Justice V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar

(K.S. Rajamony)

The best tribute to a retiring Judge will be to hold a mirror to the judgements he has handed down during the tenure of his office and to make an objective assessment of his contribution to juristic thought and the growth of the law. It is difficult to evaluate the contribution of Justice Nambiyar objectively in such close proximity to his retirement. The difficulty is aggravated by the fact that he dominated the judicial stage for 15 years and has delivered innumerable judgements in all branches of law. What is possible is only to select a few of his judgements which are indicative of his judicial attitudes and qualities The present day Indian judges are working under various handicaps. They function in courts overloaded with work, painfully conscious of the mounting arrears. Naturally therefore Judges favour expedition to excellence. Added to this is the lack of adequate research assistance either from Bar Associations or academicians. Notwithstanding these handicaps, Justice Nambiyar kept up a high standard in the quality of his judgments. They were marked by clarity of thought and expression, an elegant and facile style and a rigorous legalistic approach with due reverence for precedents. His judgements contained clear formulation of legal principles without unnecessary digressions. He seldom travelled beyond the framework of the case before him. Judicial restraint and'judicial humility were two of his outstanding virtues. He expounded the law but left reforms to the legislature. In this sense he was not a judicial activist. He was slow in invalidating legislative provisions and wherever possible applied the presumption of constitutional validity of legislative action His attitude was one of deference to the collective wisdom of the Legislature. Many of his judgements recalled what Justice Mathew said in Ambika Mill's case (AIR. 1974 SC. 1300) "Courts have the power to destroy, not to reconstruct." This outlook sometimes gave the impression that he was somewhat conservative and orthodox in his judicial opinions. But an objective review of his judgements reveals that when he was convinced of the ultra" vires nature of a statute or that there was abuse of power, he could come down heavily and strike down the law or quash the administrative action with a pungency of language which could be devastating as in P.K. Kunju's case. His insistence on adherence to procedural formalities, though at times gave the impression that he was over technical in his approach, really arose out of his conviction that procedural laws are meant to be obeyed and constitute the handmaid of justice. For example, he said in a recent decision, "While we are at one with the learned Judge that courts of law are there to do justice, we cannot countenance their breaking the cordon of procedural shackles." (1980 KLT 186).

Francis Manjooran v. Government of Kerala (1965 KLT. 1076 FB) was one of the earliest cases decided by Nambiyar J sitting along .with M. S. Menon, C. J. and Raman Nair J. This was an interesting case where applications filed by some doctors for passports for going abroad to take up employment were rejected by Government of India on the ground that medical talents in the country should not be drained. The law relating to passports at that time was somewhat odd. According to the Passports Act, 1950 no passport was needed for a person to go out of India, but he could not re-enter this country without a passport The question that arose was whether right to travel abroad was part of the 'personal liberty' envisaged in Article 21 which provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. All the three judges unanimously held that the denial of passport offended Article 21. but wrote separate judgements. They vied with one another in expounding the concept of personal " liberty and the ambit and content of Article 21. It has to be remembered "that this important constitutional issue was res Integra then and the Supreme Court had not spoken on the point. MS. Menon CJ's judgement was a brilliant piece of legal literature studded with quotations ranging from Black-stone to Ivor Jennings and a historical survey of the origin and growth of the passport system. Nambiyar J's. concurrent judgement delivered within a few months of his elevation to the Bench, is characterised by his usual felicity of expression and originality of thought. He gave a textbook analysis of Article 21 and the decisions bearing thereon which was reminiscent of the technique he used to adopt as a successful law teacher (The writer was his student in the Madras Law College). He concluded: "Giving the matter my careful consideration I am of the view that the fundamental right to 'personal liberty' in Article 21 includes the right to cross the frontiers and to re enter the country." This proposition was later confirmed by the Supreme Court in Satwant Singh's case (AIR 1967 SC 1836) which again was emphatically reaffirmed in Maneka Gandhi's case (AIR 1978 SC 597). According to Maneka Gandhi, an arbitrary denial of passport can offend not only Article 21 but also other fundamental freedoms like Art. 19 (1) (a) if the object of the applicant for passport is to make a speech abroad or Article 19 (1) (g) where his object in going abroad is to practise a profession or carry on a trade or business.

Justice Nambiyar's judgements on natural justice are particularly noteworthy. In Damodaran Nair v. District Collector (1969 KLT 283) he quashed the Collector's order cancelling a gun licence issued under the Arms Act, 1959 on the ground that the show cause notice itself was illusory in not disclosing the grounds of the proposed action and that the District Collector's conclusion that it was not in the interest of public peace and safety to allow the petitioner to keep the gun, lacked materials. The right to hold a gun on the strength of a licence was held to be a fundamental right to hold property.

Abuse of power by people in high places provoked a scathing judgement from Nambiyar's J. P. K Kunju v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 77). The Division Bench consisting of Nambiyar and Eradi JJ. Quashed an order of Government constituting a Commission of Enquiry to go into certain allegations made on the floor of the Assembly against the then Finance Minister P. K. Kunju. The order was held to be vitiated by malafides and colourable exercise of power. He said that power should be exercised by a public functionary only for the purpose for which it is conferred on him by law. If it is exercised for an unauthorised or oblique purpose, the action will be vitiated. After discussing the evidence regarding malafides, Justice Nambiyar said: "On all the facts and circumstances placed before us we feel that this was a mere ruse to drop the petitioner from the Ministry and that the dominant object of ordering enquiry against him was not to maintain the purity and integrity of administration."

Justice Nambiyar's approach to Natural Justice was however pragmatic and justice-oriented. In cases of disciplinary action against students, he seldom interfered if the procedure adopted by the University satisfied the judicial conscience that a fair opportunity had been afforded to the student to defend himself and justice had been done. For instance, in Jacob Mathew v. Prof., Medical College (1966 KLT 866) the learned Judge held that admitting a previously recorded statement in evidence did not vitiate the enquiry if the student was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

Principal, Engineering College v. John (1979 KLT 686) was a case where disciplinary action was taken by the Principal against a student for ragging. An enquiry was conducted by two professors of the college. Victims of ragging were examined in the presence of a student and were cross-examined by him. The College Council accepted the enquiry report and expelled the student from the college hostel and suspended him till the next semester. The College Council took the decision on the basis of the enquiry report and 'other evidence'.The question was whether this reference to 'other evidence' offended principles of natural justice. There was neither pleading nor proof or any indication in the files to show that the 'other evidence' referred to some undisclosed and secret evidence. The Division Bench consisting of Nambiyar CJ. and Balaganadharan Nair J. held that the enquiry was fair and there was substantial compliance with natural justice. It was held that courts should be slow to interfere with decisions of domestic tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In Hira Nath's case (AIR 1973 SC 1260) where some male students were charged with indecent behaviour towards the inmates of a girls' hostel, the Supreme Court went to the extent of holding that in an enquiry held on such charges, rules of natural justice did not require that the state­ments of girl students should be recorded in the presence of the male students concerned, or that they should be furnished with the report of the enquiry committee. In Madhavan Pillai v. Balan (1979 KLT 220 FB), it was argued that in a case where the management itself was the accuser and prosecutor it was not competent to conduct an enquiry into the misconduct of a private college teacher because the rule of natural justice demanded that no one should be a judge in his own cause. Counsel said that Statute 101(c) of the University should be read down so as to conform to that fundamental principle of natural justice. The Full Bench rejected this contention. Nambiyar CJ. Who delivered the judgment held that if a statutory provision excluded the application of any rule of natural justice the court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature and read into the concerned provision the rule that it so excluded. The importation of the rule of natural justice would lead to evisceration of the very statutory provision. It was laid down in this case that the principle of natural justice that no man shall be a judge in his own cause cannot prevail against an express statutory provision or a consensual term. Similarly in State of Kerala v. M.C. Joseph (1975 KLT. 551) Nambiyar J. held that principles of natural justice cannot avail against an express contractual term entered into by agreement or consensus of the parties providing that Government, one of the contracting parties, could decide for itself the dispute arising from the contract. The same principle was laid down by Nambiyar CJ. in State of Kerala v. Govindan Nair (1980 KLT. 186) where it was held that a clause in a lease agreement conferring power on Government to decide finally the amount due from the lessee was not penal in nature or in terroram.

Nambiyar J. has handed down a number of judgements on Fundamental Rights. The Rice & Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order 1966 defined cultivator as one who actually puts his hand to the plough to the soil. It seemed immaterial whether he had any proprietory or beneficial interest in the land. It meant that even a servant or labourer of an owner of land, could be regarded as cultivator to be dealt with under the provisions of the Order. Nambiyar J. held in Narayana Panikkar v. District Supply Officer (1968 KLT. 223) that the definition was artificial and arbitrary and offended Art. 14 and as the same was inextricably woven throughout the texture of the Levy Order, the entire Order was affected by the vice of the definition. He said: "In the absence of a satisfactory legislative definition of the term, its nuances and limitations are not matters to be supplied by judicial interpretation or judicial ingenuity. Much the less are they to be left to be evolved according to the vagaries of the executive officers entrusted with powers under the Levy Order. This recalls to mind the observation of the Supreme Court in State of A. P. v. Raja Reddy (AIR. 1967 SC. 1458) that "official arbitrariness is more subversive of the doctrine of equality than statutory discrimination."

In Azhakiya Nambiapillai v. State of Kerala (1968 KLT 27) the learned judge quashed an order of Government allowing Co-operative Societies to continue as wholesale distributors under the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 while terminating the appointments of individual distributors as violative of Art. 14. A classification of distributors into Co-operative Societies and other individuals in the matter of termination of their appointments was held to be irrational and not based on intelligible differentia. However Clause 51A of the. Rationing Order which permitted preference to a Co-operative Society in the matter of appointment of distributors was" upheld. A later Division Bench followed this decision in 1976 KLT. 54.

In Krishnan Thangal v. Stale of Kerala (1971 KLT. 948 FB.) Nambiyar J. held that the demand, levy and collection of a tax under the Kerala Land Tax Act 1961 were unauthorised and illegal as no authority had been specified by S. 5 of that Act to levy the tax. But by a majority (M. M. Nair & Nambiyar JJ. concurring and Krishnamoorthy J. dissenting) the constitutional validity of the Act was upheld Nambiyar J. did not subscribe to the proposition that a taxing statute can be condemned as confiscatory on account of the harshness and severity of its provisions. A similar view was taken by him on the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 in Sundaribai v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT. 931) which was affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal. In' Baby George v. State of Kerala (4973 KLT. 1009) appointment of Government Pleaders in the High Court by selection without inviting applications was held not to offend Art. 16.

In Sister Lewina v. Lilly Kurien (1973 KLT. 634) a Division Bench consisting of Nambiyar and Viswanatha Iyer JJ. held that the provision in the University Ordinance 33 providing a right of appeal to the Vice Chancellor against disciplinary action did not violate Art. 30(1). But the Vice Chancellor was held not to have the power to order reinstatement. Nambiyar J. said: "It cannot be said that a subordinate body such as the Syndicate intended to confer so far reaching a power on a statutory tribunal by so furtive a process. This in effect amounts to eviscerating the right of appeal to the Vice Chancellor but the remedy does not lie in our hands." But the Supreme Court took a different view in appeal (1978 KLT. 723) and held that the power to reinstate is incidental to and is implied in the power to hear an appeal. The Supreme Court however struck down Ordinance 33 (4) providing appeal to the Vice Chancellor on the ground that the conferral of such wide powers on the Vice Chancellor amounted in reality to fetter the right of administration under Art. 30 (1).

In the Full Bench decision in Sadanandan v. Raghava Kurup (1974 KLT. 650) the court examined the grounds on which a writ of habeas corpus could issue under Art.226 interfering with parental right over children. Nambiyar J. said relying on AIR. 1964 SC. 1625 that the proceedings are discretionary, a preliminary enquiry is open and that although the writ is of right it does not issue as a matter of course. Refusing the writ in that case to the petitioner who claimed to have married the third respondent and demanded her custody from her parents. Nambiyar J. observed: "In this region, where, at best, we see the picture of a woman subjected to the pulls and pressures of marital (or, may be extra marital) attachment on the one side and parental affection or guidance on the other, taking into due account the rights and responsibilities which nature entrusted to parents in regard to their children, we are not satisfied that any case of illegal detention or custody which calls for redress under Art. 226 stands made out."

Sitting in a Full Bench in Benedict Mar Gregorios v. State of Kerala (1976 KLT 458) Nambiyar J. examined the constitutional validity of the various provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1974.

In Padmanabhan v. State of Kerala (1977 KLT. 916) a Division Bench refused a writ of quo warranto against the appointment of an Additional Advocate General for the State. Nambiyar J. said: "Maybe, such appointments may provoke unseemly scrambles or conflicts or clashes in the discharge of functions. These however are not insurmountable and may be left to resolve themselves by adjustments of human relationship by development of healthy conventions or by delineation by rules and instructions. The provisions of the rules framed under Art. 165 (2) & (3) persuade us to hold that in actual practice it is possible to secure a smooth and harmonious functioning of two incumbents in the same office."

In Mayer Simon v. Advocate General (1975 KLT. 78) a Bench of five judges quashed an order passed by the Advocate General refusing for filing a suit under S. 92 (1) CPC. In agreeing with the conclusion of Govindan Nair CJ. Who wrote the leading judgement, Nambiyar J. in his separate concurring judgment travelled through a different route to reach the same conclusion. He found that the Advocate General's order was so laconic as not to indicate any application of the mind to the considerations to which he was required to bestow attention. He allowed the O. P. on that short ground.

In Pulomaja Devi v. Gopinathan Nair (1975 KLT 111) (FB), the modus operandi of making a selection of magistrates on the basis of Rules 14 and 17 of the KSSR. Which lay down the principle of communal reservation by rotation 5-nd sub-rotation, was examined. Two different modes of working out the principle were reasonable where the selections had to alternate between the merit pool and the reserved quota.Nambiyar and Bhaskaran JJ. held that the mode adopted by the PSC. was the right one to which Chandrasekhara Menon J. dissented. But the judges unanimously held that where two modes are plausible and one of them adopted by PSC, courts should not interfere under Art. 226.

The above judgements are by no means exhaustive of Justice Nambiyar's best judgements. But they indicate with sufficient conviction that Justice Nambiyar was one of the ablest judges of the Kerala High Court and his judgements would well provide an inspiring model for future generation of judges.

CORPSES CANNOT WALK

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

Appearing and disappearing with bewildering rapidity, the facts of the Bhowal sanyasi case (Bibhabati v. Ramendra Narayan- AIR. 1947 P.C. 19) have the disjointed quality of a surrealist movie. It has all the thrills and twists of a fictional whodunit-all the dramatic portents of a melodrama; it is a true life story of mystery, crime, love and adventure. It will seem that a dead man has walked out of his funeral pyre-a sequence which can only be imagined as a product of trite fiction of the class of Marie Corelli’s immortal work ‘Vendetta’. But still that was what really happened on that fateful night at Darjeeling in the year 1909.

Raja Bajendra Narayan Roy, the Zemindar of Bhowal,, one of the largest landed proprietors of East Bengal died on 26-4-1901. The family was regarded as the premier Hindu Zemindar family of Dacca and the annual rent-roll of the estate was about six lakhs of rupees. The Raja was survived by his widow, three sons and three daughters. Ramendra Narayan Roy was his second son.The three sons were mentioned in order of seniority as Bara Kumar, Me jo Kumar and Choto Kumar.

Though born with silver spoons in their mouth, the three Kumars neglected their studies in such a way that though placed under the tutelage of the best educationists; they never got beyond their Bengali and English alphabets. The Kumars were busy otherwise. They were thriving in other fields; at the age of 18, when his father died, Ramendra Narayan-the hero of our story-was a confirmed debauchee visiting prostitutes and haunting low dens of vice. In 1902 he married Bibhabati, a beautiful girl of 13. Even after his marriage, he kept on sowing wild oats and at some date subsequent to 1905 the second Kumar had gummatous ulcers on or about both the elbows and on his legs, being the tertiary stage of syphillis.

Bhibabati had a brother Satya Babu who was studying for law about the year 1908. He was a very cunning man and he proposed to the second Kumar the idea for visit to Darjeeling. Ramendra set out to Darjeeling with a party consisting of Satyababu, his wife Bhibhabati, a retinue of servants and a doctor. Sixteen days after reaching Darjeeling, Ramendra fell ill and on May 8, 1909, he died a little before midnight. The body lay in the house ‘the entire night and was cremated the next morning’. On 10th May, Bhibabati with the rest of the party left Darjeeling for Jaidobpur where shohadher ordinary residence until April 1911, where she left for Calcutta to live there permanently with her mother and brother Satyendra. She began to enjoy her widow’s estate in the undivided one third share of the Bhowal estate, which her husband the second Kumar had owned, and she recovered the proceeds amounting to Rs 30000, of a life policy taken out by the second Kumar, the necessary certificates of death having been provided. By 1919, Bhibabati had received about nineteen lakhs of rupees from the estate. In 1910, the first Kumar died and in 1913 the third Kumar also died, all due to dissipation and fast living. The Bhowal family waspractically extinct. And then things began to happenDecember - 1920: One cold morning in December an unusually lean sanyasi alighted at the usually crowded railway station of Dacca. He was later found sitting on the Buckland Bund on the river. There he sat nightand day, rain or shine, for nearly four months till April 5, 1921. But for a loin cloth, he was naked He had a fairly long beard and his hair fell behind his back, matted into a mass of cords reaching down to his knees, his body besmeared with ashes from head to foot. Buckland Bund was a public walk on the margin of a river where people promenade morning and evening for pleasure or health. All were struck by the close resemblance of this ascetic with the second Kumar of Bhowal. He was later taken to Jaidebpur where all his tenants and his relatives after close scrutiny, deliberation and questioning were finally convinced that he was none other than the second Kumar of Bhowal,-Bhibabati through her brother Satya Babu resisted and maintained that the sanyasi was only a pretender... On April 24, 1930 the second Kumar instituted a suit for declaration that he is Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy, the second son of the late Rajah Narayan Roy of Bhowal and that his possession should be confirmed in respect of the one third share of the properties described in the schedule, or if from the evidence and under the circumstances plaintiff’s possession thereof should not be established,then possession thereof should be given to him. He further asked for injunctions against obstruction to his possession. Bhibabati contested denying inter alia the identity of the plaintiff with Kumar Pamendra Narayan Roy. The rest of the story could be pieced out from the large volume of evidence which was forthcoming in this case. The defence maintained that the second Kumar died shortly before midnight and that the following morning his body was cremated with the usual rites at the new sasan at Darjeeling. The plaintiff admitted that there was a funeral procession and cremation on the morning of 9th of May but maintained that the body so cremated was not of the second Kumar; his case being that the second Kumar was taken for dead at about dusk between seven and eight 0’ clock in the evening of 8th of May, that arrangements were at once made for cremation, that the body was taken in funeral procession to the old sasan and placed in position for cremation, when a violent storm and rain caused the party to take shelter, and that on their return after the rain had abated the body was no longer there, that thereafter another body was procured and was the subject of the procession and cremation, the following morning. The plaintiff’s further case was that while the funeral party were sheltering fr6m the storm, he was found to be still alive by four sanyasis who were nearby and had heard certain sounds from the sasan and who released him and took him away, looked after him and took him with them in their wanderings, that when he had recovered from an unconscious state, he had lost all memory of who he was, where he came from and of past events. Some eleven years later he recalled that he came from Dacca, and that was how he took up a position on Buckland Bund on the margin of the river Buriganga at Dacca.

Before the First additional District Judge of Dacca, the trial lasted for 608 days. 1042 witnesses testified for the second Kumar and 433 for the defence. On 24-8-1936 the Judgment of the court was delivered which ran into 532 foolscap pages-the limit of judicial endurance! T he plaintiff was declared to be the second Kumar and entitled to an undivided one third share in the properties in suit. The appeal from the trial court’s decree was heard by a special bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Costello, Biswas and Lodge JJ. (Lodge J. dissenting) and was dismissed confirming the trial court’s decree. The appeal from the Calcutta High Court to the Privy Council was heard by Lord Thankerton, Lord Du Parcq and Sir Madhavan Nair. Mr. D N. Pritt appeared for the respondent. On 13th of July 1946 Lord Thankerton advised his majesty that the decision of the High Court should be affirmed.

Strangely enough on 3-8-1946 four days after the Privy Council judgment, the second Kumar died at Calcutta. There was a funeral procession; there was a funeral pyre; there was cremation; and it really did rain on that day. But on that fateful day he could never walk out of the funeral pyre as he did previously; and no sanyasi came to his rescue. Corpses cannot walk.

The flames of the pyre became longer than long and with one violent crackle of the skull, the curtain was finally rung down on one of the strangest sagas of human history once more flaunting the fact that truth is always stranger than fiction.

Judicial Over - Speed

(T.P.K. Nambiar, B.A.,M.L., Advocate, High Court, Ernakulam)

"Justice delayed is justice denied". "Justice hurried is justice buried". In between the two lies dispensation of true justice. "Justice is sweetest when it is freshest". "Justice hustled is justice muzzled." In between the two lies the correct administration of justice. I should think no explanation is necessary to elaborate the obvious.

Speedy justice is desirable; but speed is not synonimous with hurry. Speed is brother to despatch. But hurry is twin-brother to haste. It was truly said by Charles Caleb Colton that no two things differ more than hurry and despatch; hurry is the mark of a weak mind; despatch of a strong one. Nothing is more vulgar than haste. Benjamin Franklin realised that great haste makes great waste. Moliere put the same idea in a different form: "Unreasonable haste is the direct road to error". And over-speed is unreasonable haste.

It is very much in the news these days that the Hon'ble High Court has issued administrative instructions to the subordinate courts to do speedy justice, The subordinate courts are directed to do devotion to what is called, the 'list system'. Why, there is a judicial pronouncement on this aspect. His Lordship Mr. Justice Khalid has observed in Antony v. Rita (1980 KLT. 203): "The subordinate judiciary has to dispose of cases in accordance with the directions of the High Court. There is a list system prevalent in this State for the subordinate judiciary to adhere to. If appeals listed for hearing are not disposed of in time, the judge will have to offer explanation to its higher authorities; if the explanation is unsatisfactory he can incur their wrath also". (Of course, on the facts of that case, His Lordship found that sufficient indulgence was shown by the learned subordinate judge to the appellant's counsel to prepare and argue the case and therefore there was no impropriety in what the learned subordinate judge had done)

But the very same learned Judge (Justice Khalid) had occasion to come across another case in which a learned District Judge had shown great haste in disposing of two appeals before him. His Lordship observed (in the judgment in SA. No. 1029 of 1979): "The common judgment is highly unsatisfactory. The judgment does not contain the statement of facts; the point for consideration; nor a discussion about the points that fell for consideration with the learned judge". The appeals had been dismissed by the learned District Judge saying that "there is a lot of confusion". His Lordship Mr. Justice Khalid observed: "It is the duty of the appellate court to resolve the confusion and dispute with the aid and assistance of the counsel appearing before it. This duty has not been discharged by the court below". The judgments and decrees of the learned District Judge were set aside and the appeals were remitted back to him for fresh disposal after considering all the points at issue between the parties. This was directed to be done on or before a particular date. The appeals went back. The learned District Judge disposed them of by remanding the suits to the trial court. This was of course done within the time stipulated! Therefore the result of the hasty disposal of two appeals by the learned District Judge was, two Second Appeals before the Hon’ble High Court, two remanded first appeals before the learned District Judge and two suits before the trial court. And the parties to the proceedings stand where they were at the start of the litigation. "Quickly got, Quickly lost", as the Yiddish Proverb goes.

The present writer could supply more illustrations of such disposals in the name of the 'list system'. A commissioner reported that the property involved in a suit for injunction was in the possession of the defendant. There-Tore the plaintiff filed an application for amendment of the plaint seeking relief of recovery of possession on title. A learned Munsiff dismissed the application; and one of the grounds for such dismissal was, (as boldly and specifically stated in the order), that he had directions from the learned District Judge to dispose of the suit itself within a specific date and if the amendment were to be allowed he would not be able to comply with the directions. He was afraid he would incur the wrath of the learned District Judge!

One of my advocate friends told me the other day only that he had fallen ill on the day of the posting of a particular appeal in which he was appearing for the appellant before a subordinate court; he filed an application for adjournment supported by a medical certificate. The application was rejected and the appeal was dismissed for default, for the appeal was a listed one and the learned subordinate judge possibly thought that if the appeal "listed for hearing is not disposed of in time, he will have to offer explanations to his higher authorities; and if the explanation is unsatisfactory he would incur their wrath also".

Mr. Justice V. Ramaswamy of the Madras High Court is reported to have said that "the problem of delay; in the disposal of cases and the piling of arrears in courts could be solved to some extent by instituting a prize scheme or by giving out-of-turn promotions or advance increments to those judicial officers who disposed of maximum number of cases". (See 'The Hindu', dated 28—5—1980). Judicial officers would vie with each other for bagging the prize or promotion or increments by disposing of cases in the manner illustrated above.

It is well to remember with Koran : "Haste is of the devil". The path of judicial driving is not even. There are procedural humps, bumps, crossroads, culverts and hair-pin bends on the way. Therefore drive carefully; be steady; avoid mishaps and save time; and reach the destination sure and safe.

"Slow and steady wins the race", is the great lesson taught by the story of the hare and the tortoise.

It is not the number of cases disposed of that matters. It is the manner of disposal that is significant. Justice speaks not through statistics, but through satisfaction. Statistics and justice are strange brothers; they are frequently not even on speaking terms.

RETIREMENT OF MR. JUSTICE G. KUMARA PILLAI

In the retirement of Mr. Justice Kumara Pillai, the judiciary of Kerala loses one of its distinguished and most popular Judges. Endowed with deep legal learning and high judicial qualities, he was discharging his duties conscientiously with independence and considerable credit unswayed by personalities and unaffected by public opinion. His judgment of men and matters was sound and shrewd. His talents and erudition are borne out by his numerous judgments on all branches of law without distinction. As a Judge he marked himself with independent and clear thinking and clarity of vision. His incisiveness of intellect helped him to grasp easily and quickly, any complicated case whether civil, criminal, or revenue. He was a fine gentleman in every sense of the term. He possessed in abundant measure affable and amiable manners, and a lovable nature. Always cheerful and serene he was by nature simple and sociable. In his personal manners he was most unassuming and he endeared himself to everyone with wdiom he came into contact by his dignity, nobility of bearing and lively conversation. He was zealous to maintain the dignity of the Bar and to promote its interests. His services, as Chairman of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Member of Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chairman of Parlia­mentary Election Tribunal and as Commission of Enquiry on many occasions, have been valuable and laudable to the appreciation of all. He carries with him the ..esteem, affection, respect and unstinted appreciation of the Bar and the public. We wish him all happiness, health and prosperity.