The Competition Law IPR Interface : The Ericsson Case and its Aftermath

(By Dr.Raju Narayana Swamy, IAS)

E-mail : narayanan5@ias.nic.in   Mob.: 9447010602

Introduction

IP and competition laws share the same economic rationale. Both are founded with the purpose of promoting innovation and achieving economic development, technological advancement and consumer welfare. IPR is an intangible right protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect. It gives its owner the right to exclude others from access to or the use of protected subject matter for a limited period of time. This includes copyrights, patents, trademarks, industrial designs and trade secrets. Competition law on the other hand involves formulating a set of policies which promote competition in the market. These are aimed at preventing unfair trade practices. Well designed and effective competition laws promote the creation of an enabling business environment which improves static and dynamic efficiencies and leads to efficient resource allocation.

The relation between IPR and competition law has been described as an unhappy marriage. The former may be seen to promote monopolies while the latter is designed to oppose them. To put it more succinctly, IPRs by designating boundaries within which competitors may exercise legal exclusivity over their innovation appear to be against the principles of static market access and level playing fields sought by competition rules. In fact, the tension between competition policy and IPR dates back to the days when the statute of Monopolies 1624 was enacted in England. It prohibited monopolies, but permitted ‘patent monopolies’. But as Martin Khor puts it, a trade off may exist between achieving static efficiency through competition and long term efficacy through growth and innovation. 

Broadly their interface can be seen from two main perspectives:

i.  the impact of IPRs in shaping the discipline of competition law.

ii. the application of competition law on the post-grant use of IPRs.

    In fact IPR- related competition issues include

(a) Exclusionary terms in the licensing of IPRs- specifically the inclusion in licensing contracts of restrictive clauses such as territorial restraints, exclusive dealing arrangements, tying or grant back requirements.

(b) Use of IPRs to reinforce or extend the abuse of dominant position in the market unlawfully.

(c) IPRs as an element of mergers.

(d) Refusal to deal.

There are generally two approaches that have been adopted to prevent IPR abuse: compulsory licensing and parallel imports. The former is an involuntary contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the state. The latter refers to goods brought into a country without the authorization of the patent, trademark or copyright holders after those goods were placed legitimately into the market elsewhere.

The International Scenario

Internationally the interface between IPR and competition law is governed by the TRIPS Agreement. Members are allowed to take appropriate measures consistent with the TRIPS to prevent abuse of IPRs by right holders.  Article 31 of TRIPS provides for the grant of compulsory licenses under a variety of situations which include:-

(a) Anticompetitive practices by the patentees or their assignees.

(b) National emergencies.

(c) The interest of public health.

(d) Nil or inadequate exploitation of the patent in another country.

(e) Overall national interest.

Article 40 of TRIPS deals with anticompetitive practices in contractual licenses. In addition Article 30 permits Members to create limited exceptions to patent rights. In fact, critics consider Article 30 to be the relevant provision enabling Members to address abusive practices in acquiring and exploiting IPRs.

The Indian Position

The Indian Competition Act incorporates an exception for IPRs under Section 3(5) based on the rationale that IPRs deserve to be cocooned since a failure to do so would disturb the all – important incentive for innovation. The said provision reads as follows:-

“Nothing contained in this section shall restrict-

(i) the right of any person to restrain any infringement of or to impose reasonable conditions as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights which have been or may be conferred upon him under

(a) the Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957).

(b) the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970).

(c) the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999).

(d) the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 (48 of 1999).

(e) the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000).

(f) the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout – Design Act, 2000 (37 of 2000)

(ii)  the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent to which the agreement relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services for such export.”

Thus under Section 3 (anti-competitive agreements), IPRs have been protected to the extent that they are reasonable. Unreasonable conditions contained in an agreement will not be protected. On the other hand when an enterprise enjoys a dominant position and is thus covered by Section 4 (abuse of dominant position), it enjoys no immunity for its IPRs. This has been confirmed by the CCI in the Automobiles decision rendered on 25 August 2014. However, experts feel that the language used by the CCI in the said decision - which suggests that the existence of IPR is completely irrelevant to the analysis under Section 4 -is questionable.

It is worth mentioning here that under Section 27 of the Competition Act, the CCI  has the authority to penalize IPR holders who abuse their dominant position.   A fact to be noted is that there is no clause in Section 4 on the ground of public interest or IPR abuse as a reason for interference. Action can taken only when there is ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’.

A critique of IPR exemption under Section 3(5)

Pharma industry experts often lament that “owing to the blanket exemption under Section 3(5), the square peg of any anti-competitive practice tethered to the use of IPRs must now be brought through the round hole of  “abuse of dominant position” under Section 4”. While one can sympathize with the emotion, this is perhaps a very narrow and cynical view. True, Section 3 remains puzzling in as much as it goes against the MRTP commission precedent under the old Act which held that the Commission (and by extension the Competition Commission of today) had complete and unfettered jurisdiction to entertain a complaint regarding IPRs. However it needs to be mentioned that Section 3(5) does not give protection to unregistered IPRs such as unregistered trademarks. Even with respect to registered IPRs, the language of Section 3(5) suggests that it contains an exception (viz) the right to impose reasonable conditions. The expression “reasonable conditions” has not been defined or explained in the Act and has to be decided by the CCI on a case to case basis. For instance in the Multiplex Association case   the movie producers argued that the decision  to  not release any movies was reasonable to protect their copyright in the movies and thus valid under Section 3(5). The CCI held that IP laws do not have any absolute overriding effect on competition law and found cartel – like activity in the Indian film industry. The rights guarantees under Section 14 of the Copyright Act do not allow IP holders to act arbitrary and inconsistent with the provisions of competition law. It was held that the Act exempts the provision with respect to anti – competitive agreement in only limited circumstances (ie.) to protect the rights conferred by the relevant IP statutes.

In Shamsher Kataria v. Honda/Volkswagen/Fiat India and others for instance the CCI decided on whether the OEM’s (Original Equipment Manufacturer) claim over IPR exemption passes the reasonability test engrained in Section 3(5)(i) of the Act. It was observed that the concept of protection of an IPR under Section 3(5)(i) is qualified by the word ‘necessary’. So the question that one should ask is: Can the IPR holder protect his IPR even if such restriction was not present? Applying that test, CCI did not find merit in the OEM’s contention. It was noted that what the OESs (Original Equipment Suppliers), sell to the open market are spare parts which are finished products (bumpers, bonnet / hoods, car gears, fog lights etc). The IP required by the OESs to manufacture a spare part will be protected contractually pursuant to the agreement between the OEM and the OES and allowing OESs to sell the finished products in the open market may not affect that agreement as such.

It needs to be mentioned here that the CCI in their advocacy measures has provided an illustrative/indicative list of practices that may be unreasonable under Section 3(5).These include:-

(a) Patent pooling.

(b) Forcing licensees to acquire particular goods (unpatented materials) solely from the patentee.

(c) Payment of royalty beyond patent expiry.

(d) Subjecting a license to the condition that the validity of IPR in question cannot be challenged.

(e) Limiting the maximum amount of use the licensee may make of the patented invention.

The CCI has also clarified that the IPR must have been conferred on the holder prior to the exception being availed. Interestingly the Patents Act, 1970 explicitly prohibits certain licensing arrangements under Section 140. These include (among others) coercive package licensing and mandating exclusive grant back. It needs to be mentioned here that the Patents Act declares these conditions void and in principle not within the scope of patent rights. In such cases, the exemption under Section 3(5) of the Competition Act will not come to the rescue of the licensing parties.

Worth mentioning here is the issues of ‘trade secret’. The Director General’s Report points out that since ‘trade secret’ does not find a mention in Section 3(5), it ought not be protected. Notably the aforesaid section protects rights conferred by specific statutes and trade secret protection in India is not governed by any specific statute. Thus prima facie it appears to be excluded from protection. Nonetheless an argument can be made that even outside the scope of the said section the existence of trade secrets could be a relevant factor in assessing appreciable adverse effect on competition especially since the Apex Court has recognised reasonable protection against exploitation of trade secret. 

India’s IPR related competition litigation

It was the Aamir Khan Production v. The Director General that opened a plethora of cases dealing with IP and competition issues in India. In the said case the Bombay High Court held that the CCI has the jurisdiction to deal with competition cases involving IPR. In Kingfisher v. Competition Commission of India also it was held that all the issues that rose before the Copyright Board could also be considered before the CCI.

In yet another case, the CCI took a diminutive stand on DTH (Direct To Home) operators in India. The said operators were exonerated based on the argument that there is no such concept as ‘collective dominance’ in the Competition Act of India. It is very much doubtful whether the CCI decision is at par with similar in comparable jurisdictions. To be true to facts, the Indian jurisprudence on the subject can be classified under the following major heads:-

Abuse of dominant position

The law firm Singhania & Partners LLP filed a complaint with the CCI against Microsoft India, alleging anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominance in the Indian market with regard to their software - Windows Operating System and Windows Office. The COMPAT (Competition Appellate Tribunal) upheld the CCI ruling that Microsoft did not abuse its dominant position regarding its software license in an order dated 9th October 2012. In fact the said case was decided in favour of Microsoft despite the fact that Microsoft was facing adverse rulings in other jurisdiction like US and EU.

The Delhi High Court in  the Hawkins case   dealt with an allegation by the plaintiff that the defendant company was using the plaintiff`s trade mark “Hawkins” on their products which were pressure cooker gaskets. The Court held that a well-known mark cannot create a market monopoly due to its reputation. If it does create a monopoly it cannot use this economic strength to control the ancillary markets, then it would be considered as an abuse of dominant position.

(b) Refusal to grant IP license

Refusals when limited to decisions of a single entity would have to be examined under Section 4.  But where the refusals involve multiple entities (ie) group boycott the examination may proceed under both Sections 3 & 4 of the Act. The IMS Health Case   however put three conditions to be satisfied for declaring a refusal as an abuse of dominant position. They are:

1. That the refusal to license is preventing the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand.

2. That it is unjustified and

3. That such refusal excludes competition in the secondary market.

Complications abound in this area because of lack of guidelines from CCI and due to the fact that this subject matter is addressed in some IP legislations. To quote an example, under Section 84 of the Indian Patents Act 1970, the Controller of Patents has the power to grant compulsory license after expiry of 3 years from grant of patent in case the patented invention does not meet the ‘ reasonable requirements of the public ‘ or ‘is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price’ or ‘is not worked in the territory of India’. It is worth mentioning in this context that in 2012, the Controller of Patents granted a compulsory license to Bayer’s patent covering a cancer drug to a generic Indian drug manufacturer on all three grounds.

The Copyright Act, 1957 contains similar provisions through of a narrower scope. Compulsory license may be issued pursuant to Section 31(1)(b) of the said Act. It is worth mentioning here that this provision extends only to certain types of a copyrighted works and not all. In Music Broadcast Pvt. Ltd v. Phonographic Performance Ltd. (a 2010 decision), the Copyright Board issued compulsory license to musical works in favour of the FM radio industry on a revenue sharing model (ie) 2% of the net advertisement earnings of each FM radio station would be set aside to pay the music providers.

Other IP legislations however do not carry such explicit provisions.

(c) Excessive pricing and predatory pricing

Predatory pricing is a strategy – that entails a temporary price below the cost of production in order to injure competition and thereby reap higher profits in the long run. It was considered by the MRTP Act as a restrictive trade practice. However, overpricing of any patented product per se is not violative of any competition provisions.  But keeping the pricing of patented and branded generics outside the scope of price control is a major concern particularly in developing countries in the area of life saving drugs.

(d) Implications of merger control

Technology transfer agreements and other acquisition of IPRs may require the approval of CCI. Such transactions must be reviewed to check whether sanction is needed from a merger control perspective under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act.

(e) The Novartis Case and evergreening

The Novartis case raised the issue of extended patent application with the evergreening effects and excessive pricing of proprietary medicine. It was an eye-opener for developing countries like India.

Mention also needs to be made here of trade dress as a barrier to competition. In a country like India, colour plays a significant role in patient retention and consumer loyalty. For example, the use of a purple coloured inhaler is a sure way of keeping an asthmatic patient handcuffed to a brand for life if the colour of the inhaler is protected as a trademark even after the patent on the drug empires and other cheaper and perhaps even more effective alternatives are available albeit in different coloured inhalers. To put it a bit differently, the use of a colour, shape or trademark extends a patent monopoly for every patient who either has no choice once the doctor prescribes a drug or device or suffers from such a medical condition that a change would be extremely disruptive of his treatment regimen, causing him to reject the choice of cheaper alternatives.

The Judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court

It is worth mentioning in this context that a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court vide its judgment dated 13th July 2023 in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v. Competition Commission of India over turned an earlier decision (delivered on 30th  March 2016) by a single judge bench who had maintained the CCI’s jurisdiction in patent-related disputes. Ericsson which was being investigated by the CCI for possible abuses of dominance in patent licensing had challenged the Commission’s jurisdiction through a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) from the order of the single bench. They contended that patent matters are exclusively the responsibility of the Controller of Patents. The single judge, it needs to be mentioned here, was emphatic in culling out that there were differences between the remedies available under Section 84 of the Patents Act 1970 (provisions pertaining to compulsory licensing) and those described in Section 27 of the Competition Act. The remedies are not mutually exclusive, individuals have the option to seek redress under both if desired.

In its judgment dated 13th July 2023, the High Court observed that the Competition Act and Patents Act are specialized statutes in competition and patents. A special reference was made to an amendment carried out in 2003 to the Patents Act. The High Court found that when the legislature introduced Chapter XVI of the Patents Act in 2003 - a year after the Competition Act was passed – it was evident what the legislature intended. The goal was to turn the Patents Act into a unique piece of law. The Court concluded that the Patents Act supersedes the Competition Act with respect to the exercise of patentee rights as it viewed the Patents Act as a special legislation and applied the legal precept lex posterior derogate priori. By accepting Ericsson’s appeals, the Court invalidated the CCI’s jurisdiction over such matters.

Legal experts however are of the view that the logic that the Patents Act came later is flawed. To be true to facts, the Gazette of India notification for inclusion of Chapter XVI of the Patents Act was made through the publishing of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002. It received the assent of the President on 25 June 2002 and was published in the Gazette on the same day. On the other hand the Competition Act received the assent of the President on 13 January 2003 and was published in the Gazette of India the next day. Thus it is crystal clear that the Competition Act was the later statute. Moreover, according to Section 60 of the Competition Act, its provisions supersede and have the upper hand over any conflicting provisions found in other laws that were in existence. This Section was brought into effect after Chapter XVI of the Patents Act was enacted. Thus a plain reading of the head note of Section 60 tells us that the competition law will have an overriding effect on Chapter XVI of the Patents Act.

In fact, the powers of the Controller are personal in nature as opposed to being in rem like those of CCI. Thus CCI may have superior capabilities in monitoring patent cartels compared to the Controller. The Competition Act does not contradict the broader objective of the Patents Act. If a hierarchy is established among the legislations, the significant differences in the content of their substantive provisions may be disregarded and collaborative anti -competitive agreements involving patents may go unregulated.

Conclusion

Competition law can play a proactive role in arresting the abuse of monopoly rights granted by IPR. Through IP rights are necessary for furthering efficiency and development in a market, their potential to lead to anti-competitive outcomes cannot be ruled out. This is all the more relevant now that Courts have settled the principle that the interest of the consumer and competition in the market are of supreme importance and cannot be sacrificed. Needless to say, one cannot operate like a cartel in the name of ‘collective bargaining’ which is what happened in the FICCI Multiplex case. India can use compulsory licensing provisions in case of excessive pricing of any products including copyrighted and patented software. Tying arrangements should be dealt with using competition provisions. Specific guidelines need to be promulgated by the CCI in cases involving both IP and Competition.  Only then can the conflicts in the overlapping zones of competition law and IPR be resolved and their interaction be brought to a level that is neither conflicting nor aimed at one replacing the other. This confluence can draw attention to the intricate connection between fostering market competition and safeguarding IPR. For this Utopia to come true what is needed is deeds not words and the political will accompanied by the administrative acumen to execute.

 References

1. K.D.Raju, “The Inevitable Connection Between Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Emerging Jurisprudence and Lessons for India”, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol.18, March 2013.

2. Regibeau Pierre and Rocket Katharine, “The relationship between intellectual property law and competition law: An economic approach” www.essex.ac.uk/ /discussion-papers/papers...dp 581.pdf.

3. Buckleg Meg, “Licensing Intellectual Property: Competition and definitions of abuse of a dominant position in the United States and the European Union, “ Brooklyn Journal of International, 29 (2004)(2)797.

4. Kingfisher v. Competition Commission of India, Writ Petition No.1785 of 2009.

5. Manju Bharadwaj v. Zee Telefilms Ltd. (1996) 20 CLA 229.

6. Dr. Vallal Peruman v. Godfrey Phillips (India) Ltd. (1995) 16 CLA 201.

7. Hartej Singh Kochher and Anuttama Ghose, “Traversing Jurisdictional Boundaries: Unravelling Delhi High Court’s Verdict on Competency of Competition Commission of India in Patent Affairs”, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol 29, November 2024.

8. Schwartz H.M. “Wealth and secular stagnation: The role of industrial organization and intellectual property rights,” The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 2 (6) 2016.

9. Mehta P.S., “Interface between competition policy and Intellectual Property Rights: Select Case Studies from India”, Corridors of Knowledge for Peace an Development, 2020.

10. CCI v. Bharati Airtel, Civil Appeal No.11843 of 2018 (2019 (1) KLT OnLine 3077 (SC)).

[i] Kaha Zorina, Federal anti-trust agencies and public policy towards anti-trust and intellectual property, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 9 (1999)133

[ii] Martin Khor, Intellectual property, competition and development www.twnside.org.sg/ title2/par/mk002.doc

[iii] Pursuant to the general considerations in paragraph 1 of the TRIPS preamble read with Art 8 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement

[iv] FICCI - Multiplex Association of India vs United Producers Distributors Forum and others (Case No. 1 of 2009 decided on 25.05.2011)

[v] Case No.3 of 2011

[vi] Niranjan Shankar v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. (1967) 2 SCR 378.

[vii] 2010 (112) Bom. LR 3778

[viii] Writ Petition No.1785 of 2009

[ix] Hawkins Cookers Ltd v. Murugan Enterprises (2008) 36 PTC 290 (Del.)

[x]  Case C – 418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECR I – 5039.

[xi] Dr.B.Jayakrishnan, Asthma Inhalers And Colour Coding: Universal Data, 60 (578) Br J Gen Pract 690-691(Sep.1,2010) available athttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 2930244/.

[xii] Case No.LPA 247/2016 (Del.).

[xiii] W.P.(C) Nos. 464/2014 & 1006/2014. 

Comments on Altruism and Community Service as A Punishment
under  Section 4(f) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

(By Sajeer H.,Law Officer, Local Self Government Department, Principal Directorate, Thiruvananthapuram)

E-mail : advsajeer@gmail.com     Mob.: 9447584730

Community service is one form of punishment outlined in the Bhatariya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, among six specific offences. Although the term “community service” is not defined within the legislation, the lawmakers intentionally left its definition ambiguous to avoid being constrained by a narrow interpretation. Many jurists and legal practitioners have questions regarding the procedures for assigning community service as a punishment. Specifically, they are uncertain about how the accused will be monitored during this process and who will certify that they have successfully completed their community service and feel remorse for their past actions.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita specifies six offences that empower a Magistrate to assign community service to those found guilty. These offences are outlined in Sections 202, 209, 226, the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 303, Sections 355, and 356 of the Sanhita.

Section 202 states that, if a public servant, who is legally bound not to engage in trade, does so, they shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or fine, or both, or with community service.

Section 209 indicates that anyone who fails to appear at the specified place and time, as required by a proclamation published under sub-section (1) of Section 84 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or fine, or both, or with community service.

According to Section 226, anyone who attempts to commit suicide with the intent to compel or restrain a public servant from performing their official duty shall be punished with simple imprisonment a term which may extend to one year, or fine, or both, or with community service.

The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 303 states that in cases of theft where the value of the stolen property is less than five thousand rupees and the individual is a first-time offender, they shall be punished with community service upon returning or restoring the stolen property. Additionally, if the value of the property is below five thousand rupees, the offence is bailable, compoundable, and non-cognizable.

Section 355 also mentions community service. It states that if an individual, in a state of intoxication, appears in any public place or in a place where they are trespassing, and conducts themselves in a manner that causes annoyance to any person, they may be punished with simple imprisonment a term which may extend to 24 hours, or a fine of up to one thousand rupees, or both, or with community service.

Section 356(2) of the Sanhita states that anyone who defames another person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term that may extend to two years, or with a fine, or with both, or by performing community service.

Upon reviewing these provisions, it can be observed that the punishment of community service is not meant to stand alone; rather, it is to be combined with a sentence, except in the case of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 303 of the Sanhita. It is important to note that community service is rooted in altruism and is intended for social service purposes. It should not be regarded merely as a punishment.

The significance of community service was brought to light by the Pakwasa Committee in 1949, which recommended that inmates in jails be engaged in roadwork and suggested providing small remuneration for their labour.

In the case of Babu Singh v. State of U.P. reported in (1978 KLT OnLine 1051 (SC) = AIR 1978 SC 527), the Supreme Court encouraged the adoption of alternatives to imprisonment, such as community service. It also advocated for practices like meditation and study sessions to help rehabilitate offenders. Furthermore, the Malimath Committee recommended integrating community service into sentencing.

Community service offers a unique opportunity to address the ego of an accused individual, especially when facing trials for offences that provide them with psychological satisfaction or amusement. By engaging in community service, the accused can be reintegrated into mainstream society and accepted by the community. The ideals of love, compassion, mercy, and service can be revived through this concept.

In Venkateswaran v. State, reported in (2025 KLT OnLine 1138 SC), the Supreme Court directed the petitioner, while applying for bai, to undertake coaching at colleges and government higher secondary schools. In Saji v. State of Kerala reported in (2023 (6) KLT 567), the Honourable High Court ordered an accused, convicted under Sections 279 and 304A of the I.P.C., to perform community service at the District Hospital of Pathanamthitta for four days each month starting from January 2024.

The idea of community service as a form of punishment is an innovative proposal by Parliament, although it was not extensively explained. In simple terms, community services can be categorized into two types: direct services and indirect services.

Direct services involve individuals actively engaging in helping others. This includes preparing and serving food to the poor and needy without payment, tutoring children without accepting remuneration, assisting patients in hospitals, representing clients without fees, offering aid to those in distress, and cleaning public places such as schools, bus stands, and railway stations, among other similar tasks.

Indirect services, on the other hand, involve supporting efforts to help those in need from behind the scenes. This could include building free hospitals, establishing shelters for the underprivileged, providing financial assistance for weddings, raising funds for national welfare, supporting students financially, and engaging in charitable work.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, while not specifying the actual methods of community service, implies that direct community service actions were intended by the legislature.

There are several possible methods of community service that we can propose. These are questions to be raised by both the bench and the bar.

1. Serving in Geriatric Wards:

This is a valuable form of community service. Individuals who are sentenced for offences could be directed to assist in geriatrics wards for at least four to five days each month. This service would be beneficial for those who require attention and care. The superintendent of the hospital should be instructed to monitor these individuals’ service and report their performance and character to the court.

2. Cleaning Public Places:

Accused individuals may be assigned to clean public areas, such as hospitals, schools, and public restrooms, as well as to remove graffiti from walls. Proper directives should be given to the heads of these institutions to oversee the service and report on the accused’s work.

3. Serving Food to the Needy:

The accused should be directed to prepare and serve food free of charge to underprivileged individuals four to five days each month.

4. Providing Education on the Dangers of Drugs:

The accused could conduct educational classes for school and college students on the harmful effects of drug use and lead campaigns aimed at drug eradication.

Benefits of Community Service:

Community service can alleviate the burden on the justice system and reduce rates of recidivism. Engaging with those in need may instil a sense of repentance in offenders, encouraging them to reform and adopt better character.

Additionally, agencies benefit from the labour provided by offenders. Creative activities can enhance societal welfare without requiring monetary support or additional manpower from the government.

Community service can also increase public support. Although offenders may be compelled to perform these services, their continued engagement can foster positive changes within the community.

Moreover, it saves public funds that would otherwise be spent on incarceration. Imprisoning individuals offers no advantage to the public, whereas allowing them to serve society can lead to significant benefits and contribute to uplifting the community.

Finally, community service can contribute to a safer and more secure environment for all residents.

Risks of Community Services

Community services present several challenges. Firstly, the issue of monitoring is a primary concern. Offenders are required to report to the head of the office for certain types of community service. It is the responsibility of the head of the department (HOD) to closely monitor the activities of these individuals.

Secondly, the process of issuing a certificate upon completion of community service can lead to confusion and frustration. If the head of the department or the supervisor has not submitted a report confirming the completion of the service, the offender may be left waiting for a positive evaluation. This delay can result in public teasing, and people around the offender may refuse to associate with them.

Additionally, if offenders are reintegrated into society without adequate monitoring, there is a risk they may re-offend. For habitual offenders, community service alone may not be effective in changing their behaviour unless they are willing to make a conscious effort to do so.

Conclusion

Community service is generally viewed as a more acceptable alternative to incarceration, which often involves the misuse of public funds. Currently, community service is limited to six minor offences as outlined in the BNS. Expanding this list to include additional offences—such as those defined in sections 79 (acts intended to insult the modesty of women), 82(2) (remarrying during the lifetime of a spouse), 85 (subjecting a woman to cruelty), 270 (public nuisance), and 296 (obscene acts and songs)—could enhance the benefits of the Act for society as a whole.

PIG Menace - An Issue Created Out of A Non-Issue

(By K.M. Sudhees Babu, Advocate, Adoor)
E-mail : kmsudheesbabu@gmail.com     Mob.: 9495835962

In India pigs (Sus scrofa) are considered as a serious and significant problem in many human settlements as they cause huge damage to crops and agricultural lands. Predominantly in our State they cause a major threat to the life and property of common man. In fact among the States, wild animal - human conflict is at its peak in Kerala. Agricultural activities have come to a halt in almost all areas. The prices of vegetables and other agricultural products are skyrocketing in our State. Our Legislature unanimousy passed a resolution requesting the Centre to declare wild boars (Sus scrofa) as vermin. But nothing happened till date except an escalation in the menace caused by such pigs. So we are concerned about an effective remedy.

If we analyse the present situation in the light of the Wild Life Protection Act 1972 we will certainly come to the ineluctable conclusion that the present sorry state of affairs is the result of the inept handling of affairs by the concerned authorities.

Here damage is caused by two categories of pigs belonging to the species Sus scrofa which is specified as Item No.19. wild pig (Sus scrofa) in Schedule III of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 . One category is those which invade human areas from their habitat, ie; from the forest, for food and then returning to their habitat. The other is the pig community of the same species that have settled permanently in human settlements abandoning for ever their habitat. About ninety percent of the present day problem is created by such pigs. It is crucial to examine whether such pigs, can be counted as wild animals.

Before the amendment of the definition “wild animals in the Wild Life Act in 2003 it was -(36)” wild animal” means any animal found wild in nature and includes any animal specified in Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule IV or Schedule V, wherever found. So all animals found in the wild and all animals specified in the Schedules, irrespective of the place where they were found, were wild animals. As far as the first part of the then definition is concerned habitat alone was the criteria to decide whether an animal is wild or not. The deciding factor for the second part was the inclusion of the name of the animal in any Schedule. Hence all scheduled animals settled in a cultivating land, in any part of a building, in a well or in any human creation were wild animals then Habitat was irrelevant. It really was an absurd definition as it deprives a person of his right to property guaranteed by Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Besides it offends Article 21 of the Constitution which is a fundamental right to Protect Life and Personal Liberty.

After all this definition was amended in the year 2003 to -“ wild animal” means any animal specified in schedules I to IV and found wild in nature . Now unless any animal is not specified in any Schedule from I to IV and not found wild in nature it is not a wild animal. Hence one doubt that can be raised is whether the words “found in nature is related to habit of such animals. But if we analyse the earlier definition of  wild animal as it existed prior to 2003 and other aspects it can be seen that such a proposition is unfounded.

The meaning of the word wild in Oxford dictionary is – (of an animal or plant) in its original natural state, not domesticated or cultivated . Another one is -living or growing in the natural environment , not domesticated or cultivated . Nature means the phenomenon or the physical world collectively including plants, animals, landscapes and other features and products of earth as opposed to humans and human creations. Everything including cultivation, building , well etc. in human settlements are human creations. So wild animals or wild life cannot exist in its natural state or natural environment in human areas where everything is human creation.

The words “wherever found‟ used in the definition of “wild animal‟ prior to 2003 is important. “Wherever ‟ is a word that can be used in relation to place alone. So it can be clearly ascertained that as far as the Wild Life Act is concerned found wild in nature denotes place alone and not behaviour.

If the definitions of “wild life‟ ad “habitat‟ are read with “wild animal‟ we can see that wild animals are only those animals specified in the Schedules and living in their habitat permanently, (37) “wild life‟ – wild life includes any animal , aquatic or land vegetation which
forms part or any habitat, (15) “habitat‟ includes land, water or vegetation which is the natural home of any wild animal. If we combine the definitions of wild life and habitat we can say- wild life includes any animal, aquatic or land vegetation which forms part of the natural home of any wild animal. In fact habitat is an inseparable element of wild life. Wild animal is part of wild life. Here the natural home of the pigs (Sus scrofa) is forest alone. When we say wild boars it means only those species living in the wild, that is in the forest and nowhere else.

But it cannot be said that natural environment is confined to forest alone for all animals. From the meaning of the word nature it is clear that everything which are not human creations form part of natural environment. It is further evident from Article 51 A(g) of the Constitution of India .

51A. Fundamental duties. It shall be the duty of every citizen of India- (g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures.

Two points are evident from this Article. One natural environment is not confined to forest alone . Two wild life is confined only to natural environment . But here in the case of wild boars natural environment or habitat is confined to forest alone.

In the further proviso to Section 11(1)(a) of the Wild Life Act, which deals with hunting of wild animals what stated is that- Provided further that no such captured animal shall be kept in captivity unless the Chief Wild Life Warden is satisfied that such animal cannot be rehabilitated in the wild and the reasons for the same are recorded in writing. Here from the words “rehabilitated in the wild” it is clear that wild denotes place and that too habitat.

As per the Wild Life Act captive animals are treated as wild animals. Under the Act the definition of captive animal is (5) “ captive animal” means any animal, specified in Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III or Schedule IV which is captured or kept or bred in captivity. From the definition of “wild animal” that existed before the amendment in 2003 it is clear that a captive animal is a wild animal. But the definition of captive animal‟ was not amended and it remains as in 1972. In the previous definition of wild animal the words “wherever found‟ were sufficient to treat captive animals as wild animals without any doubt. Such words are lacking in the present definition of wild animal and that is what led to a confusion.

But it can be seen that there is no intention on the part of the legislature to change the meaning of the term captive animal. Even after the amendment in 2003 captive animals are considered as part of wild animals and the law applicable to the captive animals are the laws made under the Wild Life Act. Under Section 64(2)(f) of the Wild Life Act the State Government is empowered to make Rules for the “regulation of the possession, transfer and the sale of captive animals, meat, animal articles, trophies and uncured trophies‟. It is under this section that the Kerala Captive Elephant (Management and Maintenance) Rules were made by the State of Kerala. It is to be noted that captive elephants are tamed domesticated animals. But they are treated as per the provisions of the Wild Life Protection laws. Hunting a captive animal is just like the hunting of other wild animals. They are under the strict supervision and control of the wild life authorities. There is no other provision than the, wild life protection laws for the management and maintenance of captive animals.
If wild in nature in the definition is related to behaviour, captive animals cannot be treated as wild animals.  In fact their habitat or natural home is natural environment (here forest) and captivity is a human creation.

If wild is considered as habit a Scheduled animal even when it is permanently residing in the forest cannot be considered as a wild animal if it is not showing any wild habit. After all it is impossible to differentiate all Scheduled animals on the basis of their behavioural pattern.

Article 300 A of the Constitution of India is also relevant at this point. It is as follows. RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 300 A. Persons not to be deprived of property save  by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.

The right to property is now considered to be not only a Constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Though it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right, human rights are considered to be in the realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter, employment etc. (AIR 2013 SC 565).

The property of a person is for his exclusive possession and enjoyment. It is for his residence. It is to earn a livelihood by doing any lawful act in his property including agricultural operations. He cannot be made to abandon his property as an abode for pigs that have settled on his property making the enjoyment of his property practically impossible. Wild life authorities or any authority cannot illegally deprive a person from enjoying his property terming some animals falsely as wild animals. Here common men are destined to keep their property as a farm for such animals. If the authorities want to do so they should acquire such properties providing sufficient compensation. That is the law of our land.

Considering a private property as part of natural environment and as the habitat of a wild animals and treating an animal permanently residing there as wild animal and thus depriving the owner of the property an opportunity to enjoy his property to earn a livelihood is opposed to the Fundamental Right of a person guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Article 21 Protection of life and personal liberty – No person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

The word in Article 21 means a life of dignity and not just an animal life (AIR 2011 SC 2636). To lead a dignified life one has to earn a livelihood. As far as farmers and farm labourers are concerned their only means to sustain life is the income from cultivation. So when his cultivating land is treated as a habitat of wild animals illegally and he is prevented from driving away such animals from his property considering them as wild animals when they are not, livelihood is offended by the State. Offending livelihood is opposed to
Article 21 of the Constitution of India (AIR 2016 SC 839).

In fact forest and wild life and Forest Act and Wild Life Act are inseparably
intertwined. The intention of the Forest Act is to protect forest land, timber, trees and other forest produce. The intention of the Wild Life Act is to protect the life only in the wild here forest alone. It is to be noted that before the enactment of the Wild Life Act in 1972 preservation of wild elephants was part of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 (Chapter VII.
Section 48 to 51). In the case of wild boars its habitat is forest alone. So in the case of wild boars wild cannot have an application over and above the forest. Wild life authorities have no power on any life outside the natural environment. It is realising this fact and hence to avoid unnecessary absurdity in the earlier definition of “wild animal” that the term was amended in 2003 to give it a sensible and realistic meaning and thus to exclude Scheduled animals that have abandoned their habitat on their own from the list of wild animals. But our men are still living in an era prior to 2003 and following the definition as it existed prior to 2003 and illegally and unauthorisedly harassing and torturing common man. Where is the provision in the Wild Life Act or any other law that prohibits a person from hunting an animal specified in the Schedules, which has abandoned its habitat and is permanently residing in a person‟s private property, whether it be a pig or snake or other animal? If such an animal is treated cruelly is it not the Police to take action under the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act?

As per our Constitution it is the duty of the Panchayats and Municipalities to destruct stray dogs and pigs. In fact it is the duty of the State to protect the life and property of any person in the territory of India.

The local bodies can effectively prevent the menace caused by pigs which cannot be treated as wild boars without the assistance or order of the wild life authorities. When such pigs are not wild animals wild life authorities cannot make any rule regarding their destruction and burial of their body. A killed wild animal and its meat and other articles etc are the properties of the Government under section 39(1) of the Wild Life Act. But not in the case of an animal which is not a wild animal. So local bodies have got every right to destruct such pigs in any lawful manner and dispose their bodies in a manner beneficial to the local bodies. Now certain conditions are imposed by the wild life authorities for the killing and disposal of the body of such dead pigs which are highly inconvenient. Now local bodies are spending more than rupees one thousand for the destruction of each pig. Besides it is a difficult task to find a licenced shooter to kill them.

It is a fact that the meat of such pigs is a much preferred delicious food which is in high demand and costlier. There is no provision interdicting the local bodies from inviting open tenders for killing, owning, possessing and selling the meat of such pigs in open market. If the local bodies do so it will be an additional source of income to the local bodies and they can effectively control the pig menace within a short period.

As far as the other category of pigs are concerned they are wild boars as they haven‟t abandoned their habitat. They wade in to human settlements in search of food and then return to their habitat, which is the forest. They destroy crops and cultivation in areas adjacent to the forest and cause threat to human life. Such areas can be specified and hunting can be allowed in such areas by the Chief Wild Life  Warden or by the authorised officer under Section 11(1) (b) of the Wild Life Act. Section 11(1)(b)is as follows “ The Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer may if he is satisfied that any wild animal specified in Schedule II, Schedule III or Schedule IV has become dangerous to human life or property (including standing crops or any land) or is so disabled or diseased or to be beyond recovery , by order in writing and stating the reasons therefore, permit any person to hunt such animal or group of animals in a specified area or cause such animal or group of animals in that specified area to be hunted . Before amendment in 2003, after permit any person to hunt –“such animal or cause such animal to be hunted” alone was stated. But it is after the amendment that the words or cause such animal or group of animals in a specified area and or group of animals in that specified area” were inserted. If we verify the animals specified in Schedule II to IV we can see that among those wild animals it is mainly wild boars that are living in groups and has become dangerous to human life and property. So it can be inferred that the words “ group of animals” were introduced mainly with the object of protecting human life and property from wild boars.

In the case of those wild boars it is wise for the Government to specify areas for specified period to hunt such wild boars and can invite open tenders to hunt, own possess and sell the meat of such pigs in open market . The Government should direct the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer to do so and thus the government can collect a lot of money.

When such easy ways are available our Legislature has unanimously passed a resolution on 14th January 2024 requesting the Centre to declare “wild boars” as “vermin” under Section 62 of the Wild Life Act.

But it is doubtful whether wild boar can be declared as vermin after the amendment of the Wild Life Act in 2003. The definition of vermin is –(34) vermin means any wild animal specified in Schedule V. So a wild animal retaining the status of a wild animal even after inclusion in Schedule V alone can be declared as vermin. But after the amendment of the definition of wild animal in 2003 its meaning has changed .Now animals specified in Schedules 1 to IV alone are wild animals. So when an animal is removed from Schedules 1 to IV it ceases to be a wild animal. At present Schedule V has no place in the Wild Life

Act as it is not a schedule of wild animal. So Section 62 has lost its significance after the amendment in 2003.

Another provision to alter entries in the Act is Section 61. As per Section 61 Centre alone has the power to alter entries in the Schedules (S.61(1)(3)). But before omitting
sub-sections (2)(3) in 1991 States also were having the same powers as that of the Centre. Before the 1991 amendment the Centre as well as the States were empowered only to add entries to a schedule. But after 1991 amendment the Centre is empowered to add or to delete any entry to or from any schedule. States have no such power.

Here one very important thing to be noted is that when Wild Life Protection Act was made by the Centre in 1972 forest and wild life were in the State List. So the Wild Life Act was scripted by the Centre on the recommendation of different States as per Article 252 of the Constitution of India. Article 252: Power of Parliament to legislate for two or more States by consent and adoption of such legislation by any other State. (1). If it appears to the Legislature of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the legislature of those States, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or where there are two Houses , by each of the House of the legislature of that State.

(2). Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of the State.

So if such an act is passed no State Legislature has any power to amend or repeal that Act . So also the Parliament too cannot amend or repeal such an Act without a resolution by the States.

The law made by Parliament pursuant to the power surrendered to it under Art. 252 prevails over a State law and the provisions of the State law to the extend they conflict with central law are void.

A law made by Parliament under Art.252 cannot be amended or repealed even by Parliament except after following again the procedure prescribed by Article 252 (1)
AIR 1978 A.P. (106 (114) F.B).

That is why specific provisions were made in the Wild Life Act in 1972 under Sections 61 and 62 to give some powers to the Centre and States.

But in 1977 forest and wild life were removed from the State List (II) and included in the Concurrent List (III) . So the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures have power to make laws on those matters after 1977 as per Art 246 (2). Centre has brought many amendments to the Wild Life Act in 1982, 1986, 1991, 1993, 2003, 2004 etc on their own. The States also have got power to amend the Act under Article 246(2) subject to Art.254. It is a Constitutional power and it cannot be restrained by a plenary law. So Sections 61 and 62 lost significance after the inclusion of forest and wild life in the Concurrent List and the States also can amend any Schedule or provision without any enabling provision in the parent Act.

Another most important thing to be noted in this occasion is that , it is not wise safe or sensible to declare wild boars as vermin or to remove them from the Schedules of wild animals as it will lead to the uncontrolled killing of wild boars even from their habitat. Then the entire community of wild boars will be wiped out from our country within a short time. Our country is having a population of about 143 crores of people, most of them consuming non-vegetarian food . So it is sure that the entire wild pig community will be finished in no time.

If it so happens it will lead to so many unforseen, serious and disastrous consequences, In fact wild boars are food for carnivora like wolfs, leopards tigers etc. So if food is scarce in the forest the carnivora will frequent human areas in large numbers want only to hunt domestic animals and even human beings escalating the human- wild animal conflict to unpredictable peaks. Hence it is highly necessary to give much attention to maintain an ecological balance when wild boars and other herbivora are allowed to be hunted.

But the present method of hunting wild boars by the Government machinery employed through local bodies will not effectively prevent pig menace. Tens of thousands of pigs are causing damage to properties and cause threat to human life in our State. Killing some pigs here and there will not yield any result at all. Moreover the birth rate is very high among pigs. So our present slow process is not adequate to control pig menace. In fact pig menace be averted only by effective methods involving the public.

After all we should realise the fact that pig is not considered as a precious animal anywhere in the world. It is not at all a race facing extinction. Its number is very high in the world. So its number should be reduced considerably to protect human life and cultivation.

The two feasible and possible ways to control pig menace are –

(1). The State should make wild life authorities and public aware of the fact that those Scheduled animals that have abandoned their wild habitat and residing in human settlements permanently on their own are not wild animals and wild life authorities have no power to take action against any person who does anything to protect his life and property from such animals, In such circumstance if anybody treats any animal with cruelty it is the Police to take action as per the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.

(2). Areas lying adjacent to forest which are being invaded by wild boars frequently shall be specified by notification and restricted hunting of wild boars shall be allowed in such areas under Section 11(1) (b) of the Wild Life Act. Here also hunting rights can be auctioned and there is no bar in inviting open tenders to kill, own possess and sell the meat of such animals.

After all it is the duty of the State to Protect the Life and property of the common man.

 നിസ്സഹായൻ്റെ ആയുധമാണ് മനസ്താപം ....

(By എന്‍.അജിത്, അഡ്വക്കേറ്റ്, എറണാകുളം)

നാട്ടിലെ കോടതികളില്‍ പതിമൂന്നോളം കൊല്ലക്കാലം സിവില്‍ ക്രിമിനല്‍ അടവുകളും നട്ടുവാങ്കവും നല്ലപോലെ പയറ്റിത്തെളിഞ്ഞ ശേഷമാണ് ഞാന്‍ എറണാകുളത്തേക്ക് എന്റെ ജീവിതം പറിച്ച് നടുന്നത്. കൊടികെട്ടിയ സീനിയര്‍ വക്കീലായ മാരാര്‍ സാറിൻ്റെ ഓഫീസിലേക്കുള്ള വഴി തുറന്ന് തന്നത് സാക്ഷാല്‍ കെ.പി.എന്‍. സാറായിരുന്നു. ഒരു സീനിയര്‍ വക്കീലാപ്പീസില്‍ ഇടം നേടാന്‍ വേറെയും ചില യോഗ്യതകള്‍ കയ്യിലുണ്ടെന്ന അഹങ്കാരത്തിലാണ് ഞാന്‍ നഗരത്തില്‍ വന്നിറങ്ങിയത്. എന്നിട്ടും കാട്ടുജാതിയായ എന്നെ പട്ടണപ്പരിഷ്‌കാരികളായ സഹജീവികള്‍ക്ക് ഉള്‍ക്കൊള്ളാനും കൂടെക്കൂട്ടാനും നന്നേ വിഷമമായിരുന്നു. 

ലക്ഷങ്ങള്‍ ചിലവിട്ട് വെച്ചുപിടിപ്പിക്കുന്ന സ്റ്റെൻ്റ് നോട് തന്നെ ശരീരം ആദ്യം ഒരു അകല്‍ച്ചയാണല്ലോ കാണിക്കാറുള്ളത്, ഇതും അങ്ങനെയൊക്കെ ആയിരിക്കും എന്നൊക്കെ ഞാനും കരുതി......

 കാര്‍ക്കശ്യത്തില്‍ മാരാര്‍സാറിൻ്റെ സീനിയറായിരുന്നു അക്കാലത്തെ സീനിയര്‍ മോസ്റ്റ് ജൂനിയര്‍ ആയിരുന്ന രവിവര്‍മ്മയെന്ന, ചൂടന്‍ രവിയെന്ന, അടുത്ത ചുരുക്കം ആളുകള്‍ക്ക് മാത്രം രവിയേട്ടനെന്ന് വിളിക്കാന്‍ അനുവാദമുള്ള കൊല്ലങ്കോട് സ്വരൂപത്തില്‍ രാമവര്‍മ്മ രവിവര്‍മ്മ. അതൊരു ഒന്നൊന്നര വര്‍മ്മ തന്നെയായിരുന്നു.  കോടതിയിലും ജീവിതത്തിലും. 

ഇന്നലെ കുംഭത്തിലെ ഉത്രം. വിളക്ക് തൊഴുതുപോരുമ്പോള്‍ ലായം റോട്ടിലെ ‘സരസ്വതി’യില്‍ കേറി. രവിയേട്ടൻ്റെ മകന്‍ ബോംബെയില്‍ ജി.എല്‍.സി. യില്‍ അവസാനവര്‍ഷം. ഇറങ്ങാന്‍ നേരം അവനെൻ്റെ കാല്‍ തൊട്ട് തൊഴാന്‍ ശ്രമിച്ചത് ഞാന്‍ തടഞ്ഞു....... 

‘രവിയേട്ടന്റെ മകന്‍ ആരുടെ മുന്നിലും തല കുനിക്കരുത്... അത് മൂപ്പര്‍ക്ക് കുറച്ചിലാണ്.... അമ്മ കാത്തോളും...’. ചെറുങ്ങനെ വെള്ളം പൊടിഞ്ഞ കണ്ണ് ആരും കാണാതിരിക്കാന്‍ കണ്ണട എടുത്ത് വെച്ച് പുറത്തിറങ്ങി ഞങ്ങള്‍.

അന്നൊരു ബുധനാഴ്ചയായിരിന്നു. കേള്‍ക്കാനുണ്ടായിരുന്ന രണ്ട് അപ്പീലുകള്‍ രാവിലെതന്നെ മാറിപ്പോയി. എങ്കിലൊരു ചായയാവം എന്നുകരുതി കാന്റീനിലേക്ക് പോകുന്ന പോക്കിലൊന്ന് ചെറിയാന്‍ ജഡ്ജ്ൻ്റെ കോടതിയില്‍ ചുമ്മാ കേറിനോക്കിയതാണ്. വെറും ചുമ്മാതല്ല........ അവിടത്തെ കേസുകള്‍ നോക്കുന്ന ജൂനിയര്‍ ഈയിടെയായി നേരിട്ട് പോകാതെ മൊബൈല്‍ വഴി ‘നിര്‍ദ്ദേശികാ തല്‍പുരുഷനാ’വുന്നുണ്ടോ എന്നൊരു സംശയം ഉള്ളത് തീര്‍ക്കാനാണ് എന്ന് എനിക്ക് പോക്ക് കണ്ടപ്പോളേ മനസ്സിലായി. ചെന്ന് കേറിയ ഉടനെ മുകളില്‍ നിന്നൊരു വിളി.

‘രവി...... പാലക്കാട് ഒന്ന് പോണം.... ഒരുത്സവം നടത്തണം... ഒരാളെ കൂടി കൂട്ടിക്കോളൂ.... അയാളുടെ പേര് കൊടുത്തോളൂ ........ ഈ ശനിയാഴ്ചയാണ് ഉത്സവം. കേസ് തിങ്കളാഴ്ച്ചക്ക് വെച്ചിട്ടുണ്ട്. അന്നേക്ക് റിപ്പോര്‍ട്ട്....’ 

ഇടി വെട്ടിയപോലെ നിന്നുപോയി ഞങ്ങള്‍ രണ്ടാളും....... ഓഫീസിലെ ജൂനിയറിൻ്റെ കല്യാണം ആണന്ന്.

പോയാലും പ്രശ്‌നമാണ്...... പോയില്ലേല്‍ അതിലും പ്രശ്‌നമാണ്. പക്ഷേ രവിയേട്ടനല്ലേ ......... പണി മുഖ്യം ബിഗിലേ ....... അതുകൊണ്ട് ഉറപ്പിച്ചു. ഉത്സവം നടത്താന്‍ പോവാം.... പാലക്കാട് എന്ന് പറഞ്ഞെങ്കിലും അത് ജില്ല മാത്രമായിരുന്നു. തിരുവാഴിയോട് ന്ന് മംഗലാംകുന്ന് പോകുന്ന വഴിയില്‍ തൃക്കുന്നത്ത് അമ്പലത്തിലെ ഉത്രം വിളക്കാണ് നടത്തേണ്ടത്. എൻ്റെ നാട്......... രവിയേട്ടൻ്റെ അച്ഛൻ്റെ തറവാട് ........ പോരാത്തതിന് ശ്രീകൃഷ്ണപുരം.... ആനന്ദലബ്ധിക്ക് ഇനിയെന്ത് വേണ്ടൂ... 

അമ്പലത്തിലെത്തിയപ്പോള്‍ നന്നേ വൈകി. കമ്മിറ്റി ഓഫീസിലാണ് താമസം ഏര്‍പ്പാടാക്കിയിരുന്നത്. കുളിയും ഭക്ഷണവുമൊക്കെ കഴിഞ്ഞ് ഒന്ന് സ്വസ്ഥമായപ്പോള്‍ രവിയേട്ടന്‍ വണ്ടിയെടുക്കാന്‍ പറഞ്ഞു. 

‘നമുക്കൊരിടം വരെ പോവാം..... ഇവിടെ അടുത്താണ്... തനിക്കറിയാടോ... ഒറ്റപ്പാലം പോണ വഴി. മംഗലാംകുന്ന് വളവ്  ന്ന് എടത്തോട്ട് .... ..’ 

ഞാന്‍ കാറെടുത്തു ....... മീന്‍കുളത്തിയും കഴിഞ്ഞ് ചെന്നെത്തിയത് നിലവിളിക്കുന്നിൻ്റെ നിറുകയില്‍....

‘ഡോ..... തനിക്കറിയോ ... ഇവിടെ വന്ന് നിലവിളിച്ചവരുടെ സങ്കടങ്ങള്‍ ദേവി തീര്‍ത്തിരുന്നു.... അതാ ഈ നാട്ടുകാരുടെ വിശ്വാസം..... ഇവിടെയുള്ള ശാന്തത താന്‍ കണ്ടോ.... അസ്വസ്ഥമായ മനസ്സുകള്‍ ഇവിടെ അല്‍പനേരം ഇരുന്ന് ശാന്തമായി ഒന്ന് ആലോചിച്ചാല്‍ തീരാവുന്ന പ്രശ്‌നങ്ങളേ ആര്‍ക്കും ഉള്ളൂ.... മരിക്കാന്‍ നൂറ് വഴികള്‍ ഉണ്ടെങ്കില്‍ ജീവിക്കാന്‍ ആയിരത്തൊന്ന്.... അതാണ് ഇവിടത്തെ സത്യം... അല്ലാതെ ഒരു ദേവിയും കേറിവന്ന് തൂവാല കൊണ്ട് കണ്ണീരൊപ്പിത്തരില്ല......നൂറ് രൂപ കയ്യില്‍ വെച്ച് തരില്ല. 

ശാന്തമായി ഒരു പത്ത് മിനിറ്റ് ഇരുന്നാല്‍ എത്ര വലിയ പ്രശ്‌നത്തിനും ഒരു പരിഹാരം അവനവൻ്റെ ഉള്ളില്‍ത്തന്നെ തെളിഞ്ഞ് വരും..... ആ സത്യത്തിന് നാട്ടുകാര്‍ കൊടുത്ത ബിംബകല്പന ആണ് സങ്കടം മാറ്റുന്ന ദേവിയും ഓട്ടുവളയിട്ട കയ്യിലെ നേദ്യച്ചോറുമൊക്കെ ......... തനിക്ക് ഞാന്‍ പറയുന്നത് മനസ്സിലാവുമെന്ന് എനിക്ക് നല്ലപോലെ അറിയാം.... ഇന്നത്തെ കാലത്ത് പിഴക്കുന്നതിൻ്റെ പ്രധാന കാരണം അതുതന്നെയാണ്. കേള്‍ക്കുന്നവന് മനസ്സിലാവുന്നുണ്ടോ എന്നറിഞ്ഞല്ല സംസാരം........  പാത്രം അറിഞ്ഞല്ല വിളമ്പുന്നത്.... അവിടെയാണ് നമുക്കൊക്കെ തെറ്റിയത്... പുത്തന്‍ തലമുറ വഴി തെറ്റുന്നതും അവിടെനിന്നാണ് ...

കുറെയേറെ മൂക്കാതെ പഴുത്ത മാമ്പഴങ്ങളാഡോ നമുക്ക് ചുറ്റിലും. ചിലതൊക്കെ ഉള്ളില്‍ വിഷം നിറച്ച് പഴുപ്പിച്ചതും........ ഒരു നിലയ്ക്ക് ആലോചിച്ചാല്‍ മതിയായെടോ ഈ നാടകം കളി .... ഒരു മാതിരി ആത്മാഭിമാനമില്ലാതെ നാണം കെട്ട ജീവിതം....... മകന്‍ ഇതേ വഴിയ്ക്ക് പോകാന്‍ ആഗ്രഹിക്കുന്നൂ എന്ന് കേട്ടപ്പോ ഞാന്‍ അവനെ തടഞ്ഞതാ പലവട്ടം....മുന്നില്‍ കുഴിയാണെന്ന് പറഞ്ഞുകൊടുക്കാനേ എനിക്ക് പറ്റൂ ........ചാടാന്‍ ഒരുമ്പെട്ടവനെ പിന്മാറ്റാന്‍ എളുപ്പമല്ല’

രവിയേട്ടനെ ഇങ്ങനെ വാചാലനായി കണ്ടിട്ടില്ല...... എൻ്റെ നാക്കും വെറുതെയിരിക്കില്ല ...... ഒന്ന് ചൊറിഞ്ഞ് നോക്കീതാ....... പണിയൊന്ന് പാളി.

‘ഇന്ന് സാര്‍ മൊത്തം നെഗറ്റീവ് ആണല്ലോ.... വല്ലാത്തൊരു മുന്‍വിധികളും..... എന്തേലും പ്രശ്‌നങ്ങള്‍... പറയാവുന്നതാണേല്‍ പറയു..’

‘അതേടോ... എനിക്ക് മുന്‍വിധികളുണ്ട്... ഞാന്‍ മറ്റു പലരെയുംപോലെ തന്നെ നല്ലത് മാത്രം ചിന്തിച്ചാണീ തൊഴിലിലേക്ക് വന്നത്... നാല്പത് കൊല്ലമാവുന്നു അടുത്ത വര്‍ഷത്തേക്ക് .

ഇന്നോ..... താന്‍ നേരിട്ട് കാണുന്നതല്ലേ..... എല്ലാവര്‍ക്കും ഇരുട്ടി വെളുക്കുമ്പോളേക്കും ‘സക്‌സസ്ഫുള്‍ ലോയര്‍’ ആവണം... അല്ലേല്‍ മിനിമം ജഡ്ജിയെങ്കിലും ആകണം.... ആര്‍ക്കും ‘എക്‌സലന്റ് ലോയര്‍’ ആവണ്ട.... ‘എക്‌സലന്റ് ലോയര്‍’ ആവൂ... വിജയം നിങ്ങളുടെ പുറകെ വരും.... പറഞ്ഞാല്‍ ആര് കേള്‍ക്കാന്‍.... അത് അങ്ങനെ ഒരുകൂട്ടം. കാരണം ഉണ്ട് അതിനൊക്കെ ..... ‘സക്‌സസ്ഫുള്‍ ലോയര്‍’ ആവാന്‍ നൂറ്റൊന്ന് വഴികളുണ്ട്. പലതിലൂടെയും പലര്‍ക്കും പോകാന്‍ പറ്റും. ......  ‘എക്‌സലന്റ് ലോയര്‍’ ആവാന്‍ ഒരൊറ്റ വഴിയേ ഉള്ളൂ ...... നല്ലപോലെ അദ്ധ്വാനിക്കണം... കുറുക്കുവഴികളില്ല..... അതുകൊണ്ട് ആ വഴി അങ്ങനെ അധികമാരും പോവാന്‍ ആഗ്രഹിക്കില്ല......  സന്നിധാനത്തേക്ക് പോകുന്ന പരമ്പരാഗത കാട്ടുപാതയും സ്വാമി അയ്യപ്പന്‍ റോഡും പോലെയാണ് ........ അവരെ പറഞ്ഞിട്ട് കാര്യമില്ല... കാലിന്നടിയിലെ മണ്ണൊലിച്ച്  പോയത് ഇന്നത്തെ പിള്ളേരാരേലും എന്നെങ്കിലും അറിഞ്ഞിട്ടുണ്ടോ..... താന്‍ കുറെ എഴുത്ത് കുത്തുകള്‍ നടത്തിയതിന്റെ ഫലം എന്തായീ... കഴിഞ്ഞ മാസം കൂടി സാര്‍ ചോദിച്ചിരുന്നു എന്നോട്....’

‘എന്താ രവിയേട്ടന്‍ ഉദ്ദേശിച്ചത്..... മനസ്സിലായില്ല’

‘ഇന്നോളം ഒരു ദിവസം പോലും കോടതി വരാന്തയില്‍ പോലും കേറാത്ത നിയമവിദഗ്ദ്ധര്‍ നശിപ്പിച്ചെടുത്തതല്ലേ ഇന്നത്തെ സിവില്‍ കോടതികളിലെ തെളിവെടുപ്പ് എന്ന കാട്ടിക്കൂട്ടല്‍..... എണ്ണം പറഞ്ഞ മിടുമിടുക്കന്മാരായ വക്കീലന്മാര്‍ താഴെ കോടതിയില്‍ നിന്ന് വന്നവരാണ്...... ഒരു സാക്ഷിയെ കൂട്ടില്‍ കേറ്റി നിര്‍ത്തി നിയമം തെറ്റിക്കാതെ നാല് ചോദ്യം ചോദിക്കാന്‍ നാല് മണിക്കൂര്‍ പ്രസംഗം നടത്തണ ഇവിടത്തെ പലേ സിംഹങ്ങള്‍ക്കും മുട്ടിടിക്കും. എനിക്ക് ഹൈക്കോടതിയില്‍ എന്നും നിറയെ പണിയാണ് ഞാന്‍ താഴത്തെ കോടതികളില്‍ വിസ്തരിക്കാനൊന്നും വരില്ല... വേണേല്‍ പ്രസംഗിക്കാന്‍ വരാം എന്ന് കക്ഷിയോട് സൗജന്യം വിളമ്പുന്നത് തിരക്കുള്ളതുകൊണ്ടാണെന്ന് തനിക്ക് തോന്നുന്നുണ്ടോ.... എങ്കില്‍ താന്‍ ഇനിയും കുറെ നാള്‍ കൂടി ഈ പൂരം മാറി നിന്ന് നോക്കിക്കാണേണ്ടി വരും...’

‘കേസ് തീര്‍പ്പാക്കാന്‍ വൈകുന്നത് കൊണ്ടല്ലേ ആവക പുരോഗമനപരങ്ങളായ മാറ്റങ്ങള്‍ കൊണ്ട് വന്നത്......’

‘എന്ന് തനിക്ക് തോന്നിയോ.... എങ്കില്‍ അവര്‍ ജയിച്ചു.... അത്രമാത്രം... പണ്ടൊക്കെ ഒരു ലിസ്റ്റ് കേസ് തീരാന്‍ കൃത്യം ഒരു മാസം സമയം.. ആദ്യത്തെ പത്ത് ദിവസം തെളിവ്.... രണ്ടാമത്തെ പത്ത് ദിവസത്തില്‍ പ്രസംഗം... മൂന്നാമത്തെ പത്തുദിവസത്തില്‍ തീര്‍പ്പ്... അതായിരുന്നു നടപ്പ്....ലിസ്റ്റ് സിസ്റ്റം എന്നായിരുന്നു ഓമനപ്പേര് ....  ഇപ്പോളോ വിസ്താരം പുത്തന്‍കൂറ്റ് ‘നിയമജ്ഞന്‍‘ അവര്‍കള്‍ക്ക് .... സ്റ്റെനോഗ്രാഫറെപ്പോലെ ഒക്കെ കേട്ട് പകര്‍ത്തിയെഴുതി തുന്നിക്കെട്ടി റിപ്പോര്‍ട്ട് ഫയലാക്കാന്‍ അറുപത് ദിവസം.... എന്നിട്ട് വേണം പ്രസംഗം... പറയാനുള്ളത് എഴുതി കൊടുത്താല്‍ കൊടുത്തവന് കൊള്ളാം.... പിന്നെ അവന്റെ വിധി.... അത് വരാന്‍ അപ്പോ മിനിമം എത്ര നാളാവും.... താന്‍ പറയടോ......മൂന്നോ നാലോ മാസം ..... അതിനിടക്കാണ് ഓപ്പീസി സീപ്പീസി സീയാര്‍പ്പി അങ്ങനെ കുറെ എണ്ണം .... ഇതൊക്കെ അറിയണേല്‍ ചുരുങ്ങിയത് ഒരു നാലഞ്ച് കൊല്ലം കോടതി വരാന്തയിലൂടെയെങ്കിലും നടക്കണം...... നിയമവിദഗ്ധനായാല്‍ പോരാ ..........

കേസ് തീര്‍പ്പാക്കാന്‍ വൈകുന്നു.... കെട്ടിക്കിടക്കുന്നു എന്നൊക്കെ അലമുറയിടുന്നത് രാഷ്ട്രീയക്കാരാ...അവര്‍ക്ക് ലക്ഷ്യങ്ങള്‍ വേറെ പലതുമാണ് ..... .കക്ഷികള്‍ അത് പറയില്ല.... കേസ് നീണ്ടുപോകേണ്ടത് കക്ഷികളില്‍ രണ്ടിലൊരാളുടെ ആവശ്യമാണ്....’

‘സാര്‍ എന്തൊക്കെയാ ഈ പറയുന്നതെന്ന് ആലോചിച്ചിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... ചുമ്മാ കോടതിയലക്ഷ്യം വാങ്ങി വെക്കല്ലേ..... ചാര്‍ജ് വായിക്കാതെ ഊരിക്കൊണ്ട്‌ പോരാന്‍ ഞാന്‍ ആയിട്ടില്ല.... സാറിൻ്റെ ഈ സ്വഭാവം വെച്ച് വേറാരും വക്കാലത്ത് എടുക്കാനും സാധ്യത ഇല്ല......’ ഞാന്‍ ഒന്നൂടെ ആഞ്ഞ് ചൊറിഞ്ഞ് നോക്കി.

‘എടോ.... റിക്കവറി സൂട്ട് വിധിയായാല്‍ പ്രതി തൻ്റെ അടുത്ത് വന്ന് എന്താ പറയാറുള്ളത്... ഒന്ന് നീട്ടിപ്പിടിക്കണേ സാറേ... മകളുടെ കല്യാണം അടുത്ത് വരുന്നുണ്ട്.. വീട് പണി കഴിയാറായിട്ടില്ല .....മാറാന്‍ ലേശം കൂടി സമയം വേണം ..... . ഇറങ്ങിപ്പോയാല്‍ കേറിക്കിടക്കാന്‍ വേറെ വഴിയില്ല.... അങ്ങനെ അങ്ങനെ. 

വാടകഒഴിപ്പിക്കല്‍ കേസിലോ... ഇതൊക്കെയല്ലേ അവസ്ഥ... പണം കൊടുക്കാന്‍ വിധിയായാല്‍ പ്രതിക്ക് എന്താ വേണ്ടത്.... ലേശം കൂടി സമയം വേണം... ഏത് കേസ് വേണേല്‍ എടുത്ത് വെച്ച് നോക്കിക്കോളൂ.... രണ്ടിലൊരാളുടെ ആവശ്യമാണ് കേസ് അനങ്ങാതെ നില്‍ക്കേണ്ടത്... അത് രാഷ്ട്രീയക്കാര്‍ക്ക് അറിയില്ല...അവരില്‍ ചിലര്‍ക്കെങ്കിലും പേരിന് മുന്‍പില്‍ അഡ്വ: ഉണ്ടെന്നേ ഉള്ളൂ ...... കാളവേലക്ക് ഒരലങ്കാരം ...അത്രമാത്രം ...... അവരോര്‍ത്തില്ലെങ്കിലും മിനിമം നമ്മളെങ്കിലും ഓര്‍ക്കണം.... രാഷ്ട്രീയക്കാര്‍ക്ക് സഭയിലോ ആകാശത്തേക്കോ തൊടുത്ത് വിടാന്‍ ഒരു ചോദ്യം മാത്രമേ വേണ്ടൂ.... നമുക്ക് മുന്നില്‍ കക്ഷി വരുന്നത് ഒരു സങ്കടവുമായാണ്. പഠിച്ച നിയമം കൊണ്ട് അവന് എന്തെങ്കിലും ഉപകാരം ചെയ്യാമോ എന്നല്ലാതെ അവനെ എങ്ങനെ ചവിട്ടിയരച്ച് രസിക്കാം എന്ന് നമ്മള്‍ ചിന്തിക്കുന്നിടത്തുനിന്നാണ് ഈ സംവിധാനം തകരാന്‍ തുടങ്ങുന്നത്....ഇക്കരെ നിന്നപ്പോള്‍ സ്റ്റേ കിട്ടാന്‍ അലമുറയിട്ട് കരഞ്ഞവര്‍ പലരും അക്കരെക്കാവില്‍ ശാന്തി തുടങ്ങിയാല്‍ മേല്‍ശാന്തിയാവുന്നതും നമ്മളൊക്കെ കാണുന്നതല്ലേ ....’

‘സര്‍ പറയുന്നത് ഒരളവുവരെ ന്യായം... പക്ഷെ ഇതൊക്കെ ചെറിയ പിള്ളേര്‍ എങ്ങനെ അറിയും... അവരെ ആരേലും പറഞ്ഞ് മനസ്സിലാക്കി കൊടുക്കണ്ടേ..... അതല്ലേ നിങ്ങളുടെയൊക്കെ ജോലി.....’

‘എക്‌സാറ്റ്‌ലി..... ദേര്‍ യൂ ആര്‍..... അവിടെയാണ് അടുത്ത കടമ്പ... താന്‍ മാരാര്‍ സാര്‍ റിട്ടോ അപ്പീലോ റിവിഷനോ എന്തേലും എഴുതുന്നതോ എഴുതാന്‍ ഡിക്‌റ്റെഷന്‍ കൊടുക്കുന്നതോ ഇക്കാലത്തിനിടക്ക് കണ്ടിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... കക്ഷികളെ നേരിട്ട് സംസാരിക്കുന്നത് കണ്ടിട്ടുണ്ടോ... അത് പോട്ടേ... കോടതിയില്‍ കേറി കേസ് വേറൊരു ദിവസത്തേക്ക് മാറ്റാന്‍ ചോദിക്കുന്നത് കണ്ടിട്ടുണ്ടോ..... ഇനി താന്‍ പോയി അലമാരയില്‍നിന്ന് അഡ്വക്കെറ്റ്‌സ് ആക്ട് എടുത്ത് അതിലെ പതിനാറാം വകുപ്പൊന്ന് മനസ്സിരുത്തി വായിക്കൂ.... രണ്ടാംനിര വക്കീലന്മാരെ ഒന്നാം നിരക്കാരാക്കി വാര്‍ത്തെടുക്കാന്‍ സായിപ്പ് പണ്ടേ പറഞ്ഞ് വെച്ച ഉപായമാണ് ആ വകുപ്പ്.... പറഞ്ഞുതുടങ്ങിയാല്‍ പറയാന്‍ കുറെയേറെയുണ്ട്......... അതൊക്കെ പ്രശ്‌നമാണ്...’

‘സര്‍..... സത്യത്തില്‍ ഇതൊക്കെക്കൂടി ആലോചിക്കുമ്പോള്‍ ഈ ആനമയിലൊട്ടകം കളിയിലെ സത്യാവസ്ഥകള്‍ പലതും പലര്‍ക്കും അറിയുന്നില്ലെന്നാണോ പറഞ്ഞുവരുന്നത്....’

‘ഇതൊന്നും തീര്‍ത്തും അറിയാതെ അല്ലടോ പലരും പലതും ചെയ്യുന്നത് .... ചിലതൊക്കെ അറിയാതെയും ചെയ്യുന്നുണ്ട് ഇല്ലാതില്ല ...... ‘’.

‘നമ്മളിപ്പോള്‍ ടെക്കി യുഗത്തിലല്ലേ.... ഒക്കെ പെട്ടീലാക്കലല്ലേ ഇപ്പോളത്തെ ട്രെന്‍ഡ്.... കോടതികളും വല്ലാതെ പുരോഗമിച്ചു.... പലരും ആവണപ്പലക കൊണ്ടാണ് നടപ്പും ഇരുപ്പും പ്രയോഗവും..... പലക ഇല്ലാത്തവന്‍ പിണം.... അതാണ് ഇന്നത്തെ അവസ്ഥ..... ‘ 

‘ജസ്റ്റിസ് ഗവായ് ഈയടുത്ത് എന്തോ അതിനെപ്പറ്റി പറഞ്ഞതായി എവിടെയോ വായിച്ചു. എടോ... സ്വന്തമായി ബുദ്ധിയും ഒറിജിനല്‍ തിങ്കിങ്ങും ഉണ്ടേല്‍ എന്തിനാടോ പുറമെ നിന്നൊരു കൃത്രിമ ബുദ്ധിയുടെ കൈത്താങ്ങ്.... ഇന്ത്യാ രാജ്യത്ത് പതിമൂന്ന് ജഡ്ജിമാര്‍ ഒരുമിച്ചിരുന്ന് എഴുതി നിയമലോകം ഇന്നും വാഴ്ത്തുന്ന ഒരേയൊരു വിധിയെ ഇന്നോളം ഉണ്ടായിട്ടുള്ളൂ.... കേശവാനന്ദ ഭാരതി കേസ്.... അതിന്റെ തുടക്കം ഒരു സിആര്‍പി ആയിരുന്നെന്ന് താന്‍ ഇന്നോളം അറിഞ്ഞിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... അതിന് ആ രണ്ട് വിധികളും മുഴുവനായി ഒരിക്കലെങ്കിലും വായിക്കണമെന്ന് ഒരിക്കലെങ്കിലും തോന്നിയിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... എങ്കില്‍ കേട്ടോളൂ..... അത്തരം ഒരു വിധിക്ക് കാരണമായ സീആര്‍പി കൈ കൊണ്ട് എഴുതി ഫയലാക്കിയത് സാക്ഷാല്‍ ടി.എസ്. വെങ്കിടേശ്വര അയ്യര്‍ ആയിരുന്നു .............. അതിന്നും സുപ്രീം കോടതി മ്യൂസിയത്തില്‍ ഇരുപ്പുണ്ട് ....... ആ ഒരു കയ്യെഴുത്ത് പ്രതിക്ക് ഇന്ത്യാരാജ്യത്തെ നിയമ രംഗത്ത് ഉണ്ടാക്കാന്‍ സാധിച്ച ഓളങ്ങളൊന്നും ഇന്നോളം ഒരു സോഫ്റ്റ് കോപ്പിക്കും സാധിച്ചിട്ടില്ലെന്ന് താനെങ്കിലും ഒന്നറിഞ്ഞിരിക്കണം.....’

‘ഇതിപ്പോ ഭീഷ്‌മോപദേശം പോലായല്ലോ സര്‍..... സമയം നല്ലോണം വൈകി... പോയി കിടക്കണ്ടേ..... നാളെയല്ലേ ഉത്സവം...’

‘ പോകാം.... ഉപദേശിക്കാന്‍ ഞാന്‍ ആരുമല്ലടോ.... ഇന്നത്തെ കാലത്ത് ഉപദേശം കേള്‍ക്കാനും ആര്‍ക്കും താല്പര്യമില്ല.... ഉപദേശിക്കാന്‍ ഞാന്‍ ശ്രമിക്കുകയുമില്ല... കാരണം.... ഉപദേശിച്ചിട്ട് വേണ്ട ഒരാള്‍ നന്നാവാന്‍.... നന്നാവാന്‍ ഒരു ‘എക്‌സ്റ്റെണല്‍ എയ്‌ഡ്’ വേണ്ട... മനസ്സ് മാത്രം മതി ...... ഞാന്‍ നന്നാവണം എന്ന് ഏറ്റവും കൂടുതല്‍ ആഗ്രഹിക്കാന്‍ എനിക്കേ പറ്റൂ ..............മറ്റുള്ളോര്‍ക്ക് അതിനുവേണ്ട സാഹചര്യം ഒരുക്കിത്തരാനേ കഴിയു ....... സ്വയം നന്നാവണം... 

തന്നോട് പറഞ്ഞതിന് കാരണമുണ്ട്.... ഈ പണി ഒരു നിയോഗമാണ്.... ഗതിയഞ്ചും മുട്ടുമ്പോളാണ് ഒരാള്‍ ഒരു നിവൃത്തിക്കായി കോടതി കേറുന്നത്. നിസ്സഹായൻ്റെ അവസാനത്തെ ആയുധമാണ് ഉള്ള് ചുട്ടുള്ള ശാപം... സമയം കിട്ടുമ്പോ താന്‍ ഭാരതത്തില്‍ ജനമേജയൻ്റെ സഹോദരന്മാര്‍ ഒരു നായ്ക്കുട്ടിയെ അതിഭീകരമായി ദ്രോഹിക്കുന്നൊരു കഥയുണ്ട് ....അതൊന്ന് വായിക്കൂ ..... അമ്മയായ സരമ പരാതിയുമായി രാജസമക്ഷം ചെന്നെങ്കിലും ഒരു മറുപടിയുമില്ലാതെ നിസ്സഹായയായി തിരികെ പോകുന്നുണ്ട്.... അകാരണമായ ഒരു ഭയം ഭരണാധികാരിയില്‍ ആ നായ്ക്കുട്ടി വിതക്കുന്നുണ്ട്... കഥയുടെ മദ്ധ്യത്തില്‍കടന്ന് വരുന്ന ഏകലവ്യൻ്റെ സഹായിയായ ഒരു നായയുണ്ട്........ ഭരണാധികാരികളുടെ അധികാരഹുങ്കിനെതിരെ കുരച്ച് കൊണ്ട് വന്നവന്‍..... എല്ലാം കഴിഞ്ഞ് മഹാപ്രസ്ഥാനത്തിന് പോകുമ്പോളും ഉണ്ട് കൂട്ടിനൊരു നായ.... ഉടമയെ ആപത്തുകളില്‍ നിന്ന് സദാ ഉണര്‍ത്തിക്കൊണ്ടിരിക്കുന്നവന്‍..... കണ്ണീര് തുടക്കേണ്ടവന്‍ കണ്ണീര് വീഴ്ത്തരുത്. തൻ്റെ ചോറ് തട്ടിത്തെറിപ്പിച്ചവന്‍ വറ്റിറങ്ങാതെ ഇവിടെയെവിടെയോ ഇല്ലേ ..... ഉള്ള് ചുട്ടവൻ്റെ ശാപത്തിന് വല്ലാത്ത പൊള്ളലാണ് ........ താന്‍ ഉള്‍പ്പെട്ട പുത്തന്‍ തലമുറ അറിഞ്ഞ് അടുത്ത തലമുറയ്ക്ക് കൈമാറേണ്ട ഒന്നാണീ അറിവുകള്‍.... നല്ലതുകള്‍ മാത്രമേ കൈമാറി കൈമാറി നിലനില്‍ക്കൂ..... ഇക്കാലത്തിനിടക്ക് കണ്ട പലരേയും പലതിനെയും നമ്മള്‍ ഒരിക്കലും ഓര്‍ക്കാറു പോലുമില്ലല്ലോ ....... എന്നാല്‍ ചിലരെയും അവര്‍ തന്ന നല്ല ഓര്‍മ്മകളയേയും എന്നും ഓര്‍ക്കാറുമില്ലേ........ അക്കണക്കിന് സുഹൃത്തേ........ തനിക്ക് ഞാനീ പറഞ്ഞതൊക്കെ ഒരു ഉപദേശമായി തോന്നിയാല്‍ എനിക്ക് തെറ്റി..... കാരണം ഇത് ഉപദേശമല്ല ......... ഈ തൊഴിലിൻ്റെ സത്യമാണ്...... നീ വേണമിത് അടുത്തവന് കൈമാറാന്‍.... ‘. 

പറയാന്‍ ഒട്ടേറെ ബാക്കി വെച്ച് പോയ രവിയേട്ടന്‍ ഇല്ലാത്ത മൂന്നാമത്തെ ഉത്രം വിളക്കാണിന്ന് ....... എക്കാലത്തും തെളിഞ്ഞ് നില്‍ക്കുന്ന കുംഭമാസത്തിലെ ലക്ഷ്മി ശങ്കരനാരായണ വിളക്ക്.........

Parole as the Rule, Denial as the Exception — Justice Beyond Bars

*(By Muhammed Farooque K.T., Advocate, Tirur)

E-mail : farooque.kt@gmail.com   Mob.: 7012473900

“Prisoners are still ‘persons’ entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all the requirements of due process.”

-- Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting view in Pell v. Procunier (417 U.S.817 (1974)).

The rule of law and justice is not confined to free citizens; it extends to individuals whose rights and liberties are curtailed by imprisonment. Even when a prisoner’s freedom is lawfully restricted through procedure established by law, they still retain certain rights, including the right to parole and access to courts in India for the enforcement of those rights, ensuring their legal protections. In this regard, a notable observation reflecting this principle was made by Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978 KLT OnLine 1013 (SC) = AIR 1978 SC 1675, para.3):“Freedom is what Freedom does-to the last and the least-Antyodaya.”

In line with this principle, the humanism embedded in our Constitution, reflecting the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, underscores the intrinsic worth of every individual—including prisoners—as observed in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978 KLT OnLine 1013 (SC) = AIR 1978 SC 1675). Similarly, as part of our constitutional philosophy, we acknowledge the compelling statement from the British Government’s White Paper, People in Prison (Ibid.at p.423): “A society that believes in the worth of individual beings can have the quality of its belief judged, at least in part, by the quality of its prison and probation services and of the resources made available to them.”

In the same strain a British Buddhist-Christian Judge, speaking to a BBC reporter emphasized the importance of compassion in dealing with a convict (The Listener, Nov. 25, 1976, p.692): “Circuit Judge Christmas Humphreys told the BBC reporter recently that a judge looks at the man in the dock in a different way, not just a criminal to be punished, but a fellow human being, another form of life who is also a form of the same one life as oneself. In the context of karuna and punishment for karma the same Judge said: The two things are not incompatible. You do punish him for what he did, but you bring in a quality of what is sometimes called mercy, rather than an emotional hate against the man for doing something harmful. You feel with him, that is what compassion means”.

Similarly, Roger G. Lanphear, in a study, quotes a poignant letter from a prisoner that makes a powerful point: “Dear Mrs. Stender : You cannot rehabilitate a man through brutality and disrespect. Regardless of the crime a man may commit, he still is a human being and has feelings. And the main reason most inmates in prison today disrespect their keepers is because they themselves (the inmates) are disrespected and are not treated like human beings. I myself have witnessed brutal attacks upon inmates and have suffered a few myself, uncalled for. I can understand a guard or guards restraining an inmate if he becomes violent. But many a time this restraining has turned into a brutal beating. Does this type of treatment bring about respect and rehabilitation ? No. It only instills hostility and causes alienation toward the prison officials from the inmate or inmates involved. If you treat a man like an animal, then you must expect him to act like one. For every action, there is a reaction. This is only human nature. And in order for an inmate to act like a human being you must trust him as such. Treating him like an animal will only get negative results from him. You can’t spit in his face and expect him to smile and say thank you. I have seen this happen also. There is a large gap between the inmate and prison officials. And it will continue to grow until the prison officials learn that an inmate is no different than them, only in the sense that he has broken a law. He still has feelings, and he’s still human being. And until the big wheels in Sacramento and the personnel inside the prisons start practicing rehabilitation, and stop practising zoology, then they can expect continuous chaos and trouble between inmates and officials. Lewis Moore”

Parole: A Path to Prisoner Reform

In Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of A.P.(1977 KLT OnLine 1201 (SC) = (1977) 3 SCC 287), Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer emphasized that, in the modern context and in line with the views of Mahatma Gandhi—who shared the perspective of progressive criminologists worldwide—it is essential to regard offenders as patients and prisons as institutions for mental and moral rehabilitation. The community has a vital stake in the reformation of offenders. Rather than relying on intimidation or punitive measures, the focus should be on therapeutic interventions aimed at their reintegration into society. The Honourable Supreme Court observed in Mohammed Giasuddin (supra) as follows: “The subject of study takes us to our cultural heritage that there is divinity in every man which has been translated into the constitutional essence of the dignity and worth of the human person........Progressive criminologists across the world will agree that the Gandhian diagnosis of offenders as patients and his conception of prisons as hospitals - mental and moral - is the key to the pathology of delinquency and the therapeutic role of punishment. The whole man is a healthy man and every man is born good. Criminality is a curable deviance. The morality of the law may vary, but is real. The basic goodness of all human beings is a spiritual axiom a fall-out of the advaita of cosmic creation and the spring of correctional thought in criminology.........Alfieri has suggested: ‘society prepares the crime, the criminal commits it. George Micodotis, Director of Criminological Research center, Athens, Greece, maintains that ‘Crime is the result of the lack of the right kind of education.’ It is thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to anti-social behavior has to be countered not by undue cruelty but by re-culturisation. Therefore, the focus of interest in penology is the individual and goal is salvaging him for society. The infliction of harsh and savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times. The human today views sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated into criminality and the modern community has a primary stake in the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defense. We, therefore consider a therapeutic, rather than an in ‘terrorem’ outlook, should prevail in our criminal courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind.”

Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr. (1981 KLT OnLine 1008 (SC) = AIR 1980 SC 2147), wisely emphasized that parole should be granted liberally to aid in the reformation of prisoners and facilitate their reintegration into society. He stated: “In our view, penal humanitarianism and rehabilitative desideratum warrant liberal paroles, subject to security safeguards, and other humanizing strategies for inmates so that the dignity and worth of the human person are not desecrated by making mass jails anthropoid zoos. Human rights awareness must infuse institutional reform and search for alternatives.”

The primary objective of therapeutic or reformatory jurisprudence is to reintegrate prisoners into society as responsible, law-abiding citizens. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and Related Recommendations, published by the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Welfare, New York, 1958, are as follows: “The treatment of prisoners should emphasize not their exclusion from the community, but their continuing part in it. Community agencies should, therefore, be enlisted wherever possible to assist the staff of the institution in the task of social rehabilitation of the prisoners. There should be in connection with every institution social workers charged with the duty of maintaining and improving all desirable relations of a prisoner with his family and with valuable social agencies. Steps should be taken to safeguard, to the minimum extent compatible with the law and the sentence the rights relating to civil interests, social security rights and other social benefits of prisoners.”

Jimmy Carter, the 39th President of the United States, though not a legal expert, made notable observations on the importance of parole and its reformative aspect in his Law Day speech at the University of Georgia while serving as Governor. His remarks are worth quoting: “Well, I do not know the theory of law, but there is one other point. I want to make, just for your own consideration. I think we’ve made great progress in the Pardons and Paroles Board since I have been in Office and since we have reorganized the Government. We have five very enlightened people there now. And on occasion they go out to the prison system to interview the inmate, to decide whether or not they are worthy to be released after they serve one third of their sentence. I think most jurors and most judges feel that when they give the sentence, they know that after a third of the sentence has gone by, they will be eligible for careful consideration. Just think for a moment about your own son or your own father or your own daughter being in prison, having served seven years of a lifetime term and being considered for a release. Don’t you think that they ought to be examined and that the pardons and Paroles Board ought to look them in the eye and ask them a question and if they are turned down, ought to give them some substantive reason why they are not released and what they can do to correct their defects?”

Parole: As the Rule

Parole is the conditional early release of a prisoner based on good behavior, requiring regular reporting to authorities while keeping the sentence intact. It is granted only after a portion of the sentence has been served. The Supreme Court, in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986), aptly defined parole and the conditions for its grant as follows: “A parole can be defined as conditional release of prisoners i.e., an early release of a prisoner, conditional on good behaviour and regular reporting to the authorities for a set period of time. It can also be defined as a form of conditional pardon by which the convict is released before the expiration of his term. Thus, the parole is granted for good behaviour on the condition that parolee regularly reports to a supervising officer for a specified period. Such a release of the prisoner on parole can also be temporarily on some basic grounds. In that eventuality, it is to be treated as mere suspension of the sentence for time being, keeping the quantum of sentence intact. Release on parole is designed to afford some relief to the prisoners in certain specified exigencies. Such paroles are normally granted in certain situations, some of which may be as follows: (i) a member of the prisoner’s family has died or is seriously ill, or the prisoner himself is seriously ill; (ii) the marriage of the prisoner himself, his son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, brother, sister, or sister’s son or daughter is to be celebrated; (iii) the temporary release of the prisoner is necessary for ploughing, sowing, harvesting, or carrying out any other agricultural operation on his land or his father’s undivided land actually in his possession; (iv) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient cause; (v) parole can be granted only after a portion of the sentence has already been served; (vi) if the conditions of parole are not abided by, the parolee may be returned to serve his sentence in prison, such conditions including the commission of a new offence; and (vii) parole may also be granted on the basis of aspects related to the health of the convict himself.”

Parole rules are generally incorporated into Jail Manuals or established through other state-specific laws. Each state has its own laws governing prisons and jails, which set out detailed regulations on parole, furlough, remission, and other aspects of prisoner management. These regulations are framed by the State Government under Section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894, the Prisoners Act, 1900, and other relevant laws enforced by the respective State Governments.

The Supreme Court aptly highlighted a prisoner’s right to claim parole in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986). The Court emphasized that the criminological objective of parole is the reformation of prisoners and that due consideration must be given to that societal aim. It concluded that parole should be granted based on factors such as the likelihood of reformation and good conduct in prison which states as follows: “A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for the period of sentence or for rest of his life in case he is a life convict. It is in this context that his release from jail for a short period has to be considered as an opportunity afforded to him not only to solve his personal and family problems but also to maintain his links with society. Convicts too must breathe fresh air for at least some time provided they maintain good conduct consistently during incarceration and show a tendency to reform themselves and become good citizens. Thus, redemption and rehabilitation of such prisoners for good of societies must receive due weightage while they are undergoing sentence of imprisonment.”

Denial of Parole as the exception:

Parole is to be denied only if the applicant poses a menace to society; otherwise, parole stands as the rule, and its denial as the exception. As aptly observed by the Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017  SC 4986), conviction for a serious and heinous crime cannot be the sole reason for denying parole. At the same time, if it is the only crime committed by the individual, they cannot be categorized as a hardened criminal. Wherever a person convicted has suffered incarceration for a long time, he can be granted temporary parole, irrespective of the nature of offence for which he was sentenced. In this context, the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. (1979 KLT OnLine 1032 (SC) = (1979) 3 SCC 646) emphasized that the nature of the crime is not the sole determinant while assessing a crime; rather, the reformation of the individual remains the focal point. The Court observed: “The retributive theory has had its day and is no longer valid. Deterrence and reformation are the primary social goals.” In cases where a person has been convicted of a serious offense, the competent authority, while assessing such cases, would be well advised to apply stricter standards when evaluating good conduct, prior criminal history, the likelihood of reformation, or the potential risk posed to public peace and tranquillity etc. Public interest demands that habitual offenders who may reoffend or pose a threat to law and order should not be released on parole. A prisoner’s qualification as a social menace is assessed based on factors such as habitual offending, bad conduct in prison, and the unlikelihood of reformation, which align with sentencing objectives like deterrence and prevention.

While granting parole the possibility of recurrence of crime must be considered as observed in the Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986). Because, a significant number of crimes are committed by offenders released back into society after conviction, highlighting the importance of evaluating whether a prisoner shows a tendency to reform or is likely to relapse into crime. Recidivism, the tendency to reoffend despite correctional treatment, indicates that rehabilitation efforts have failed, suggesting the individual may be a hardcore criminal beyond reform. Correctional therapy’s ineffectiveness in such cases justifies denying parole based on merit. Hardcore criminals often develop lasting associations, loyalties, and attitudes that sustain their criminal behavior, with peer pressure and social ostracization from delinquent groups further contributing to reoffending. Persistent criminal behavior may also stem from inherent pathological traits such as mental defectiveness, emotional instability, internal conflicts, criminal ecocentrism, and psychosis. Criminologist Frank Exner emphasizes that the likelihood of reoffending increases with prior arrests and that as past crimes accumulate, the interval between offenses shortens. The primary goal of criminological studies is to differentiate between offenders who can be rehabilitated and those who are habitual and irredeemable. To distinguish recidivists from non-recidivists and hardcore criminals from occasional offenders, Exner outlines several key factors in the 6th edition of Kriminologie (pp. 115-120) as follows: “(1) hereditary weakness in family life, (2) increasing tempo of criminality, (3) bad conditions in the parental home, (4) bad school progress, especially in deportment and industriousness, (5) failure to complete studies once begun, (6) irregular work habits (work shyness), (7) onset of criminality before the age of 18, (8) more than four previous sentences, (9) quick relapse into crime, (10) interlocal criminality (mobility), (11) psychopathic personality as diagnosed by an institutional doctor, (12) alcoholism, (13) release from an institution before the age of 36, (14) bad conduct in the institution, and (15) bad social and family relations during the period of release.”

Types of Parole:

When discussing parole, three related terms come to the mind of a legal practitioner: furlough, custody parole, and regular parole. As far as ‘regular parole’ is concerned, it may be granted in the following cases as observed by the Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986): (i) serious illness of a family member; (ii) critical conditions in the family on account of an accident or death of a family member; (iii) marriage of any member of the family of the convict; (iv) delivery of a child by the wife of the convict if there is no other family member to take care of the spouse at home; (v) serious damage to life or property of the family of the convict, including damage caused by natural calamities; (vi) to maintain family and social ties; and (vii) to pursue the filing of a special leave petition before this Court against a judgment delivered by the High Court convicting or upholding the conviction, as the case may be.

The same aforesaid judgment Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986) also defines custody parole and furlough. Custody parole is generally granted in emergent circumstances, such as the death or marriage of a family member, serious illness of a family member, or any other urgent situation. Furlough, on the other hand, is a temporary release from prison, granted under specific conditions, particularly in cases of long-term imprisonment. The time spent on parole will not be considered part of the sentence. However, the period of furlough will be counted as time served. In essence, furlough is granted as a remission for good conduct.

The Supreme Court and High Courts, through various pronouncements (see State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Suresh Pandurang Darvakar (2006 (2) KLT OnLine 1125 (SC) = (2006) 4 SCC 776); and State of Haryana & Ors. v. Mohinder Singh (2000 (2) KLT SN 26 (C.No.29) SC = (2000) 3 SCC 394), Charanjit Lal v. State of Delhi (1985 Cr.L.J. 1541 = 1986 2 ILR (Del.) 417), has laid down the differences between parole and furlough. Both parole and furlough are conditional release. While a prisoner can be released on parole when he is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for any offence whatsoever and irrespective of the duration of the imprisonment awarded to him, furlough can be granted only in those cases where a prisoner has been sentenced to long imprisonment i.e. five years or more. Further, it is evident that release on parole is designed to afford some relief to the prisoner in certain specified contingencies, for instance, illness or death of member of his family or marriage of the prisoner himself or any member of the family etc. whereas furlough is in the nature of a remission earned by a prisoner by consistent good conduct for over a number of years and it is granted to him as a matter of course if other conditions laid has satisfied. One of the postulates which must weigh with the authorities while granting furlough is that the prisoners release will not be hazardous or prejudicial to the public peace and tranquillity. Further the period of furlough counts as sentence undergone unless, of course, the prisoner released on furlough commits an offence outside the prison. In other words, while parole is tantamount to more suspension of the sentence for the time being keeping the quantum of sentence awarded to a prisoner in fact, furlough affords double relief in the sense that it gives not only an opportunity to the prisoner to breath fresh air and enjoy the society of his kith and kin etc. outside the prison but also counts towards the total sentence awarded to him, i.e. his total sentence is reduced to the extent he earns remission in the form of furlough by continuous good conduct.

Section 433A of Cr.P.C. doesn’t restrict parole or furlough:

It is important to remember that when a prisoner applies for parole, they would have already spent some time in jail. During this period, various reformatory measures would have been implemented, in accordance with the reformation facilities available in modern jails. While the remission of time spent outside of jail on parole, furlough, or through the release of prisoners—including life convicts—does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of Section 433A of Cr.P.C., it is subject to the condition that the prisoners who are sentenced to imprisonment for life falling under the two specified categories of Section 433A must serve a mandatory minimum of 14 years of imprisonment. After this period, an order of release may be issued under Section 432/433 of Cr.P.C. or Articles 72/161 of the Constitution. In other words, remission, whether as a reward or otherwise, cannot reduce the sentence to less than the minimum 14 year period. However, this does not preclude a life convict falling within the scope of Section 433A from being granted parole or furlough during their sentence. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer Advocates for the prison administration to liberalize parole, seeking to relieve pent-up tension and curb the rise of sexual perversion in contemporary prisons. As observed by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr. (1981 KLT OnLine 1008 (SC) = AIR 1980 SC 2147 at p.2174): “There was some argument that Section 433A is understood to be a ban on parole. Very wrong. The Section does not obligate continuous fourteen years in jail and so parole is permissible. We go further to say that our Prison Administration should liberalise parole to prevent pent-up tension and sex perversion which are popular currency in many a penitentiary (see Sethna, ‘Society and the Criminal’ Tripati publications, 4th Edn. p.296).”

It is now well established that the four primary objectives of punishment imposed by the State on an offender are deterrence, prevention, retribution, and reformation. However, the issue of penology is complex, and these objectives must be considered holistically, particularly when dealing with life convicts who, in a literal sense, are incarcerated for the rest of their lives. In this context, as the Supreme Court has held, the release of such convicts from jail, intermittently, for short periods, could be considered. This provides them with an opportunity not only to address personal and family matters but also to maintain connections with society. Provided they consistently demonstrate good conduct during their incarceration and show a genuine inclination to reform, they should be allowed to experience life outside prison for a limited time. In other words, the redemption and rehabilitation of these prisoners, for the betterment of society, must be given due consideration while they are serving their sentence. Viewed from this perspective, there is no reason why life convicts, subject to Section 433A, should not be granted periodic release, either on parole or furlough, provided they have served at least 14 years of actual imprisonment. The concept of constructive imprisonment during parole or furlough does not fall within the ambit of Section 433A, and therefore, it cannot be reasonably argued that the possibility of furlough should be entirely excluded for life convicts affected by this provision.

Denial of parole leads to institutionalization:

The provisions of parole and furlough embody a humanistic approach toward individuals incarcerated in jails. The jurisprudential purpose of parole or furlough is to allow inmates to address personal and familial matters while maintaining their connection with society. Dr.Craig Haney, in his seminal work, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), discussed how prolonged imprisonment without parole or contact with the outside world can lead to the institutionalization of prisoners, making their reintegration into society upon release significantly more challenging. Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in Mohammed Giasuddin (supra), society has a vested interest in ensuring that offenders are adequately prepared for reintegration. Prisoners released without strong support networks, employment opportunities, familiarity with their communities, or essential resources face a significantly higher risk of recidivism. Many individuals revert to crime post-release due to a lack of hope in being accepted as productive members of society. Parole and furlough serve as crucial mechanisms in facilitating their successful reintegration as observed in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986).

Conclusion:

A society that upholds human dignity can be measured by the conditions of its prisons and the rights afforded to its prisoners. In a lawful and organized system, every individual deserves a dignified life. Committing a crime does not strip a person of their humanity or justify the denial of basic rights. While prisoners’ rights may be subject to reasonable restrictions, though they remain fundamental and enforceable. A just prison system goes beyond punishment, prioritizing rehabilitation and offering hope through parole, fostering reintegration and healing. This correctional orientation is a constitutional mandate rooted in social justice, as reflected in Article 14 (anti-arbitrariness), Article 19 (anti-reasonableness) and Article 21 (sensitized processual humanism). (See - Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, (1980 KLT OnLine 1046 (SC) = (1980) 3 SCC 488), Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr., (1978 KLT OnLine 1001 (SC) = (1978) 1 SCC 248), and Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent Central Jai, Tihar, New Delhi (1978 KLT OnLine 1030 (SC) = (1978) 4 SCC 104), Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986)).

In conclusion, as Justice Douglas warned about the arbitrary revocation of parole— which could obstruct the rehabilitation and reformation of prisoners— a concern reflected in Morrissey v. Brewer, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 505, as follows: “The rule of law is important in the stability of society. Arbitrary actions in the revocation of paroles can only impede and impair the rehabilitative aspects of modern penology. ‘Notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’, are the rudiments of due process which restore faith that our society is run for the many, not the few, and that fair dealing rather than caprice will govern the affairs of men.’”