By C.J. Abraham, Registrar, High Court of Kerala
Subordinate or Delegated Legislation
C.J. Abraham, Registrar, High Court of Kerala
(Formerly Additional Secretary, Kerala Legislative Assembly)
The volume of Legislative work in every Legislature is on the increase year after year on account of governmental activities extending to more and more fields of human activity. The process of law making has also become more complicated; but at the same time the law has to be correct in technical details. In such circumstances the Legislature does not have enough time to calmly deliberate on all the complicated and technical details of the provisions of the Legislative measures brought before it Hence the practice is for the Legislature to lay down broad principles of any Legislation and delegate to the Executive the duty and power to frame regulations, rules, bye-laws, schemes etc. in conformity with the principles embodied in the Legislation. This power of Legislation given to the Executive being subordinate to the supreme Legislative power of the Legislature is known as subordinate or delegated Legislation.
It is now an accepted proposition that any matter which essentially constitutes the Legislative policy of the Ltate should not be delegated by the Legislature to the Executive. The principle is that the supreme Legislative authority of the Legislature in essential Legislative policy matters shall not be abdicated to any other body. In regard to any Legislation on hand the Legislature will lay down a policy or standard for the guidance of the delegated authority. Once when the Legislature has provided in a statute the principle of a new law, the Executive may by means of the delegated power of Legislation, make regulations, rules, bye-laws etc. to work out the application of the law within the principles and suitable to the changing circumstances. When rules, regulations, bye-laws etc. are framed by the Executive in exercise of the powers delegated to it by statute, such rules etc. will have the force of law and the same binding power as any provision of the principal statute.
There are parliamentary measures to scrutinise whether the agency to which Legislative power is delegated exercises the power within limits. In India both in the Lok Sabha and in the Legislative Assemblies of the States there is the Committee on Subordinate Legislation to scrutinise and report to the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies whether the powers to make regulations, rules, bye-laws etc. conferred by the Constitution or delegated by the Legislature are being properly exercised within such delegation. Each regulation, rule, bye-law etc. framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution or the Legislative functions delegated by the Legislature to a subordinate authority shall be numbered and published in the Government Gazette immediately after it is promulgated. After such publication it is the duty of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation to consider—
(i) Whether it is in accord with the general objects of the Constitution or the Act pursuant to which it is made;
(ii) Whether it contains matter, which in the opinion of the Committee, should more properly be dealt with in an Act of the Legislature;
(iii) whether it contains imposition of any tax;
(iv) whether it directly or indirectly bars the jurisdiction of the Courts;
(v) whether it gives retrospective effect to any of the provisions in respect of which the Constitution or the Act does not expressly give any such power;
(vi) whether it involves expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the State of Kerala or the public revenues;
(vii) whether it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the Constitution or the Act pursuant to which it is made;
(viii) whether there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in its publication or in laying it before the Legislature; and
(ix) whether for any reason its form or purport calls for any elucidation.
If the Committee is of opinion that any order should be annulled wholly or in part, or should be amended in any respect, it shall report that opinion and the grounds thereof to the Assembly. If the Committee is of opinion that any other matter relating to any order should be brought to the notice of the Assembly, it may report that opinion and matter to the Assembly.
The Rules of procedure in the Legislature also provide that all regulations, rules, sub-rules, bye-laws etc. framed in pursuance of the Constitution or the Legislative powers delegated by the Legislatures to a subordinate authority shall be laid before the Legislature for the periods specified in the Constitution or the relevant Acts. This is to enable the Members of the House to consider the subordinate legislative measures in all its aspects and to move for amendments if necessary.
Apart from the above parliamentary check on the exercise of delegated power, all orders made in exercise of delegated power are subject to examination by courts at the instance of a third party, on a plea of ultra vires.
Thus delegated Legislation is an essential part of Legislation to enable easy and convenient working of the governmental machinery. But the delegated power shall be exercised carefully and within permitted limits.
Abkari Act - Bad Law ?
(Published in 1980 KLT)
By P. Rajan, Advocate, Thalasserry
Abkari Act - Bad Law ?
(P. Rajan, Advocate, Tellicherry)
The Abkari Act (1 of 1077) came into force in 1967 after suspending the provisions of the Prohibition Act and by making necessary amendments to the other 3 Acts which were in force - Cochin Abkari Act, Travancore Abkari Act and Madras Abkari Act. Even though a decade has elapsed after the enforcement of the Act it has not been subjected to necessary changes. The Act permits courts to award imprisonment which may extend to one year or three thousand rupees or both as the maximum and things like receptacles, utensils, apparatus etc. are also liable to confiscation.
It seems that the Act is rather 'tight-lipped'. It does not speak much about the procedure to be followed by the Excise Officials regarding seizure, custody and sending of the articles seized to the court. The only section is S.53, which empowers the police officer to take charge of and keep in custody the articles seized under the Act. Sealing of the sample is to be done by the police officer in charge of the Police Station with his seal This is the only Section which says about the procedure to be followed that too after the seizure. The Act does not compel the officers to secure the presence of witnesses at the time of seizure or to affix the signature or thumb impression as the case may be, of the person from whom the article is seized on the bottle or container. This gives sufficient opportunity to the detecting hands to do things in their favour for a successful prosecution Various High Courts including our High Court decided very many issues under this Act and other Excise Acts in favour of the accused persons. Even then there is difficulty in accepting case-laws as such. There is much difference between case-law and statutory law. Trial Courts can't accept the former as such because facts and circumstances of each case may vary. In short, case law is metal in the mine unlike statutes.
To safeguard the interests of the person from whom article is seized, time is to be fixed for sending the article or sample of the same to the court; otherwise, there could be no difficulty in tampering with the article seized. The Act permits one to carry or possess 4 1/2 liters of Indian made foreign liquor. But the definition given in the Act for foreign liquor and country liquor needs illustrations. Many of the prosecutions under this Act are for carrying or possessing illicit liquor. But illicit liquor is not defined. Permission is given to the Excise Officers to impose penalty for avoiding prosecutions and detecting hands can award the sentence. So the natural tendency will be to increase the number of seizures without complying with the procedural formalities. To safeguard the interests of the individuals necessary changes are to be made to make the Act self contained.
Suspension of an Aided School Teacher Under Te K.E.R.
By M.P.R. Nair, Bar-at-Law, Sr. Advocate
Suspension of an Aided School Teacher Under Te K.E.R.
(M. P. R. Nair, Bar-at-Law)
Chapter XIV-A of the Rules under Kerala Education Act dealing with the conditions of services of aided school teachers provides under Rule 67(7) for the power that can be exercised by the educational authority consequent on an order of suspension passed by the manager. This sub-rule is intended to act as a restraint on an arbitrary exercise of the power of suspension conferred on the manager in respect of a teacher (or of a member of the non-teaching staff) of an aided school. The power of appointment to the posts of teaching and non-teaching staff in an aided school is vested in the manager under the Kerala Education Act. The ancillary powers such as the power to order suspension pending enquiry and the power to impose punishments consequent upon disciplinary proceedings also vest in the manager although very recently an Ordinance has been passed by the Government of Kerala empowering the government or any officer not below the rank of an Educational Officer authorised by the government in this behalf to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the teacher of an aided school, to suspend him pending enquiry and impose upon him all or any of the penalties-prescribed under the Kerala Education Rules.
2. I am concerned in this note only so far as the power of the Manager is concerned to initiate disciplinary action against the teacher of an aided school-Under S.12 of the Kerala Eduction Act the manager may for sufficient reasons suspend a teacher for a period not exceeding 15 days without prior sanction of the officer authorised by the government’ in this behalf. These reasons must necessarily relate to one or more of those specified in Rule 67 (1), Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules namely (i) when a disciplinary proceeding against a teacher is contemplated or is pending;
(ii) when a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial;
(iii) when final orders are pending in the disciplinary proceedings, if the authority considers that in the then prevailing circumstances it is necessary, in public interest, that the teacher should be suspended from service.
3. When one or more of these grounds are disclosed, the manager may suspend a teacher pending enquiry for a period not exceeding 15 days. If the manager desires that the suspension of the teacher has to be extended beyond a period of 15 days, sanction, as stated earlier, has to be obtained from an officer authorised by the government in this behalf. Rule 67(7) of Chapter XIV-A provides for the manner in which the period of suspension can be extended beyond 15 days. The manager who is of the opinion that the period of suspension is to be extended beyond 15 days reports the matter together with the reasons for suspension to the Educational Officer, and if the suspension is in respect of the headmaster of a secondary school or a training school, he reports the matter to the Regional Deputy Director. The Educational Officer in respect, of a teacher, and Regional Deputy Director in respect of a headmaster in a secondary school or a training school, then conducts a preliminary investigation into the grounds for suspension. The authority concerned then directs the manager to reinstate the teacher with effect from the date of suspension, if the authority is satisfied that there exists no valid ground for the suspension, The manager then has two alternatives namely; (i)to reinstate the teacher forthwith or(ii) to show satisfactory cause for non-compliance with the order of reinstatement. In the latter case, the authority considers the explanation submitted by the manager for non-compliance with the direction to reinstate the teacher and then it is open to the department to disburse the pay and allowances of the teacher as if the teacher were not suspended and recover the amount so disbursed from the manager. There is thus a deemed reinstatement. If on the other hand, the authority is satisfied that there are valid grounds for such suspension the authority may accord premission to the manager to place the teacher under suspension beyond the period of 15 days. The rule further makes it imperative that the authority shall: pass orders permitting suspension or otherwise within the said 15 days.
4. Cases of suspension of teachers in aided schools have been very many and since the remedies under Art. 226 of the Constitution are available to the teacher as well as to the manager, there are very many instances in which the aggrieved persons have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Rule 67 (7), it is submitted, has not yet been subjected to an authoritative interpretation by the High Court although there are decisions and decisions in which Rule 67(7)has come up for consideration in the High Court whether oh petitions filed by the aggreived teacher or by the aggreived manager. The wording of Rule 67 (7) itself perhaps has not been happy or felicitous. But that is beside the point. It is a statutory rule and so Iong as it stands as such it has to be interpreted in accordance with the canons of Interpretation of Statutes. Perhaps it is one of those rules which is quite lengthy in the K.E.R. Besides it incorporates various matters which could perhaps have been worded in different rules for the sake of brevity and clarity.
5. It is perhaps for this reason that the Educational Officers have also not been able to understand and appreciate the full effect of this rule. There are cases and cases in which the educational authorities have purported to act under Rule 67(7) but made inadvertent departures from the strict scope of the rule. The investigation contemplated under this sub-rule is meant only for the purpose of deciding whether the manager has exercised the power of suspension arbitrarily or whether there are or there are not valid grounds for keeping the teacher under suspension beyond a period of 15 days. As I have stated already, the grounds for suspension have been laid down under Rule 67(1) of Chapter XIV-A of the KER. From the nature of the wording in sub rule (7) of Rule 67 as also the nature of the duty cast on the educational officers to pass orders within the period of 15 days, it becomes clear that the investigation contemplated in Rule 67(7) is not an enquiry into the merits or demerits of the charges or for a final pronouncement on the maintainability or -otherwise of the charges, although that is being done in a number of cases by the educational officers. The investigation contemplated under Rule 67(7) is only meant to determine whether or not a prima facie case on the materials furnished by the manager has been disclosed that warrant suspension of a teacher beyond a period of 15 days so that a further enquiry as contemplated under Rule 75 in Chapter XIV-A of the KER. can effectively be conducted for imposing any of the penalties specified in items (iv) to (viii) of Rule 65 of Chapter XIV-A of KER., namely Reduction to a lower rank, Compulsory retirement, Removal from service, Dismissal from service, Reduction of pension.
6. The authority conducting the preliminary investigation has only to be satisfied that a primp, facie case has been made out by the manager and in such an event the manager will be entitled to an order to keep a teacher under suspension beyond a period of 15 days. The educational authorities without appreciating the full implications of the rule, invariably make a detailed enquiry into the charges themselves and proceed to pronounce on the merits of the charges by observations such as “the charge is dismissed”, or “the allegation is dismissed”. Rule 67(7) does not appear to confer such power at all, as has been held by the High Court in Kumaran v. The District Educational Officer, Ottapalam and others. In this case, the manager of an aided school suspended a teacher from service pending enquiry into certain charges framed against him. The D.E.O. who conducted a preliminary investigation under Rule 67(7) directed the manager to reinstate the teacher although the D.E.O. found that some of the charges were proved. Of the scope of the investigation under Rule 67(7), Eradi, J. observed as follows:
“......the District Educational Officer has proceeded to express his views as to whether or not the charges framed against the teacher are prima facie sustainable. I feel that any expression of opinion by this Court touching those nutters, at this stage, is not conducive to the holding of a proper enquiry under Rule 75 of Chapter XIV-A. It has however, to be observed that there is considerable force in the contention of the petitioner that the District Educational Officer in passing Ex. P3 has made certain observations and remarks in .his order which would tend to create an impression that he has already reached final conclusion on the merits of the charges framed against the teacher. This is certainly not expected to be done at the stage of passing an order under Rule 67 (7) because at that stage no full-fledged enquiry is conducted and the officer is expected only to record a prima facie finding a’s to whether or not there are circumstances warranting the continuance of the order of suspension against the teacher. If the Educational Officer does not restrict the scope of his decision to these limits at the stage of passing the order under Rule 67 (7) there is always the danger of one party or other being seriously prejudiced by reason of the officer committing himself to some particular view regarding the maintainability or otherwise of the charges before he has had the benefit of the entire evidence being placed before him......”
7. Such a preliminary investigation conducted, and the authority come ‘ to the conclusion that circumstances do not warrant the continuance of the order of suspension, an order for reinstatement of the teacher follows. The question then would be whether or not the manager is bound to give effect to this direction? The sub-rule provides that the manager has an opportunity to show “satisfactory cause” against the direction to reinstate the teacher. At this stage the authority concerned has to advert to the materials furnished by the manager and decide whether the cause shown by the manager is satisfactory or not. If the attempt of the manager to show satisfactory cause fails, the rule provides for “deemed reinstatement” of the teacher with the necessary and inevitable consequence that the Department may disburse the pay and allowances of the teacher subject to recovery of the same from the manager.
8. If, on such a preliminary investigation it is found that there are valid grounds for suspension, is it open to the authority concerned to decline permission to continue the order of suspension beyond the period of fifteen days? The wording in Rule 67 (7.) is as follows:-
“...If on such investigation it is found that there are valid grounds for such suspension-permission may be given to the Manager to place the teacher under suspension beyond fifteen days, if necessary”.
The words in italics would indicate that there is option reserved to the authority concerned to decline sanction even in such cases. Would that be the intention of the rule? I doubt very much. The manager is then a helpless person whose power to suspend a teacher even for valid and sufficient reasons-be it in the best interests of the institution-will rest solely on the good-sense of investigating authority, whose attitudes to the manager will largely govern the exercise of his discretion. It cannot be that such an arbitrary position is contemplated by the rule. The authority concerned, In my submission, is bound to accord sanction for the continuance of the suspension if, in consequence of the preliminary investigation, the authority finds that valid grounds exist for the suspension ordered by the manager. The word ‘may’ used in the sub-rule will have to be interpreted as “shall” in such circumstances, and the words “if necessary’’ treated as surplusage. Otherwise, very anomalous situations may arise giving rise to legal battles at the expense of the litigants. One hopes the executive and the legislature will take note of the anomaly.
9. One other point deserves consideration. I have mentioned earlier in this note that in the event of the authority concerned passing an order directing the manager to reinstate the teacher, it is open to the manager to show satisfactory cause against the order of reinstatement Once that is done, the educational authority on a consideration of the materials furnished by the manager has to decide whether the cause shown is satisfactory, or not. Should it appear to the authority that the cause shown is not satisfactory, is it possible for the authority to insist on the manager to give effect to its direction and proceed to take action against the manager for non-compliance with the direction? Since the remedy of the department has also been indicated in the rule itself namely that the department may disburse the pay and allowances’ of the teacher subject to the recovery of the same from the* manager it would appear that there is no power on the educational authority to compel the manager to give effect to its-direction to reinstate the teacher. The best interests of the institution are perhaps better known to the manager than the educational authority. The danger inherent perhaps in giving effect to the direction of the departmental authority-will be better known to the manager than anyone else. Apart from a few and’ rare cases in which personal element might play a part, it is not difficult to imagine cases where it would be necessary in the best interests of the institution to keep a teacher away from school pending a full enquiry into his conduct. At the same time, the aggreived teacher in whose favour findings have been entered into during the preliminary investigation should also not be made to suffer. The recalcitrant manager should also not be able to take advantage of the situation. That is why the pay and allowances disbursed to the teacher are liable to be recovered from the manager. The combined effect of all these is that the manager has a power to keep a person away from school even if it be that he violates the directions of the educational authority in this regard, provided he is prepared to face the penal consequence of reimbursing the salary and allowances to the department. That is right which has to be read into the scheme of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules, however unhappy though it is.
A different view, however, has been expressed by the High Court of Kerala in O.P. 3631/1968 and O.P. 3709/1968. It was contended therein that no writ will lie against the manager compelling him to reinstate a teacher in whose favour an order has been passed by the educational authority after a preliminary investigation under Rule 67(7). The Court held that the intention of Rule 67(7) is not merely to recover from the manager the amount disbursed to the teacher as pay and allowances consequent on the deemed reinstatement, but there is a right conferred on the teacher to work in the institution consequent on an order passed by the authority in his favour. It was further held therein that the provision for recovery of pay and allowances from the manager is only meant to act as a deterrent on the manager from keeping a teacher away from the school. No appeal was carried from this decision and the law, therefore, is as in the above decision. It is respectfully submitted that the law requires reconsideration-If it were the intention of Rule 67(7), the wording of the relevant portion of the Rule could have been very different. An opportunity to show satisfactory cause need not have been given nor should there have been the provision for deemed reinstatement and recovery of the pay and allowances from the manager.
10. It is not unusual that government servants are suspended from service for an indefinite period pending enquiry into the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. Suspension is not a punishment under the KER. The power of suspension conferred on the manager is subject to control under Rule 67(7). But Rule 67(7) cannot abrogate the power of the manager. The remedy of the teacher lies in establishing his innocence during the “enquiry under Rule 75. An interpretation such as has been outlined above will only be consistent with the tone and% tenor of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules. In any case, an authoritative interpretation of Rule 67(7) will be desirable to resolve the ambiguity and vagueness that now surround it.
SPEAKING ORDER-AN ATTRIBUTE OF NATURAL JUSTICE?
By M.P.R. Nair, Bar-at-Law, Sr. Advocate
SPEAKING ORDER-AN ATTRIBUTE OF NATURAL JUSTICE?
(M. P. R. Nair, Bar-at-Law)
In a recent case K. Karaipak & Ors. etc, v. Union of India & Ors reported in (1969) S.C.W.R. I 1122 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the trend in recent years of the development of the principles of natural justice. In this case, the petitioners who were gazetted Officers serving in the Forest Department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir sought to quash a notification issued by the government of India as violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution besides being violative of the principles of natural justice. In the Selection Board constituted for the purpose of selection of officers to the Indian Forest Service, Mr. Naqishbund, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests in Jammu and Kashmir was one of the members. Mr. Naqishbund himself was a candidate seeking to be selected to the All India Forest Service. No doubt, in the fitness of things, he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. The selections in question were said to have been made solely on the records of the Officers and Mr. Naqishbund admittedly participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the claims of his rivals were considered. He was also party to the preparation of the selected candidates in order of preference wherein his name was shown as No. 1 in the list. One of the questions that the Supreme Court had to consider was whether the selections made by the Selection Board were to be set aside on the ground of violation of natural justice. In holding that in as much as Mr. Naqishbund was party to the preparation of the selection list in which his name was shown as No. 1, Mr. Naquishbund “was undoubtedly a judge in his own cause, a circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice”, the Supreme Court analysed the concept of natural justice and the change that the law has undergone in recent years. To the two well-known principles of natural justice namely, (I) that no one shall be a judge in his own cause and (2) that no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing, a third rule was added, namely, that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. The observation of the Supreme Court at para 19 of the Report strikes significant.
“The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negative^ to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely; (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Hema debat case index propria casual) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many mofe subsidiary rules came to be added to be rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to sea why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative atone timo are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision, is the aim of both, quasi-judicial enquiries, as, well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala and, ors. (1568) II S. C. W.R. 117 the rules, of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to given case must depend to, a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case the, frame-work, of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of person* appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case”,
If, as stated by the Supreme Court, the object of the rules, of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, the third rule as enunciated by the Supreme Court assumes considerable significance. Under this rule, it is necessary for the aggrieved party to be satisfied that quasi-judicial or administrative enquiry has been conducted in good faith, without bias, and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. This doctrine necessarily, casts a duty on a quasi-judicial or administrative authority empowered by their acts to affect the rights of citizens, and to pass orders which visit civil consequences upon citizens to assign reasons for such orders. It has, been held in a number of decisions, and the law is now well settled, that even administrative authorities have a duty to act judicially in cases where they affect the rights of citizens and this duty necessarily implies that the authority, has to advert to the materials on record and arrive at a conclusion on the basis, of the evidence and has to record the reasons therefore. If no reasons, are recorded for the conclusion, it will not be possible to maintain whether the: authority has adverted to the materials on record, whether there has been an application of the mind on the materials on record or whether the authority has been influenced by extraneous considerations. In order, therefore, to satisfy that the authority under the 3rd rule of the principles of natural justice-has acted neither unreasonably nor arbitrarily it is very essential that reasons have to be recorded for the conclusions for, if “one does not know the facts, on which the conclusion against one is, drawn, it would be impossible to challenge it or lead, rebuttal.”
The question arises if the ultimate order passed at any rate by quasi-judicial authority should be speaking order. The answer to this question ought to be in the affirmative. The further question would be whether insistence upon, a speaking order is a requirement of the principles of natural justice. It cannot be disputed, and it is now fairly eertain, that the rules of natural justice insist upon, a conduct on the part of a quasi-judicial authority to act in a manner free from arbitrariness and unreasonableness. If that be so, giving of reasons is-certainly a requirement and an attribute: of the principles of natural justice.
In a recent case decided by the Allahabad High Court reported in 1969 ALJ 174, the learned Judge on an analysis of the case law on the subject just relevant for the purpose observed as follows:.
“Neither, on, principles nor on authority could it be said that the principles of natural justice require that the ultimate order must, be a speaking one.”
The facts of this case may be noted. The plaintiffs in this case claimed to be Indian citizens who temporarily migrated, to Pakistan on account of certain chaotic conditions in Aligarh. They returned to India with; a. Pakistani Passport. On expiry of the period of visa, the authorities in India sought to deport the plaintiffs to Pakistan against which action the plaintiffs filed a suit and obtained an injunction. The suit was decreed on the finding that till the Central Government determined the citizenship of the plaintiffs under the Citizenship Act» the defendants would not deport the plaintiffs to Pakistan. The Central Government eventually passed orders declaring that the plaintiffs had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan. The plaintiffs thereupon filed a suit for a declaration that this order was illegal and for an injunction restraining the* defendants from deporting the plaintiffs out of India. One of the contentions though not raised by the plaintiffs in the courts below but argued before the High Court was that the order requiring them to leave the country was passed in violation of principles of natural justice in as much as the order passed against the plaintiffs was not a speaking order.
This case was ultimately decided on other points since the plaintiffs did not urge this contention either in the pleadings or before any of the courts below. The learned judge, however, came to the conclusion that absence of reasons in a quasi-judicial order does not automatically void the order. However the’ learned judge added that
“A quasi-judicial order which does not stats reasons may be defective, improper’ or may also be valid, depending on facts of each case. In this situation, it will be difficult to say that such an order would be void ab initio Or a nullity in law. It would, in my’ opinion, suffer from a material irregularity and to be a voidable, and not a void order,’“
The learned judge was further pleased to add that
‘If the order is treated as voidable, then it has to be voided on that ground”.
It will, therefore, be seen that the Allahabad High Court was of opinion, though the High Court did not decide the case on this point, that a quasi-judicial order which does not state reasons would suffer from a material irregularity and to be a voidable order. The effect is the same and the only inferences from the judgment read as a whole are(1) that a quasi-judicial authority ha& to record reasons and (2) that an order which does not comply with this is a voidable order, suffering from a material irregularity and to be voided on this’’ ground. It is therefore, submitted that this decision cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that the principles of natural justice do not require assignment of reasons nor of the proposition that an order which does- not state’ reasons is not a void order.
A recent decision of the Kerala High Court reported in1959 KLT 230’ (Ibrahim Kunju v. State of Kerala & Ors) throws considerable light on this point. In this case, the affairs of a cooperative society, committed to the management of a board was subjected to a preliminary scrutiny by the Deputy Registrar and upon his report the Joint Registrar issued orders- superseding the Board of Management. Of course, a notice was issued to the Board and an explanation obtained. The board submitted an appeal to the government against the order. This appeal was also dismissed. The order of the Joint Registrar superseding the board and the appellate order of the government were challenged before the High Court. One of the grounds of attack was that no reasons were given in support of the order. One other fact may also be noted. On the date on which the appeal was posted for hearing before the Government, the counsel for the appellant applied in writing for an adjournment on reasons of ill-health. The adjournment was refused by the government and the case decided ex parte. The question before the High Court relevant for our purpose was two-foId (1) whether failure to give reasons is fatal to quasi-judicial orders (or administrative orders) which affect rights of citizens, and (2) whether giving of reasons is a requirement of natural justice. The observations of the learned Judge on these points are illuminating’. So far as the 1st point is concerned, namely, whether absence of reasons in quasi-judicial orders (or administrative orders that affect the rights of citizens), normally voids the order, his Lordship after adverting extensively to the case-law on the subject declared that ’failure to give reasons ordinarily voids the order”.
On the second point, namely, whether assigning of reasons is a requirement of natural justice, His Lordship observed as follows:
“Natural justice, I must warn, cannot be perverted into anything unnatural or unjust and cannot, therefore, be treated as a set of dogmatic prescriptions applicable without reference to the circumstances of the case. The question merely is, in all conscience have you been fair in dealing with that man? If you have been arbitrary, absent-minded, unreasonable or unspeaking, you cannot deny that there has been no administrative fair play”
and at paragraph 9 of the report, His Lordship further observed:
“Another point has been taken that the refusal of adjournment by the government without assigning reasons was arbitrary and therefore unjust. Giving reasons for orders is certainly a requirement of natural justice. But this does not mean that every incidental or interlocutory or other similar order must contain elaborate reasons.”
There was no doubt in the mind of h is Lordship that giving of reasons is a requirement of the principles of natural justice Indeed, this conclusion of his Lordship is justified, nay fortified by the observations contained in a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court reported in 1950 K.LT t304. (Josephv. Supdt,of Post Offices). At para.5 of the report, the following passage appears.
“.........even where there be no express provisions and administrative authorities be discharging quasi-judicial functions, judicial pronouncements insist on reasons being given for the order”
and at page 1308 of the report it has been further observed that
“where the order by administrative authorities be quasi-judicial, it must be ‘speaking order’ and absence of reasons in it would be fatal to its legality. The complaint by the petitioner is that he was suspended in 1952 and had not been allowed to do any work thereafter; that the criminal complaint against him has been found not to be established; that he has been thereafter dismissed for unsatisfactory conduct; but he does not know what that conduct is, and is not, from the record, in a position to exercise properly the right of appeal, which the Rules give him”.
If, therefore, assigning of reasons has by judicial pronouncements been insisted upon in regard to administrative orders, there is perhaps no escape from the conclusion that the requirement to assign reasons for quasi judicial orders cannot be dispensed with under any circumstances.
It is significant to note in this context that the Donoughmore Committe on natural justice, in its report on Ministerial Powers added two more principles to the two age-old principles of natural justice, namely (a) A party has a right to know the reason for a decision affecting him, be it judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative;
(b) when a decision is arrived at after conducting an enquiry, the report of such officer must be made available to the parties concerned The opinion of the Law Commission (Reform of Judicial Administration, Vol. 11) is not different either.
‘In the case of administrative decision provision should be made that they should be accompanied by reasons.”
It may not be necessary to refer to other decisions or authorities to substantiate this point. If, as noted by the Supreme Court, a 3rd rule of Natural Justice has been engrafted to the two well-known principles requiring quasi-judicial authority not to act arbitrarily or unreasonably, it goes without saying that reasons for the conclusions alone would reveal whether an authority has acted unreasonably or arbitrarily. Without knowing the reasons as to why and under what circumstances an adverse conclusion has been drawn against a citizen, with civil consequences visiting upon him, it is impossible to say or maintain that arbitrariness or unreasonableness cannot be suspected of the orders of the authority. Administrative fair-play demands assigning of reasons for the orders and quasi-judicial obligation involves giving reasons for orders. Both are subject to the dominion of natural justice. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that natural justice requires giving reasons for orders and the 3rd rule as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above, unambiguously states so, if one “lifts the veil” or strips it of the legal jargon.
Section 12 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
By V.K. Sathyavan Nair, Advocate, Kottayam.
Section 12 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
(V.K. Sathyavan Nair, Advocate, Kottayam)
S.12 of Act 2 of 1965 creates an anomolous situation. The questions posed for discussion are:-(1) What are the legal consequences which follow an order under sub-S.3 of S.12 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act? (ii) Is the order final and executable under S.14 of that Act? (iii) Do the provisions of S.11 apply to cases covered by an order under S.12 (3)?
S.12 confers remedial right on the land lord who has applied for eviction under S.11 as it provides for contingencies arising out of failure on the part of the tenant to deposit rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. S.12 is widely worded and applies to any petition for eviction under S.11 irrespective of the grounds on which the eviction is sought for. Suppose the landlord files an application for eviction under Sec. 11 (3) on the ground that he bona fide needs the building. On the date of the application there may not be any rent in arrears. Nevertheless the tenant has to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building as is plain from a reading of S.12.
“No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under S. 11 shall be entitled to contest the application...unless...all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due.”
It is clear that the failure on the part of the tenant to deposit rent in accordance with S.12 (1) ends in forfeiture of his rights to contest the application. A tenant who defaults to pay admitted arrears of rent cannot also avail of the protections secured by the other provisions. Sub-S. 2 of S.12 provides for fixing a day by the court ‘for depositing the amount. The time for depositing arrears of rent should not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and in the case of rent that accrues subsequently two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. Thus law shows its indulgence towards the tenants and gives him a reasonable opportunity to protect his rights. But if the order of the court fixing the day for deposit is not complied with, the legal consequence, namely the forfeiture of the rights of the tenant to contest the application imminently follows. According to sub-S. 3 of S.2 the Rent Control Court has to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building stopping all further proceedings unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary. Virtually, the court overrules all the contentions of the tenant and passes an order for eviction. Now the difficulty arises. Can the above order be deemed to be an order under S.11 of the Act. The argument that could be advanced is that S.11 is exhaustive of the grounds of eviction and an application for eviction will lie only under S.11. An order for eviction can be*passed only under S.11. Therefore, whenever an order is passed under sub-S.3 of S.12, it is to be deemed to been order under S.11 and automatically the provisions of S.11 are attracted and the tenant can avail of the benefits again. Thus a tenant against whom an order of eviction is passed under subsection 3 of S.12 is entitled to deposit arrears of rent, interest and cost within one month from the date of the order. But that protection is not available if an order under S.12 (3) is held to be distinct from an order Sec.11. Are those orders distinct and separate?
However, a Division Bench of our High Court has categorically stated- 1963 KLT 688-that “Ss.11 and 12 of the Act are not dependant on each other. They provide for different contingencies though the consequence of the noncompliance of the mandates of either section is eviction. It must then follow that an order for eviction passed under S.12(3) is not amenable to correction under S.11 (2) (b) which relates to orders of eviction passed under that subsection, ie. S.11(2) only.” Therefore it is clear that the position is that an . order under S.12(3) is conclusive and final. A tenant against whom an order is passed under S.12(3) is not entitled to deposit the amount and get the order vacated under S.11 (2)(c).
The legality of an order under S. 12 (3) was considered in 1964 K.LT. 50 9. There was a specific order by the court to deposit arrears of rent accrued during the pendency of the proceedings. It was not deposited in full. Eviction was ordered under Sec. 12 of the Act. The tenant applied for issuance of Writ of certiorari to quash the order. The Division Bench held that when a court has passed an order directing a party before it to do a particular thing, in default of which a certain statutor y consequence is to follow, if the party is to be relieved of the consequences of a non-compliance of that order he has to make a specific motion therefor showing sufficient cause for his non-compliance of the order and making the appropriate prayer therein; otherwise the order would work itself out (in this case order under S.12(2)) and the default to comply with it will bring the appointed consequences on the tenant. The court refused to interfere with the impugned order. The above rulings clearly show that once the Rent Control Court passes an order under sub-S. 3 of S. 12 for non-compliance of an order under sub-S.2 of that Section, the tenant loses all his rights and protection8 conferred on him by sub-section (2) and similar provisions of S.11.
But the curious thing to be noted is that an order under S.12(3) is not mentioned in S. 14 which clearly enumerates the executable orders. So the question is whether an order under S.12 (3), though it is perfectly legal, is executable under S.14? Or can it be deemed as an order under S. 11 for purposes of execution. If the answer is in the affirmative, immediately it follows that the protection given by S.11(2)(b) is available to that tenant. If an order under S.12 (3) is deemed to be an order under S. 11 for purposes of execution it may bring violence to the principle laid down in 1963 KLT. 688. Applying the rules of justice and common sense as is done in the case of an order under clause 9 of TC. Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Order 1950 holding it to be an executable order under S. 14 of Kerala Act XVI of 1959, vide 1963 KLT. 308, it is to be said without any hesitation that an order under S. 12 (3) is executable. But the Act does not provide for it. The anomaly can be remedied only by necessary amendments as long as the legal position is taken to be concluded by the decisions of the Division, Bench in 1963 KLT. 688 and 1964 KLT. 509. The inhibitions contained in S. 12 (S. 12 was first introduced in The Rent Control Ordinance of 1959) lead to hardship as the tenants are deprived of their primary right to contest for the only fault of having failed to deposit the arrears of rent within a short time specified by the Court. It is also to be remembered that the intention of the legislature is to confer relief on tenants against unreasonable evictions.