TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION UNDER HINDU LAW

(V. Sivaswamy, B.A., B.L., Advocate, Crangannore)

Testamentary disposition is nothing but the product of a necessity felt by man to divert the natural course of succession. Apart from the Seven Wonders of the World so widely spoken of in this material world, there is an equally great wonder seen recorded in the famous stanza contained in the Mahabharatha -”Day by Day, creature after creature doth enter Yama’s abode and yet, those who remain, seek to live forever. What is there still more wonderful?” (1) Man is dust; to dust he should return. Can he on such return take with him the material fruits of his life’s labour? This apparent disability, he has not failed to feel; yet he does not lose heart. He goes on with the question-who should enjoy his wealth when he is no more?

All schools of Hindu Law have waxed eloquent in discussing the question-Who should inherit a person’s estate in the event of his death? Elaborate rules are found in the various texts, to determine the person or persons to whom the estate of a man should go on his death. But the ancient texts seem to be silent with respect to the question, whether the porosities himself without reference to these rules, can during his life-time itself, determine the person to inherit his estate. In other words, the idea of a testament as something effective to divert the course of succession prescribed by law seems to have been unknown to the ancient fathers of Hindu Law.

The history of the development of Hindu Law will reveal that testamentary disposition first gained currency in Bengal and it was slow to be recognized in the south. The Bengal school of thought headed by Jimutha-vahana who was for absolute proprietorship seems to have been more congenial to the development of testamentary disposition. The south, adopting as it did, the Mithakshara propounded by Yagnavalkya, who maintained the right by birth given to the son, apparently ought to have found some difficulties in readily conceding the right of testamentary disposition. The leading case on the point pertaining to the southern school is Nagalutchmee v. Gopoo (2) where the right of testamentary disposition was confirmed by the Privy Council. Commenting upon this decision John D. Mayne observes: “...there can be little doubt that the decision was in unconscious conformity with the popular feeling-a feeling which aimed at increased liberty in regard to property, and which showed itself by attempts to alienate it in ways unknown to the law of the Mithakshara, In fact, the people of Southern India, were trying perhaps with-out knowing what they did, to take upon themselves the powers which Jimutha-vahana and his disciples had conferred upon the Hindus of Bengal”. (3)

Consistent with the consciousness of the community and perhaps consistent also with the freedom of disposal of property guaranteed as a fundamental right to all citizens under our Constitution, our Parliament has provided achapter on Testamentary Succession as Chapter III in the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. (4). Clause (1) of Section 30, the only section contained in that chapter gives to every Hindu the right of disposing any property by will or other testamentary disposition. The essential condition precedent to the exercise of this right is that the property should be capable of being so disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (5) or any other law for the time being in force applicable to Hindus.

It is clear therefore from Section 30 clause (1) that the right of testamentary disposition granted thereby is not an absolute or unqualified right, but is only a qualified one, the extent and limits of which are to be determined with reference to the Indian Succession Act and pristine Hindu Law in the light of legislative enactments, if any bearing thereon.

Part VI of the Indian Succession Act deals with testamentary succession & though as per Section 57 of the said Act, most of the provisions of that Part are made applicable to Hindus, one of the restrictions imposed upon such application is that no testator should bequeath property which he could not have alienated inter vivos or to deprive any person of any right of maintenance of which, but for the application of those sections, he could not deprive them by will. The same was the result brought about by the Hindu Wills Act, 1870 (6) and the Probate and Administration Act 1881 (7). The indefeasibility of the right of maintenance by testamentary disposition is of course expressly declared in clause (2) of Section 30 of the new Act.

The limits of testamentary capacity with reference to the nature of the property, sought to be derived as gathered from the uncodified Hindu Law in the light of judicial pronouncements are also the same. Whatever property is so completely under the control of the testator that he may give it away in specie during his life-times, he may so devise by will. Hence a man may bequeath his separate or his self-acquired property. Even a sole surviving co-parcener may be queath the family estate which comes to vest in him exclusively on the death of all the other co-parceners, for that is property over which he comes to have absolute control. A woman may dispose of by will such parts of her Sthridhanam as Aare during her life-time absolutely under her own control. She could not thus devise by will property inherited from a male, because the estate that she gets thereby is only a limited estate. A member of an undivided family having an interest in the joint family could not yet bequeath it by will for “at the moment of his death, the right by survivorship is at conflict with the right by devise. Then the title by survivorship, being the prior title, takes precedence to the exclusion of that by. Devise” (8).

The question is how far the present Hindu Succession Act has modified the prior law relating to wills. So far as property inherited by a woman is concerned, what was once only a limited estate is rendered under Section 14 an absolute one over which she gets absolute powers of control, provided she is possessed of the estate on the date of commencement of the‘Act (9) with the advent of the Act, property inherited by a female from a male, becomes her absolute property capable of being devised by her by will.

But what about the interest of a co-parcener in co-parcenary property? The distinct attribute of the Mithakshara School is the propounding of the theory of devolution by survivorship as distinct from devolution by succession-a theory which is perhaps a logical consequence of the allied theory of right by birth. The Mithakshara Law as propounded by Yagnavalkya probably knew no such thing as succession properly so called in a Hindu co-parcenary. To quote the classical words of Lord Westbury, “no individual member of the family, whilst it remains undivided, can predicate of the joint and undivided property that he, that particular member has a definite share, one-third or one-fourth”. (10) His is a fluctuating interest capable of being enlarged by deaths and liable to be diminished by births in the family.

As is seen from section 6 of the new Act, it can be seen that the law of Mithakshara relating to devolution of property by survivorship is not completely abrogated. It is expressly preserved to operate in all cases except in the case of the existence of a female heir or a male heir claiming through such female as specified in class 1 of the Schedule. Clause (1) of section 30, if it had stood above, would not have authorized devise by will of a co-parcener’s undivided interest in co-parcenary property. But trouble is caused by the explanation appended thereto declaring that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time beieg in force, the interest of a male Hindu in a Mithakshara co-parcenary property shall be deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by him within the meaning of the sub-section.

The wide language in which the evplanation is couched and the presence of the non-obstante clause therein raises at least apparently a conflict with section 6 providing for devolution by survivorship of the co-parcener’s interest. But a close analysis of the various provisions contained in the statute may resolve the apparent conflict.

Section 6, it may noted, does not deal with succession at all. It is concerned with devolution of interest in co-parcenary property and provides that such interest shall on the death of the co-parcener devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the co-parcenary and not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Full respect has been given to the theory, that a co-parcener acquires a right by birth in the co-parcenary property immediately on his becoming a member thereofan interest not at all capable of being predicated, but at the same time a fluctuating interest liable to be diminished by births and enhanced by deaths of members in the co-parcenary. Devolution by survivorship is incompatible with the right of testamentary disposition in respect of co-parcenary interest, because as observed earlier, at the moment of the co-parcener’s death, “the right by survivorship will be at conflict with the right by devise”. In ordering devolution by survivorship in section 6, the legislature has been wise enough to use also the words-”and not in accordance with thisAct”, The Act deals with succession-both testate and intestate. It is for purposes of section 30 dealing with testate succession that the explanation is given that the interest of a male Hindu in co-parcenary property is devisable by will. The words “within the meaning of this sub-section” occurring at the end of the explanation are not without significance. When such interest is to devolve by survivorship as per section 6, no question of succession at all arises; the provisions of the Act including section 30 and the explanation are not attracted at all. Much effort is not required to see that it is only when the devolution by survivorship as contemplated by the main part of section 6 is ruled out, that the freedom of testamentary disposition given by section 30 read along with its explanation can be exercised.

Devolution by survivorship of the co-parcener’s interest is ruled out in case there is a female heir or a male heir related through a female. In such cases, the rule of survivorship as enunciated in the Mithakshara is given the goby; succession is substituted for survivorship. And when once succession is introduced, it can either be intestate succession as contemplated in chapter II of the Act or testamentary succession as provided for in Chapter III, section 30. It is when testamentary succession arises, that the freedom of testamentary disposition in respect of the co-parcenary interest envisaged in the explanation to section 30 gets projected into bold relief.

It may be noted that it is in answer to the call from the champions of the fairer sex clamouring for economic freedom for the woman that the rule of survivorship has been abrogated by the proviso to section 6 and daughters and other female heirs included as heirs within class I of the Schedule, In the case falling within the proviso, the interest of a deceased co-parcener as determined by a notional partition taking place between the co-parceners immediately before his death (see explanation I to section 6) instead of vesting by survivorship upon the other co-parceners is to descend on the heirs specified in class I of the Schedule. This descent of property by succession upon such heirs can very well be obviated by resorting to testamentary disposition, so that by one stroke of the pen, the testator can, if he wishes throw over-board all the new heirs introduced by the Act. He can throw over-board even sons, daughters and all others and ordain a complete stranger to inherit his property-a feat he could not perform under pristine Mithakshara law even after it came to countenance the effect of wills. In all cases where a man is able to dispose of his property he could do so by will. Thus he could devise by will even his interest in a co-parcenary, provided he left no other co-parcener behind. But he could not do so if he left behind a son or other co-parcener for such son or other co-parcener, immediately on his death, became a co-parcener with him, acquiring at the same time an interest potent enough to absorb to itself his interest on his death. This theory is adhered to by section 6 of the Act, to the extent to which the rule of survivorship is directed to exclude the rule of succession; but when once succession comes into play, which is a consequence of the introduction of new heirs, the power of testamentary disposition can also be exercised. The Act no doubt gives the right of inheritance to daughters and other female heirs; but at the same time, it has given the co-parcener the freedom of disposing of that interest by will-an instrument which he may use with effect to keep them at bay. The extent to which such testamentary disposition is resorted to will give us an inverse measure oi the popularity of the new law of succession introduced by the Act.

Foot Note:

(1) Ahanyahani Bhuthani Pravisanti Yamalayam; Seshah athavarami-chanti Kimaschayram Athah Param.

(2) 6. M. I. A. 309.

(3); Mayne’s “Hindu Law” 8th Ed. P. 564, Para 413.

(4) Central Act 30 of 1958.

(5) Central Act 39 of 1925.

(6) Central Act XXI of 1870.

(7) Central Act V of 1881.

(8) Per curiam Vitla Butten v. Yarnunamma 8. Mad. H. C R. 6.

(9). Kotturuswami v. Veeravva A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 577.

(10). Appoovier v. Ramasubbiar (1866) H,M- 1. A. 75

RIGHT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

[V.A. Abdul Azeez, B.A., B.L., Legal Assistant, Kerala Law Secretariat]

‘Between independent States respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of International relations’

Corfu Channel Case I. C. J. reports 1949, page 35.

The General Assembly of the U. N. condemned the joint British and French intervention in Egypt in October 1956 and of Soviet Union in Hungary in November 1956. The plea of self-defence put forward by Britain in the former ease was not accepted. The hostilities arising out of the invasion of Egyptian held territory by Israeli Forces was declared an act of aggression.

The right of self-defence is most clearly invoked in the defence of State territory. In other words, the clearest example of a situation affording to the territorial State a right of self-defence is an assault upon its territory.There are several instances in recent history where States’ illegally transgressing the boundaries of another try to justify their action on the ground of self-defence. Japanese Forces invaded Manchuria on September 1931. China brought this to the attention of the Council of the League. The Lytton Commission went to the spot to study the situation. The Commission said that the military operations of the Japanese troops cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate defence. The principle relied upon by the Commission was that every act of self-defence must depend for its justification, on the importance of the interests to be defended, on the imminence of the danger and on the necessity of the act.

The right to defend territory in the lawful possession of a State belongs to that State and this right cannot be disputed or disregarded. The violation of the territory of a neighboring State in pursuit of persons who have committed acts prejudicial to the safety of that State has been justified as a continuation of action in self-defence. This right of self-defence is a controversial one. If the action of the pursuing State is distinctly punitive in character and goes beyond the necessaries of protection, it cannot be brought under the category of self-defenee.

It is an accepted principle in International law that a State is bound to refrain from propaganda in a friendly country hostile to the latter’s Government, but it is interesting to note that the propaganda broadcasts of the ‘Voice of America’ which have been transmitted to Soviet Russia have been justified.

A State may, on grounds of self-defence, justify discrimination against the products of another State even if there is a treaty to the effect that no discrimination will be shown towards that State. There was an agreement between Britain and Belgium to treat Great Britain and her nationals on a basis of commercial equality. It was held that protective measures can be adopted oven if they are inconsistent with the terms of the agreement.