By David S. Averbuck
Recent Developments in Legal Education in America: The Process of Growth and Redefinition
(David S. Averbuck)
(B.A. 1964, University of California, Berkeley; J. D. 1967, University of California Boalt Hall School of Law, Berkeley; Lecturer, University of California, Berkeley, School of Social Welfare (on leave); Visiting Fulbright Professor of Law, Calcutta University College of Law (1979-80)).
During the past decade, law schools in the United States have made monumental changes in their admissions, policies and programs and in turn have begun innovative and imaginative alterations in their curricula. Both phenomena are interrelated and find their common impetus from the social movements of the 1960's which predominated American academic, domestic and judicial life. It is the purpose of this paper to highlight the recent developments in admissions over the past 15 years and to focus on the areas and problems which lay ahead for law schools in the United States.
Brief History
The beginning of legal education at American universities occurred when Thomas Jefferson created a professorship of law at William and Mary College in 1779.[1] Two generations later, in 1817, the Harvard Law School was established and is now the oldest existing law school in the United States. [2] From 1800, when there were 69 law schools in our small country, a steady growth occurred and the number of institutions offering degrees in law expanded until by 1925 they totalled 168. [3] That number has remained fairly constant, although the size and diversity of these educational institutions have changed dramatically.
In 1921, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching published Alfred Z. Reed's Training for the Public Profession of the Law, and it is this lengthy document which one might refer to for a more comprehensive study of the history of legal education in the United States. As Professor Preble Stolz [4] has pointed out, it was during Reed's time that the basic three year graudate program of law was institutionalized in America, that a minimum of two years of undergraduate work had to be completed before admission to law school (now it is almost uniformly required that a Bachelor's degree roust first be completed), that the American Bar Association declared that only in law school could one get an adequate legal education, and that law schools would be subject to an accreditation procedure. Thus, the legal profession strongly placed its hand on the legal education system of our country, and continues to maintain its influence in this day.
Law schools, like medical schools, have until recently limited the number of students who would eventually enter the profession—limited this number on criteria other than the needs of society. Our legal education institutions catered primarily to white middle class and upper class male graduates who usually were to enter corporate and commercial practice. Other than in the area of criminal law, the emphasis at most law schools neglected the social problems of the racial minorities in America, the poor, the environment, and civil rights. While debate over change in the schools became common place after World War II, little action in fact was taken to remedy the inadequacies of our programs. [5]
The 1960's were the turning point for legal education in America, and the forces which altered its character were as diverse as the changes which were to come. First, the country had its first President born in this century, John F. Kennedy, whose "New Frontier" encouraged social action—most noteworthy being the development of the Peace Corps, which was to be the breeding grounds for many future socially conscious law students. Political programs such as the "New Frontier" are often short-lived in our society, capturingthe dreams of a generation and then failing to meet sufficiently its aspirations. But the assassination of the President not only shocked our nation, it committed us to fulfill what was perceived as his dreams of social change; and with the domestic leadership of Lyndon Johnson (who knew how to control the Congress), and the Civil" Rights Movement led by the late Martin Luther King, Jr., who gave us moral leadership, social change became a massive reality in America. Congress responded with the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 (42 U.S.C.S. 2000 et seq.), 1965 (79 Stat. 437) and 1968 (82 Stat. 73). It was a watershed period, not only for academic institutions which were being integrated but also for the legal community at large. Students who participated in non-violent protests throughout the country and particularly in our Southern states as well as those returning from the Peace Corps expected their law schools to offer avenues for social change and redress of grievances; in addition these students were acutely aware of the lack of black, brown, women and other minorities in their classrooms. It was during this period that I was attending law school at the University of California, and we had only "five women in our class of 275 and only one Black student Eight years later, the same institution admitted overninety (90) women and seventy-five (75) Blacks, Latinos, and Asians while keeping the total class size down to roughly 280.
The judiciary and the legal profession itself played a major role in this revolutionary change. Our Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren (a graduate of my law school), began changing the role and needs of the legal profession in 1963 In the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, and with later decisions, the Court mandated that all criminal defendants who could not afford a lawyer must be appointed counsel at state expense (But see Scott v Illinois. (77-1177) U. S. (3-5-79) which allows for the State toavoid appointing counsel to indigents in criminal cases if no prison terra is in-volved in the sentencing.). Four years later in the Application of Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), the same Court ruled that this right to counsel was applicable to juveniles involved in our Juvenile Court systems With the creation of President Johnson's "War on Poverty" [6] came tree legal services for the poor; and thus with the creation of public defenders required by Gideon and its progeny, juvenile advocates required by Gault, legal aid lawyers handling civil matters, and lawyers needed to enforce integration and the Civil Rights Acts, there arose job opportunities for an increasing number of law graduates—especially for minority lawyers who could assist members of their own communities.
In short, students and professionals alike clamored for what might be synopsized as two major changes: (1) increased enrollment in the law schools of those communities underrepresented in the legal world, namely Blacks. Latinos, Asians, and women; and (2) addition of courses offered in law school that would prepare advocates for challenging social problems such as racism, poverty environmental pollution, and the War in Vietnam (the latter being concerned with Military and Draft law for soldiers and citizens not willing to participate in the war). [7]
I was at the Berkeley campus of the University of California at this time, and the major motivators for these changes came from the students and faculty on the campus, Viewed on a miscroscopic level, the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. united the campus community—as it did elsewhere in America—and special admissions programs for minorities were instituted. In addition, instructors began supplementing their normal texts and discussions with topics and cases relevant to the current social problems. Demonstrations and protests occurred at other less progressive schools, and indeed even at our law school when we did not seem to be moving fast enough. A sense of emergency prevailed, a desire to avoid further violence and bloodshed by creating legal institutions to solve problems.
But on a larger scale, two remarkable changes were occurring in the legal educational system. First, the role of law and the lawyer in American society was and continues to be re-evaluated and re-defined, a process that is long overdue in our changing society. Second, and by far more important, the number of qualified (both minority and otherwise) lawyers has skyrocketed, which in turn has enhanced citizen access to the law and placed great burdens on a judiciary which has not been able to keep up with the now at times staggering caseload. Thus, as will be seen below, the thrust and impact of legal education in America has during the past decade gone through perhaps its most revolutionary change.
Admissions
Law schools desire their graduates to become educated and cultured lawyers, hopefully in the best tradition of their learned profession. They realize that the foundation of liberal culture must usually be laid in college. Hence, while the law schools prescribe no fixed requirements with respect to the content of pre-legal education (other than completion of a four-year undergraduate program at a recognized university), their admissions committees take into account the nature of college work done as well as the quality of academic performance demonstrated.[8]
Basically, there are four factors [9] which will be highly relevant in determining admissions to our law schools, although it must be stressed that each institution is free within legal limits to set its own criteria for admissions. By far the most recognized criteria is the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), which is administered throughout the United States during the year. Prepared by the Educational Testing Service headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey, it is governed by representatives from the law schools on a nation-wide basis. "The LSAT is designed to measure certain mental capabilities important in the study of law and, thus, to aid law schools in assessing the academic promise of their applicants. The test covers a broad range of disciplines and gives no advantage to candidates with a particular discipline. The questions yielding the LSAT score are designed to measure the capacity to read, understand, and reason logically using a variety of verbal and quantitative material. In addition, there is a section on writing ability designed to measure skill in using standard written English to express ideas clearly, precisely, and fluently."(The Law School Admission Bulletin and LSAT Study Guide, p. 4 (ETS, 1977).)
The mode and content of the test is under constant evaluation. For example, while I was a dean of admissions at Boalt Hall School of Law (University of California, Berkeley), the relevance of the LSAT in judging the quality of minority applicants was under intense criticism. Statistics compiled by the Educational Testing Service showed that white middle-class applicants uniformly scored higher than minority or working-class applicants. For several years each of the participating law schools supplied the Educational Testing Service with the results of law school grades for all of its students, and the resulting adjustment in the type of test has produced more uniform treatment to all applicants. Administrators of the law school admissions programs at each institution receive numerous reports on how to evaluate the LSAT scores, and thus are able to predict better the possibilities of success at the law schools for each applicant.
The second major criteria for admission to law school in America is the undergraduate record of the applicant. Complete transcripts of a student's records are sent to the schools to which he or she applies, and again these grades and records are compared with other candidates. Obviously, there is no uniformity in grade-giving between institutions, or for that matter, even between different faculties in the same university. Thus, the Educational Testing Service compiles records on each department of a large or small undergraduate program—for all of our schools—and attempts to give us a roughidea of how well the student applicant compares to others in the same field at his or her home campus. Often greater emphasis is placed on the last two years of undergraduate education by law school admissions officers because by that time the student will be selecting courses of a more advanced nature and the growing pains of college fife should be finished by the end of the second year. [10]
The third criteria is composed of one or more recommendation letters which the candidate solicits from former teachers, employers or advisors. This is by far the least trustworthy of all items, since a form of unnatural selection has occurred by the time the administrator receives the letter. In the past, influential people would write these letters—from the President of the United States to a local Congressman—and they occassionally influenced the final outcome of the selection process. In reality, except for a few minor instances of abuse, [11] such forms of "influence peddling" have become rare or non-existent.
The reason for the termination of this injustice is complex. In part it is due to the rising social consciousness of administrators who will not be brow-beaten by politicians and favor-seekers; m part it is due to the fact that with so many applicants for so few spaces available, the number of such instances of outside pressure grew to the point where the administrator did not and could not choose between the many contenders. Perhaps most important was the tremendous increase in the number of applicants and the quality of the candidates; administrators had to justify each and every admissions decision to faculty and students—both of whom are usually represented on the admissions committees at most of our law schools.
The fourth criteria is a written personal statement by the applicant of why he or she seeks a seat in a law school. The importance of this two to three page essay must not be minimized. For example, when 1 handled the admissions program at Boalt Hall, we had over 5,500 applicants for 275 seats— or to put it more brutally, one out of twenty applicants would eventually be admitted to our first year class I found that the LSAT and the grade records enabled me to eliminate roughly 1,500 applicants because they appeared "high-risk" candidates, statistically at least. That still leftover 4,000 people from which to choose. Perhaps fifty to a hundred were superlative for example, 11 had received perfect scores on the LSAT. But of the remaining, now roughly 3,900 applicants for 200 seats (after the geniuses were admitted), we needed some criteria to differentiate between them could have selected the remainder out of the over 400 candidates who had been selected Phi Beta Kappa; or I could have selected the remainder out of over 300 candidates who had already received a Ph. D. in another field other than law; indeed, I could have selected a class composed entirely out of brilliant women, or minorities, or for that matter, red-heads. It was thus decided that the personal statements of the remaining candidates would be used not so much to determine who was qualified, but rather to pick a diversified and multifaceted group of students who could bring different backgrounds, desires and intellect to the class.
By having the faculty and several leading students involved in the selection process, law schools in America have been able to minimize arbitrary decision-making by one or two administrators further, by having an abundance of applicants compared to the seats available, the finer law schools were guaranteed to have the creme de la creme. For the law schools, the 167 which are currently accredited by the American Bar Association (which includes the finer schools like Berkeley, Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Columbia, Virginia and others), it means that they too have selected stronger if not overly-qualified students for their programs. Contrary to other fields in higher education, law schools continue to have a higher and higher number of applicants, and we now have over 85,000 candidates per year for approximately 40,000 seats at all of our accredited law schools.
There are now roughly 500,000 lawyers in the United State's, a little less than one lawyer for every 400 people. [12] The following table will perhaps reflect the tremendous growth-rate in law school attendance and the legal community since the begining of the social revolution in America which might be dated from 1963, the year of John F. Kennedy's death and the commitment of the American people for domestic change.
Year |
Total |
Enrollment Women |
First Year |
L.S.A.T. Administrations |
J.D. or LL.B. Awarded |
Admissions to the Bar |
1963 | 49,552 | 1,883 | 20,776 | 30,528 | 9,638 | 10,788 |
1964 | 54,265 | 2,183 | 22,753 | 37,598 | 10,491 | 12,023 |
1965 | 59,744 | 2,537 | 24,167 | 39,406 | 11,507 | 13,109 |
1966 | 62,556 | 2,678 | 24,077 | 44,905 | 13,115 | 14,644 |
1967 | 64,406 | 2,906 | 24,267 | 47,110 | 14,738 | 16,007 |
1968 | 62,779 | 3,704 | 23,652 | 49,756 | 16,077 | 17,764 |
1969 | 68,386 | 4,715 | 29,128 | 59,050 | 16,733 | 19,123 |
1970 | 82,499 | 7,031 | 34,713 | 74,092 | 17,183 | 17,922 |
1971 | 94,468 | 8,914 | 36,171 | 107,479 | 17,006 | 20,485 |
1972 | 101,707 | 12,173 | 35,131 | 119,694 | 22,342 | 25,086 |
1973 | 106,102 | 16,760 | 37,018 | 121,263 | 27,756 | 30,879 |
1974 | 110,713 | 21,788 | 38,074 | 135,397 | 28,729 | 30,707 |
1975 | 116,991 | 26,737 | 39,038 | 133.546 | 29,961 | 34,144 |
1976 | 117,451 | 29,982 | 39.996 | 133.320 | 32,597 | 37,935 |
1977 | 118,557 | 32,538 | 39,676 | 128,135 | 33,640 | 37,660 |
1978 | 121,606 | 36,808 | 40,479 | 127,760 | NA. | NA. |
Source: American Bar Asso. Journal, V. 65, p. 577 (April, 1979)
NOTES: Enrollment is that in American Bar Association approved schools as of October I. The LSAT. candidate volume is given for the test year ending in the year stated. Thus, 127,760 administrations of the LSAT. occurred in the test year July, 1977, through April, 1978. JD. or LLB. degress are those awarded by approved schools for the academic year ending in the year stated. Thus, 33,640 degrees were awarded in the year beginning with the fall, 1976, term and ending with the summer 1977, term. Total new admissions to the bar are for the calendar year and included those admitted by office study, diploma privilege, and examination and study at an unapproved law school. The great bulk of those admitted were graduated from approved schools.
One might assume that with this tremendous growth in the law schools and the corresponding rise in the legal profession that the public might become satiated with lawyers. On the contrary, now that a Legal Aid system has fully taken root in American life, with thousands of legal aid lawyers and public defenders for the poor, the middle class is demanding even a greater number of lawyers to take care of their needs. Often lawyers in private practice charge too much for middle class people to use their services until a real legal crisis has arisen, so the middle class has begun to develop schemes by which they too can use the legal community without facing financial ruin.
One such scheme is being developed by the American labor movement and far-sighted employers. Like medical insurance, a form of legal insurance is being created by which employees and employers will pay a premium each month that will entitle the worker to use lawyers at discount rates or for no charge, presided the matter is unrelated to labor relations issues. There are several such schemes currently being tested and instituted, one which my old law firm arranged with the telephone workers' union in the San Francisco area. which proved extremely successful to worker and lawyer alike. The point is that with "the continual growth in this area, new employment opportunities will be created for lawyers to work with middle class people not only in solving crisis situations but also in providing preventative advice and assistance— such as in the drafting and preparation of wills, review of real estate transaction, estate planning, tax advice, domestic relations assistance. [13]
As mentioned earlier, the continuing trend in creating lawyers has also created more litigation, and Chief Justice Burger has on numerous occassions belittled our litigious mania. In the last 15 years the number of cases filed in the Federal (as opposed to our state) courts has nearly doubled, and similar increases have been recorded in many state court systems; in the last 5 years the number of class-action suits in Federal courts has nearly doubled (which therefore represents cases involving numerous litigants) and in 1976 a total of 5,320 civil rights suits were brought against employers (1,500% increase over 1970). [14] Speaking at a conference sponsored by the American Bar Association at Columbia University Law School. Chief Justice Burger warned that unless new ways were found to settle disputes, the country might be overrun by "hordes of lawyers hungry as locusts" and concluded by saying that the people want quick, inexpensive relief from their legal problems. [15]
One month later after that speech, at the end of June, 1977 the United States Supreme Court in a 5 to 4 decision ruled that attorneys have a consitutional right to advertise fees for routine legal services. The Court majority in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, U. S. (1977), found that advertisements may aid the administration of justice and consumers without lowering professional standards, and that advertisements are permissible if limited to brief, factual information [16] Two days later, the Supreme Court nullified a lower court order barring a Virginia consumers group from issuing a directory of attorney's fees, citing the new ruling that limited legal advertisement is constitutionally protected.
These decisions reflect the judiciary's response to the growth in the legal community and the continued rise in enrollment at our law schools; perhaps more important, it reflects the heavy caseload of our courts, and our judiciary's attempt to help reorder changes in the scope of lawyer-client relations. The time has come for the public to be informed about this expanding profession, or should I say industry, for the legal profession is now being viewed by the American public as a consumer's item rather than a "public profession" available to only a highly narrow clientele. [17] Gideon's Trumpet has in fact been beard, and the problems in the legal educational community and the Bar caused by their unprecedented growth must now be faced.
The Problems with Admissions
Outside of the question as to what would be the ideal number of law students in our country, the major issue is centered on the selection process of these future lawyers by the law schools. Frankly, the four criteria described earlier developed in part to help administrators select "qualified" law students. This is no longer a problem, for in fact it is hard to find an applicant who is not qualified. The LSAT remains a test to exclude rather than to include, and thus the admissions committees need greater guidance from the faculty and the society as to just who should be admitted and why.
Fundamental questions must be asked and analyzed, and the most pressing issue is the definition of "qualified." Are we to continue to focus on the legal profession in the old way—that is, a profession of lawyers as an elite class, or are we to maintain the change of viewing the law as a tool for all people in society? Recent developments, such as the rise of legal clinics and the offering of legal advice at booths at department stores, [18] seem to suggest that the democratization of the law is a process which cannot be 'stopped.
During and throughout the Watergate Affair, the prominence of Nixon's lawyers and their criminal activities were well noted by the public, and the bar responded not only by dismissing or suspending many of them from the practice of law but also by pressuring universities to add courses on judicial ethics. Many post-Watergate bar examinations began including questions on legal ethics, and closer scrutiny of applicants to the bar ensued The following course description from Harvard Law School has become the norm rather than the exception:
"Professional Responsibilities.— All students (who take the course) will spend 9 hours during the first three weeks of the semester in sessions on Professional Responsibility and 12-15 hours in specially scheduled sessions during the remainder of the term. These may be in 1 or 2 hour segments at the election of the instructor. The course presents readings and problems dealing with very practical issues of professional responsibility regularly faced by lawyers in the daily routine of practice A second part of the course presents readings and problems dealing with the issues faced by the profession as a whole the provision of legal services and problems in connection therewith and other matters relating to the way the profession organizes itself..."
This is but one of many courses offered at Harvard and elsewhere dealing with legal ethics, and there has been a corresponding effort on the part of admissions officers to estimate the moral character of applicants before admission to the law schools.
Dean Christopher G. Langdell of Harvard, over one hundred years ago, instituted the case method of legal education which was based on the Socratic method of teaching. In the New York Times of July 23, 1978 (IV, 9:1), Abraham Goldstein, former dean at Yale Law School, attacked the over-use of the case method and noted that law school education in America was "depressingly similar" from school to school—we lack "range and variety," we lack sufficient courses on practical experience If in fact the use of clinical programs is to occur, and if we are to move away from the case method and towards more practical experience of the law students, then our LSAT and other criteria of "qualified" students will likewise have to be adjusted.[19] Some law schools have begun this transition, and thus new modes of legal education are beginning to respond to the needs of the community.[20]
Even at our more staid institutions, the growth of clinical programs and greater selection of elective courses on problems of the poor, environment, international law, and civil rights has occurred. However, our law schools have still to find a means by which we can evaluate the advocacy ability of our candidates. (While moot court courses are usually required, they do not help the admissions officer who has nothing but statistics, grades and paper by which to judge a candidate before admission to the program.)
Chief Justice Burger, addressing the American Law Institute, proposed an experiment in legal education under which selected law school students would study established courses for 2 years and then spend their 3rd year in internship focused on courtroom practices; he suggests that three law schools in different parts of the country, financed by private foundation and professional funds rather than government subsidy, adopt this revised approach, [21] But again, if this is to be a workable model, the admissions system must begin the process of change by selecting those candidates who will best develop under such a system.
In short, what I am suggesting is that the law schools must first determine the types of lawyers we need, develop a proper curriculum to fulfill the students' needs and education, and then revamp the admissions procedures; in reality, the. process has actually been in reverse order based on "qualified" students who fit a model created by Dean Langdell a century ago and only subject to change on a piece-meal basis due to pressures from outside academia. [22]
A Word on Bakke and Minority Admissions
In the year since it was delivered, the United States Supreme Court decision in Bakke v. The Regents of the University of California, U. S. (1978), has had virtually no effect on minority-group enrollments at most law schools in America. The Court ruled that Allan P. Bakke, a white engineer, had been improperly denied admission to the University of California's medical school at Davis because of a special admissions program for minority groups which set a quota. The 5-to-4 Bakke decision held that programs that set aside a specific number of seats for minority groups were illegal in the absence of some official finding of discrimination, yet also held that race might be a factor in an admissions program if used properly to overcome de facto discrimination. In a more recent case, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co .U.S. (1979), the Court appears to have significantly restricted the Bakke case, since in Weber an affirmative-action plan was upheld, even though there was no finding of discrimination against the Kaiser plant.
The American Bar Association reports that the number of minority-group students enrolled in accredited law schools rose to 9,922 last fall, up from 9,597 in the fall of 1977. Women now comprise over 30% of the 1978 total enrollment in approved law schools, contrasted with 27 44% in 1977 and 25.53% in 1976 and 22 85% in 1975. Even the enrollment of physically disabled students has risen sharply over the years, although the recent decision in Southeastern Community College v. Frances B. Davis, U.S. (1979), might slow this trend.
Thus, minority enrollment and growth is here to stay, and these students have had a profound effect on the legal education in America. They have been vociferous in their demands for important changes in the curriculum; they have continued the pressure on administrators to enhance the special admissions programs and to create courses more relevant to their minority communities; and the faculties have had to change their teaching methods to a group of students that now reflect a much broader base in American life. The process of change is far from complete, but the important thing is that it is still continuing, and we can look forward to a growing number of minorit lawyers who will change the character of the bar and their alma maters.
Conclusion
The past fifteen years in American legal education have been remarkable, for it has become more responsible and responsive to the social and political movements in our nation. Over a hundred years ago Dean Langdell at Harvard turned away from the lecture method in order to stimulate and challenge his law students; it was a major innovation. Today, the stimulus comes from outside the walls of academia; it comes from the people of America and their aspirations for a more responsive legal community; it comes from the faculties and administrators who are more than ever atuned to the complexity and problems of the legal profession; and fortunately it comes from an enlightened student community that sees the law as an interdisciplinary field—one which cannot be divorced from our environment, our mistakes, our need for social change, indeed, our consciousness of the world.
Our admissions procedures and values reflect that ongoing struggle, one which hopefully will continue and never end. After all, we do expect not only that we as a nation will change as long as we exist, but that mankind-and I mean by that men and women—will demand that we stay abreast of the constant movement of society towards social justice. Admissions are but a small item in our judicial system, but it is surprising how it reflects the many forces which are alive and active around us.
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Foot Notes:-
1.Currie, Brainerd, "The Materials of Law Study," 3 Journal of Legal Education 331 (1951)
2.Warren, Charles, "History of the Harvard Law School." (1908).
3.Packer, Herbert L. and Ehrlich, Thomas, New Directions in Legal Education, (A Report for the Carnegie Commision on Higher Education, 1972) p. 259.
4.Stolz. Preble, "Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921): A Contemporary Review", reprinted in the appendix of Packer and Ehrlich, Ibid at 227, which gives an outstanding description of American legal education's development.
5.Meyers, Charles J., '-Education of Present and Future Lawyers," in Law and the American Future (ed. Schwartz, Murray L., 1976) p. 179.
6.For literature of legal issues raised during this period in the area of poverty law. see ten Broek, Jacobus, ed., The Law of the Poor (1966), first printed and published in California Law Review 54, May 1966. On the right to counsel issue in criminal cases, see Lewis, Anthony, Gideon's Trumpet (1964).
7.These additional areas of legal expertise often forced many law schools to employ new instructors who specialized in these fields; at first many taught only part-time, which is the exception rather than the rule in most American law schools, and later these instructors developed into full-time academic colleagues.
8.In the rarest of circumstances, given the number of applicants to law schools in America, will the admissions officers even consider an applicant without a Bachelor's degree; however, exceptions might occur if there are the most unusual of situations presented—none of which struck me when I was handling admissions at the law school (Boalt Hall). Note that this paragraph describing the view of a possible candidate by a law school is a slight paraphrase of the 1976/77 Harvard Law School Catalog, p. 19, but represents the predominant view in America.
9.Not all schools follow these four criteria (LSAT, grades, recommendations, and personal statement), some ignoring one or the other, and each giving different weight to each criteria. In short, there is no uniformity in the admissions process in the United States.
10.Many students, for economic or other rearons, often attend extremely inexpensive (but less prestigious than universities) community colleges for the first two years of undergraduate work, and thus such a rule placing greater stress on the last two years (after these students have transferred to a four year college or university) does not work as a disadvantage to them.
11.Such rare instances are fully reported when discovered, much to the chagrin of schools and students alike. See April 23, 1978 New York Times. 1:5,
12.May 17, 1977, New York Times, 1:5 and 55:1.
13.State Bar Associations have recently begun investigating and setting up different forms of pre-paid legal service plans, and the American Bar Association has sponsored several pilot programs. A recent Amendment to our National Labor Relations Act has included pre-paid legal services as a possible item in collective bargaining. However, there may be anti-trust problems for such pre-paid plans which fix legal fees if the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Group Life and Health Insurance Company v. Royal Drug Company, (77-952) U.S. (1979), is any indication.
14.May 18, 1977, New York Times, 1:3
15.May 28, 1977, New York Times, 1:1.
16.June 28, 1977, New York Times, 1:5 and 14:5.
17.An American Bar Association survey reported in the New York Times of May 17, 1977 (1:5) showed that over two-thirds of all Americans had never used a lawyer or only used one once, and thus most citizens have little if any information on which lawyer to employ. See also 65 American Bar Association Journal 543 (April 1979).
18.65 American Bar Association Journal 548 (April 1979) has two articles, one entitled '"Legal services offered in New York department store," the other "Sears and Wards weighing legal clinics."
19.Packer & Ehrlich, supra, at 37. (See footnote 3).
20.See May 15, 1979, New York Times, III, 1:1.
21.May 17, 1978, New York Times, II, 24:1.
22.For the response of legal educators and academicians interested in the continuance of special admissions programs, see XVIII, Number 17 (July 2, 1979) of the Chronicle of Higher Education.
Whither Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in India ?
(Published in 1980 KLT)
By T.A. Ramadasan, Advocate, Tellicherry
Whither Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in India ?
(T.A. Ramadasan, Advocate, Tellicherry)
It was in 1975 that Claims Tribunals were for the first time constituted in Kerala, and the District Judges of Judicial Districts were made the Tribunals for their respective districts. Though the notification constituting these Tribunals was published in April 1975, the District Judge Tribunals could not actually try or dispose of cases, because there were no rules framed. The Public and the Bar had represented several times and ultimately it was only on 25-7-1977, over two years after the constitution of tribunals, that the Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977 were published.
Meanwhile, needless to say, accidents went on increasing day by day and every accident gave rise to a claim and the accumulated number of petitions in each District swelled to thousands. The District Judges began taking up cases, but then fresh wisdom dawned on the Government, and constitution of seperate Tribunals was proposed with the concurrence of the High Court. When once this proposal was in the air, the District Judge Tribunals lapsed into inactivity. Even part-heard cases were not completed. New ones were not entertained, or at any rate were only just received.
Ultimately, the Government, decided upon constituting regional tribunals for a group of Districts, designed as Camp Courts. In fact, the pending numbers in each District justified one Tribunal for each District at least till the back logs were cleared. But in this also the High Court, possibly obsessed with the idea of easing its own burden in ordinary Courts, concurred. The difficulties of claimants were never taken into account. Camp Courts like Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals have only added to the delays, apart from burdening litigants. A strange way of reaching justice at the door of aggrieved!
Yet three Tribunals were constituted for the whole State and the District Judges Tribunals were asked to bundle up the pending cases to be dispatched to the permanent seats of the newly, constituted regional Tribunals. This was by two notifications dated 23-6-1979 and 10-7-1979.
Now, these regional Tribunals are at Calicut, (for the four Districts of Cannanore, Kozhikode, Malappuram and Palghat) Ernakulam (for the districts of Trichur, Ernakulam, Idukki and Kottayam), Trivandrum (for the districts of Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey). But so far these have not started functioning at least in Kozhikode, records of pending cases have not been transmitted, staff have not assumed charge, no buildings or furniture have been provided. One does not know, which is the address of the Tribunal at Calicut, where the claimants have to file petitions. Yet, accidents are ever on the increase, but there is no forum to file claims for the victims. Be it remembered that, Art.-39A enjoins a duty on the State to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice. The High Court is in charge of these tribunals, and yet a victim in a road accident is denied a forum. Will it not be wise to reinvest the jurisdiction in the concerned District Judges themselves, and where the pending numbers warrant, appoint additional Judges to function as tribunals, instead of leaving such a claim to wandering tribunals which never have found a house yet ? This definitely is not the way to reach justice to unfortunate victims, or to give them speedy justice.
Could the High Court and the Government continue to ignore this brooding sense of injustice?
Frayed Justice
(Published in 1980 KLT)
By M. Marcus, B.A., M.L., Lecturer, Govt. Law College, Ernakulam
Frayed Justice
(M. Marcus, B.A., M.L., Lecturer, Govt. Law College, Ernakulam)
"They live in an atmosphere of echoing footsteps and clanging gates and shouted orders".
'Prison' by Michael Wolff
The concept of justice has been expressed to mean the desire to "render to every man his due". Modern writers on jurisprudence attack this explanation of the notion of justice as defective for the reason that the question as to "what is due" to a person admits of no precise definition. This paper is concerned with the exposing of a situation of injustice which occurs in the administration of Criminal justice. Prof. Hart H. L A. compares justice in punishment to the notion of property and propounds the theory of distributive justice and speaks of "retribution in distribution". [1] When we examine the situation of a convicted husband in prison undergoing long term imprisonment and his wife in the free world outside we are struck with the thought whether the concept of justice as rendering everyone his due is fully put into practice. It is a fact that when penal justice meets out punishment by way of imprisonment to the convicted husband it may be said that such punishment is due to him, but at the same time his wife is deprived of the right of sexual intercourse with him during the term of his imprisonment in our country. It appears that in this instance justice does not render anything to her but it deprives her of her "due" right mentioned above without any justification. The right of a wife to move a civil court to get a decree in her favour for restitution of conjugal right is an established situation known to courts of justice. Therefore the fact that a wife has such a right is beyond dispute.
The notion of punishment relates back to the days of Adam and Eve and it is recorded in the Old Testament that Adam and Eve were punished by expulsion from the Garden of Eden as per Christian mythology. The sentence passed in the event of such punishment merits appreciation. Adam was decreed "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread". The sentence on Eve reads "in sorrow thou shall bring forth children". [2] One significant point that emerges, here is that eventhough God Almighty punished both Adam and Eve the sentence pronounced on Eve does not deprive Eve of her right of sexual intercour. ? with Adam for the reason that as per "Genesis" there was no other male human being in existence who could be nought by Eve for procreation. This means that even under the point of punishment the conjugal right of the wife was protected. The author feels that this should be an eye opener to the law makers of this country in this context. If we view the incident in the garden of Eden through the spectacle of modern criminal jurisprudence we will label them (Adam and Eve) as participis criminis for the reason that Eve ate "the fruit of the forbidden tree" and. she abetted Adam to taste of it and Adam did it also. So the liability for violation of the command was rightly fixed on both of them. But the divine law touching sentence has taken into account the nature of homosapine in its full import and that is why divine justice has not deprived Eve of her right of conjugal relation with Adam. Here we find the disparity in the content of celestial justice with the terrestrial justice in cases where the husband is sentenced to a punishment of imprisonment.
We feel proud in declaring that we are in an era of the humanisation of criminal justice and the individualisation of punishment is the moving spirit of the present day penal justice. It may be noted here that we are just after celebration of International Women's Year, but the pathetic state of the Indian wife whose husband is sentenced to long term of imprisonment mocks at the grand celebration referred to above.
It cannot be surmised that only the unmarried men will be the criminals in society. So much so when a married man is punished with long term of imprisonment and shut in prison the inevitable consequence is that his wife is deprived of her right of sexual intercourse with him during such period in India and she cannot move a civil court for restitution of conjugal right for the reason that the basis of filing a petition for that purpose is the refusal by the husband to have sexual connection with the wife without sufficient justification.[3] Nobody says that the convicted husband refuses his wife's desire for sexual union with him. But the law in India rather does not allow him. The right of sexual intercourse between married persons is a right sanctified by the law of marriage and the sense of justice in society. The fact remains that atleast in India the conviction of a husband for an offence involving long term of imprisonment does not ipso facto annul his marriage, so much so the wife is not free to marry another person for fear of being prosecuted for the offence of bigamy. The divorce law in India does not admit conviction for an offence resulting in imprisonment as a ground of divorce. In this set up under the compulsive urge of the body, if the wife gives her consent to another man for sexual intercourse with her, he will be prosecuted for adultery under the Indian penal law. I feel that the fate of the convict's wife is brought out clearly now. It will not be wrong to say that the law as it stands in India penalises her for no fault, though she is not punished strictly for the reason that punishment is restricted to the offender as rightly observed by prof Hart H, L. A [4] Punishment known to the common law of crimes as well as the Indian Penal Code presupposes Mens Rea and Actus Reus. One fails to understand what Mens Rea or forthat matter what Actus Reus the law can impute to the wife of a convict. It is strange to note that the law in India sneaks away with an air of indifference after bringing about the deprivation of the right of sexual intercourse of the convict's wife with her husband. It is relevant to consider at this point that the criminal law considers it unfair to punish the wife of a criminal for having harboured him for the reason that "he is her lord" so far as the pre-conviction period is concerned. This is fair concession granted by the modern criminal law to the wife of a criminal which may be a reflection of the fact that the dignity of wedlock surpasses the gravity of criminal justice and the cruelty of the archaic Roman law Lex quis quis which decreed the punishment of the convict's wife and children for the offence which he committed, in the past days of criminal jurisprudence. This change in the substantive criminal law marks a legalistic and analytical approach to criminal justice. When we glance at the adjectival criminal law in India that is, the Code of. Criminal Procedure, Sec. 125 catches our attention. This section champions the cause of the derlicted wife and the law lends its aid by compelling the husband to give her maintenance. This means that the criminal law both substantive and procedural show a concern to the wife prior to the conviction of her husband. If the law's concern for the wife is real then why in India the conjugal visit in prison by the wife to her husband under imprisonment is not made legally permissible. It appears that a wife to whom civil courts lend aid by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights facilitate the same physical act between husband and wife which is denied by the criminal law to the wife of the convict. Sir James Fitz James Stephen, a learned criminal judge of England and the historian of the English Criminal Law in expounding the close relation between crime and punishment caiches at the imagery of the desire of the married person to have sexual intercourse with his wife. But curiousaly enough once a husband is convicted in India the sexual intercourse between himself and his wife comes to an end during the period of imprisonment of such husband. Writers on Criminology plead much for the better treatment of the convicted prisoner in prison, but only very little attention has been bestowed on the fate of the convict's innocent wife by many of the writers and by the administrators of criminal justice. It is high time to take up her case either in the shape of permitting her to visit her husband in prison for conjugal relation or the law should provide that the conviction of a husband for an offence punishable for 7 years or more with imprisonment shall result in the annulment of marriage so that the wife is free to marry if she likes in such an event. It is also felt that such a provision would make husbands more cautious before they embark upon crimes of deeper dye. It may be noted that conviction is a ground of divorce in certain countries. It is said "conviction for felony or sentence to imprisonment is a ground for divorce under the statutes of most states such as Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California and Colorado". [5]
The penal institutions in Mexico, permit wives to visit their husbands in prison under certain circumstances and to spend the night with them. [6] In Sweedish prison also the conjugal visiting is legally permitted. These instances are sufficient enough to make our legislators to frame laws permitting conjugal visiting in the prison of India. It is argued by some that release on Parol is a sufficient substitute to permit conjugal visiting in prison. But then one should not forget the fact that release on parol is dependent upon the subjective satisfaction of the prison authorities which has nothing to do with the desire of the convict's innocent wife. It appears that if the release on Parol is to eclipse the right of conjugal visiting in prison it would mean that the sexual union between the convict and his wife will have to be scheduled as per the moods, fancy and discretion of the prison authorities which is the worst step that can be thought of. Two modern criminologists observe "perhaps the most dignified type of conjugal visiting was established in Argentina in 1947. A specially built structure was set aside for the purpose in the national penitentiary in Buenos Airs...and intricate architectural plan provides scrupulously for privacy and staff members detailed, for the maintenance of the system are specially selected...The rooms are attractively furnished each with a private bath and toilet [7]
It appears that a frustrated innocent wife of a convict in India is placed in such situation by law as to compel her to drift into prostitution and in that event the godess of justice will be quick to get her punished for soliciting. One is driven to ask whether the godess of justice is an unwilling spinster who satisfies her jealousy against a wife who is the wife of a convict sentenced to long term imprisonment. The fate of the husband in prison leads him slowly but surely to moral degeneration since absence of his wife diverts him to perverted sex practices in the shape of homosexuality with the result that when he is released in the distant future he comes to his family as a worst man. A noted author observes "as one sex community the prison is abnormal. Men's personalities become strangely warped whenever they are to get along for long period without the gentler sex. Important here is the physiological effect of the absence of women. Sex expression is one gratification which is denied to the prisoner but which isnot denied even to the slave. Put the most normally adjusted men in a womenless society and there will be increased resort to substitute for normal sex relationship. In prison men are starved for companionship of wife, children or friend".[8]
Stanton Wheeler observes "errors made in, releasing men too early are publicly observable. Under a statute allowing commitment upto life, however errors made in keeping men who may in fact be cured cannot be trusted because by the nature of procedure they are not given a chance either to succeed or to fail......There is always the danger of undue restriction of civil liberties in attempts to provide adequate protection to the community. [9]
The present situation denying conjugal visiting in prison is productive of further criminal acts by the wives and the children of the convict will also drift to the path of juvenile delinquency. It is felt that if such conjugal visiting is allowed, the convict prisoner will come in closer relation with his wife which will tend to create a desire for his home which will be conducive to his rehabilitation.
We make too many laws and twist and reshape the Constitution of our country by legislative measures even to the extent of protecting animal life. It would have been more sensible and useful if Parliament had passed laws permitting and specifying conditions of conjugal visiting of the convict by his wife in our prisons than worry about straining the Constitution for less worthy and urgent matters. It is felt that our legislators in their wisdom should examine the nature of justice rendered to the convict's wife in our polity for the reason that the most fair minded judge cannot pass an order for conjugal visiting to the prison by the prisoner's wife by invoking the inherent powers under S. 482 of Criminal Procedure Code "to secure the ends of justice" in this matter where ends of justice stand Frayed.
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Foot Note:-
1.'Punishment and Responsibility' by Prof. Hart H.L A.
2.Genesis-Chapter III verse 16 17 The Holy Bible
3.Encyclopedia Britanica Vol. VII Page 457
4.'Punishment and responsibility'—Prof. Hart H.L.A.
5.Loss and curtailment of rights-by Sol Rubin "Crime and Justice" Vol. Ill by Radinowics and Wolf Gang.
6.Encyclopaedia of Criminology by Vernon C. Branham and Samuel.
7.New Horizon of Criminology by Barnes and Teeters, Page 511
8.Criminology by Donald R. Traft, Page 581
9.Sociology of Crime and delinquency by Marvin Wof Gang, Leonard Savitz and Norman Johnstan, Page 639
Forensic Titbits
(Published in 1980 KLT)
By T.M. Abdulla, Advocate, Tellicherry
Forensic Titbits
(T.M. Abdulla, Advocate, Tellicherry)
Loose Terms:— Who is 'petitioner-respondent', 'respondent-respondent', 'appellant-respondent' etc.? So confusing!
'Petition' is either O. P. or E. P. But E. P. is included within the definition of application'. E. P. is better taken out of the definition and classified with O. P. All others are applications. This distinction is seldom recognised. Applications and petitions are indiscrimately so called.
'Responnent' in what? appeal, petition or application? Why not use differentiating words for the adversary in different proceedings? A suggestion: Applicant Vs. Respondent. Petitioner Vs. Counter-petitioner. Appellant Vs. Opponent?
Appellant-petitioner or petitioner-appellant? Sometimes describing from past to present and sometimes from present to past rank. Better stick to one mode of expression to avoid confusion.
Copies:—Copy-getting is a delaying matter. Notwithstanding load of mistakes a certified copy consumes time. Why not use mechanical means like tape-recording and photo-copying at party's extra cost? Why printing if more than 700 words? R. 127 permits photographing documents, but only by Govt. photographers or Govt-approved photographers. Where are they? Why not by private photographers also taking care for safety of documents?
There are free copies and charged copies to be supplied by one side to the other. Obtaining a charged copy is a cumbersome processwritten request, intimation of charges, payment and then preparation and supply. Vide R. 135. It does not work. This rule speaks of copy of proceedings; 'proceedings' include all documents except those produced as evidence. Vide R. 5 (11), Rules of Practice. No definition of the word 'proceeding in the Code. 'Proceeding' in a generic sense means "any application to a court of justice, however made, for aid in enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, for damages or for any remedial object". Balck's Law Dictionary definition, generally accepted. Free copy of plaints, written statements, applications, affidavits and counter-affidavits are required to be given to opposite side. As evidence documents are not included in the word 'proceeding', they need not be given on charge under R. 135. Then there is little that can be obtained on charge under this rule. Free copy of all documents on which a party relies for relief may be given to the other side. The cost of such copies may form part of costs in the cause in case of success. It calls for amendment of either R. 135 or R. 5(11) CRP.
Returning papers for curing defects:—Presented papers are often returned. There is a subterefuge in R. 32. It speaks of returning for non-conformity with the practice of the court. What can be a practice of the court other than what is prescribed by the Code and the Rules of Practice? Practice of the court is vague.
Timing of presenting a proceeding is sometimes material. While date-sealing and numbering and initialling by the chief ministerial officer, he may endorse the time of the initial presentation also on papers.
Cost-list:—Rule 196 allows 10 days time for filing cost-list. This accounts for delay in preparing decree copy. Why not require to file it on the day of the closing of the case for judgment or on the next day?
"In the circumstances of the case, no costs" is a lazy ending with an abandonment of court's duty. Yet this is almost a routine.
Arguments:—Points urged in oral argument are often missing in judgments. Written argument supplemented, if court so requires, by oral clarifications is the remedy for this.
List of authorities relied on may be given to the other side in advance to avoid surprise.
Lawyers' Responsibility
(Published in 1980 KLT)
By Alexandar Skaria, Advocate, Ernakulam
Lawyers' Responsibility
(Alexandar Skaria, Advocate, Ernakulam)
Politics is not sufficiently pure. Nor do the politicians claim to be perfect. The members of the legislature, as also the masses who elect them, are not all learned or enlightened. They are not all ignorant either. Most of them do not 'drink deep or taste not the Parian Spring' so much so that the danger of a little learning runs at a high potential across the administration.
The judiciary, however, is above board. Before a man emerges as a lawyer, he has to take a series of University Degrees one after another, and has to undergo years of meticulous study and preparation for that purpose. The lawyers, including judges and advocates, are thus a class or competent men of learning and enlightenment, of integrity and maturity. They profess to be such, and are supposed to be so, when they advocate for others and sit in judgment over others. By continuous hard work they advance towards perfection as they advance in age and experience.
The court is the guardian of the constitution and the lawyers have the keeping of the law entrusted and committed to them. Any defect in legislation, or in the implementation of any law is challenged in courts where lawyers look at it from all angles and prescribe the necessary antidote. Breaches in the law are also dealt with by them. The toning up of the national character is thus the lawyers' responsibility. For a lawyer, imperfection is no plea. He has got to be perfect or else he must abdicate the profession and go in search of pastures new.
It is the apathy of the lawyers, though indirectly, that is the initial cause of all corruption. The fault, learned brothren, is not in our stars; nor in our fellowmen mainly, but ourselves that we remain underdeveloped, and the rule of law deteriorates in our country. It is high time that we awoke to reality, and realised our responsibility.