Judges on Strike: Lessons to Learn

(By Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate, Supreme Court and  Kerala High Court)

The total bedlam in the Telangana judiciary has left an indelible scar in the country’s legal history.  Very many Judges across the new State behaved abominably when they called for ‘High Court bandh’ (a new brand indeed) and threatened of availing mass casual leave (which the service rules are unable to tackle).  The advocates fulsomely supported the Judges and they could practically lock the court premises scattered over the ten districts in Telangana.  Altogether eleven Judges are suspended by the High Court at Hyderabad.  The effrontery by the bar and the bench reflected a peculiar category of judicial jingoism that refuses to share even a common High Court for the two States which enjoyed geographical and political syncretism till the bifurcation in 2014.

The “Bangalore principles of judicial conduct” is a fine instrument of Indian origin that captured international recognition.  It was accepted in its revised form at the Round Table Conference of the Chief Justices held at The Hague in 2002.  The principles require the Judges of all ranks to ‘exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct, in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary” and to “avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety” and “accept personal restrictions”.  The Telangana episode is apparently antithetical to the grandeur of the ‘Bangalore values’.  Winston Churchill put it pithily: “A form of life and conduct more severe and restricted than that of ordinary people is required from Judges”.

One should not however, underestimate the concerns expressed by the agitators at the grass root level.  The Subordinate judiciary is the supreme judiciary for the majority of the people in India.  In All India Judges Association case (1991), the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of district judiciary which performs the sovereign functions of the State.  In essence, every Judge is bound to be an epitome of the Constitution.

The Telangana Judges’ Association seems to have a genuine concern about the provisional allocation of Judges between the two States.  As against the cadre strength of 335 Judges in Telangana, only 190 are ‘natives’ and others are from Andhra Pradesh, it is bemoaned.  The protesters  demanded the “Andhra Judges” to “quit Telangana”.  Also they demand a separate High Court for the newly formed State.

Article 3 of the Constitution enables “formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing State”.  The State of Telangana is formed by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014.  The statute envisaged a clear bifurcation of the State in the executive and the legislative realm.  However, Section 30 of the Act in a consolatory gesture said that, for the time being, the High Court at Hyderabad would remain as the common High Court for both the States.  Section 31, on the other hand,   by way of a predictive note, prescribes separate High Courts for both the States.  Thus the political division which the Telangana could attain was not translated to judicial level.  The judiciary at Telangana, for a variety of reasons, finds itself uncomfortable with the control exercised by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

Judicial federalism is a constitutional virtue. The High Courts in the country are older than the Supreme Court.  Article 214 of the Constitution only says that “there should be a High Court for each State”.  It does not make it mandatory that each State has to have a separate High Court.  Democratic harmony in Indian Federalism has however materialised common High Courts for a few States.  Gauhati High Court exercises jurisdiction over Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland and Mizoram.  Punjab and Haryana share a single High Court.  Bombay High Court encompasses Maharashtra, Goa, Dadra, Daman and Diu. Lakshadweep is under the Kerala High Court and the Andaman Nicobar Islands are under the Calcutta High Court.   Puducherry,  a different terrain, subjects itself to Madras High Court.

However, the story of Telangana is ostensibly different.  People in the new State can have legitimate reasons and justifications to demand judicial autonomy and independence.  But the means to  attain the end also needs to be equally legitimate.  The judicial tinderbox in Telangana is the manifestation of the deeper fissure between the two States at political, economic and cultural levels.   But the method of agitation by the robed brethren had only exacerbated the situation.  The suspension orders by the High Court, which refused to strike a code with the political and historical sentiments emanated from the judicial citizenry in Telangana has only aggravated the judicial dismemberment. Federalism and decentralisation do not halt with the powers accrued on the High Court.  It should travel further, down to earth.  A separate High Court for Telangana would help maintaining the quintessential relation between the court and the people.

(The above article was originally published in Deccan Herald dated 2.7.2016).

What A Fall -- Friends?

(By K. Ramakumar, Sr. Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

Seniority in every walk of life is a proud achievement, which undoubtedly has to be earned or acquired and not adjured or canvassed. Like respect, it has to be commanded and not demanded. Unfortunately, even in one of the oldest professions in the world and considered honourable and learned there is open pettifogging for recognition of seniority at official levels. To aggravate the situation, Writ Petitions have been filed not only in the Supreme Court but in Meghalaya, Karnataka and Kerala High Courts questioning the designation of some Lawyers as Seniors, of-course by other Lawyers.

What a pitiable and piffling predicament? Intensely distressed no less a person than our venerable Chief Justice of India had declared in open Court “We are open to correct the system, but challenging past designation is not good for the Bar. There should be some comity at the Bar”. The Hon’ble Chief Justice was making comments at the time when the Apex Court was dealing with a petition questioning the very mechanism of designation of Lawyers as Senior Advocates by the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice also suggested that Lawyers should “place some confidence in the collective wisdom of the Bench”.

However, the most significant observation made by the Hon’ble Chief Justice is as follows: “Some time, even we are surprised that someone has emerged successful (in getting designated).”

How could this happen in an institution primarily established to uphold the rules and the rule of law. Lawless law Courts are beyond the imagination of an ordinary citizen. Ultimately the Hon’ble Chief Justice said “Whatever has happened has happened. Intervene and argue on what should be the system of designation we are open to correcting the system”.

The Hon’ble Chief Justice was candid enough to concede “there are no statutory norms for designating Advocates”. This indeed raises a piquant and pertinent question, ‘how can the Apex Court and the High Courts engage in entangling themselves with a crucial issue touching the very dignity and prestige of the Bar, in the absence of statutory rules’? It appears only the High Court of Bombay has firm and definite rules regarding designation of Advocates as Seniors. No other High Court has framed rules so far. This definitely will lead to misuse, for which indubitably some sections of the Bar are prone to. Seniority is not only sought after but also fought after. Coteries, caucuses and cliques never do any good to the noble profession. How do the learned Judges who are not expected to be familiar with the antecedents, capacity, character, knowledge, and maturity, etc., of all lawyers practicing before them, fix upon one of them as a Senior Advocate without any norms to guide them in that matter. It must be said to the credit of one of the prominent chartered High Courts of the country, the Mumbai High Court that it has not only stuck to the rules framed by it but by and large has been sagacious in the matter of choosing Lawyers to be conferred with the honour of Senior designation. In all other High Courts including in the Apex Court absence of Rule has led to lobbying and the consequent discontentment among a wide section of the Bar. It gives no credit either to the givers or to the takers. Absence of parameters always paves the way to arbitrariness. Like in any other field unmeritorious often queue up and finally make it as the Hon’ble Chief Justice had the courage to admit.

In no other profession there exists the system of conferring seniority. There are no Senior Doctors, no Senior Architects, no Senior Scientists and no Senior Engineers. The very system, which often works out to invidious discrimination therefore, needs a second look. In a democratic country we need not blindly copy the pattern of English Courts. We can make a beginning to charter our own course. Sooner it is done the better, for ensuring the integrity and credibility of judicial institutions.

sXmgnen \nbat`ZKXnIÄ

(By Thampan Thomas, Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Kerala High Court)

C´ybn \nehnepÅ 54 tI{µ sXmgn \nba§-fpw 100 ]cw kwØm\ \nba§fpw X§fpsS hyhkmb kwcw`§fpsS hfÀ¨bv¡v hne§pXSnbmbn \n¡p¶p;  Ah t`ZKXn sN¿Wsa¶XmWv C´ybnse sXmgnepSaIfpsS \nc´camb Bhiyw. BtKmfoIcW {]{Inbbn sXmgn taJebn \nb{´W§Ä¡v Øm\ansöpw, Xpd¶ hn]W\ taJebn aXvkc¯n\mWv {]m[m\ysa¶pw, BbXn\m DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIsf A\nb{´nXambn NqjWw sN¿m³ X§Ä¡p IgnbWsa¶pw AhÀ hmZn¡p¶p. sXmgnemfnIsf \nban¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\papÅ AhImiw, X§Ä¡v kzbm¯amsW¶pw, aÕc It¼mf¯n GXpXcw DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIfmWv D]tbmKnt¡IsX¶v Xocpam\n¡m\pÅ AhImihpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡msW¶XpamWv AhcpsS Imgv¨¸mSv. tImÀ¸tdäpIfpsS k½À±¯n\v hg§n C´ym Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ ]pXnb sXmgn \nba ]cnjv¡mc§Ä ASp¯v Xs¶ ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v AwKoIcn¡phm\nSbpIv. CXnt\mSIw CXn\mbn _nÃpIfpsS IcSpcq]hpw, XrI£n NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv Ìm³Un§v I½ÁnbpsS \S]Sn {Ia§fpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn. C´ybnse sXmgnemfn, sXmgnepSa, Kh¬saâv {]Xn\n[nIfS§p¶ D¶X A[nImc kanXnbmb C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³knsâ ip]mÀiIÄ adnIS¶p sImImWv Cu \o¡w. DXv]mZ\ {]{Inbbnse Xpey]¦mfnbmb sXmgnemfn CtXmsS k¼qÀ®ambn ]mÀizhXv¡cn¡s¸SpIbmWv. ]p¯³ kmt¦XnI  hnZyIfpw, LS\m]camb amähpw sXmgn taJebpsS a\pjy apJw Xs¶ ]msS amÁn.

hmPvt]bn Kh¬saânsâ Im-e-¯v 2002 2-mw sXmgn I½oj\mbn \nban¨ {io. Pn.cho{µhÀ½ I½oj³ \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfpsS ad]änbmWv ]p¯³ sXmgn  \nba t`ZKXnIÄ. {io. Pn. cho{µhÀ½bpsS ip]mÀiIfn AkwLSnX taJe Hgn¨pÅ FÃm   ip]mÀiIfpw   C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³kv  \ncmIcn¨XmWv. PkvÁnÊv KtP{µ KUvIÀ sNbÀam\mb 1-mw sXmgn I½oj³ 1967 \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfmWv sXmgnemfnIÄ¡v \nehnepÅ tkh\ thX\ hyhØ \nba ]cnc£bneqsS Dd¸phcp¯nbXv.

sXmgn \nba§fpsS ASnØm\ ZÀi\w \½psS  `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§fnepw, \nÀtZiI XXz§fnepw AS§nbncn¡p¶p. A´ÀtZiob  sXmgn am\ZÞ§Ä \nÝbn¡s¸«n«pÅ ILObpsS 189 I¬h³j\pIfpw, 200 ]cw ip]mÀiIfpw, {]tab§fpw temIs¯¼mSpapÅ sXmgn \nba§fpsS \nba XXz kwlnX (Basic Jurisprudence)BWv. C´ybnse ap³ Kh¬saâpIÄ C¶v \ne\n¡p¶ sXmgn \nba§Ä cq]s¸Sp¯pt¼mÄ Chbmbncp¶p AhcpsS amÀ¤tcJ. sXmgn \nba§Ä Hcp Welfare\nbasa¶ \nebn {]tXyI ]cnKW\IÄ \ÂIn kwc£n¡s¸«ncp¶p. sXmgn AhImi§sf am\pjnI Ah-Imi§fmbn ]cnKWn¡pIbpw a\pjys\ NqjWw sN¿p¶ k{¼Zmb§Ä \nb{´n¡phm³ Ch D]bpàamhpIbpw sNbvXp.

C¶v Xpd¶ It¼mf¯n hnIk\¯nsâ adhn sXmgnemfnIsf \nkmchXv¡cn¨v aqe[\w sXmgnemfn¡v ta k¼qÀ® B[n]Xyw Øm]n¨ncn¡pIbmWv. AXn\m ]c¼cmKXambn A\phÀ¯n¨p h¶ncp¶ kwLS\m kzmX{´yhpw, Iq«mb hnet]iepw, \nba ]cnc£bpw Hgnhm¡phm\mWv sXmgnepSaIfpw, Kh¬saâpw B{Kln¡p¶Xv.

hyhkmb _Ô \nbaw (Labour Code on Industrial Relations 2015)

1947se sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbahpw, 1928se t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbahpw, 1948se C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSpw t{ImUoIcn¨v Hcp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n\v Kh¬saâv cq]w sImSp¯ncn¡p¶p. Cu \nba¯nsâ IcSp  hyhØIsfIpdn¨v cIv XrI£n  NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv sXmgnÂImcy kaXnbpsS NÀ¨Ifpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn«pIv. Hcp ]s£ Cu _nÃv F{Xbpw thKw ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v  \nbaw B¡s¸Sphm\nSbpIv. sXmgnemfnbpw, sXmgnepSabpw, Dev]mZ\ taJebnse Xpey ]¦mfnIsf¶ AwKoIrX kahmIyw Xncp¯n¡pdn¨v sXmgnepSabv¡p taÂssI \evIp¶XmWv hyhkmb _Ô tImUv. sXmgnepSabv¡pw, sXmgnemfnbv¡pw, at²y kÀ¡mcnsâ \n£v]£X F¶Xv amän Kh¬saâv sXmgnepSa ]£¯v tNcp¶p. t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbaw d±v sNbvXv ]pXnb tImUn bqWnb\pIfpsS cq]oIcWw t]mepw Akm[yam¡n¯oÀ¡p¶p.  ]pdta \n¶pw, bqWnb\p IÄ¡v t\Xm¡Ä ]mSnÃ. DsI¦n Xs¶ AXv AkwLSnX taJebn am{Xw. A§s\ HcmÄ¡v `mchmlnbmIp¶ bqWnb\pIÄ cIp am{Xw. Øm]\§fn \n¶pw, s]³j\mb hÀ¡v t\XrXz Øm\§Ä GsäSp¡m³ AtbmKyX, sXmgnemfn bqWnb\pIÄ¡v Political Fund  cq]oIcn¡m\hImianÃ. bqWnb\pIÄ cPnÌÀ sN¿m³  Npcp§n-b-Xv 100 t]À AsÃ-¦n 10 iXam\w Poh\¡mÀ At]£n¡Ww. ]WnapS¡pIÄ ]qÀ®ambpw \nb{´W hnt[bw. \nba hncp² ]WnapS¡pIÄ¡v Pbn in£.  sXmgnepSaIÄ sXmgnemfnIfpambn t\cn«v IcmÀ DIm¡mw. Iq«mb hnet]ien\pw kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯n\p ta I¯n hbv¡p¶ GÀ¸mSv. CXv `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§-fnÂs¸Sp¶ 19mw A\ptOZw A\phZn¡p¶ kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯nsâbpw, ILObpsS 87, 98 F¶o tImÀI¬h³j\pIfp sSbpw \Kv\amb ewL\w. sXmgnemfnIÄ Poh³ sImSp¯v t\SnsbSp¯ am\pjnImhImi §Ä Cu t`ZKXnbneqsS FSp¯p Ifbp¶p. ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n Aenªp tNcp¶ asämcp \nbaamWv  C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSv.  \nehn Cu \nbaw hyhkmb Øm]\§fnse Poh\¡mcpsS tkh\ hyhØIÄ \nÀ®bn¡p¶p. Poh\¡mÀ s¡XnscbpÅ A¨S¡ \S]SnIÄ, {]tamj\pIÄ, ^mIvSdnbn A\phÀ¯nt¡INpaXeIÄ, ØeamÁ§Ä XpS§nbh ]qÀ®ambpw sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw  \evIp¶ XmWv t`ZKXn sN¿s¸« \nbaw. CXnse XrI£n _Ôhpw, Kh¬saânsâ CSs]Sepw ]msS CÃmbva sN¿pIbmWv. sXmgnepSabv¡p A\nb{´nXamb A[nImcw  \evIp¶ \nba ]cnjv¡mcw. Hire and Fire(\nban¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\pw) sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw \evIp¶ \nba t`ZKXn. Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSnsâ \ntj[§Ä tNmZyw sN¿phm³ sXmgnemfnbvt¡m, bqWnb\pIÄt¡m AhImianÃ. Dev]mZ\ Imcy£aXbv¡p thI]cnjv¡mc§Ä hcp¯p¶Xn\v DSabv¡p ]qÀ® kzmX{´yw DImbncn¡pw. sXmgn k{¼Zm-b-¯n 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mcpÅ hyhkmb Øm]\w kÀ-¡mÀ A\phmZanÃmsX AS¨p]q«m³ ]pXnb \nbaw sXmgnepSasb A\phZnbv¡p¶p. ap¶dnbn¸panÃmsX amä§Ä hcp¯mw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfnsbbpw, \nÝnX kab sXmgnemfnsbbpw \nban¡mw.

sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbaw t`ZKXn  sNbvXp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô tImUv \nehn hcpt¼mÄ, Gsd hÀjambn \½psS tImSXnIÄ  \ÂInbn«pÅ hn[nIfpw, XymtKmÖzeamb kac§fneqsS t\SnsbSp¯ t{SbvUv bqWnb³ AhImi§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw thX\hpw, Xpeyamb ]¦mfn¯w F¶ ASnØm\ XXzhpw hnS]dbpIbmWv.  sXmgnemfnIÄ  A\p`hn ¡p¶ \nba ]cnc£IÄ CtXmsS CÃmXmIpw. Dev]mZ\ hÀ²hn\mbn sXmgnemfnIÄ ASnaIfpw sXmgnepSaIÄ   kÀÆm[nImcnbpw kÀ¡mÀ Hcp t\m¡pIp¯nbpw Bbn-¯ocpw.

thPv tImUv (Labour Code on Wage Bills, 2015)

thX\ kw_Ôamb \nba§Ä kwtbmPn¸n¡pIsb¶ Dt±it¯msS Minimum Wages Act, Bonus Act, Equal Remuneration Act, Payment of Wages ActXpS§nb \nba§Ä GIoIcn¨v sXmgn–thX\ \nba§sf t{ImUoIcn¡p¶ ]pXnb \nba \nÀtZiamWv Labour Code on Wage Bill, 2015.\nehnepÅ  thX\w Ipdbv¡p¶Xn\v bmsXmcp  sXmgnepSabv¡pw  AhImianÃ. Ct¸mÄ Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ sXmgn \nba t`ZKXnIfneqsS  aWn¡qdpIÄ¡pw, DZv]mZ\¯n\pw Iqen IW¡m¡n an\naw thX\w \nÝbn¡mhp¶XmWv. F¶m \nehnepÅ \nba§Ä A\pkcn¨v \ntXym]tbmK km[\§fpsS hne, Hcp sXmgnemfnbpsS Bhiy§Ä, DXv]mZ\ Nnehv XpS§nbhsbÃmw XrI£n  kanXnbneqsS hnebncp¯nbmWv an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡p¶Xv. C¯cw Hcp \nba¯n\v {]m_eyansöpw ]Icw sXmgn sN¿p¶ kab¯nsâbpw DXv]mZ\¯nsâbpw ASnØm\¯n an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡Ww F¶v ]dbp¶Xv `cWLS\ \ÂIp¶ Dd¸pIfpsS ewL\amWv. BonusF¶Xv kmÀÆ{XoIhpw, \o¡nhbv¡s¸« thX\hpamsW¶v sXmgnemfnIÄ Bhiys¸Spt¼mÄ Bonus \nba¯nsâ ]cn[nbn  \n¶pw AwKkwJybpsS ASnØm\¯n Øm]\§sf Hgnhm¡m\pÅ AhImiw ]pXnb Bonus Act\ÂIp¶p.  AXv Hcp sXmgn XÀ¡ambn D¶bn¡phm\pÅ AhImihpw \ntj[n¡s¸Sp¶p. Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\sa¶Xv \nÀ_ÔaÃmsX hcpt¼mÄ hyXyØamb thX\w Htc Xcw sXmgnen GÀs¸Sp¶hÀ¡p \ÂIphm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v AhImiw \ÂIpIbmWv. CXv `cWLS\ hmKvZm\w sN¿p¶ auenImhImi§-fmb 14Dw, 16Dw A\ptOZ§Ä¡v FXncmWv. thX\sa¶Xv  hyàn]camb Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n \ÂIm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v ]pXnb \nbaw Ahkcw \ÂIp¶p. CXv \nc¦piamb NqjW¯n\v hgn hbv¡pw. Hmtcm \nba§fpsSbpw DtZiye£y§Ä a\knem¡msX Ah Hcpan¨v Iq«nt¨À¯v Hcp GIoIrX \nbaam¡p¶Xv A-imkv{XobamWv. an\naw thX\w Gäw Npcp§nb thX\amWv. ]Wn¡p-Å Iqen ]eXnsâbpw ASnØm\¯n emWv \nPs¸Sp¯nbn«p-Å-Xv, AXv \ÂIp¶ coXn XpS§nbh hyhØ sN¿p¶XmWv Payment of Wages Act. BonusF¶Xv ASnØm\]cambn \o¡n hbv¡s¸« thX\w F¶ \ne-bn GÁw Npcp§nb BonusDw em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w F¶ \nebn Balance Sheetsâ ASnØm\¯n ]¦nSp¶ hnlnXhpamWv t_mWÊv. Wage Codet\mSv _Ôs¸Sp¯n Kh¬saâv t`ZKXn \nÀtZin¡p¶ asämcp \nbaw Equal Remuneration ActBWv. kv{XoIÄ¡pw, ]pcpj³amÀ¡pw Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pÅXv kmÀÆtZioIambn AwKoIcn¡s¸«n«pÅ XXzamWv.

C´y³- `cWLS\bpw, ILOI¬h³j\pIfpw sXmgn cwK¯v hnthN\w ]mSnÃm sb¶pw, Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pw, Npcp§nb thX\w Pohn¡m\mhiyamb thX\ambncn¡Wsa¶pw \njv¡Àjn¨n«pIv. `cWLS\bpsS 14 Dw, 39 Dw, 43 Dw A\ptOZ §Ä Ch Dd¸p Xcp¶p. Chsb Bkv]Zam¡nbmWv Iqen kw_Ôamb hyXykvX \nba§Ä ]mÀesaâv AwKoIcn¨n«pÅXv. ]pXnb thX\ \nbaw \S¸m¡p¶tXmsS Iqen  sXmgnepSabpw, sXmgnemfnbpw X½n D­m¡p¶ Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n aWn¡qdpIÄ¡v IW¡m¡n Bbncn¡pw. 12 ap-X 131/2 aWn¡qÀ hsc sXmgnemfnsb ]WnsbSp¸n¡mw. Npcp§nb Iqensbt¶m, PohnXm[njvTnX an\naw Iq-en F¶tXm _m[Iambncn¡pIbnÃ. hnIknX cmPy§fn Atacn¡ DÄs¸sS Hcp aWn¡qdn-\v 1500 U.S. Dollar(10,000 cq]) hsc an\naw thX\w Bhiys¸«mWv Ct¸mÄ sXmgnemfnIÄ ]WnapS¡p¶Xv.  C´ybn aWn¡qdn\pÅ icmicn thX\w tI-h-ew 40 Dw 50 Dw cq]m am{XamWv. CXv cq]bpsS A`y´c hym]mc aqey¯nsâ t]cnemsW¶v kÀ¡mÀ hmZn¡p¶p. ChnsS tI{µ t{SbvUv bqWnb\pIÄXs¶ Bhiys¸«ncn¡p¶ Npcp§nb {]Xnamk th-X-\w 15000 cq]bmWv. kÀ¡mÀ IcmÀ sXmgnemfn IÄ¡v sImSp¡Wsa¶v Bhiys¸Sp-¶-Xv 10000 cq] am{Xhpw. kp{]ow tImSXnbpsS hn[nb\pkcn¨v C´ybn \nbam\pkrXamb  an\naw thX\w \evIm³ Ignbm¯  sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v  hyhkmbw \S¯phm³ AhImianÃ. \h DZmchXv¡cW \b§Ä¡v A\pkrXamb GIoIrX ]p¯³ thX\ \nbaw \S¸nem¡p¶tXmsS `cWLS\bpw, kp{]owtImSXn hn[nIfpw A{]kàambn¯ocpw. t_mWÊv \nbaw amdp¶tXm-sS 8 iXam\¯n Ipdbm¯-Xpw
20 iXam\¯n IqSm¯Xpamb em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w am{XamIpw t_mWÊv.

^mIvSdokv BIvSv t`ZKXn \nbaw 2016

hnIk\¯n\v hnLmXambn C´ybnse sXmgn \nba§Ä \nesImÅp¶psh¶pw, {]tXyIn¨pw kpc£nXXzhpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£a {]hÀ¯\hpw (Safety, Health and Welfare)  em¡mbpÅ  ^mIvSdokv BIvSv s]mfns¨gpXWsa¶pw, FICCI, ASOCHEM, Chamber of Commerce, Manufactures Association XpS§nb sXmgnepSa kwLS\IÄ apdhnfn Iq«m³ XpS§nbn«v Imew Gsdbmbn. F¶m Cu \nbaw t`ZKXn sN¿msX Xs¶ h³ hnIk\-amWv sI«nS \nÀ½mWw, J\\w, F©n\obdn§v XpS§nb hyhkmb¯nepImbn«pÅXv. 1948\p tijw 1954, 1976, 1987 F¶o hÀj§fn \S¯nb aq¶p t`ZKXn am{XamWv. 1987 se t`ZKXn t`m¸m Zpc´¯nsâ ASnØm\¯nemWv. BtcmKy kpc£bpw, A]IS \nhmcW¯n\pw A\nhmcyamWv.  C´ybn Hcp aWn¡q-dn 46 acW§Ä hyhkmb A]IS§Ä DIm¡p¶p F¶mWv IW¡v.  Cu kmlNcy¯n IqSpX ]cnc£IÄ hcpt¯It`ZKXnbv¡p ]Icw, XeXncnª asämcp t`ZKXnbmWv tamZn kÀ¡mÀ sImIphcp¶Xv. 40 Ipdhv BfpIÄ sXmgn sN¿p¶ hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ ]cn[nbn Hgnhm¡p¶p. CXp h-gn 80% hyhkmb Øm]\§Ä \nb{´W hnapàcmbn¯ocpw. ]pXnb  kmt¦XnI hnZyIÄ D]tbmKn¨v h³InS hyhkm-b-§Ä 40 Ipdª am\htijnsImIv \S¯mhp¶ XmWv. tdmt_m«pIfpw, BÁanI F\ÀPnbpw DÅnSt¯mfw, hyhkmb D]m[nIsf hnLSn ¸n¡phm³ Ignbpw. IqSpX sXmgnemfnIÄ bmsXmcp hyhkmb¯nepw Bhiyambn hcnÃ. ]pXnb t`ZKXn {]-Im-cw 14 hbÊmb Ip«nIsf ^mIvSdnIfn tPmen sN¿n¡mw. CXv Child Labour Act\p hncp²amWv. \nc´cambn DImbns¡mIncn¡p¶ hyhkmb A]IS§Ä,  sXmgnemfn IÃm¯hcpsS kpc£ Cu t`ZKXnIÄ aptJ\ Dd¸p hcp¯p¶nÃ.  F³tUmkÄ ^m³, shSns¡«]ISw, sI«nSw XIÀ¶p hogÂ, kvt^mS\w, tdUntbj³ {]kcWw, Ch \nb{´n¡p¶Xn\p ]Icw A\phZn¨ncn¡pIbmWv. Kh¬saânsâ ]cntim[\IÄ iàns¸Sp¯n. Hcp ka{Kamb ^mIvSdnkv \nbaw sImIphcmsX ]Icw P\§fpsSbpw, sXmgnemfnIfpsSbpw Poh\pw kz¯n\pw kpc£nXXzw \ÂIp¶, Pohn¡m³ AhImiw \ÂIp¶  `cWLS\bp-sS  21 mw A\ptOZw ewLn¡p¶ `cWLS\m hncp² t`ZKXnbmWv ]pXnb ^mIvSdokv BIvSv.  kpc£bpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£ahpw Dd¸p hcp¯p¶ILO\nÀtZi§Ä B-sI 18 I¬h³j\pIfn AS§nbncn¡p¶p. Ah C´y Kh¬saâv {]mhÀ¯nIam¡Ww. ‘Make in India’Blzm\{]Imcw P\§sfbpw, sXmgnemfnIsfbpw ]´mSphm³ A´ÀtZiob Ip¯IIÄ¡v A\paXn  \ÂIcpXv.

kvtamÄ FâÀss{]knÊv BIvSv

(THE Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (Amendment) Bill, 2015)

\nehnepÅ tjm]vÊv Bâv  FÌm»njvsaâv BIvSv  t`ZKXn sNbvXv kvtamÄ FâÀ ss{]knÊv BIvSv  F¶ ]pXnb \nbaw sImIphcp¶Xv sNdpInS hyhkmb Øm]\§sf  ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ  ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡m\mWv.  AXnep]cn {][m\s¸« kmaqly kpc£bpw, BtcmKy ]cn]me\hpw \nb{´W§fpw adnI-S-¶v 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mÀ am{XamWv DÅsX¦n {][m\-s¸« 14 sXmgn \nba§fn \n¶pw sXmgnepSaIÄ Hgnhm¡s¸Spw. kz´w IW¡pIÄ kzbtah kÀ«nss^ sNbvXv sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v kaÀ¸n¡mw. Kh¬saâv ]cntim[\IÄ DImInÃ. k¼qÀ® kzmX{´yhpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡p e`nbv¡p¶p. Hcp henb ImÀ Dev]mZ\  ^mIvSdn t]m-epw 40 Xmsg sXmgnemfnIÄ AS§p¶ hnhn[ ^mIvSdnIfmbn Xcw Xncnbv¡s¸Spw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfn k{¼Zmbw \nehn hcpt¼mÄ  sXmgnepSaIÄ   \nba§Ä¡v AXoXcmIpw.

A{]âoÊv BIvSv

sXmgn ]cnioe\¯nsâ adhn ZoÀL¡mew sXmgnemfnIsf \nba]camb B\pIqey §Ä A\phZn¡msX A{]âoÊvIfmbn \nban¡phm³ A\phZnbv¡p¶XmWv A{]âoÊv BIvSv. CXnsâ ASnØm\-¯n 18 hbÊn XmsgbpÅ Ip«nIsf XpSÀ¨bmbn A{]âoÊpI fmbn \nban¡mw. CXv _methe \ntcm[\w adnIS¶v lo\amb sXmgn k{¼Zmb¯n\v (Precarious Job)Ahkcsamcp¡p¶p.

80% hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ]e \nba§fpsSbpw ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡pt¼mÄ C´y AwKoIcn¨n«pÅ LabourInspectionI¬h³j³ A{]kàamIpw.  U.N. AwKoIcn¨ anÃn\obw tKmÄ, IqSpX sXmgnehkc§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw F¶ Decent Work Agenda (DWA)bmWv. AXv ChnsS C\n Hcp acoNnI. C´ybn \nÀ½n¡pI (Make in India)Blzm\ {]Imcw, hntZiIp¯IÄ¡v Ipdª Iqen¡v sXmgnemfnIsf ASnaIfm¡n hyhkmbw XpS§m³ A\phZn¡p¶XmWv ]pXnb \nba t`ZKXnIÄ.

sXmgnen \nbat`ZKXnIÄ

(By Thampan Thomas, Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Kerala High Court)

C´ybn \nehnepÅ 54 tI{µ sXmgn \nba§-fpw 100 ]cw kwØm\ \nba§fpw X§fpsS hyhkmb kwcw`§fpsS hfÀ¨bv¡v hne§pXSnbmbn \n¡p¶p; Ah t`ZKXn sN¿Wsa¶XmWv C´ybnse sXmgnepSaIfpsS \nc´camb Bhiyw. BtKmfoIcW {]{Inbbn sXmgn taJebn \nb{´W§Ä¡v Øm\ansöpw, Xpd¶ hn]W\ taJebn aXvkc¯n\mWv {]m[m\ysa¶pw, BbXn\m DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIsf A\nb{´nX ambn NqjWw sN¿m³ X§Ä¡p IgnbWsa¶pw AhÀ hmZn¡p¶p. sXmgnemfnIsf \nban ¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\papÅ AhImiw, X§Ä¡v kzbm¯amsW¶pw, aÕc It¼mf¯n GXpXcw DXv]mZ\ D]m[nIfmWv D]tbmKnt¡IsX¶v Xocpam\n¡m\pÅ AhImihpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡msW¶XpamWv AhcpsS Imgv¨¸mSv. tImÀ¸tdäpIfpsS k½À±¯n\v hg§n C´ym Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ ]pXnb sXmgn \nba ]cnjv¡mc§Ä ASp¯v Xs¶ ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v AwKoIcn¡phm\nSbpIv. CXnt\mSIw CXn\mbn _nÃpIfpsS IcSpcq]hpw, XrI£n NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv Ìm³Un§v I½ÁnbpsS \S]Sn {Ia§fpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn. C´ybnse sXmgnemfn, sXmgnepSa, Kh¬saâv {]Xn\n[nIfS§p¶ D¶X A[nImc kanXnbmb C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³knsâ ip]mÀiIÄ adnIS¶p sImImWv Cu \o¡w. DXv]mZ\ {]{Inbbnse Xpey]¦mfnbmb sXmgnemfn CtXmsS k¼qÀ®ambn ]mÀizhXv¡cn¡s¸SpIbmWv. ]p¯³ kmt¦XnI hnZyIfpw, LS\m]camb amähpw sXmgn taJebpsS a\pjy apJw Xs¶ ]msS amÁn.

hmPvt]bn Kh¬saânsâ Im-e-¯v 2002 2-mw sXmgn I½oj\mbn \nban¨ {io. Pn.cho{µhÀ½ I½oj³ \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfpsS ad]änbmWv ]p¯³ sXmgn \nba t`ZKXnIÄ. {io. Pn. cho{µhÀ½bpsS ip]mÀiIfn AkwLSnX taJe Hgn¨pÅ FÃm ip]mÀiIfpw C´y³ te_À tIm¬{^³kv \ncmIcn¨XmWv. PkvÁnÊv KtP{µ KUvIÀ sNbÀam\mb 1-mw sXmgn I½oj³ 1967 \ÂInb ip]mÀiIfmWv sXmgnemfnIÄ¡v \nehnepÅ tkh\ thX\ hyhØ \nba ]cnc£bneqsS Dd¸phcp¯nbXv.

sXmgn \nba§fpsS ASnØm\ ZÀi\w \½psS `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§ fnepw, \nÀtZiI XXz§fnepw AS§nbncn¡p¶p. A´ÀtZiob sXmgn am\ZÞ§Ä \nÝbn¡s¸«n«pÅ ILObpsS 189 I¬h³j\pIfpw, 200 ]cw ip]mÀiIfpw, {]tab§fpw temIs¯¼mSpapÅ sXmgn \nba§fpsS \nba XXz kwlnX (Basic Jurisprudence)BWv. C´ybnse ap³ Kh¬saâpIÄ C¶v \ne\n¡p¶ sXmgn \nba§Ä cq]s¸Sp¯pt¼mÄ Chbmbncp¶p AhcpsS amÀ¤tcJ. sXmgn \nba§Ä Hcp Welfare\nbasa¶ \nebn {]tXyI ]cnKW\IÄ \ÂIn kwc£n¡s¸«ncp¶p. sXmgn AhImi§sf am\pjnI Ah-Imi§fmbn ]cnKWn¡pIbpw a\pjys\ NqjWw sN¿p¶ k{¼Zmb§Ä \nb{´n¡phm³ Ch D]bpàamhpIbpw sNbvXp.

C¶v Xpd¶ It¼mf¯n hnIk\¯nsâ adhn sXmgnemfnIsf \nkmchXv¡cn¨v aqe[\w sXmgnemfn¡v ta k¼qÀ® B[n]Xyw Øm]n¨ncn¡pIbmWv. AXn\m ]c¼cmKXambn A\phÀ¯n¨p h¶ncp¶ kwLS\m kzmX{´yhpw, Iq«mb hnet]iepw, \nba ]cnc£bpw Hgnhm¡phm\mWv sXmgnepSaIfpw, Kh¬saâpw B{Kln¡p¶Xv.

hyhkmb _Ô \nbaw (Labour Code on Industrial Relations 2015 )

1947se sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbahpw, 1928se t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbahpw, 1948se C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSpw t{ImUoIcn¨v Hcp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n\v Kh¬saâv cq]w sImSp¯ncn¡p¶p. Cu \nba¯nsâ IcSp hyhØIsfIpdn¨v cIv XrI£n NÀ¨Ifpw, ]mÀesaâv sXmgnÂImcy kaXnbpsS NÀ¨Ifpw ]qÀ¯nbmbn«pIv. Hcp ]s£ Cu _nÃv F{Xbpw thKw ]mÀesaân AhXcn¸n¨v \nbaw B¡s¸Sphm\nSbpIv. sXmgnemfnbpw, sXmgnepSabpw, Dev]mZ\ taJebnse Xpey ]¦mfnIsf¶ AwKoIrX kahmIyw Xncp¯n¡pdn¨v sXmgnepSabv¡p taÂssI \evIp¶XmWv hyhkmb _Ô tImUv. sXmgnepSabv¡pw, sXmgnemfnbv¡pw, at²y kÀ¡mcnsâ \n£v]£X F¶Xv amän Kh¬saâv sXmgnepSa ]£¯v tNcp¶p. t{SbvUv bqWnb³ \nbaw d±v sNbvXv ]pXnb tImUn bqWnb\pIfpsS cq]oIcWw t]mepw Akm[yam¡n¯oÀ¡p¶p. ]pdta \n¶pw, bqWnb\p IÄ¡v t\Xm¡Ä ]mSnÃ. DsI¦n Xs¶ AXv AkwLSnX taJebn am{Xw. A§s\ HcmÄ¡v `mchmlnbmIp¶ bqWnb\pIÄ cIp am{Xw. Øm]\§fn \n¶pw, s]³j\mb hÀ¡v t\XrXz Øm\§Ä GsäSp¡m³ AtbmKyX, sXmgnemfn bqWnb\pIÄ¡v Political Fund cq]oIcn¡m\hImianÃ. bqWnb\pIÄ cPnÌÀ sN¿m³ Npcp§n-b-Xv 100 t]À AsÃ-¦n 10 iXam\w Poh\¡mÀ At]£n¡Ww. ]WnapS¡pIÄ ]qÀ®ambpw \nb{´W hnt[bw. \nba hncp² ]WnapS¡pIÄ¡v Pbn in£. sXmgnepSaIÄ sXmgnemfnIfpambn t\cn«v IcmÀ DIm¡mw. Iq«mb hnet]ien\pw kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯n\p ta I¯n hbv¡p¶ GÀ¸mSv. CXv `cWLS\bpsS auenImhImi§-fnÂs¸Sp¶ 19mw A\ptOZw A\phZn¡p¶ kwLS\ kzmX{´y¯nsâbpw, ILObpsS 87, 98 F¶o tImÀI¬h³j\pIfp sSbpw \Kv\amb ewL\w. sXmgnemfnIÄ Poh³ sImSp¯v t\SnsbSp¯ am\pjnImhImi §Ä Cu t`ZKXnbneqsS FSp¯p Ifbp¶p. ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô \nba¯n Aenªp tNcp¶ asämcp \nbaamWv C³Ukv{Sob Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSv. \nehn Cu \nbaw hyhkmb Øm]\§fnse Poh\¡mcpsS tkh\ hyhØIÄ \nÀ®bn¡p¶p. Poh\¡mÀ s¡XnscbpÅ A¨S¡ \S]SnIÄ, {]tamj\pIÄ, ^mIvSdnbn A\phÀ¯nt¡INpaXeIÄ, ØeamÁ§Ä XpS§nbh ]qÀ®ambpw sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw \evIp¶ XmWv t`ZKXn sN¿s¸« \nbaw. CXnse XrI£n _Ôhpw, Kh¬saânsâ CSs]Sepw ]msS CÃmbva sN¿pIbmWv. sXmgnepSabv¡p A\nb{´nXamb A[nImcw \evIp¶ \nba ]cnjv¡mcw. Hire and Fire(\nban¡m\pw, ]ncn¨phnSm\pw) sXmgnepSabv¡p A[nImcw \evIp¶ \nba t`ZKXn. Ìm³UnwKv HmÀUÀ BIvSnsâ \ntj[§Ä tNmZyw sN¿phm³ sXmgnemfnbvt¡m, bqWnb\pIÄt¡m AhImianÃ. Dev]mZ\ Imcy£aXbv¡p thI]cnjv¡mc§Ä hcp¯p¶Xn\v DSabv¡p ]qÀ® kzmX{´yw DImbncn¡pw. sXmgn k{¼Zm-b-¯n 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mcpÅ hyhkmb Øm]\w kÀ-¡mÀ A\phmZanÃmsX AS¨p]q«m³ ]pXnb \nbaw sXmgnepSasb A\phZnbv¡p¶p. ap¶dnbn¸panÃmsX amä§Ä hcp¯mw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfnsbbpw, \nÝnX kab sXmgnemfnsbbpw \nban¡mw.

sXmgn XÀ¡ \nbaw t`ZKXn sNbvXp ]pXnb hyhkmb _Ô tImUv \nehn hcpt¼mÄ, Gsd hÀjambn \½psS tImSXnIÄ \ÂInbn«pÅ hn[nIfpw, XymtKmÖzeamb kac§fneqsS t\SnsbSp¯ t{SbvUv bqWnb³ AhImi§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw thX\hpw, Xpeyamb ]¦mfn¯w F¶ ASnØm\ XXzhpw hnS]dbpIbmWv. sXmgnemfnIÄ A\p`hn ¡p¶ \nba ]cnc£IÄ CtXmsS CÃmXmIpw. Dev]mZ\ hÀ²hn\mbn sXmgnemfnIÄ ASnaIfpw sXmgnepSaIÄ kÀÆm[nImcnbpw kÀ¡mÀ Hcp t\m¡pIp¯nbpw Bbn-¯ocpw.

thPv tImUv (Labour Code on Wage Bills, 2015 )

thX\ kw_Ôamb \nba§Ä kwtbmPn¸n¡pIsb¶ Dt±it¯msS Minimum Wages Act, Bonus Act, Equal Remuneration Act, Payment of Wages ActXpS§nb \nba§Ä GIoIcn¨v sXmgn –thX\ \nba§sf t{ImUoIcn¡p¶ ]pXnb \nba \nÀtZiamWv Labour Code on Wage Bill, 2015.\nehnepÅ thX\w Ipdbv¡p¶Xn\v bmsXmcp sXmgnepSabv¡pw AhImianÃ. Ct¸mÄ Kh¬saâv sImIphcp¶ sXmgn \nba t`ZKXnIfneqsS aWn¡qdpIÄ¡pw, DZv]mZ\¯n\pw Iqen IW¡m¡n an\naw thX\w \nÝbn¡mhp¶XmWv. F¶m \nehnepÅ \nba§Ä A\pkcn¨v \ntXym]tbmK km[\§fpsS hne, Hcp sXmgnemfnbpsS Bhiy§Ä, DXv]mZ\ Nnehv XpS§nbhsbÃmw XrI£n kanXnbneqsS hnebncp¯nbmWv an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡p¶Xv. C¯cw Hcp \nba¯n\v {]m_eyansöpw ]Icw sXmgn sN¿p¶ kab¯nsâbpw DXv]mZ\¯nsâbpw ASnØm\¯n an\naw Iqen \nÝbn¡Ww F¶v ]dbp¶Xv `cWLS\ \ÂIp¶ Dd¸pIfpsS ewL\amWv. Bonus F¶Xv kmÀÆ{XoIhpw, \o¡nhbv¡s¸« thX\hpamsW¶v sXmgnemfnIÄ Bhiys¸Spt¼mÄ Bonus \nba¯nsâ ]cn[nbn \n¶pw AwKkwJybpsS ASnØm\¯n Øm]\§sf Hgnhm¡m \pÅ AhImiw ]pXnb Bonus Act\ÂIp¶p. AXv Hcp sXmgn XÀ¡ambn D¶bn¡phm \pÅ AhImihpw \ntj[n¡s¸Sp¶p. Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\sa¶Xv \nÀ_ÔaÃmsX hcpt¼mÄ hyXyØamb thX\w Htc Xcw sXmgnen GÀs¸Sp¶hÀ¡p \ÂIphm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v AhImiw \ÂIpIbmWv. CXv `cWLS\ hmKvZm\w sN¿p¶ auenImh Imi§-fmb 14 Dw, 16 Dw A\ptOZ§Ä¡v FXncmWv. thX\sa¶Xv hyàn]camb Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n \ÂIm³ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v ]pXnb \nbaw Ahkcw \ÂIp¶p. CXv \nc¦piamb NqjW¯n\v hgn hbv¡pw. Hmtcm \nba§fpsSbpw DtZiye£y§Ä a\knem¡msX Ah Hcpan¨v Iq«nt¨À¯v Hcp GIoIrX \nbaam¡p¶Xv A-imkv{XobamWv. an\naw thX\w Gäw Npcp§nb thX\amWv. ]Wn¡p-Å Iqen ]eXnsâbpw ASnØm\¯n emWv \nPs¸Sp¯nbn«p-Å-Xv, AXv \ÂIp¶ coXn XpS§nbh hyhØ sN¿p¶XmWv Payment of Wages Act. BonusF¶Xv ASnØm\]cambn \o¡n hbv¡s¸« thX\w F¶ \ne-bn GÁw Npcp§nb BonusDw em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w F¶ \nebn Balance Sheetsâ ASnØm\¯n ]¦nSp¶ hnlnXhpamWv t_mWÊv. Wage Codet\mSv _Ôs¸Sp¯n Kh¬saâv t`ZKXn \nÀtZin¡p¶ asämcp \nbaw Equal Remuneration ActBWv. kv{XoIÄ¡pw, ]pcpj³amÀ¡pw Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pÅXv kmÀÆtZioIambn AwKoIcn¡s¸«n«pÅ XXzamWv.

C´y³- `cWLS\bpw, ILOI¬h³j\pIfpw sXmgn cwK¯v hnthN\w ]mSnÃm sb¶pw, Xpey tPmen¡v Xpey thX\w \ÂIWsa¶pw, Npcp§nb thX\w Pohn¡m\mhiyamb thX\ambncn¡Wsa¶pw \njv¡Àjn¨n«pIv. `cWLS\bpsS 14 Dw, 39 Dw, 43 Dw A\ptOZ §Ä Ch Dd¸p Xcp¶p. Chsb Bkv]Zam¡nbmWv Iqen kw_Ôamb hyXykvX \nba§Ä ]mÀesaâv AwKoIcn¨n«pÅXv. ]pXnb thX\ \nbaw \S¸m¡p¶tXmsS Iqen sXmgnepSabpw, sXmgnemfnbpw X½n D­m¡p¶ Icmdnsâ ASnØm\¯n aWn¡qdpIÄ¡v IW¡m¡n Bbncn¡pw. 12 ap-X 13 1/2 aWn¡qÀ hsc sXmgnemfnsb ]WnsbSp¸n¡mw. Npcp§nb Iqensbt¶m, PohnXm[njvTnX an\naw Iq-en F¶tXm _m[Iambncn¡pIbnÃ. hnIknX cmPy§fn Atacn¡ DÄs¸sS Hcp aWn¡qdn-\v 1500 U.S. Dollar(10,000 cq]) hsc an\naw thX\w Bhiys¸«mWv Ct¸mÄ sXmgnemfnIÄ ]WnapS¡p¶Xv. C´ybn aWn¡qdn\pÅ icmicn thX\w tI-h-ew 40 Dw 50 Dw cq]m am{XamWv. CXv cq]bpsS A`y´c hym]mc aqey¯nsâ t]cnemsW¶v kÀ¡mÀ hmZn¡p¶p. ChnsS tI{µ t{SbvUv bqWnb\pIÄXs¶ Bhiys¸«ncn¡p¶ Npcp§nb {]Xnamk th-X-\w 15000 cq]bmWv. kÀ¡mÀ IcmÀ sXmgnemfn IÄ¡v sImSp¡Wsa¶v Bhiys¸Sp-¶-Xv 10000 cq] am{Xhpw. kp{]ow tImSXnbpsS hn[nb\pk cn¨v C´ybn \nbam\pkrXamb an\naw thX\w \evIm³ Ignbm¯ sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v hyhkmbw \S¯phm³ AhImianÃ. \h DZmchXv¡cW \b§Ä¡v A\pkrXamb GIoIrX ]p¯³ thX\ \nbaw \S¸nem¡p¶tXmsS `cWLS\bpw, kp{]owtImSXn hn[nIfpw A{]kàambn¯ocpw. t_mWÊv \nbaw amdp¶tXm-sS 8 iXam\¯n Ipdbm¯-Xpw 20 iXam\¯n IqSm¯Xpamb em`¯nsâ ]¦mfn¯w am{XamIpw t_mWÊv.

^mIvSdokv BIvSv t`ZKXn \nbaw 2016

hnIk\¯n\v hnLmXambn C´ybnse sXmgn \nba§Ä \nesImÅp¶psh¶pw, {]tXyIn¨pw kpc£nXXzhpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£a {]hÀ¯\hpw (Safety, Health and Welfare)em¡mbpÅ ^mIvSdokv BIvSv s]mfns¨gpXWsa¶pw, FICCI, ASOCHEM, Chamber of Commerce, Manufactures Association XpS§nb sXmgnepSa kwLS\IÄ apdhnfn Iq«m³ XpS§nbn«v Imew Gsdbmbn. F¶m Cu \nbaw t`ZKXn sN¿msX Xs¶ h³ hnIk\-amWv sI«nS \nÀ½mWw, J\\w, F©n\obdn§v XpS§nb hyhkmb¯nepImbn«pÅXv. 1948\p tijw 1954, 1976, 1987 F¶o hÀj§fn \S¯nb aq¶p t`ZKXn am{XamWv. 1987 se t`ZKXn t`m¸m Zpc´¯nsâ ASnØm\¯nemWv. BtcmKy kpc£bpw, A]IS \nhmcW¯n\pw A\nhmcyamWv. C´ybn Hcp aWn¡q-dn 46 acW§Ä hyhkmb A]IS§Ä DIm¡p¶p F¶mWv IW¡v. Cu kmlNcy¯n IqSpX ]cnc£IÄ hcpt¯It`ZKXnbv¡p ]Icw, XeXncnª asämcp t`ZKXnbmWv tamZn kÀ¡mÀ sImIphcp¶Xv. 40 Ipdhv BfpIÄ sXmgn sN¿p¶ hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ ]cn[nbn Hgnhm¡p¶p. CXp h-gn 80% hyhkmb Øm]\§Ä \nb{´W hnapàcmbn¯ocpw. ]pXnb kmt¦XnI hnZyIÄ D]tbmKn¨v h³InS hyhkm-b-§Ä 40 Ipdª am\htijnsImIv \S¯mhp¶ XmWv. tdmt_m«pIfpw, BÁanI F\ÀPnbpw DÅnSt¯mfw, hyhkmb D]m[nIsf hnLSn ¸n¡phm³ Ignbpw. IqSpX sXmgnemfnIÄ bmsXmcp hyhkmb¯nepw Bhiyambn hcnÃ. ]pXnb t`ZKXn {]-Im-cw 14 hbÊmb Ip«nIsf ^mIvSdnIfn tPmen sN¿n¡mw. CXv Child Labour Act\p hncp²amWv. \nc´cambn DImbns¡mIncn¡p¶ hyhkmb A]IS§Ä, sXmgnemfn IÃm¯hcpsS kpc£ Cu t`ZKXnIÄ aptJ\ Dd¸p hcp¯p¶nÃ. F³tUmkÄ ^m³, shSns¡«]ISw, sI«nSw XIÀ¶p hogÂ, kvt^mS\w, tdUntbj³ {]kcWw, Ch \nb{´n¡p¶Xn\p ]Icw A\phZn¨ncn¡pIbmWv. Kh¬saânsâ ]cntim[\IÄ iàns¸Sp¯n. Hcp ka{Kamb ^mIvSdnkv \nbaw sImIphcmsX ]Icw P\§fpsSbpw, sXmgnemfnIfpsSbpw Poh\pw kz¯n\pw kpc£nXXzw \ÂIp¶, Pohn¡m³ AhImiw \ÂIp¶ `cWLS\bp-sS 21 mw A\ptOZw ewLn¡p¶ `cWLS\m hncp² t`ZKXnbmWv ]pXnb ^mIvSdokv BIvSv. kpc£bpw, BtcmKyhpw, t£ahpw Dd¸p hcp¯p¶ ILO\nÀtZi§Ä B-sI 18 I¬h³j\pIfn AS§nbncn¡p¶p. Ah C´y Kh¬saâv {]mhÀ¯nIam¡Ww. ‘Make in India’Blzm\{]Imcw P\§sfbpw, sXmgnemfnIsfbpw ]´mSphm³ A´ÀtZiob Ip¯IIÄ¡v A\paXn \ÂIcpXv.

kvtamÄ FâÀss{]knÊv BIvSv

(THE Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (Amendment) Bill, 2015)

\nehnepÅ tjm]vÊv Bâv FÌm»njvsaâv BIvSv t`ZKXn sNbvXv kvtamÄ FâÀ ss{]knÊv BIvSv F¶ ]pXnb \nbaw sImIphcp¶Xv sNdpInS hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ^mIvSdokv BIvSnsâ ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡m\mWv. AXnep]cn {][m\s¸« kmaqly kpc£bpw, BtcmKy ]cn]me\hpw \nb{´W§fpw adnI-S-¶v 300 Xmsg Poh\¡mÀ am{XamWv DÅsX¦n {][m\-s¸« 14 sXmgn \nba§fn \n¶pw sXmgnepSaIÄ Hgnhm¡s¸Spw. kz´w IW¡pIÄ kzbtah kÀ«nss^ sNbvXv sXmgnepSaIÄ¡v kaÀ¸n¡mw. Kh¬saâv ]cntim[\IÄ DImInÃ. k¼qÀ® kzmX{´yhpw sXmgnepSaIÄ¡p e`nbv¡p¶p. Hcp henb ImÀ Dev]mZ\ ^mIvSdn t]m-epw 40 Xmsg sXmgnemfnIÄ AS§p¶ hnhn[ ^mIvSdnIfmbn Xcw Xncnbv¡s¸Spw. IcmÀ sXmgnemfn k{¼Zmbw \nehn hcpt¼mÄ sXmgnepSaIÄ \nba§Ä¡v AXoXcmIpw.

A{]âoÊv BIvSv

sXmgn ]cnioe\¯nsâ adhn ZoÀL¡mew sXmgnemfnIsf \nba]camb B\pIqey §Ä A\phZn¡msX A{]âoÊvIfmbn \nban¡phm³ A\phZnbv¡p¶XmWv A{]âoÊv BIvSv. CXnsâ ASnØm\-¯n 18 hbÊn XmsgbpÅ Ip«nIsf XpSÀ¨bmbn A{]âoÊpIfmbn \nban¡mw. CXv _methe \ntcm[\w adnIS¶v lo\amb sXmgn k{¼Zmb¯n\v (Precarious Job) Ahkcsamcp¡p¶p.

80% hyhkmb Øm]\§sf ]e \nba§fpsSbpw ]cn[nbn \n¶v Hgnhm¡pt¼mÄ C´y AwKoIcn¨n«pÅ LabourInspectionI¬h³j³ A{]kàamIpw. U.N AwKoIcn¨ anÃn\obw tKmÄ, IqSpX sXmgnehkc§fpw, sa¨amb sXmgnepw F¶ Decent Work Agenda (DWA)bmWv. AXv ChnsS C\n Hcp acoNnI. C´ybn \nÀ½n¡pI (Make in India)Blzm\ {]Imcw, hntZiIp¯IÄ¡v Ipdª Iqen¡v sXmgnemfnIsf ASnaIfm¡n hyhkmbw XpS§m³ A\phZn¡p¶XmWv ]pXnb \nba t`ZKXnIÄ.

Supreme Court and Amendments to the Constitution

(By Justice K.T. Thomas, Former Judge of the Supreme Court of India)

There are reports in the media that the Supreme Court and the Union Government are now engaged in arriving at a solution to diffuse the impasse created as sequel to the five Judge bench verdict which over turned the Constitution 99th Amendment (called ‘the NJAC judgment’). I felt earlier that with the culmination of the marathon exercise involved in Kesavananda Bharathi (1973) 4 SCC 225) the Indian Constitution will ever remain unimpaired. It was a great solace to the Indian citizen that no Parliament in future can destroy the basic features of the Constitution of India. But the majority verdict in the NJAC case (2015 (4) KLT SN 121 (C.No.154) SC - Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India) has portended the dangerous extent to which the sword of Kesavananda Bharathi could be swung by semantic exercises even against seemingly harmless mechanism provided by the Constitution using the amending power for appointing the Judges.

The majority judgment in NJAC case administered a warning that even three judges are enough to chop down any amendment of the Constitution disliked by the judges of the Supreme Court, no matter such amending law had the backing of the entire Parliament and the entire federal units of the Republic of India. Parliament’s constituent power is shown to be powerless in adopting an alternative mechanism to the collegium system, which was, in fact, created by the judges themselves through two judgments, and which is, indisputably, riddled with serious flaws. The perils highlighted by Justice Kurian Joseph are almost a testimonial pointing to the nadir to which the collegium system has plummeted over the years. Yet, learned judge joined the other three judges to strike down the Amendment on the premise that independence of the judiciary is safe in the collegium system but will be destroyed by the new alternative adumbrated in the Amendment.

The silver lining discernable from all the separate judgments is the finding that independence of the judiciary is a basic structure of our Constitution. But on the question whether the Amendment has destroyed it, one of the judges (Justice Chelameswar) advanced strong reasons to hold that it has not, while the rest found it has. The result is the revival of the flawed system.

When pointed out that the Amendment secured near hundred per cent support from the Parliament and from the entire federal units as has been envisaged in the Constitution, the majority judges held that all that is not enough to protect the Amendment. I have no dissent over that approach provided the Supreme Court could discover through the judicial review that the Amendment destroys the basic structure of the Constitution. Unfortunately, no effort was made to chisel down/expand/restrict the dangerous potentialities of the Amendment, even assuming that it did have. It would have been judicial statesmanship to show creativity by protecting the Amendment instead of whipping the weapon of destruction, a la judicial invalidation.

It is an enigma why the Five-Judge Bench did not refer this momentous issue to be decided by a much larger bench, at least larger than the bench that created the collegium system, so that the Supreme Court could re-evaluate the judge made mechanism. From media reports I learned that a plea was raised by the Bar for adopting such a course, and the bench observed that the plea would be considered later. Of course, if the Amendments were upheld, it would be a different matter; but when it appeared to the judges otherwise, it was only proper that such an issue of great immense importance ought to have been decided by a larger bench.

The reasoning shown by the majority judges that the presence of even a single member of the executive would erode all the independence of the judiciary is far from convincing. Examples of constitutional institutions like Election Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General and the Parliament created instrumentality. Vigilance Commission, are also meant to be independent, but the fact that they are appointed by the executive alone was not counted by the Constitution makers as capable of impairing the independence of those institutions. The reasoning that EC and CAG, etc., are different from judiciary is quite unimpressive, to say the least. The question whether such instrumentalities, too, could function independently in spite of the executive role in their appointment was not addressed by the judges in the majority. Independence of judiciary is in the sphere of functional performance, as its requirement is in the post appointment years. Protection provided for judges, as for removal, payment of salary, etc., are also provided for the other institutions, such as EC and CAG.

Majority opinions adversely viewed the presence of two members of the civil society mainly on two grounds: First is the concept of “eminent persons” was not defined; second, the concurrent view of any two persons could effectively veto the majority opinion. But both reasoning is untenable.

At any rate, the reasons offered in the majority opinions are too fragile and tenuous to overturn the constitutional provisions. We should not overlook the reality that unity of two persons in the NJAC could only have prevented the selection of a person from becoming a judge. Such a unity cannot enable an ill-suited person for appointment. Is it not a safety measure to prevent an unfit person from reaching the Supreme Court Bench, even at the risk of its maximum demerit that a suitable person is not being selected? Similarly, the presence of one executive representative, none other than the Union Cabinet Minister for Law, should have been welcomed wholeheartedly, particularly when the role of the executive in the selection of judges in all other democratic countries is of a much higher dimension.

Nevertheless, what should not have happened has happened. We can learn a lesson for future. Is it safe for parliamentary democracy to persist with the power of even a unity of just three judges striking down a constitutional provision on the premise that it violates the ratio of Kesavananda Bharathi case.

I wish to make a suggestion for consideration. Whenever it appears to the Supreme Court in future that the validity of any Constitutional provision requires to be decided on the touchstone of basic structure doctrine, the same shall be decided by a bench of at least the size which decided Kesavananda Bharathi case. This can be achieved through amendment of the relevant Rule by the Supreme Court itself in the exercise of its powers under Article 145(2) of the Constitution of India.