\jvS]cnlmcw \ÂIm³ hogvN hcp¯nbm XShv in£ hn[n¡mtam? Hcp hntbmP\Ipdn¸v

 (By F.]n.Fw.sambvXp, I®qÀ)  E-mail : najidaadiraja@gmail.com   Mob. 9446597898

2024 (5) sI.FÂ.Sn. 681þmw \{¼mbn dnt¸mÀ«v sN¿s¸«Xpw sslt¡mSXnbpsS {Inan\ dnhnj³ s]äoj³ 1149/ 2008 \{¼nepÅXpw 2024 k]vä_À 13þmw \p D¯chnd¡nbXpamb kmenw. V. tIcf sÌbnäv tIÊn hnNmcW tImSXnbpw XpSÀ¶v A¸o tImSXnbpw {]Xn¡v \ÂInb in£ AtX]Sn icnsh¨p sIm­Imbncp¶p _lp: sslt¡mSXn kn¦nÄ s_©v hn[n {]Jym]\w \S¯nbXv.

aPnkvt{Säv {]Xn¡v tImSXn ]ncnbpwhsc XShpw {Inan\ \S]SnN«w 357(3) hIp¸v {]Imcw aq¶p e£wcq] \jvS]cnlmcambn A\ymb¡mc¶p \ÂIphm\pw hogvNhcp¯nbm aq¶pamkw XShv A\p`hn¡p¶Xn\pambncp¶p in£bmbn hn[n¨ncp¶Xv. aPnkvt{Sävv {]Xn¡v aq¶p e£w cq] {Inan\ \S]SnN«w 357 (3)  hIp¸v {]Imcw \jvS]cnlmcw \ÂIm\pw hogvN hcp¯nbm aq¶pamkw XShv A\p`hn¡m\pw D¯chn« ]Ým¯e¯n {]kvXpX D¯chv _lp: sslt¡mSXn AtX]Sn AwKoIcn¨t¸mÄ ChnsS \nba]camb Hcp {]iv\w DbÀ¶phcp¶pI­v. {Inan\ \S]SnN«w 357(3) hIp¸v {]Imcw \jvS]cnlmcw D¯chn«m AXv \ÂIm¯]£w XShv in£ hn[n¡m³ \nbaw tImSXn¡v A[nImcw \ÂIp¶pt­Im? Cu teJIsâ Dd¨ adp]Sn “CÔ sb¶mWv. Cu ho£Ww Xmsg {]Xn]mZn¡p¶ hkvXpXIfneqsS teJI³ sXfnbn¡phm³ B{Kln¡p¶p.

d±m¡s¸« 1973 se {Inan\ \S]Sn N«¯n 357þmw hIp¸nepw D]hIp¸pIfnepambn«mWv {Inan\ tImSXnIÄ¡v \jvS]cnlmcw D¯chnSm\pÅ A[nImcw \ÂIs¸«n«pÅXv. AXn ChnsS hnhmZamb 357 (3)þmwhIp¸v Xmsg AtX]Sn D²cn¡p¶p.

“tImSXn ]ng in£ `mKambn«pÅXÃm¯ Hcpin£mhn[n Npa¯pt¼mÄ tImSXn¡v Ipämtcm]Ww  sN¿s¸«n«pÅ BtfmSv  Abmsf A{]Imcw in£¡v hn[n¨Xv GXv IrXy¯n¶mtWm B IrXyw ImcWambn GsX¦nepw \jvStam £Xntbm A\phZn¨n«pÅ BÄ¡v D¯chn \nÀt±in¡p¶ XpI \jvS]cnlmcambn sImSp¡m³ D¯chv sN¿mhp¶XmWv.”

AXmbXv  in£ XShvin£ am{XamIpt¼mÄ, \jvSw kw`hn¨ hyàn¡v  \jvS]cnlmcw  D¯chnSm³ tImSXn¡v A[nImcapsI­¶p {]kvXpX hIp¸v hn`mh\w  sN¿p¶p. ]s£ tImSXn D¯chnSp¶ Cu hIp¸v {]ImcapÅ \jvS]cnlmcw {]Xn \ÂInbnsæn ]Icw XShv in£ hn[n¡m\pÅ A[nImcw N«¯nse 357(3)þmwhIp¸v A\phZn¡p¶nÃ. ]s£ kn.BÀ.]n.kn 357(1) hIp¸\pkcn¨p Hcp in£bmbn Npa¯s¸Sp¶ ]ngkwJy apgpht\m `mKnIamtbm \jvS]cnlmcambn A\phZn¡m³  tImSXn¡[nImcapI­v.  ]ng Hcp in£bmsW¶ \nebn ChnsS \jvS]cnlmcw \ÂInbnsæn XShvin£ \ÂIp¶Xn bmsXmcp A]mIXbpanÃ.

\jvS]cnlmcw \ÂIp¶Xn\v D¯chnSp¶Xv \nbahyhØIfpsS ASnØm\¯n Hcp in£bÃ. F´psImI­v “in£” sb¶Xv d±m¡s¸« 1860se C´y³ in£m \nba¯nse 53þmw hIp¸n \nÀÆNn¡s¸«n«pI­v.  AXp{]ImcamWv.

“53 þ in£IÄ :þ Cu \nbkwlnXbnse hyhØIÄ¡v Iogn GXv in£IÄ¡mtWm Ipä¡mÀ AÀlamIp¶Xv B in£IÄ

   H¶maXv       :  acWw

   c­ImaXv       :   Poh]cy´w

   aq¶maXv      :  XShv þ c­Ip Xc¯nÂ

                     ITn\XShv  (2) shdpwXShv

   \memaXv      :  hkvXp I­IpsI«Â

   A©maXv     :  ]ng

ChbmIp¶p.

ChnsS \jvS]cnlmcw Hcp“in£”bmbn ]cnKWn¡p¶nÃ. IqSmsX ]ngbpsS hogvN¡v XShn\pÅ in£mhn[n kn.BÀ.]n.kn 30þmw hIp¸n hyhØ sNbvXn«pI­v. “aPnkvt{Sänsâ tImSXn¡v ]ng HSp¡p¶XnenÅ \nbaw {]m[nImcw \ÂIp¶ Imes¯ XShv in£ \ÂImhp¶XmWv.”

ChnsSbpw  \jvS]cnlmc kwJy \ÂIm³ hogvN hcp¯nbm XShv in£ \ÂIm³  A[nImcw aPnkvt{Sän\p \ÂIp¶nÃ.

asämcp {]iv\w sslt¡mSXn¡v AXn¶pÅ A[nImcapt­Im? sslt¡mSXnIÄ¡v ]mÊm¡mhp¶ in£mhn[nIsf kn.BÀ.]n.kn 28(1) hIp¸n {]Xn]mZn¨n«pIv.

“sslt¡mSXn¡v \nbaw {]m[nImcw \ÂIp¶ GXv in£mhn[nbpw ]mÊm¡mhp¶XmWv“.

\jvS]cnlmcw \ÂIm³ hogvN hcp¯nbm XShv in£ \ÂIm³ Hcp \nbahyhØbpw \nehnenÃm¯ Npäp]mSn sslt¡mSXn¡pw {]kvXpX A[nImcansöp hyàam¡p¶p.

ASp¯Xmbn taÂhyhØIÄ kw_Ôn¨p \nehnepÅ “Zn `mcXob \mKcnIkpc£ kwlnX 2023” F´v ]dbp¶psb¶p ]cntim[n¡mw. \jvS]cnlmcw kw_Ôn¨p _n.F³.Fkv.Fkv BIvSn 395þmw hIp¸nemWv {]Xn]mZn¨ncn¡p¶Xv. \nbahIp¸v \{¼nepÅ hyXymkaÃmsX, kn.BÀ.]n.knbnse hyhØIfpambn Hcp amähpanÃ. \nehnepÅ \nba¯nepw \jvS]cnlmcw \ÂIm³ hogvNhcp¯nbmÂXShv in£ \ÂIm\pÅ Hcp hyhØbpanÃ. sslt¡mSXnbpsSbpw Iogvt¡mSXnIfpsSbpw A[nImc ]cn[nbnepw henbamä§fnÃ. in£bpsS \nÀÆN\¯n sF.]n.kn., 54þmw hIp¸n¶p]Icambn \nehnepÅ“Zn `mcXob \ymbkwlnX 2023þmw BIvSn 4þmw hIp¸nemWv Ah {]Xn\nZm\w sN¿p¶Xv. “kmaqlytkh\w”Hcp in£bmbn IqSpX tNÀ¯psh¶sXmgn¨m kn.BÀ.]o.knbpambn aäp bmsXmcp hnXymkhpanÃ. ta {]Xn]mZn¨ hkvXpXIfn \n¶pw d±m¡s¸« kn.BÀ.]n.kn 357(3) _n.F³.Fkv Fkv 395(3) hIp¸p {]ImcapÅ \jvS]cnlmcw hn[n¨m AXv ]men¨nsæn XShv in£ hn[n¡m³ tImSXnIÄ¡[nImcansöpt_m[ys¸Sp¶XmWv.

]s£ \jvS]cnlmcw F§ns\ CuSm¡pw? d±m¡s¸« kn.BÀ.]n.kn. Bnse 431þmw hIp¸v (\nehnepÅ _n.F³.Fkv.Fkv BIvSnse 461þmw hIp¸v) AXn\p¯cw \ÂIp¶p­.  “431:  Cu \nba kwlnXbn Iogn sNbvX GsX¦nepw  D¯chnsâ _e¯n sImSp¡m\pÅXpw hkqem¡p¶ k{¼Zmb¯n¶v aäphn[¯n {]ISambn hyhØ sNbvXn«nÃm¯Xpamb (]ngbÃm¯Xpamb) GsX¦nepw  ]Ww ]ngbmbncp¶Xv t]mse hkqem¡mhp¶XmWv”. CtX hyhØ \nehnepÅ _n.F³.Fkv.Fkv  BIvSn 472þmw hIp¸mbn AtX]Sn \ne\nÀ¯nbn«papI­v.

]ng CuSm¡Â kw_Ôn¨p kn.BÀ.]n.kn. 421þmw hIp¸n (_n.F³.Fkv.Fkv 461þmw hIp¸v) hniZambn {]Xn]mZn¨n«I­.v  AXv {]Imcw \jvS]cnlmcw ]ngt]mse CuSm¡m³ c­Iv amÀ¤§fmWv hyhØ sN¿s¸«ncn¡p¶Xv. P]vXnhgnbmbn XpI sehn sN¿m\pÅ hmdI­v ]pds¸Sphn¡p¶Xn\pw GsX¦nepw PwKa hkvXphnsâ hnÂ]\bpamWv H¶p. c­Imas¯XmIs« `q¡c IpSnÈnIbmbn XpI I­IpsI«m³ PnÃm IeIvStdmSv \nÀt±in¡p¶ hmdâv ]pds¸Sphn¡pI.

s\tKmjy_vÄ C³kv{Spsaâv 138þmw hIp¸v {]ImcapÅ Cu teJ\¯n¶m[mcamb tIÊnse hn[n apJhpcbn kqNn¸n¨ncp¶phsÃm. ]s£ Iogvt¡mSXn hn[nIsf¡pdn¨p sslt¡mSXn D¯chnsâ  6þmw JWvUnIbn {]Xn]mZn¨Xv ChnsS Hcn¡ÂIqSn D²cn¡p¶p.

“6: After trial the learned – Magistrate found the accused quilty under Section 138 N.I.Act and he was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till rising of court and to pay a compensation of Rs.3 lakhs to the complainant under Section 357 (3) Cr.P.C with a stipulation that in default of payment of compensation accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months. The Appeal preferred by the accused as Crl.A.No.219/2016 was dismissed by the sessions court by confirming the conviction and sentence…” XpSÀ¶p dnhnj³ lcPnbnt·Â hmZwtI« tijw sslt¡mSXn ]pds¸Sphn¨ D¯chpw AtX]Sn ChnsS D²cn¡p¶p.

“…… Therefore this court finds no reason to interfere with the finding of conviction and order of sentence passed against the accused.

The Revision Petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed”.

ChnsS DbÀ¯s¸Sp¶ tNmZyanXmWv. kn.BÀ.]n.kn 357(3) (\nehnepÅ _nF³.Fkv.Fkv BIvSv 395) hIp¸v {]Imcw Npa¯p¶ \jvS]cnlmc kwJy \ÂIp¶Xn hogvNhcp¯p¶]£w XShv in£ hn[n¡p¶Xv \nbahncp²atÃ?. A§s\ XShv in£ hn[n¡m³ A\phZn¡p¶ GsX¦nepw \nbahyhØ \nehneptI­m? Cu tNmZy§Ä¡p¯cw Is­I¯m³ {]Xn]mZyhnjbw \nbaRvP·mscbpw \ymbm[n]scbpw ChnsS _m[yØcm¡p¶pI­v.

taÂkqNn¸n¨ tIÊn am{Xaà ]e hn[nIfnepw Cu \nbasshcp²yw {]ISam¡p¶qI­v. DZmlcWambn 2024 (5) sI.FÂ.Sn 692þmw \{¼mbn dnt¸mÀ«vsN¿s¸«Xpw 2024 BKÌv 29\v hn[n {]kvXmhn¨Xpamb AeIvkm­À V._nPpsNø³ tIÊnse sslt¡mSXn D¯chnepw Cu sshcq²yw ZriyamIp¶pI­v. F³.sF.BIvSv 138þmw hIp¸v  {]ImcapÅ {]kvXpX tIÊn Ipä¡mc\msW¶p Is­¯nb {]Xn¡v aPnkvt{Säv \ÂInb in£ Bdpamkw XShpw A¿mbncw cq] ]ngbpambncp¶p. ]ng AS¨m kn.BÀ.]n.kn 357(1) hIp¸v {]Imcw \jvS]cnlmcambn A\ymb¡mc\p \ÂIp¶Xn¶pw ]ng HSp¡phm³ hogvNhcp¯nbm Hcp amkw IqSpX XShv A\p`hn¡m\pw aPnkvt{Säv D¯chn«ncp¶p. ]s£  dnhnj³ lcPnbpambn  Cu tIÊv sslt¡mSXnbnse¯nbt¸mÄ in£bn amäw hcp¯pIbpI­mbn. sslt¡mSXn D¯chnsâ 17þmw JWvUnIbn {]Xn]mZn¨Xv C{]Imcambncp¶p.

      “17:  Considering the long delay and the purpose and object  of the  legislation, this court is inclined to modify the sentence as simple Imprisonment  for one day till rising of court and to pay compensation of `5 lakhs to the appellant complainant with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for six months.

ChnsS \jvS]cnlmcw hn[n¨Xv kn.BÀ.]n.kn 357 (3) hIp¸v {]ImcamsW¶p hyàam¡nbn«nsænepw hmNILS\ AXv hyàam¡s¸Sp¶pI­v.

kn.BÀ.]n.kn.357 (3) hIp¸v  (\nehnepÅ _n.F³.Fkv FkvBIvSv 395(3) hIp¸v) {]ImcapÅ \jvS]cnlmcw \ÂIp¶Xn hogvN hcp¯nbm XShvin£ \ÂIp¶ coXn hensbmcp {]XymLmXw krjvSn¡phm³ hgn Hcp¡p¶pI­v. \jvS]cnlmcw \ÂIm³ km[n¡m¯ Npäp]mSn {]Xn PbnÂin£ A\p`hn¡m³ X¿mdmIpt¼mÄ AhnsS “\nba¯n¶p ap¼n kaXz”sa¶ `cWLS\ 14þmw hIp¸v A\phZn¨n«pÅ auenImhImi¯nsâ \áamb ewL\w ZÀin¡s¸Sp¶p. AXpsImI­v  Cu hnjb¯n  \nbaÚcpw \ymbm[n]cpw {i² ]Xn¸nt¡­Ip¶ BhiyIXbpsS A\nhmcyX Du¶n¸dbp¶p. ASp¯pXs¶ AXpImIpsa¶ ip`{]Xo£tbmsS ChnsS hncmaanSp¶p. 

Law Making for Breaking by Courts, without any Accountability

(By Adv. S. Balachandran (Kulasekharam), Thiruvananthapuram)
E-mail : balachand59@gmail.com     Mob. 9387734030

1. The judiciary is the master, protector, and enforcing authority of the rule of law. Nowadays, the general public holds faith, belief in impartiality, and trust only in the judiciary. Many people are under the impression that they will receive immediate relief from the judiciary, which is why law-abiding citizens refrain from taking the law into their own hands to address grievances.

2. “Justice delayed is justice denied” is a compelling yet unfulfilled aspiration that often remains a mere phrase within the legal system. The higher judiciary, through various thoughtful and impactful pronouncements, has made several decisions aimed at minimizing the duration of litigation. It has formulated mandates to expedite proceedings and ensure timely relief. However, these mandates often remain unimplemented, gathering dust in the archives. Subordinate courts frequently disregard the directives of the higher judiciary, and no mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance. Moreover, these decisions lack provisions for penal consequences in cases of non compliance. As a result, trial courts often turn a blind eye to these mandates, effectively violating them without accountability.

3. In Quantum Securities Pvt. Ltd. v. New Delhi Television Ltd. (2015 (4) KLT Suppl. 8 (SC) = 2015 SCC 10 602),decided on 1st July 2015, the Honorable Supreme Court held that “the court shall make an endeavor to finally dispose of the application for a temporary injunction within 30 days from the date on which the ex parte injunction is granted.” However, in practice, most trial courts, after granting temporary injunctions without notice to the defendants, take months or even years to dispose of such matters on merit, despite urgent requests from defendants. The verdict lacks provisions for penal consequences in cases of non compliance. Consequently, this decision is routinely ignored or violated by trial courts. The absence of clear consequences for non compliance and liabilities imposed on errant courts renders this decision a toothless directive, existing merely as an inert provision in legal statutes.

4. Similarly, in A.Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S.Chellappan (2000 (3) KLT OnLine 1052 (SC) = 2000 (7) SCC 695), decided on 19th September 2000, the Honorable Supreme Court held that “if an ex parte order of injunction is not disposed of on merit within one month from the date of appearance of the defendants, an appeal from that ex parte order of injunction will lie to the District Court.” However, when this option is pursued, the matter often languishes in the District Court for years. Furthermore, trial courts tend to refrain from passing orders in such interlocutory applications, citing the pendency of the matter before the District Court. This situation exacerbates delays, leaving parties to suffer due to judicial inaction or procedural lapses. It is a well-established principle of law that no party should be made to endure hardship due to the court’s inaction or failure to adhere to procedures established by law.

In Rahul Sui Shaw v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi (2021 (3) KLT 235 (SC) = 2021 (2) KLT OnLine 1050 (SC)), decided on 22nd April, 2021, the Honorable Supreme Court, by invoking Articles 141, 142, 144, and 227 of the Constitution of India, directed that “execution proceedings must be completed within six months from the date of filing, with extensions allowed only by recording reasons in writing for such delays. Furthermore, the Court instructed the High Courts to reconsider and update all rules relating to the execution of decrees under their powers within one year from the date of the order. To expedite execution proceedings”, the Supreme Court laid down 16 specific conditions. However, this decision remains a silent and unfulfilled directive. None of the execution courts have complied with these directions, and the High Court of Kerala, to date, has not taken steps to fulfill the prescribed conditions. Execution petitions continue to take years, and the Supreme Court’s dictum remains repeatedly violated without consequence.

6. In Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Vilasini(2022 (3) KLT 924 (SC)), decided on 13th June 2022, the Honorable Supreme Court emphasized that “once a preliminary decree is passed in a partition suit, the trial court must proceed suo motu to draw up the final decree. The Court held that there is no need for separate final decree proceedings; instead, the court should list the matter for action under Order XX Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code immediately after the preliminary decree”.

a) The Supreme Court further directed its Registry to forward a copy of the judgment to the Registrar Generals of all High Courts, who were instructed to circulate the directions to the concerned trial courts.

b) The Court observed that litigants seek actual relief, not merely paper decrees. For instance, in money suits, litigants expect to recover money; in partition suits, they expect possession of property. However, the current system often forces parties to undergo multiple proceedings, including preliminary decree proceedings, final decree applications, and execution processes, exhausting their resources and delaying justice for decades.

c) The Supreme Court highlighted that by the time a party secures a preliminary decree, they often lack the finances or energy to pursue final relief, contributing to considerable delays and undermining the civil justice system’s credibility. Both courts and lawyers should prioritize final decree proceedings and executions as much as the original suits.

d) The proverbial observation that “the difficulties of a litigant begin when they obtain a decree” remains relevant. Success in a suit is meaningless unless the party obtains actual relief.

7. Under Section 24 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it is stipulated that final orders in any proceedings should be passed within four months from the date of appearance of the parties, as far as practicable. However, this provision has become practically ineffective and warrants a constitutional review.

8. It is fortunate that most poor litigants remain unaware of these systemic shortcomings. If litigants were fully informed of these issues and began conducting their cases independently, the judiciary would struggle to address their grievances effectively. The loyalty of advocates to the judiciary ensures that these systemic problems remain largely unchallenged.

9. The Honorable Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the principle that “Lex non cogit ad impossibilia — the law does not compel a person to do what is impossible.”
In 2024 (5) KLT 111, the Court reaffirmed this principle, emphasizing that no one is bound to perform the impossible.

In conclusion, I hope the Honorable Supreme Court continues to deliver such landmark judgments, even as the trial courts and other judicial bodies persist in violating them. This ongoing disconnect underscores the urgent need for reform to uphold the rule of law and ensure justice is both timely and effective.

Frame  of Suit Based on Easement  of Necessity

 (By P.B. Menon, Advocate, Palakkad)   Mob. 9846544495

I am obliged to pen these few lines on this subject only out of my experience as a civil lawyer at the Bar in the course of the last nearly 75 years.

As a matter of fact in my said career I have not come across a single suit relating to easement of necessity having been filed with reference to Section 14 Indian Easement Act 1882 by any lawyer.

Whenever, due to partition or transfer splitting up of a holding as provided for in Section 13(a), (b) & (c) of the Indian Easement Act take place, an easement of necessity springs up in favour of the dominant tenement. In such cases what is seen generally done is to claim Easement of necessity over the existing way or road in the servient tenament. That I believe is not  proper or correct method, for Section 14 provides the right procedure. The  plaintiff who files the suit should issue a registered notice to the servient  tenament holder demanding him to set out  a way through his tenement which is reasonably convenient to the plaintiff dominant owner to have access to his plot,. and if he refuses ,neglects or fails to provide such a way the plaintiff can seek the aid of the court to set out such a way by issuing a commission to inspect and suggest a convenient way by filing a suit. That I believe is the real import and scope of Section 14. So to claim easement of necessity over the existing way and moulding the relief in the prayer portion so, is clearly wrong and unsustainable in law. Of course if the defendant has no such objection to allow the plaintiff to use the existing way there will be no problem at all. If you analyse the scope of  the section the real option is left with the servient owner of the tenement to set out  the way and the dominant owner has no right to insist upon the old existing way or any other way as he suggests. As a plaintiff, he can only  demand to set out a way through the servient tenant but can’t never  insist on a particular way according to his wishes. I feel that is the correct position in law.

In case a reader of this article feels otherwise please come up with his view to enlighten me on the subject which I warmly welcome.

Administrative Indifference to Mass Gatherings

(By Hariraj M.R., Senior Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
Email : harirajmr@gmail.com     Ph.: 9447072461

“The greatest failure of all is the failure to act when action is needed”.—John Wooden

The tragic incident involving Smt.Uma Thomas, Member of the Legislative Assembly, has once again underscored the negligence surrounding safety measures at public events. The immediate fallout has sparked discussions about the organizers’ failure to prevent such an accident. These conversations, predictably, will dominate the media for a short time. Social media may extend the discourse, but if history is any guide, the fervor will fade, leaving the root issues unresolved — until the next tragedy.

In 1999, a devastating stampede at Sabarimala claimed 53 lives. Public outrage was swift. A judicial commission was established, which recommended urgent safety improvements. Yet, these recommendations fell by the wayside as the event faded from public memory.

Twelve years later, on January 14, 2011, another stampede at the same location took 106 lives. Once again, the response was limited to declarations and token measures. In those 12 years, little had been done to address the glaring risks.

The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), in its 2014 guide on managing crowds at mass gatherings, emphasized:

“Crowd disasters are, in general, man-made and entirely preventable with proactive planning and flawless execution by well-trained personnel”.

Yet, governments at all levels have failed to implement and enforce mandatory safety protocols for mass gatherings. The Institute of Land and Disaster Management in Kerala published guidelines in 2015 specifically for safety at “religious gatherings”. Unfortunately, these guidelines remain just that—recommendations, often ignored. The suggested standard operating procedures are rarely implemented, reflecting a pattern of systemic apathy.

Curiously, these guidelines apply only to religious gatherings, as if other events are immune to such risks. Public gatherings—whether in theaters, exhibition grounds, or marathons—are equally vulnerable. The glaring issue is the absence of legally binding provisions mandating safety measures for any mass event.

A chilling example of this negligence is the 2023 tragedy at Cochin University of Science and Technology, where four lives were lost. As usual, there was outrage, cases were filed, and directives were issued to revise “campus event protocols”. However, no protocol with statutory authority existed then — or exists now — for mass gatherings in Kerala, whether on campuses, in public spaces, or at religious events.

The NDMA guidelines identify poor guard railings as a common structural cause of accidents at such events. Tragically, Smt.Uma Thomas’s severe injury was due to a complete lack of proper barricades, compounded by the presence of a poorly constructed, unauthorized structure. Even more appalling was the absence of basic medical facilities on-site. She had to be carried away without adequate first aid or a stretcher—an unthinkable lapse in an event hosting thousands.

Every such incident triggers criticism from uninvolved quarters and defensiveness from organizers. Yet, the underlying truth is undeniable: as a society, we are indifferent to safety. We resist safety mandates—whether helmets, seat belts, or crowd control measures. When accidents occur, we engage in predictable debates, which dissipate as soon as another issue grabs our attention.

The governments must act decisively. A robust statutory framework for mass gatherings is urgently needed. This framework must include the following key elements to ensure public safety:

a. Comprehensive Crowd Control Measures:Clear statutory provisions should mandate the use of proper barricades, designated entry and exit points, maximum capacity limits for venues, and emergency exit protocols. Advanced crowd management technologies, such should also be employed to predict and prevent overcrowding.

b. Effective Risk Assessment and Management: Every event should undergo a thorough risk assessment before it is approved. This should include identifying potential hazards, assessing the venue’s structural integrity, and evaluating emergency preparedness. Event organizers must be required to submit detailed safety plans to regulatory authorities for approval.

c. Interagency Co-ordination:Collaboration between law enforcement, disaster management authorities, medical services, and local administrative bodies need to be ensured for pre-event planning, realtime monitoring, and post-event assessments to ensure accountability and continuous improvement. A body with inter departmental representation must be tasked with the responsibility of approving such gatherings and imposing conditions on the organisers.

d. Rapid Response Mechanisms:Emergency medical facilities, including first-aid stations, ambulances, and trained paramedics, must be mandatory at all large gatherings. A well-defined evacuation plan should be in place, with rehearsals conducted to ensure seamless execution during an emergency. Trained hands must be ensured onsite for effective response without delay.

e. Strict Legal Accountability: Laws governing mass gatherings must impose stringent penalties for negligence, including fines, suspension of licenses, even without any accident occurring and, in severe cases, criminal charges must be brought against organizers and officials responsible for lapses.

f. Learn from Mistakes :Every accident or mishap must lead to a detailed investigation and study based on which the protocols for safety are continuously revised.

g. Public Awareness Campaigns: Awareness campaigns should promote responsiblebehaviour, such as avoiding overcrowding, following signage, and adhering to safety guidelines. Attendees must be empowered to report safety violations without fear of reprisal.

Action must be purposeful and swift. Lives lost in preventable tragedies are a permanent reminder of our collective failure to prioritize safety. With political will and administrative commitment, these measures can transform how mass gatherings are organized, making them safer for everyone. Action must be purposeful and swift, for, as George Santayana warned,

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

 Delayed Verdicts in Reserved Judgments – Some Judicial Dimensions

(By O.V. Radhakrishnan, Senior Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
Email : ovrradhika@yahoo.com    Ph.: 0484 – 2390318

‘Delayed verdicts in reserved judgments’ is a constitutional conundrum for want of suitable measures in the Constitution specifying a dead-line for delivery of judgment from the date the case is reserved for judgment. The constitution does not put a strict time-limit on the delivery of judgment once the entire process of participation in the justice delivery system is over.  The litigants suffer persecution for justice stake on account of the inordinate, unexplained and negligent delay in pronouncing the judgment.  I should like to include a quote from  Walter S.Landor “Delay of justice is injustice.”   

In State of Orissa v. Binapairi Dei¹  the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “If there is a power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power.  If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity.  That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case.” When a litigant approached the Court for getting his grievances redressed and is made to wait for judgment after arguments on both sides are concluded and reserved the case for judgment to an uncertain future is disastrous.  The pronouncement of the judgement is a part of the justice dispensation system and the delay in disposal of cases may shake every confidence in the judicial system which is tragically ignored by some Judges.  

A judgment of distant days offends against the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, that an act of the court shall prejudice none. The ‘inordinate, unexplained and negligent delay’ in protracting the pronouncement of the judgment for the period ranging from 4 months to 12 months and above since the date of posting the case for judgment is highly undesirable, bad in law and infringes the objectives of Delivery of Justice and its Speedy Reach.

In R.C.Sharma v. Union of India²the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled: “12...........Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances is highly undesirable even when written statements are submitted.  It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considered important may have escaped notice.  But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of the litigation.  This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we have often observed, must not
only be done but must manifestly, appear to be done.” 

In Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani v. HPA International³ the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “A long delay in delivery of the judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations in the minds of the parities to a case.  Moreover, the appellants whose appeal have been dismissed by the High Court may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the Bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgement – nearly after five years.” 

In Anil Rai v. State of Bihar⁴the Apex Court ruled: “4. It has been held time and again that justice should not only be done but should also appear to have been done.  Similarly, whereas justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is even worse than that. ..........but once the entire process of participation in the justice delivery system is over and the only thing to be done is the pronouncement of judgment, no excuse can be found to further delay for adjudication of the rights of the parities, particularly when it affects any of their rights conferred by the Constitution under Part III. ”     “7.  Adverse effect of the problem of not pronouncing the reserved judgments within a reasonable time was considered by the Arrears Committee constituted by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Chief Justice’ Conference.  In its report of 1989-90, Chapter VIII, the Committee recommended that reserved judgments should ordinarily be pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date conclusion of the arguments.  If, however, a reserved judgment is not pronounced for a period of three months from the date of conclusion of the arguments, the Chief Justice was recommended to be authorised to either post the case for delivering judgment in open court or withdraw the case and post it for disposal before an appropriate Bench.”  “10. Under the prevalent circumstances, in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court.  Such guidelines, as for the present, are as under:

(i)   The Chief Justice of the High Court may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court Officer concerned.

(ii)  That Chief Justice of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month.

(iii)On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter.  The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information.  Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.

(iv)Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months from the date reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with a prayer for early judgment.  Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

(v)  If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments.  It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances.

 11. We hope and trust that the above guidelines shall be strictly followed and implemented, considering them as self-imposed restraints.”

Regarding the aspect of delay in pronouncing judgments after a conclusion of arguments, Thomas J reiterated the above guidelines for providing added emphasis to them.  It has been clarified that the above enumerated measures are intended to remain only until such time as Parliament would enact measures to deal with the problem. 

The financial cost to be incurred by the litigants as a result of releasing a case after it has been heard over a long period and judgement has been reserved compounds not merely the delay but also expense for parties to incur to engage a counsel for a fresh round of hearing/s which is an aspect deserves serious consideration.

We may note at this point that the Constitution of India remains unexpressed regarding the contingency when Supreme Court and High Court Judges do not pronounce judgments promptly. It is necessarily for the obvious reason that the founding fathers of the Constitution reposed great trust and confidence on the sense of responsibility and accountability of the Supreme Court and High Court Judges occupying the seat of justice in discharging their constitutional obligations. The Judges will have to hold to the trust and confidence reposed on them and are all the more accountable for delivering judgments with promptitude.

Article 226(3) of the Constitution lays down that when a party against whom an ex parte interim Order is made and that party makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such Order, the High Court shall dispose of that application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of the such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim Order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. Article 226(3) is confined to ex parte interim Orders only and does not cover cases where ex parte interim Order is not initially granted. A provision unprovided for in the Constitution fixing a time-frame between the date of final hearing of a case and the date of delivery of the judgment arouses much public concern and disconcert to the litigants. It is for the Parliament to exercise constituent power to provide a suitable provision in the Constitution to ensure that delay in justice delivery system is not caused. Unreasonable delay in handing down judgment every so often makes the final decision of the Court completely unpredictable wild card.

Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking that the Judges might have acted with unwarranted casualness and indifference. Sometimes, the Judges themselves forget points of vital importance and points of details argued at the time of hearing and the arguments developed brick by brick become obliterated by passage of time. The lessons made manifest by experience are that the Judges forget the details of the facts and niceties of the legal points advanced when the interval between the date of hearing of the case and the date of judgment is too long.  The judges have prodigious deal of time for delivery of judgments at their disposal.  And yet, reserved judgments continue, in the words of the Supreme Court itself, to “remain consigned to hibernation.”   

The blighting effect of reserving judgements to an undated future was considered by the Arrears Committee constituted by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Chief Justices’ Conference. The Committee in its Report (1989-1990) published by the Supreme Court of India-1990 recommended:  RESERVED JUDGEMENTS – STATUTORY LIMIT FOR PPRONOUNCEMENT – “8.27 Reserved judgment should ordinarily be pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments.  If, however, a reserved judgment is not pronounced for a period of three months from the date of the conclusion of the arguments, the Chief Justice may either post the case for delivering judgment in open court, or withdraw the case and post it for disposal before an appropriate Bench.  It is desirable than appropriate rule or statutory provision is made in this behalf.” 

Indubitably, pronouncement of judgments promptly is an essential attribute of speedy justice. Constant delay and equivocation affect the judicial business which should be dispatched with swiftness. High Courts and Supreme Court are untrammelled by any rule or law regarding the period for pronouncement of judgments or orders but is only trammelled by judicially evolved rules of conscience in the absence of a provision in that behalf in the Constitution.

This desideratum is feasible provided Parliament vest with the constituent power under Article 368 of the Constitution to amend the Constitution add a provision prescribing time-limit for delivery of judgement since the date the case is reserved for judgement after final hearing of the case. The necessity to deliver judgments immediately after the hearing is over, is sine qua non of   the concept of the rule of law.

 It’s high time for the Parliament to exercise its constituent power to amend the Constitution to meet the situational needs and to provide for the particular situation to ensure just delivery of justice.  It is the responsibility of the legal system to provide its seekers justice, in letter and spirit and that the delivery of justice should be reasonable, quick and just but never without quality.  It is indispensable for the system to survive and to go on.

Foot Notes:

1.  State of Orissa v. Binapairi Dei (1967 KLT OnLine 1228 (SC) = AIR 1967 SC 1269).

2.  R.C.Sharma v. Union of India  (AIR 1976 SC 2037).

3. Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani v. HPA International (2000 (1) KLT SN 50 (C.No. 56) SC = (2000) 2 SCC 13).

4. Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001 (3) KLT SN 15 (C.No. 21 (SC) = (2001) 7 SCC 318).