna are declared to be "lovers and cherishers of the law". They are invoked as "lords of the shining light" to protect men not only from their enemies but from the forces of nature. "The winds waft sweets; the rivers pour sweets for the men who keeps the law; may be plants be sweet for us. Sweet be the night and sweet the dawns, sweet the terrestrial atmosphere, sweet be our Father in Heaven to us". (Rig. Veda. Book I, Hymn 90).

According to Savingny, Law is the organ of folk right; it moves and grows like every other expression of the life of the people; it is formed by custom and popular feeling,' through the operation of silent forces and not by the arbitrary will of a Legislature. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall unarmed except for the force of law, determined the right of judicial review over legislative decision, gave breath and blood to the American precedent, as "a Government of laws and not of men". So it was also that at the testing time of that Republic, Abraham Lincoln was a man who knew only two basic books - the Bible and Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law. Richard Hooker has stated that law can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is in the bosom of God; her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and on earth do her homage-each in a different sort and manner admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.

The guiding principle of the American Constitution (in fact the motto of the constitution of every civilized nation) has been explained:-If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. In framing a Government which is to be administered by men, over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the Government to control the Government; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. The origin of the rule of law is based on certain fundamental propositions founded on certain natural rights inviolable and inviolate and which have emerged in the process of the evolution of the human being due to the development of culture and refinement. The origin of the ideas of individual liberty, freedom and private property are all milestones on the way from savagery to civilization. Prof. Lasky says: "From the Rule of Law, in a word, there is imposed on the State, the obligation to assume to each and all its citizens the means to enable them to contribute all it is in them to give to the fullest realization of social solidarity. It is because of this obligation that the State is entitled to use force for the achievements of its end. For all the matter that is essential for the purpose, there should be constitutional guarantees in the ultimate framework of the State. In such an attitude we have all the materials for the full the theory of the State. Experience is to suggest in terms of social solidarity a rule of right conduct and the aim of the State is its realization. The State clearly is bound by the rule, that is to say, bound by law, for by every definition, it is an instrument and not an end".

With all this, sometimes we do feel really concerned about public morality. It is our chief and indeed our only protection against tyranny and exploitation. If we could not rely on our politicians to give an honest account of their official conduct and intentions, if we could not rely on our civil servants to administer affairs impartially, if we could not rely on our magistrates and judges, to enforce equality before the law, if we could not rely on the police not to practice torture and not to manufacture evidence, if we could not rely on the Press to make an honest attempt to ascertain the facts and to report them fairly, not only should we be deprived of any control over the conduct of public affairs but we should be denied the security which is essential for our private well being. Among all forms of official wickedness, the perversion of justice outrages us most. Not that the egoism, or even the stupidity of a politician or the corruption of a civil servant may not do more harm. But we look on the law as our protection against the infringement of what we take to be our rights. Even though the laws themselves may be oppressive or discriminatory there is some safeguard in their being honestly applied. And we feel most deeply threatened and wounded when a miscarriage of justice arises out of political, racial or communal prejudice.

All About Finger Prints

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

As we skip over the pages of the Indian Evidence Act and come to S.46, we find the word 'finger impressions' in brackets in that section. The portion in brackets was added by S.3 of Act V of 1899. The statement of objects and reasons of that Act contains the following paragraph:

"The system of identification by means of such impression is gaining ground and has been introduced with considerable success in the Lower Provinces of Bengal. It seems desirable that expert evidence in connection with it should be admitted and with that object it is proposed by the third clause of the Bill to amend the law on the subject."

Years have rolled by; still no Indian criminal is found doing his job with gloves oh, or in any way afraid of leaving his fingerprints at the scene of the crime, for the very plain reason that in India unlike Scotland Yard and FBI, analysis of finger prints have not reeived the due regard it should have in the detection of crime.

It is very interesting to trace the back ground of the history of finger print legislation. In China and the East, the finger and thumb print have been used for centuries as a form of signature, to seal official documents and legal claims. A twelth century Chinese romance describes the finger printing of two women arrested for murder. The finger prints of an early Briton on a pick haft at Brandon, Suffolk, are at least five thousand years old.

In the West, a most important early record of the legal awareness of the fingerprints is the Major Declamations, the addresses of a Roman Lawyer. One of them is a case which centres on the planted evidence of bloody handprints and this is used by the defending lawyer of the innocent man to break down the real murderer, who then confesses. During the middle ages, in Europe seals were also impressed by the finger print as a sign of one's 'act and deed'. Marcello Malpigi, an Italian Physiologist of the seventeenth century was the European to consider scientifically the ridge patterns on the skin. His contemporary Nehemiah Grew, Secretary of the Royal Society, similarly studied the pores of the hand and feet. Other scientists followed up these studies over the next two centuries. In 1823 Johann Purkinje, Professor of Anatomy at Breslau, suggested the first system for the classification of finger prints. In the 1880's too, there is evidence that others in the West were becoming very conscious of the significance of fingerprints. In two contemporary detective stories of Mark Twain, 'Life on the Mississippi' and Pudd'nhead Wilson', fingerprinting plays a crucial role. In 1892, Juan Vucetich, later director of the fingerprint bureau in Buenos Aires and formulator of a classification system, achieved the first conviction of a murderess on the evidence of finger-prints.

In 1890, Edward Richard Henry, Inspector General of Police in Bengal, simplified and made really workable achievements hitherto made in the field of finger printing system. In 1897 he published a book "Classification and uses of Fingerprints" which became an official text book and his system was accepted by many European countries and the United States. In 1901 Henry was made the Assistant Commissioner at Scotland Yard and in the same year the Central Finger-print Branch was created. In 1902, on Derby Day, fifty-four men were arrested on the Epsom Race Course and fingerprinted. By next morning, an Inspector was ready with the records of twenty-nine old offenders amongst those charged. In the autumn, a burglary at the Denmark Hill provided the first trial to accept fingerprint evidence at the Central Criminal Court. Jackson, the accused, whose finger-prints were already in F.B.I. records received seven years.

The first murder case in which fingerprint testimony placed a serious role was the celebrated 'Straton trial'. On a rainy Monday morning, in 1905 an elderly couple named Farrow, was found battered in a chandler's shop. The husband was dead and his wife died three days later in hospital. The motive had obviously been robbery and two black masks made of silk stockings were found in the shop. Aright thumbprint was found on the tray of the cash box which did not correspond with any of the victims or a policeman who admitted having touched the tray. The robbery committed under a delusion that the Farrows were fabulously rich and kept a large sum of money in the premises. Actually, they were only employees of the shop and had only a few pounds in the cash-box. A careful police check finally led suspicion to fall on two young hooligans named Alfred and Albert Straton. On the Sunday after the murder, a police officer heard that Alfred was in a public house. With some courage, he went in along (the place was full of petty criminals and prostitutes) and ordered Alfred to come outside where he arrested him for murder. 'The thumbprint on the tray was found to have eleven points of resemblance to Alfred's thumb print. Albert also was arrested later. Mr. Justice Channel in his summing up, was cautious about the thumbprint evidence but admitted the extraordinary resemblance. The Stratons were found guilty and sentenced to death.

The Bhowal Sanyasi Case

(T.G. John, Advocate, Thrissur)

Appearing and disappearing with bewildering rapidity, the facts of the Bhowal Sanyasi case (Bibhabati v. Ramendra Narayan - AIR 1947 P.C. 19) have the disjointed quality of a surrealist movie. It has all the thrills and twists of a fictional whodunit-all the dramatic portents ofa melodrama; it is a true life story of mystery, crime, love and adventure. It will seem that a dead man has walked out of his funeral pyre-a sequence which can only be imagined as a product of trite fiction of the class of Marie Corelli's immortal work 'Vendetta'. But still that was what really happened on that fateful night at Darjeeling in the year 1909.

Raja Bajendra Narayan Roy, the Zemindar of Bhowal, one of the largest landed proprietors of East Bengal died on 26-4-1901. The family was regarded as the premier Hindu Zemindar family of Dacca and the annual rent-roll of the estate was about six lakhs of rupees. The Raja was survived by his widow, three sons and three daughters.

Ramendra Narayan Roy was his second son. The three sons were mentioned in order of seniority as Bara Kumar, Mejo Kumar and Choto Kumar.

Though born with silver spoons in their mouth, the three Kumars neglected their studies in such away that though placed under the tutelage of the best educationists, they never got beyond their Bengali and English alphabets. The Kumars were busy otherwise. They were thriving in other fields; at the age of 18, when his father died. Ramendra Narayan - the hero of our story - was a confirmed debanchee visiting prostitutes and haunting low dens of vice. In 1902 he married Bibhabati, a beautiful girl of 13. Even after his marriage, he kept on sowing wild oats and at some date subsequent to 1905 the second Kumar had gummatous ulcers on or about both the elbows and on his legs, being the tertiary stage of syphilis.

Bhibabati had a brother Satya Babu who was studying for law about the year 1908. He was a very cunning man and he proposed to the second Kumar the idea for visit to Darjeeling. Ramendra set out to Darjeeling with a party consisting of Satyababu, his wife Bhibabati, a retinue of servants and a doctor. Sixteen days after reaching Darjeeling, Ramenra fell ill and on May 8, 1909, he died a little before midnight. The body lay in the house 'the entire night and was cremated the next morning'. On 10th May, Bhibabati with the rest of the party left Darjeeling for Jaidebpur where she had her ordinary residence until April 1911, where she left for Calcutta to live there permanently with her mother and brother Satyaendra. She began to enjoy her widow's estate in the undivided one third" share of the Bhowal estate, which her husband the second Kumar had owned, and she recovered the proceeds amounting to Rs.30,000/-, of a life policy taken out by the second Kumar, the necessary certificates of death having been provided. By 1910, the first Kumar died and in 1913 the third Kumar also died, all due to dissipation and fast living. The Bhowal family was practically extinct.- And then things began to happen December 1920. One cold morning in December an unusually lean sanyasi alighted at the usually crowded railway Station of Dacca. He was later found sitting on the Buckland Bund on the river. There he sat night, and day, rain or shine, for nearly four months till April 5,1921. But for a loin cloth, he was naked. He had a fairly long beard and his hair fell behind his back, malted into a mass of cords reaching down to his knees, his body besmeared with ashes from head to foot. Buckland Bund was a public walk on the margin of a river where people promenade morning and evening for pleasure or health. All were struck by the close resemblance of this ascetic with the second Kumar of Bhowal. He was later taken to Jaidebpur where all his tenants and his relatives after close scrutiny, deliberation and questioning were finally convinced that he was none other than the second Kumar of Bhowal. Bhibabati through her brother Satya Babu resisted and maintained that the sanyasi was only a pretender. On April 24, 1930 the second Kumar instituted a suit for declaration that he is Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy, the second son of the late Rajah Narayan Roy of Bhowal and that his possession should be confirmed in respect of the one third share of the properties described in the schedule, or if from the evidence and under the circumstances plaintiff s possession thereof should not be established, then possession thereof should be given to him. He further asked for injunctions against obstruction to his possession. Bhibabati contested denying inter alia the identity of the plaintiff with Kumar Paramendra Narayan Roy. The rest of the story could be pieced out from the large volume of evidence which was forthcoming in this case. The defence maintained that the second Kumar died shortly before midnight and that the following morning his body was cremated with the usual rites at the new sasan at Darjeeling. The plaintiff admitted that there was a funeral procession and cremation on the morning of 9th of May hut maintained that the body so cremated was not of the second Kumar; his case being that the second Kumar was taken for dead at about dusk between seven and eight O' clock in the evening of 8th of May, that arrangements were at once made for cremation, that the body was taken in funeral procession to the old sasan and placed in position for cremation, when a violent storm and rain caused the party to take shelter, and that on their return after the rain had abated the body was no longer there, that thereafter another body was procured and was the subject of the procession and cremation, the following morning. The plaintiff s further case was that while the funeral party were sheltering from the storm, he was found to be still alive by four sanyasis who were nearby and had heard certain sounds from the sasan and who released him and took him away, looked after him, and took him with them in their wanderings, that when he had recovered from an unconscious state, he had lost all memory of who he was, where he came from and of past events. Some eleven years later he recalled that he came from Dacca, and that was how he took up a position on Buckland Bund on the margin of the river Bunganga at Dacca.

Before the First Additional District Judge of Dacca, the trial lasted for 608 days. 1042 witnesses testified for the second Kumar and 433 for the defence. On 24-8-1936, the judgment of the Court was delivered which ran into 532 foolscap pages the limit of judicial endurance! The plaintiff was declared to be the second Kumar and entitlted to an undivided orte third share in the properties in suit. The appeal from the trial Court's decree was heard by a special bench of the Calcutta- High Court consisting of Costello, Biswas and Lodge JJ (Lodge J. dissenting) and was dismissed confirming the trial court's decree. The appeal from the Calcutta High Court to the Privy Council was heard by Lord Thankerton, Lord Du Pareq and Sir Madhavan Nair, Mr. D.N. Pritt appeared for the respondent. On 13thof July 1946 Lord Thankerton advised his majesty that the decision of the High Court should be affirmed.

Strangely enough on 3-8-1946 four days after the Privy Council judgment, the second Kumar died at Calcutta. There was a funeral procession; there was a funeral pyre-there was cremation; and it really did rain on that day. But on that fateful day he could never walk out of the funeral pyre as he did previously; and no sanyasi came to his rescue. Corpses cannot walk.

The flames of the pyre became longer than long and with one violent crackle of the skull, the curtain was finally rung down on one of the strangest sagas of human history once more flaunting the fact that truth is always stranger than fiction.

Sweet and Sour!

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

The court room is often likened to a stage, with the Judge, the lawyer and the litigant as the leading lights of the play. A layman cannot just comprehend the many technicalities, the tactical niceties and the hair splitting commonly associated with the temples of justice.

Unpremeditated humour often sends the audience into peals of laughter. Once an eminent advocate of our country was arguing a case before a Judge who had risen from the bar. The Judge was in the habit of snubbing his erstwhile collegues. One day while a case was being argued, the lawyer referred to a book of which there was only one copy which was the one in his hands. The Judge asked for it and it was passed on to him. While going through the book, the Judge found a bug. Addressing the lawyer he said "There is a bug in your book". The lawyer replied at once. "Sir, it is one of those ambitious bugs which have gone from the bar to the bench.

Readers of Serjeant Robinson's 'Bench and Bar' may recall a pleasant story he tells of Danby, a former wigmaker in the Temple. One day, says Robinson, a legal friend went to Danby's to have his hair cut, and while the operation was in progress, he noticed a small boy of about ten years playing in the shop. The customer asked Danby whether the boy was his. "Yes Sir" was the reply "to the best of my knowledge and belief. "And what do you mean to make him?" was the next question. "Well, Sir, as at present advised and without prejudice, if he turns out a sharp clever fellow I mean to bring him to my own business, but if he should prove to be, in the efflux of time, a dull, idle, blockhead -- as I think it is not unlikely he will -- I shall send him to the Bar". Apart from the humour of the little incident and its sly hit at the profession, it amusingly exhibits the love of legal expressions which the wig-maker had managed to pick up in the course of his work and his daily contact with lawyers, 'To go bail for', 'to join issue with', 'a moot point', 'possession is nine points of the law', are only a few of the idioms which the law has presented to our current English.

Here is a fascinating story of a Judge who was not very alert to the arguments advanced at the bar. The Judge while the argument was progressing suddenly noticed that a donkey had started braying outside the court room. He enquired 'what is this noise?' Pat came the reply from the lawyer arguing the case "Sir, this is the echo of the court". The witty retort elicited laughter in the court room. The Judge became very attentive thereafter. Soon he got the better of the lawyer, The donkey started braying again and the Judge comically remarked "Please don't both of you speak at the same time".

Some times an affable insolence heard in the court relieves its tedium., The story goes of a prisoner who was an old offender not unknown to the Judge who was trying him 'It is time you checked in your carrer of crime' said His Lordship. "How many times have you been convicted of this offence before?" 'Five' was the man's unruffled reply. "Five" said His Lordship. "Then this time I shall give you the maximum sentence laid down by the law".

'Maximum?' echoed the prisoner "Don't the regular customer get a discount?"

Before electric fans came in vogue punkhas used to be tied to long ropes which were constantly pulled by coolies and some times by peons. One hot sultry day in the Madras High Court, the Judge went to sleep. The late Mr. Norton, who was arguing the case before him found himself in awkward position. It so happened that the peon was also enjoying a nap. Mr. Norton felt very annoyed. He thumped the table with his books as a result of which both the Peon and the Judge woke up with a start. The Judge asked the counsel, 'Why what is the matter?' Mr. Norton's crushing retort had the telling effect. "Oh, nothing my Lord --it is only the impertinence of the peon to think that he can go to sleep in the open court, as if he is also a Judge".

Mr. Justice Khosla, the former Chief Justice of Punjab High Court, recounts the story of a lawyer who was not very particular about his dress and appearance. One day unexpectedly, he appeared in court meticulously dressed. He was well groomed wearing a new gown. The Judge slyly sizing him up said, 'it seems you got a lottery'. The lawyer repaid in the same coin at once and retorted "My Lord, how can I be so lucky as you are. Your Lordship gets a lottery on the first day of each month".

An eminent lawyer who had made a significant contribution to court room humour was an Irish Barrister John Carran, considered to be the high priest of the scintillating repartee. An Irish Judge had trained a small dog to sit beside him in the court. One day when Curran was arguing the case, the Judge turned his eyes from him in contemptuous indifference and started fondling the dog. The barrister stopped, 'Go on' said the Judge. 'I beg your pardon' answered Curran 'I thought your Lordship was in consultation'.

The same Judge once said to Curran, 'Oh Sir if that is the law, I may burn all the law books'. 'Oh no my Lord, better read them' came the witty reply.

Tailpiece:

'The greater the number of laws and enactments, the more thieves and robbers there will be'. LAOT ZU Chinese philospher.

Personality Disorders and Nullity of Marriage According to Church Jurisprudence

(Rev. Dr. Joseph Vadakumcheny, Presiding Judge, Archdiocesan Tribunal, Ernakulam)

The Ability to Assume the Marital Obligations

As in every contract, consent is the efficient cause of the marriage covenant, and the deficiency of this consent cannot be supplied by any human power other than the spouses themselves. In order for a marriage to be contracted validly, a psychologically valid consent, elicited in terms of due mental discretion alone, will not be enough. The spouses should also be in a position to decide upon or reach out the object of the marital consent, which points to the capacity of the contractants in respect of the very object of marriage, and this capacity is termed by jurisprudence as 'the ability to assume the marital obligations'.

Viewing marriage objectively, we can see that the object of the marriage covenant is the formation of a permanent family, which entails the mutual rights and obligations which level with the nature, purpose, and the essential characteristics or properties of marriage. Hence, the spouses, while entering marriage, should be endowed with the emotional maturity and 'the capacity to assume', whereby they can bind themselves in order to sustain, honour, and fulfil the essential obligations of marriage.

A person's inability to assume marital obligations can be said to be amounting to a consensual defect, only in the sense that a psychologically valid consent could be rendered inefficient with regard to the object in so far as the object of the marital consent would be far beyond the reach of the contracting person (subject) because of his/her 'personality make up' which impedes him/her from carrying out the obligations of married life.

Lack of due discretion necessarily implies inability to assume marital obligations, and not vice verse. For, the marital consent is of the present ('de praesenti') and the marital obligations which constitute the object of the marital consent are to be. under- taken here and now at the time of marriage, and hence the person who is bereft of the due discretionary power of the mind is also enept to assume the object of the marital consent.

On the other hand, a person because of some personality disorder, though not deprived of the due discretionary power at the time of marriage, can remain enept to sustain, honour, and fulfil the obligations of married life. In such a case the marriage can be declared null on the score of the 'inability to assume marital obligations' alone. That is why the present Rotal Jurisprudence recognises 'inability to assume marital obligations' as an autonomous ground of nullity as distinct from the 'lack of due discretion'.

Since marriage-consent is of the present and the marital obligations are to be assumed here and now at the time of the marriage, 'the inability to assume' of either contractant is to be assessed with respect to the time of marriage, so much so, it should exist at the time of marriage and not at a later period. An example will illustrate this: suppose that somebody has reached an agreement to buy a house, and unfortunately the said house was razed to the ground at the event of an earthquake or any other calamity, precisely before the registered deed of contract was executed; the buyer unaware of the incident executes the contract deed in respect of the house which was inexistent at the time of the purchase deed; since it was a contract regarding an inexistent thing, the said contract cannot be but invalid. In like manner the marriage contract would be invalid, were it to be effected when either of the spouses had not the ability to assume the obligations of marriage. The 'inability to assume' is also termed as incompetence.

The Essential Rights and Obligations of Marriage

Traditionally the essential rights and obligations which constitute the object of the marriage-consent were limited to the exchange of the right to those acts necessary for procreation of progeny ('bonum prolis'), to a life-long marriage ('borumSacramenti'), and to fidelity in marriage ('bonum fidei').

Already in the Encyclical "Casti Connubi", Pope Pius XI had included among the essential marital obligations of spouses, "the generous giving of self and the life-long commitment of the person to the partner in marriage" (Preface).

The Pastoral Constitution of Vatican II, "Gaudium et Spes" (n. 48), while describing marriage as "an intimate partnership of life and love", and "as a mutual giving of two persons" has enlarged the extent of the rights and obligations of marriage also to "the community of life and love". The Council indeed speaks of a sane interpersonal relationship between the spouses about which St. Thomas Aquinas has already preluded (Suppl., q. 44, art -1).

The Jurisprudence of the S.R. Rota has taken proper account of the mind of the Vatican Council while judging the marriage -nullity cases. The Rotal Judge Serrano in a decision, dated 5 April 1973, states that as matrimonial consent is primarily and radically directed to the interpersonal relationship, the partner in marriage, who, because of his/her personality make-up, is simply unable to form an adult personal relationship, cannot contract a valid marriage (SRRD: Vol. LXV, p. 330-331, nn. 11,12).

The Communion of Life and Love

The revised legislation of the Church while defining marriage has incorporated the Conciliar concept and terminology on marriage: "The marriage covenant established by the Creator and ordered by His Laws, by which a man and a woman, by an irrevocable personal consent, establish between themselves a partnership of the whole life, is by its natural character ordered toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of the offspring" (CCEO, 776; CIC, Can. 1055). If the marriage is'a community of life and love', then the marriage-partners, must conscientiously give to each other the right to this community of life and love together. That means, a prospective spouse must be able to make a rudimentary assessment of the capacities of oneself and of the partner, and to decide freely that he/she wishes to establish a perpetual and exclusive community of life and love with the partner, a community that will involve-a life-time of fundamentally faithful caring and sharing (Lawrence G. Wrenn, Decisions, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 160). This consideration opens the way to deal with easily those marriage cases in which one of spouses, because of some personality disorder, is unable to give the marriage partner this right to a community of life and Jove in marriage.

The communion of life stands out as the basic and overall marital obligation, and as such it comprises all other essential obligations which marriage entails. Hence the capacity to promote a mutually committed interpersonal relationship in view to fostering generously the community of conjugal life and love can be considered as an indispensable specific capacity the spouses should be endowed with.

In other words, the communion of life and love on the basis of an interpersonal relationship presupposes in the spouses a unique capacity coupled with that state of mind which is solicitous of promoting the well-being of the one by the other, of being a mutual aid in love and fidelity, of giving oneself and accepting the other as a distinct person, and of relating to each other in a meaningful manner of caring, sharing and supporting (The Code of Canon Law: A Text and Commentary, TPI, Bangalore, 1986, p. 777-778; SRRD: Coram Serrano, 9 July 1976: Monitor Ecclesiasticus, 102 (1977), p. 369Sq.)As the main radical capacity of those called to married life, it engenders all the rest of the subsidiary capacities which are necessary to guarantee and protect the three 'bona' of the marriage covenant, namely, the procreation and education of children, a life-long committed married life, and the marital fidelity. That means, the incapacity or inabilility on the part of either of the spouses to assume and fulfil any one of the essential obligations, whether it be relating to the 'bonum prolis', or 'bonum Sacramenti', or 'bonum fidei', or communion of life, is sure to render the marriage-consent defective on the part of its object.

Though it is difficult to determine the quantum of the marital obligation relating to communion of life and love, it is nevertheless possible to determine those obligations which would constitute a required minimum without which there could be no marriage at all. A true marriage certainly requires the ability to establish and maintain at least a minimum kind of common life, ie, a certain minimum capacity of the couple to share their lives together in more than a physical sense.

Adverse Impact of a Personality-Disorder on the Communion of Married Life

A person can be rendered incapable of true matrimonial consent on the score of 'inability to assume' by a phychic disorder. Excepting the qualified cases of Psychoses which necessarily impair the required discretionary power of the mind, there can be cases of psychopathis personalities which are personality disorders exhibiting a variety of abnormal behavioural patterns to the extent of causing harm either to oneself (Neuropaths) or to the society (Sociopaths). "The abnormal is but an exaggerated or unbalanced expression of the normal - mode of behaviour or of living which is logical although socially maladjusted outcome of the particular individual's original endowment" (Kolb, Modern Clinical Psychiatry, 9th ed., W.B. Saunder's Company, Philadelphia, London, Toronto, 1977, p. 119).

In the chapter dealing with the matrimonial consent, Canon Law rules: "Those, who, because of causes of a psychic nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage, are incapable of contracting marriage (CCEO, 818, n. 3; CIC, 1095,n.3).

It is to be noted that only personality disorders of psychic nature, which stem from the original endowment of the particular individual can bring about the inability which is our present consideration. Hence Vices which are acquired habits due to the malice of the will cannot give ground to a nullity case on the score of inability to assume.

Psychic anomalies like severe immaturity, Neurosis, Psychopathy, Borderline cases etc. could be pointed out as general causes of the psychic incompetence, and the

personality disorders like homosexuality, Nymphomania, Trans-sexualism etc. would be some of the particular causes for the said incompetence, deriving from any of the aforesaid general causes.

Although Modern Psychiatry distinguishes a variety of psychopathic personalities amounting to ten different kinds, all of them have certain common traits like immaturity, egocentrism, non-communication, propensity to tell lies, debility of the mind, inability to take a practical decision etc. (SRRD: Coram Raad, 13 Nov. 1979: Monitor Ecclesiasticus, 105 (1980), p. 33, n.6).

It is characteristic of the psychopathic personalities that, while their mental faculties remain intact and unimpaired, they are prone to be unsteady and their fluctuating suggestibility and affectivity are wont to produce a certain immaturity which renders them incapacable of having control and evaluative insight into life whereby the sufficient freedom of choice would be lacking in them. The immature personality is exemplified by a lack of psychic maturity, dependency, incapacity of accepting responsibility etc.

In the case of psychopathy or personality disorders, it is not easy to determine practically whether the disorder has reached such a stage at the time of marriage as to render the contract incapable of assuming marital obligations. There is no favour of presumption on the part of law in such cases. Only the existence of a very serious and aggrevating circumstance in connection with the marriage would give grounds to absolute incompetence of the contractant. It is in this sense that Canon law speaks of the 'inability to assume'.

Some Ecclesiastical Tribunals, especially of the United States, seem to consider also relative incompetence termed as 'psychological or radical incompatibility' (mutual inability to fulfil the obligations of marriage) as giving grounds for nullity of marriage on the score of inability to assume'. This relative incapacity, accordingly, is any psychological incompatibility tantamount to a personality disorder which renders one incapable of fulfilling the obligations of marriage only with a particular person.

Whatever be the terminology adopted in order to designate this relative incapacity, as a matter of fact, this cannot be an acceptable criterion at all to decide upon the nullity of a given marriage. For, we cannot speak of any true moral impotence or incompetence which is shared half and half mutually by both the spouses. The invalidating psychic anomaly should exist in an aggrevating degree in either or in both the spouses. In either case it can be only an absolute incompetence. The relative incompetency can bring about only difficulties in a given marriage and not any invalidating circumstance.

We should bear in mind that there is adequate distinction between impossibility and difficulty. So too there is distinction between inability and incompatibility. Cases of inability result in impossibility, while the cases of incompatibility bring about difficulties only which could be surmounted by the intervention of good will and efforts for adaptation and adjustment on either side. Lack of this good will and efforts at the opportune time during the course of joint married life cannot argue apt all for the nullity of as marriage on the score of inability to assume and fulfil the obligations of marriage. Hence the incompetence in order to be invalidating the marriage consent, should have already existed as a serious personality disorder which had irremediably rendered either of the contractants really incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage at the time of contracting the marriage.