LATE SRI. JOSEPH THALIATH

It is with profound sorrow that we have to record here the passing away of Sri. Joseph Thaliath on 14th January 1959. As a Judge of the Cochin Chief Court and later as Judge and Chief Justice of the Travancore High Court, Mr. Joseph Thaliath has earned a name for integrity, independence and impartiality. Endowed with the most affable manners and a most equable temperament he has been discharging his onerous duties to the admiration and satisfaction of all. Throughout his long tenure of office he has never been known at any time to have either lost his temper or said anything harsh to anybody. In his personal manners he was most unassuming and simple. The bar had universal esteem and regard for him and his respect for the Bar was very high. We tender to the members of his bereaved family our heartfelt sympathies and condolences in their distress. May God bless his Soul?

Retirement of Mr. K. T. Koshi, Chief Justice

Mr. K. T. Koshi, Chief Justice has retired from service after a continued and valuable service as a great Judge. His work as a Judge of the High Courts of Cochin & Travancore-Cochin and as the Chief Justice of Travancore-Cochin and Kerala High Courts, has produced absolute satisfaction and unstinted appreciation to the legal profession and the public and has brought for him a reputation as one of the most brilliant, learned and erudite Judges. The Law Reports bear ample testimony for his-deep learning and thoroughness. He has built up a body of case-law which has enriched our jurisprudence.

He started practice in 1921 at Ernakulum and within a short time he rose to eminence in the galaxy of legal luminaries of the erstwhile Cochin State, by dint of his industry, intellect and advocacy. He continued his hard work and perseverance in a greater degree after he became a Judge. In the midst of his studying the cases and scrutinizing the various files he was having his detailed researches in the Law Reports making himself thorough and up-to-date. He possessed judicial talents of a high order. He brought to bear on every question a strong common sense and a generous humanity which won for him the respect and confidence of the profession and the general public. His alertness of mind, his quick grasp of points, his intolerance of verbiage, his love of precision and his anxiety to do justice are his admirable personal qualities. His judgments besides evincing wealth of legal learning and scholarship have a refreshing originality about them, born no doubt of his unique mastery of the classics. He was as much at ease in the intricacies of the constitutional law, toughness of commercial law, dry details of an account suit, bewildering uncertainties of the boundaries of a cherikal, the peculiar principles of Marumakkathayam Law, or the anxious aspects of a criminal case as in the facts of an ordinary promissory note suit.

In bidding you respectful farewell, we convey to you our best wishes for a long life, prosperity and happiness. May God bless you with health and energy enough to enable you to render still more useful services?

Hon’ble The Chief Justice Mr. K. Sankaran

It gives us great pleasure to offer our sincere and respectful felicitations and, good wishes to Mr. Justice Sankaran on his appointment as the, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court. We are sure he is eminently qualified for this high office by reason of his long experience as a Judge of fearless independence, exceptional integrity and absolute impartiality.

He was born on 18-8-1075 M.E. After a brilliant academic career he set up practice at Quilon and later on at Trivandrum. He was appointed as an Additional District Judge on 2-12-1111. For a short period he had his services as. a Government Secretary. On 13-11-1116 he was appointed as a District Judge and on 31-12-1121 he was elevated to the High Court of Travancore. He was continuing as a High Court Judge from that date on words in the midst of the vast changes the State had undergone. In 1958 he had his services as the Acting Chief Justice of Kerala.

We have absolutely no doubt that his elevation to a higher office of responsibility will be hailed with complete satisfaction by the Bar and the public. His work as a Judge has always been distinguished. His judgments dealing with many a difficult and intricate questions have been remarkable for their clarity of expression and lucidity of thought. Unswayed by personalities and unaffected by public opinion he was discharging his duties conscientiously to the appreciation of all. In his personal manners he was most unassuming, simple and humble.

He richly deserves the high office that has been conferred on him and we are sure in discharging his duties as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court he will uphold the high traditions of the High Court and maintain the independence and supremacy of the judiciary and the res­pect for the Bar. We express our sincere and best wishes to him for a long and healthy life and a glorious career in his new office.

Year in Retrospect — 1979

(K.S. Rajamony)

Constitutional & Administrative Law

R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority (AIR. 1979 SC. 1628) marks a significant step in the march of Indian Administrative Law and is of major jurisprudential importance as was Royappa (AIR. 1974 SC. 555) of 1974 and Maneka Gaadhi (AIR. 1978 SC. 597) of 1978. The primary focus of the case is in reaffirming the rule that all authorities coming within the definition of "State" under Art. 12 are subject to the same constitutional or public law limitations as Government. No corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of Government can exercise its power arbitrarily when dealing with the public, whether in the matter of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise. Its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance and must be nondiscriminatory. In reaffirming the above rule, the court also explores the nature and status of public corporations and their evolution as the "third arm of the Government". In Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohanlal (AIR. 1967 SC. 1857) two tests had been laid down for identifying an 'authority' as State. They were (1) whether it has been invested with statutory power to issue binding directions to third parties, the dibedience of which would entail penal consequence or (2) whether it has the sovereign power to make rules and regulations having, the force of law. These tests were followed by Ray C. J. in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram (AIR 1975 SC. 1331). Mathew J. however in the same case propounded a broader test, viz. whether the statutory corporation or other body or authority is an instrumentality or agency of Government. In the present case the Supreme Court accepts the tests laid down in Rajasthan Electricity Board case, but adopts the test of governmental instrumentality or agency as an additional test. While thus expanding the frontiers of the concept of'State', the court removes the misunderstanding resulting from decisions suchas the Praga Tool Corporation (AIR. 1969 SC. 1306) and Sabhajit Tawari (AIR. 1975 SC. 1329) to the effect that companies and socieities are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The impression created by the above line of cases was that, anon-statutory body is not an 'authority'whatever be the extent of governmental control over it and conversely, a statutory body is an 'authority', governmental control over it being irrelevant. These clouds have now been cleared. Hereafter the test will be whether they are governmental instrumentalities or agencies, for determining which the cumulative effect of a number of criteria has to be examined; some of them are, whether any assistance financial or otherwise is given by the State and if so its nature and magnitude, whether there is any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and if so its nature and extent, whether the corporation enjoys State conferred or State protected monopoly status and whether the corporation is carrying out public functions closely related to Governmental functions. This decision which helps to evolve a new jurisprudence around public corporations is a welcome trend in the progress of public law, though the entire discussion is by way of obiter.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel has once again found its most eloquent exposition in M. P. Sugar Mills v. State of U. P. (AIR. 1979 SC 621) after the Indo-Afghan Agencies case (AIR. 1968 SC. 718). On the basis of a statement made by the Secretary in the Industries Department of U. P. Government, a news item appeared in thepress to the effect that Government had decided to give exemption from sales tax for a period of three years to all new industrial units in the State. The appellant, relying on the representation of government borrowed moneys from various financial institutions, purchased plant and machinery and set up a Vanaspathi factory at Cawnpore. A Bench consisting of Bhagwati and Tulza-purkar JJ. held that the Government was bound on the principle of promissory estoppel to make good the representation made by it. In both the cases mentioned above Government was held bound to honour its informal assurances if a citizen had acted to his detriment by relying on them. Nay, it is not necessary that the promisee should suffer any detriment at all; it is enough if he has altered his position in reliance on the promise. In an excellent thesis on this expanding doctrine, Bhagwati J said that it is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice and "there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence." There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity," In this respect the court differed from the English rule that it can only be a shield and not a sword. The defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. Four earlier decisions of the Supreme Court by larger benches where a contrary trend was indicated, were distinguished with the concluding observation that "there Is no authoritative decision of the Supreme Court which has departed from the Indo-Afghan Agencies Case." This case may raise the interesting question as to what would be the position if a smaller Bench of the Supreme Court differs from a larger Bench. The Supreme Court said in State ofU. P. v. Ramachandra Trivedi (AIR. 1976 SC. 2547) [1]: "Even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller Benches of this Court it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger Benches. The proper course for a High Court in such a case is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger Benches of Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by smaller Benches of the court which practice hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by the Supreme Court itself."

State of Kerala v. T P. Roshana (AIR. 1979 SC. 765)is an interesting illustration of judicial activism on the part of the Supreme Court. After striking down the scheme of admission to the Medical colleges, the court did not sit back leaving it to the helpless government to solve the consequential crisis. The result of the declaration of invalidity of the concerned G. O. would have been to throw out a number of students already undergoing their course. The court came to their rescue and persuaded the Calicut and Kerala Universities, the Indian Medical Council and Government of Kerala to increase the number of seats so that 30 more students from the colleges affiliated to the Calicut University could be admitted to the medical colleges in the State. Apart from demonstrating the dynamics of writ jurisdiction and the ultimate purpose of the judicial process, Krishna Iyer J. explained how the vagarious element in the valuation of answer papers though factually true, was too marginal to be violative of Art 14. Current conditions in Kerala were considered by the court as justifying the classification of the student community on zonal basis for the purpose of admission to medicial colleges. The court did not find any substantial differentiation between the Kerala and Calicut Universities in regard to the awarding of marks or syllabi or examination methodology for the pre-Degree or degree course. As per the impugned Government order the seats available for MBBS were distributed among the students of the two universities in the ratio of the candidases registered for the pre-Dgree and B. Sc. course in the two universities, taking the average for the previous three years.The Supreme Court agreed with the Kerala High Court that this was discriminatory. There was no nexus between the registered students'strength and the seats to be allotted.

Manohar v. Marotrao (AIR. 1979 SC. 1084) brings into focus the clash between what may be termed as the modern purposive approach and the traditional literal approach in the matter of interpretation of statutes. By a majority, it was held that where an LIC employee contested a municipal election successfully without obtaining the permission of the LIC Chairman the election was not rendered void or illegal. Krishna Iyer J said, "The strictly literal may be not often be logical if the context indicates a contrary legislative intent. A policy oriented understanding of a legal provision which does not do violence to the text or the context gains preference as against a narrow reading of the words used."

The golden rule in the construction of statutes appears to be, whenever there is a choice, choose the meaning which accords with reason and justice. Thus a division bench of the Kerala High Court (Eradi and Narendran JJ.) in Eapen v. Union of India (1979 KLT. 861) quashed an order passed by the P & T Department superannuating a telephone-technician five years before the due date. An error which had crept into the school record happened to be reproduced in the employee's service record also. His request for correction of the date of birth in the service record was declined on the ground that Fundamental Rule 56, Note 5, permitted correction only "if it is established that a bonafide clerical mistake has been committed in recording the date of birth in the service book". Faced with the glaring injustice, Eradi J. observed that in interpreting the rule "the attitude should not be one of wooden rigidity but should be one susceptible of sufficient flexibility so as to meet out justice in truly deserving cases".

One of the most significant contributions of the Supreme Court during 1979 is its restoring basic human rights to convicts and undertrial prisoners. Speedy trial has been held to be an essential and integral part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. A large number of undertrial prisoners languishing in the jails of Bihar for periods longer than what they would have been sentenced to suffer if found guilty, were ordered to be released. In Hussainra Khatoon (AIR. 1979 SC. 1360) Bhagawati J. said that courts must abandon the antiquated concept under which pretrial release is ordered only against bail with sureties. The accused must as far as possible be released on his personal bond the amount of which should not be excessive. Pathak J. said that there is an urgent need for a clear provision in the Crl.PC. enabling the release in appropriate cases of an undertrial prisoner on his own bond without sureties and without any monetary obligation. Alerting the Bihar judiciary of its responsibility to protect human liberty, Bhagawati J. said in Hussainara Khatoon (AIR. 1979 SC 1369) "the judiciary in the State of Bihar also cannot escape its share of blame because it could not have been unaware of the fact that thousands of undertrial prisoners are languishing in jail awaiting trial which never seems to commence". It was also held that free legal service is an essential ingredient of the guarantee of Art. 21. Two more cases in these series laying down the same principles are reported in AIR. 1979 SC 1377 & 1819. It is quite possible that what happens in Bihar happens in the other States as well and calls for immediate enquiry by the Government, judiciary and leaders of public opinion.

By far the most outstanding contribution of the Supreme Court to constitutional law during the year is In Re the Special Courts Bill, 1978 (AIR. 1979 SC 478).The question referred by the President to SC was "whether the Bill or any of the provisions thereof if enacted would be constitutionally invalid?". It was held that offences alleged to have been committed during the period of Emergency constitute a class by themselves and so do the persons who are alleged to have utilized the high public or political offices held by them as a cover or opportunity for committing those offences. The object of the bill is to ensure a speedy trial. The classification is founded on an intelligible differentia and has a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved. However the ante-dating of the Emergency from June 25 to February 27, 1975 was declared unscientific and irrational. The classification was held invalid in so far as it covered offences committed before 25th June 1975, Clause 4(2) providing that Government's declaration regarding the offences to be dealt with under the Act shall not be called in question in any court, was held to be invalid. "The declaration will be open to judicial review. In a Government of laws there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability".

In AIR. 1979 SC 429, it has been held that if the service of a temporary Government servant is terminated arbitrarily and without any reason whatsoever and employees junior to him are retained in service, the termination is illegal and violates Arts. 14 & 16. J978 KLT. 605 (FB) has to be reconsidered in the light of this decision. 1977 KLT. 362 now stands restored.

Art. 311 (2) is not attracted where the order of termination is not by way of punishment, but is a termination simpliciter of the service of a temporary Government servant. A complaint against the person can be taken into account for the purpose of considering the suitability of the employee. It was merely a motive and not the foundation of the order. AIR 1979 SC. 684.

In Karunanidihi v. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 898) the SC. laid down when two statutes can be said to be repugnant to one another. The Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1974 is not repugnant to the IPC. or the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was also held that a Chief Minister is a Public Servant Under S. 21 of IPC.

The provisions in the Indian Foreign Service (Conduct and Discipline) Rules 1961 requiring a female employee to obtain permission of Government in writing before her marriage and denying right to be appointed on the ground that candidate is a married woman are discriminatory against Women and offend Articles 14,15 and 16. 1979 SC. 1868; Rule 12 (iii) of the Kerala Education Rules banning admission of girls to boys schools violates Art. 30.(1). The rule therefore was held inapplicable to minority schools. 1979 SC. 83; The rule of construction is firmly established that retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation. If the enactment is expressed in a language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only. 1979 SC 592; A trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a different court cannot ipso facto be held to offend Art 20 (1). No accused has a fundamental right to trial by a parti­cular court or procedure. S. 5 (3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 provides a rule of presumption of guilt. The accused was charged with the commission of an offence under the Act when S. 5 (3)-was in existence. This section was repealed by an amending Act of 1964, but re-introduced by another amending Act of. 1967. The result was that S. 5 (3) revived and the presumption could be applied in the trial of the accused. There is no violation of Art. 20 (1). AIR 1979 SC. 692; The power of review inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors. High Court has power to review its orders under Art. 226. But the power cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits which is the province of a court of appeal 1979 SC 1047; In District Registrar, Palghat v. Koyakutty, (AIR. 1979 SC 1060) a person became Lower Division Clerk as a result of exemption from qualification granted by the Madras Government. After the States Reorganisation, the Kerala Government issued an order that all such persons should pass a test for further promotion as Upper Division Clerk. The SC held that the Government order violated Rule 28 (b) (ii) of the KSSR. The court further said that the Kerala High Court was justified in giving a positive direction to Government to promote the employee. AIR. 1979 SC. 1060. Adverse remarks in confidential report cannot be acted upon to deny promotion unless they are communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the remark Such an opportunity is not an empty formality. The selection committee should give reasons for superseding any member of the State Civil Service for promotion to IAS. "Rubber-stamp" reasons are not enough. "Officer not found suitable" is the conclusion and not a reason in support of the decision to supersede him" 1979 SC 1622. The words "regular" or "regularisation" do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. 1979 SC 1676; The absence of a right to appeal in the statute does not spell arbitrariness. Giving reasons for conclusions is ordinarily an important component of natural justice in quasi-judicial tribunals. 1979 SC 1803; A train lighting inspector was appointed by the Chief Electrical Engineer. Subsequently the power of appointment to that category was delegated to the Asst. Electrical Engineer who removed the employee from service. The removal was held illegal as offending Art. 311(1). 1979 SC 1912; A former member of the Public Service Commission can be validly appointed as Governor of a State, because the office of Governor is not an employment under government and it does not therefore come within the proibition of Article 319 (d). AIR. 1979 SC 1109.

In 1979 KLT 845 Kochu Thommen J. points out that the distinction between jurisdictional errors (in the Anisminic sense) and errors within juris­diction which is the criterion for distinguishing a void order from a voidable order is so fine that it has reached almost the vanishing point. An order may be void ab-initio. But it continues to operate until its invalidity is declared by court. Until then a void order is only voidable and the person against whom it made is bound by the consequence flowing from it. In this view the learned Judge declined to quash an order imposing penalty for non-payment of sales tax on the ground that the levy of sales tax itself was null and void. It is true that the distinction between void and voidable orders is considerably blurred by recent English decisions. However, the question whether an illegal administrative order is void or voidable may not be capable of an answer in the abstract. The question may have to be solved in concrete cases taking into account the type of interest involved and the person against whom the order is sought to be enforced. In 1979 KLT. 220 (FB.) it is held that a private college, though affiliated to the University, is not a statutory body nor has the teacher statutory status. Therefore a writ will not lie. Akhileswara Iyer's case (1959 KLT. 816) was over-ruled. It was also held that the principle that 'no man shall be judge in his own cause' cannot prevail against an express statutory provision or a consensual term. In 1979 KLT. 286 the meaning and content of 'seniority-cum-fitness' was discussed by Gopalan Nambiyar CJ. An element of assessment of suitability is involved in deciding seniority-cum-fitness. The employee's service record is certainly an element to be taken into account.

In 1979 KLT. 350, a Bench of five judges declared the Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1971 as unconstitutional and void. In a scholarly judgment, Eradi J. discussed the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights enshrined in Arts. 25 & 26 and the extent to which State Regulation can abrridge them. Any law which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other secular authority would violate Art. 26(d). It is not open to restrict the performance of religious rites and ceremonies under the guise of regulating the administration of the trust estate. Unguided power of nominating the managing committee, arbitrary power of alienation of Devaswom properties, the confirment of extraordinary powers on the Administrator and power to appoint a non-Hindu, vesting the administration and control over the funds in State Government, denial of right to approach the civil court were all held violative of Arts. 25 & 26.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Foot Note:-

1.What happens if the larger bench is divided, say 6: 5 and the smaller Bench of 7 judges is unanimous?

x          x          x

Civil Law

The controversial Lizzy v. Kuttan (1976 KLT 571 FB) found its Waterloo at last in the five judges' decision in Kesava Bhatt v. Subraya Bhat (1979 KLT 766). It was held by the larger Bench that (a) in a suit for injunction, no question of the rights of a tenant arises and reference to Land Tribunal is not necessary; (b) the mere incorporation of an unnecessary or irrelevant plea of tenancy in the written statement cannot attract the bar of S. 125 (3). The question of tenancy must arise for consideratian; (c) if a question of tenancy arose, the civil court decree without reference to the tribunal would be without jurisdiction and hence null and void; (d) a matter which had become res judicata cannot be said to "arise". Lizzy v. Kuttan however, still haunts judicial thinking on the KLR Act. See for eg. Chinna Amma v. Sarojini Amma [1] where Poti J. expressed the opinion that Lizzy v. Kuttan did not say anything different from Kesava Bhat.

Without deviating from the ratio of the Division Bench decision in 1976 KLT 870, Viswanatha Iyer J held that a revision under S. 103 of the KLR. Act will lie to the High Court against an order of the Appellate Authority upholding the plea of tenancy and sending back the case for passing a formal order under S. 72F. Such an order of the Appellate Authority is a final order amenable to revision. This decision has obviated the needless and empty formality of going through the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority in a farcical second round to enable the High Court to adjudicate the question of tenancy in revision. 1979 KLT. 910; When the Nair Act was repealed on 1—12—1976 by Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975, pending proceedings continue to be governed by the Nair Act,—1979 KLT. 810 [2]. There is no impediment or bar against an appellate court permitting amendment of pleadings so as to enable a party to raise a new plea. If the necessary material for the plea is already there, the amendment may be more readily granted, but there is no prohibition against permitting amendment at the appellate stage merely because the necessary material is not already before the court. AIR. 1979 SC. 551; The statutory right of pre-emption though not amounting to an interest in the land is a right which attaches to the land and which can be enforced against a purchaser by the person entitled to pre-empt. Where the pre-emptor-decree holder sold the property, the vendee is entitled to execute the decree under S. 146 even without an assignment of the decree. AIR. 1979 SC 1066;

Continued

In a suit to enforce a guarantee bond which is a continuing guarantee, so long as the account is a live account in the sense that it is not settled and there is no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out the obligation, limitation does not commence running. Limitation would only run from the date of breach, AIR. 1979 SC. 102; Application for reference was not made to the Collector within the time prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector however made the reference without expressing any opinion as to whether the application was time barred or not. The Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the prescribed period and if it was so, decline to answer reference, AIR. 1979 SC. 404; Where in a contract between the State and a contractor, the stipulated period was twelve months, but power was conferred on the Executive Engineer to grant extension of time and for levying penalty for delay, time cannot be considered to be of the essence of the contract and the rescision of such a contract by the State without fixing a further period making time the essence is illegal and the security deposit of the contractor cannot be forfeited, AIR. 1979 SC. 720. Mathew v. TLB (1979 KLT 601 SC) [3] settles some controversies arising from the ceiling provisions of the KLR Act; (a) Affirming 1976 KLT 632, it was held that lands converted into plantations between 1-4-1964 and 1-1-1970 do not qualify for exemption under S. 81(l)(e); (b) It is not permissible for the Taluk Land Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal under S. 72-K(1) merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation of evidence or that it suffers from procedural errors. But the Board can examine whether the certificate is inaccurate on its face or has been obtained by fraud or collusion, 1976 KLT 716 overruled; (c) Affirming 1977 KLT 64, SC. held that S. 84 (3) is retrospective. It invalidates voluntary transfers made after 15-9-1963 with reference to the ceiling area fixed by the Amending Act 35 of 69. 1977 KLT 64 affirmed; (d) Child in the womb on 1-1-1970 is not a member of family for the purpose of S. 82(1)(c); (e) Unmarried daughters attaining majority before 1-1-1970 are not entitled to the benefit of 6 acres under S. 82(1) in the absence of any share under personal law; (f) TLB can revise its order on receipt of additional reports from Collector; (g) Transfers such as gifts made after 1-1-70 have to be ignored even if they are of the excepted variety mentioned in S. 84.

A seven judges Bench of the SC. has reaffirmed that notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act is not necessary under any State Rent Control Act to get an order of eviction. AIR 1979 SC. 1745.

As a rule, mere proof that an event has happened or an accident has occurred, the cause of which is unknown, is not evidence of negligence. But the peculiar circumstances constituting the event or accident, in a particular case, may themselves proclaim in concordant, clear and unambiguous voices the negligence of somebody as the cause of the event or accident. It is to such cases that the maxim res ipsa loquitur may apply, if the cause of the accident is unknown and no reasonable explanation as to the cause is coming forth from the defendant, AIR 1979 SC. 1848.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Foot Note:-

1.A.S. No. 18 of 1976 decided on 21—12—79 by Poti. Janaki Amma JJ.

2.But does Act 30 of 1976 repeal the Nair Act in its entirety; See for a critical com­ment, 1979 KLT. (Journal) 41.

3.This case is reported in AIR 1979 SC 1573 as C. Veetil Ammad V. Taluk Land Board.

Foot Notes:-

1.Currie, Brainerd, "The Materials of Law Study," 3 Journal of Legal Education 331 (1951)

2.Warren, Charles, "History of the Harvard Law School." (1908).

3.Packer, Herbert L. and Ehrlich, Thomas, New Directions in Legal Education, (A Report for the Carnegie Commision on Higher Education, 1972) p. 259.

4.Stolz. Preble, "Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921): A Contemporary Review", reprinted in the appendix of Packer and Ehrlich, Ibid at 227, which gives an outstanding description of American legal education's development.

5.Meyers, Charles J., '-Education of Present and Future Lawyers," in Law and the American Future (ed. Schwartz, Murray L., 1976) p. 179.

6.For literature of legal issues raised during this period in the area of poverty law. see ten Broek, Jacobus, ed., The Law of the Poor (1966), first printed and published in California Law Review 54, May 1966. On the right to counsel issue in criminal cases, see Lewis, Anthony, Gideon's Trumpet (1964).

7.These additional areas of legal expertise often forced many law schools to employ new instructors who specialized in these fields; at first many taught only part-time, which is the exception rather than the rule in most American law schools, and later these instructors developed into full-time academic colleagues.

8.In the rarest of circumstances, given the number of applicants to law schools in America, will the admissions officers even consider an applicant without a Bachelor's degree; however, exceptions might occur if there are the most unusual of situations presented—none of which struck me when I was handling admissions at the law school (Boalt Hall). Note that this paragraph describing the view of a possible candidate by a law school is a slight paraphrase of the 1976/77 Harvard Law School Catalog, p. 19, but represents the predominant view in America.

9.Not all schools follow these four criteria (LSAT, grades, recommendations, and personal statement), some ignoring one or the other, and each giving different weight to each criteria. In short, there is no uniformity in the admissions process in the United States.

10.Many students, for economic or other rearons, often attend extremely inexpensive (but less prestigious than universities) community colleges for the first two years of undergraduate work, and thus such a rule placing greater stress on the last two years (after these students have transferred to a four year college or university) does not work as a disadvantage to them.

11.Such rare instances are fully reported when discovered, much to the chagrin of schools and students alike. See April 23, 1978 New York Times. 1:5,

12.May 17, 1977, New York Times, 1:5 and 55:1.

13.State Bar Associations have recently begun investigating and setting up different forms of pre-paid legal service plans, and the American Bar Association has sponsored several pilot programs. A recent Amendment to our National Labor Relations Act has included pre-paid legal services as a possible item in collective bargaining. However, there may be anti-trust problems for such pre-paid plans which fix legal fees if the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Group Life and Health Insurance Company v. Royal Drug Company, (77-952) U.S. (1979), is any indication.

14.May 18, 1977, New York Times, 1:3

15.May 28, 1977, New York Times, 1:1.

16.June 28, 1977, New York Times, 1:5 and 14:5.

17.An American Bar Association survey reported in the New York Times of May 17, 1977 (1:5) showed that over two-thirds of all Americans had never used a lawyer or only used one once, and thus most citizens have little if any information on which lawyer to employ. See also 65 American Bar Association Journal 543 (April 1979).

18.65 American Bar Association Journal 548 (April 1979) has two articles, one entitled '"Legal services offered in New York department store," the other "Sears and Wards weighing legal clinics."

19.Packer & Ehrlich, supra, at 37. (See footnote 3).

20.See May 15, 1979, New York Times, III, 1:1.

21.May 17, 1978, New York Times, II, 24:1.

22.For the response of legal educators and academicians interested in the continuance of special admissions programs, see XVIII, Number 17 (July 2, 1979) of the Chronicle of Higher Education.