Sakshya Adhiniyam Mandates Hashing the Original;
Established Jurisprudence Requires Hashing the copy also

(By Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam) E-mail : sajikoduvath@gmail.com      Mob.: 9400230025

Abstract

•   1. Section 63 of the BSA mandates the hash certificate for the original electronic record alone.

•  However, to fulfill the intended purpose, the HASH value certificate for the copy (computer output) must also be provided.

•   2.Section 63(4)(c) of the BSA does not specifically mandate that hashing must be done at the time of copying.

•   But the judicial precedents require recording the hash values at the time of ‘copying’.

Part I - Established Jurisprudence Varies from the Enacted Law

HASH Certificate Under Section 63 (BSA)

The (earlier) Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 65B mandated only a simple certificate, as provided under Section 65B(4), when ‘computer output’ (copy) was producedbefore a court. But, the new Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,  2023, requires, in Section 63(4), the HASH value certificate, also.

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Act speaks as to copy(computer output) as under:

• 63. Admissibility of electronic records – (1) “… any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper…. or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied …..”

Section 63(4)(c) of the Act reads as under:

• “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.“

HASH Value Certificate

The Certificate required in Section 63(4)(c) of the Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) must be “in the form specified in the Schedule”. It is laid down in the schedule (not expressly stated in the body of the section-text) that this certificate (HASH value certificate) is needed in addition to the Certificate that is required in sub-section (4) as regards the matters enumerated in sub-section (4).

HASH Value Certificate: Form in the Schedule

The Form in the Schedule directs to state the following:

•    “I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is ……, obtained through the following algorithm –

•   SHA1:

•   SHA256:

•   MD5:

•   Other ……... (Legally acceptable standard)

•   (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)”

What is (Literally) required is the Certificate concerning the Original

From the above form, it is evident that what is required is a certificate as regards the original ‘electronic/digital record(s)’, not any copy thereof.

Besides clause (c) of sub-section (4), clauses (a) and (b) also refer to the ‘original’ and not to a ‘copy’. Clauses (a) and (b) read as under:

•   “(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;

    (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication devicereferred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).”

The expression “identifying the electronic record containing the statement” in clause (a) of sub-section (4) further emphasises that the “statement” should pertain to that found in the ‘computer,’ indicating the statement within the physical device itself.

This interpretation aligns with the evidentiary logic that authentication must relate or refer to the source.

Moreover, the words “where it is desired to give a statement in evidence” in
Sec. 63(4) can be understood to refer to the “statement” as it exists in the electronic form in the (original) computer or in its digital storage (rather than the ‘copy’ or reproduction of that statement introduced later in court).

Relevant words in Section 63(4) reads as under:

•   “Where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate… shall accompany the electronic record…”

The term “electronic record,” as used in this context, appears incongruent because the statute seems to treat the original electronic source and the document produced from it (such as a printout or soft copy) under the same terminology. This conflation could lead to multiple confusions, including what exactly is being certified, the original data in the system, or the document derived from it.

Further Discordant Notes

1. The law compulsorily requires the HASH certificate. But, the requirement for the HASH certificate is unnecessary, especially in situations where there is no dispute regarding the computer output (copy or print-out).

2.It is not made clear in Sec. 63, BSA –

•   (i) What is the precise purpose of ascertaining the hash value of the (original) ‘electronic or digital record’ and not a copy (computer output) that is actually produced before the court?

•   (ii) This raises also another question: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s hash is referenced?

•   (iii) Why does the requirement of including HASH value appear only in the Schedule (certificate format) and not in the main body of Sec. 63 itself?

•   (iv) The lack of explicit mention in the section text also creates uncertainty about whether hash values are mandatory or directory (merely illustrative of best practices).

Established Jurisprudence

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal((2020)3 SCC 216) (although it was delivered before the introduction new Adhiniyam of 2023), is regarded as the most authoritative decision on this matter.

The enacted law (Section 63, BSA) requires the HASH value ‘certificate’ as regards the original ‘electronic or digital record(s)’, the prevailing consensus among the courts in India is the following –

• The primary objective of the certificate being verification of the authenticity of the copy (CD, pen drive, etc.), the certificate must refer to the copy (computer output), as well as to the original (electronic record) from which the copy was derived.

As regards the HASH value in Sec. 63(4), BSA, the following matters requires consideration –

•   The main text of Section 63(4) does not use the term “hash value”.

•   The ‘HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s‘ is required to be given under the ‘Form’ scheduled.

•  Even though it is not specifically stated, the ‘HASH values’ of both the original and the copy of the record must be provided (otherwise, the intended purpose will not be served).

Part II - The Law Does Not Mandate Hashing at the Time of Copying

As shown above, the Court decisions refer to the HASH value of the copy (computer output) produced in court, and not the original (electronic or digital record).

It is also worth noting that the Section does not clarify when hashing must be done—whether during copying from the original or at the time of presentation before the court.

It is true that the hash value of the copy of the CCTV footage (or any other digital evidence) should ideally be generated at the time the copy is made, and not merely at the time when the pen drive or other storage device is produced in court.

Hash Value Is Insisted at Four Stages even under Evidence Act

Madras High Court, in Yuvaraj v. State (2023-4 Mad.LJ (Cri.) 238), observed as under:

•   “206. To ensure that what is collected as an evidence in the source is exactly reflected or produced at the time of marking the electronic evidence before the Court, particularly when it comes to CCTV footages, a standard operating procedure must be followed. Such a practice will guarantee that nothing gets altered/deleted/added by the time the evidence is tendered before the Court. Hence, the concept of hash value is insisted at four stages and this value must be the same on all those four stages to ensure authenticity. When the CCTV footage gets stored in the hard disk, that is the first stage where the hash value must be noted down when it is received by the analyst from the Court on requisition made by the prosecution. Thereafter, the analyst creates a copy/mirror image of what is contained in the hard disk and this must also have the same hash value. As the next step, the forensic examination starts and ultimately, it is concluded and a report is given by the forensic analyst. In all those four stages, the hash value must be the same.”

•   207. For convenience, after the examination is completed by the forensic analyst, the footage can be downloaded to a DVD/CD and the same hash value will be reflected without any change. Since the extraction from the hard disk to the DVD/CD makes such DVD/CD as a secondary evidence, it goes without saying that such a DVD/CD must be accompanied with Section 65-B certificate. Copies taken and given to the accused persons under Section 207 of Cr.P.C. regarding the CCTV footages should also be accompanied with Section 65-B certificate.”

Hash Value Must Be Recorded – Guidelines of Government in Tax Matters

In the “Digital Evidence Investigation Manual, 2014, Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), Department of Revenue Ministry of Finance Government of India, reads, in Para 6.8, as under:

•   “6.8 Forensic Imaging/Cloning: If on previewing, important data is found either in deleted or in active form, the storage medium is required to be cloned for evidence purpose. Otherwise a normal data backup can be taken. The following steps should be taken at the time of cloning:

•   •  Preparation….. In cases where very high capacity disks/servers (Over 200 GB) are found at the search premises, separate Hardware imaging devices, which are up to ten times faster, would be needed. These hardware devices have in-built authentication engines. On completion of the imaging process, the device displays the hash value of the cloned hard disk. The image/clone has to have the same hash value as that of the target hard disk. The Hash value should be recorded in the Panchnama and the assessee can be given the option of seeking a copy of the imaged/cloned hard disk by paying the copying charges.”

Para 6.8 also requires the following under the heading ‘Report’:

•   •  Report: Take printout of report generated by the imaging tool which contains the details of imaging attributes, details of Hard Disk Drives imaged, date and time and the most important thing the hash value of the Hard Disk Drive. Attach the report along with panchnama as an annexure to it.

In M/s.Saravana Selvarathnam Retails v. The Commissioner of Income Tax
 (2024-463 ITR 523 : 298 Taxman 319 : 339 CTR 10 (Mad.)(HC)), the main grievance of the petitioner was that the digital data evidences were collected by the respondents from unknown locations without any valid search warrant and without following the guidelines issued by the CBDT vide Digital Evidence Investigation Manual. The Madras High Court addressed the contention in detail and held as under:

•   “The Digital Evidence Investigation Manual has been issued by the CBDT by virtue of powers available under Section 119 of the IT Act and hence, the Income Tax Authorities and all the other persons employed in the execution of this Act are bound to observe and follow such orders, instructions and directions issued by CBDT. ….. Hence, it is mandatory for  W.P. Nos. 9753, 9757, 9761 & 11176 of 2023 respondents to follow the Digital Evidence Investigation Manual issued by CBDT while conducting search and seizure and it is not optional.”

Directives of Maharashtra and Kerala Governments

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka (2023-2 Kar.LJ 397), it is pointed out –

•   “In fact, the Government of Maharashtra has already implemented the practice of collecting hash value of electronic evidences and collecting the memory component of the device it is recorded on at the first instance since 2016. A reference can also be made to the Standard Operating Procedures issued by the Government of Kerala for collection of digital evidence related to crimes against women and children, since 2021. In fact, guidelines on extraction of hash value are also given in Digital Evidence Investigation Manual Central Board of Direct Taxes Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.”

Hash Values of the Original and Copy at the Time of Copying, Required

Though Section 63(4)(c) of the BSA does not specifically mandate

•   (i) that hashing must be done at the time of copying, and (ii) that the hash value must pertain to the copy (computer output), also, established jurisprudence, through long-standing legal precedents, requires recording the hash values of both the original and the copy at the time of copying, to demonstrate that the data is protected against tampering.

Conclusion

It is a fact that Section 65 of the old Act and Section 63 of the new Act were introduced as enabling provisions, designed to simplify the admissibility of electronic records.

•   However, due to poor and rigid drafting, they have paradoxically had the opposite effect.

In practice, it may be more feasible for many litigants to physically produce the original device—such as a computer, laptop, or mobile phone—before the court, rather than to obtain a certified hash value through a forensic expert.

REMEDY WORSE THAN THE DISEASE

K. Ramakumar, Sr. Advocate, High Court of Kerala

The hiding of heaps of currency notes discovered, though from an outhouse in the residence of a Delhi judge, not far away from the red brick building in Tilak Marg housing the Supreme Court, has sent shockwaves among the legal fraternity in India. More startling was the handling of the issue by the highest court.

Law, fortunately, is alike in India for a highwayman and a highbred. Any erring citizen is bound to be answerable to law if he breaches the same. Our magnificent constitution proclaims equal protection of law, not unequal protection from law. Unfortunately, there appears to be an attempt to create an artificial and arbitrary category of citizens, privileged even in the commission of culpable offences. This was first revealed in what is infamously known as the Veeraswamy case [(1991) 3 SCC 655 = 1991 (2) KLT OnLine 1028 (SC)]. The Apex Court surprisingly laid down a new procedure:

“It is accordingly directed that no criminal case shall be registered under Section 154 CrPC against a Judge of the High Court, Chief Justice of High Court or Judge of the Supreme Court unless the Chief Justice of India is consulted in the matter. Due regard must be given by the government to the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of India. If the Chief Justice of India is of the opinion that it is not a fit case for proceeding under the Act, the case shall not be registered.”

Sri Justice Lalit Sharma dissented and spoke:

   “The approval of Chief Justice of India can be introduced as a condition for prosecution only by the Parliament and not by the Supreme Court.”

The facts unfolded in Veeraswamy were revolting and questioned the very existence of the rule of law in the country. Wads of currency notes were found concealed in a pillow cover in his bedroom, which, when caught, the judge explained was handed over to him by the chief minister. Nothing happened except the routine registration of a crime, which was, as usual, indefinitely postponed till his death.

It is not the first time that currency notes are found out from judge’s premises. From the chambers of a Bombay judge, they were recovered. From the residence of a woman judge in Chandigarh, currency notes were caught. To the misfortune, singularly, of that lady judge, she faced a prosecution but was acquitted later.

A lady lawyer of the Bombay High Court, rated high among courts in legal circles, has written an article in an English newspaper courageously and candidly exposing the double talk on corruption by those who are enjoined in law to curb it and convict the guilty. A lawgiver cannot be a lawbreaker.

The handling of the hidden cash in the Delhi bungalow of a constitutional functionary had received flak from all quarters, including from the Hon’ble Vice President of India, himself a former lawyer of the Supreme Court. A demand has now been rightly made to reconsider Veeraswamy (supra), a stumbling block in the even march of law to deal with culpability. The Supreme Court remains silent.

Instead, a committee of judges drawn from three different high courts, the authority of such a committee being highly questionable, had gone into the issue and testified to the veracity of the accusation against the judge, reportedly holding the view that the judge was wrong, nay culpable.

Ordinary citizens of this country who ardently adore judges sitting in judgment over their fellow citizens had justifiably expected an investigation by an appropriate agency since a prima facie crime has been committed not by a layman but a lawman highly placed and exempt even from truthful criticism by reason of the Contempt of Court Act. The movement of the machinery of investigation is also stalled on account of the extraordinary step taken by the highest court of the country in entrusting the investigation to an in-house committee of judges instead of permitting the law to take its own course.

Be it remembered that the Supreme Court has only appellate powers over judges of the High Court and no administrative authority.

The fallout is that a grave guilt, falling in the category of a white-collar crime severely criticised by the Supreme Court in money laundering cases involving high functionaries, is given an exemption and escape from the due process of law, still held sacred under our constitution.

The entire legal community is saddened. So are the common,simple-minded citizens of the country, who are asking inconvenient questions, difficult to find answers to.

PRESUMPTION V. TRUTH : WHY SECTION 115 OF THE

BHARATHIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM NEEDS A REBOOT

(By Akhil Ben, Advocate, Trivandrum)    E-mail : akhilben854@gmail.com     Mob.: 6282315526

Abstract :In Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph (2025 (1) KLT 632 (SC) = 2025 KLT OnLine 1141 (SC), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that, in the absence of proven non-access between spouses, the statutory presumption under Section 115 of the Bharathiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (S.112 IEA) conclusively determines paternity. This article critically examines the legal and social risks posed by such an interpretation, particularly the possibility that a child may biologically belong to a man other than the husband. It questions whether the law, in it’s current form, adequately protects the rights of all parties or risk perpetuating legal inaccuracies under the guise of preserving social order.

Introduction :The presumption of legitimacy under Section 115 of the Bharathiya Sakshya Adhiniyam was a legislative innovation of it’s time. Rooted in the social need to preserve marital sanctity and protect children from stigma, it holds that a child born during a valid marriage is the legitimate offspring of the husband, unless non-access between the spouses at the time of conception is proven. InIvan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, the Court reinforced this principle, holding that scientific truth must yield to legal presumption unless the demanding threshold of non-access is met.

This judgement raises a critical jurisprudential concern : What if the presumption is wrong? What if the child, legally presumed to belong to the husband, is in fact the biological child of another man? By denying the admissibility of DNA evidence in such circumstances, the law risks entrenching a falsehood as legal truth. This article explores the ramifications of this legal fiction and argues for a recalibrated approach to Section 115 that integrates science, justice and constitutional values.

The Presumption Under Section 115 : Protective or Obstructive?

Section 115 was enacted with noble intentions : to protect children from the harsh consequences of illegitimacy and to prevent malicious questioning of paternity. However, the provision was formulated in an era that lacked the tools for scientific verification. With the availability of reliable DNA testing (The American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) and similar international bodies report over 99.99% probability of paternity inclusion in tested cases), continuing to treat paternity as an immovable presumption, especially in the face of contradictory evidence, raises pressing concerns about truth, identity and justice.

In Ivan Rathinam, the court held that even where a child and mother asserted that the child was the issue arising out of an extra-marital relationship, the presumption of legitimacy prevailed because the mother and her husband cohabited during probable time of conception. The court refused to order a DNA test, noting that non-access had not been proven and that such testing could violate the dignity and privacy of the individuals involved. But this begs the question : What if the child is not the husband’s? What if DNA evidence-if permitted-would show conclusively that another man is the biological father? The law, as interpreted, effectively denies the possibility of correcting a fundamental error.

The Legal Fiction at the Heart of the Dilemma

At the center of this controversy lies the tension between legal presumption and biological fact. By deeming legitimacy and paternity synonymous unless non-access is proven, Section 115 effectively creates a legal fiction. But the danger of fiction is that it may persist even in the face of truth.

In a scenario, where the husband is not the biological father, the court’s appraoch implies the following consequences :

1. For the child : The child is denied the opportunity to identify or seek rights (emotional, legal or financial) from the biological father. This undermines the child’s right to identify and familial connection, a right increasingly recognized under Article 21 of the constitution.

2. For the biological father : If the child is legally deemed to belong to another man, the biological father’s role is erased, denying both his responsibility and his potential rights (such as custody, visitation and emotional bonding)

3. For the husband : A man may be legally and financially obligated to raise a child who is not biologically his, based solely on the presumption of cohabitation, even if he asserts no paternity and lacks a biological connection.

This trinity of injustices calls into question whether rigid flexibility to Section 115 serves justice or perpetuates legal fiction at the expense of truth and autonomy.

International Approaches : Flexibility in Presumption

Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the evolving interplay between legal presumption and factual reality. In the United Kingdom and the United States, while a presumption of legitimacy exists, it is rebuttable by DNA evidence if it serves the child’s best interests and justice. The focus is on the truth and welfare of the child, not on the perpetuation of legal construct.

India’s jurisprudence, however, remains largely formalistic in this domain. The strict requirement of proving non-access, often an impossibility, prevents even a prima facie inquiry into biological reality. Such rigidity undermines the purpose of justice, espcially when all the parties seek the truth and no legitimate interest is served by suppressing it.

Balancing Privacy with Right to Truth

The court inIvan Rathinam emphasized the rights to privacy and dignity of the husband and mother. While these rights are critical, they must be balanced against the child’s right to know their origins and the alleged biological father’s right to challenge a legal presumption imposed upon him. This is not a binary issue of dignity versus truth, it is a matter of ensuring that legal processes do not enforce untruths in the name of order.

A more balanced jurisprudence would allow for narrowly tailored judicial discretion: if credible evidence suggests that the legal presumption may be erroneous, courts should be empowered to order DNA testing, especially when all parties are willing or when the child’s long-term welfare is at stake

Conclusion: Time for Doctrinal Recalibration

Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph reaffirms the formalistic interpretation of Section 115,
but in doing so, it forecloses the possibility that the law could be wrong, and that a child’s entire legal identity may rest on that error. This outcome is deeply problematic in a constitutional order committed to truth, dignity, and justice.

It is time to reconsider whether Section 115 should remain conclusive in its present form. A statutory amendment or progressive judicial interpretation could recognize that while the presumption of legitimacy is vital, it must yield when scientific evidence clearly points in another direction, and where the interests of justice demand such inquiry. Law cannot afford to remain blind when truth knocks on its doors.

JUSTICE P.B. SURESH KUMAR - THE JUDGE WHO UNDERSTANDS

(By Aswini Sankar R.S., Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

On this occasion marking Justice P.B. Suresh Kumar’s retirement, let me share some personal memories.

First, as a nervous junior lawyer with a week of practice experience at bar, I stood before his Lordship, with shivering and shaking voice, hands and legs, seeking an adjournment in a civil appeal’s admission. Lordship asked, “Why don’t you argue?” Upon our compulsion and I started, with feeble voice, stammering through the little I knew, I cannot recall what I argued or even the facts of the case, but I remember his lordship’s expression vividly: serious, focused, with his cheek resting on his hand, resembling the expressions of my Mom who listen carefully to my kindergarten (LKG) adventures.

After I completed my facts and law, I paused, he smiled gently and asked,

“What do you want now?”

Though I never expect, that question, I genuinely replied,

“My Lord, the appeal may be allowed.”

You raised eyebrow slightly, “At this admission stage?”

I without hesitation but with tension said,

“Then, then…. the appeal may be admitted, My Lord.”

The entire courtroom burst into laughter, all except two; his Lordship and myself.

After cross checking to the files, his lordship kindly, dictated: “Admit. Issue notice. Stay further proceedings.”

The second incident happened years ago, in the chamber of my senior, a genius in law, Mr. K. Ramkumar. The team was preparing feverishly for a matter listed in the Miscellaneous Court. We were cross-checking a bunch of case law printouts, chronologically arranged, labelled, and highlighted to clarify a tricky legal point.

Suddenly, our clerk, Rajeevan Chettan, came to the senior’s chamber and informed us that the judge was on leave, and the matter would be taken up by Justice PBS instead. My senior immediately said, “Don’t waste Justice Suresh’s time. One telling judgment is enough—he’ll understand.”

And that’s true, you did understand.

The third incident happened during a difficult time when tensions rose between the Bar and the Press. A classmate of mine, a fellow lawyer, was injured during that unrest. The very next day, His Lordship along with some others came to the Bar Association Hall to meet the Bar. He walked up to my friend, placed your hand on his shoulder, and asked gently,

“Are you okay?”

After a month, in open court, while taking the petition list of his lordship miscellaneous jurisdiction, at 4:15 p.m., (a notorious list then, among the advocates, for shortage of time for which no one can be blamed though) while my friend, asking for a stay extension in his matter, you asked him again,

 “Are you okay?”

That gesture spoke volumes.  

Yes, what my senior said is absolutely true, Justice P.B. Suresh Kumar, easily and genuinely understands the law. Not only the law but the facts, the emotions and the Bar.

Even though in my personal statistics, I got more dismissals and rejections from his court, but never once did I feel unheard or disrespected as a lawyer. Lordship, we thank you! We will miss you personally, and we also miss a judge like you in the Bench too.  

Professional Dignity in the Digital Age :
A Call to the Next Generation of Advocates

(By Kuriakose George Thekkel, Chief Manager (Law), State Bank of India)
E-mail :kgthekkel@gmail.com           Mob.: 9895106460

 “The Bar is not a private guild, nor is the Bench a cloistered conclave. It is a public institution serving the nation. Its conduct must elevate, not erode, public faith.”   -- Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer

“The strength of the judiciary lies not in might or numbers, but in the reverence with which it is viewed by those who appear before it.”       -- Justice H.R. Khanna

“A profession whose members regard it as a duty to uphold its dignity is one that commands the confidence of the people.”          -- Justice Vivian Bose

Abstract

The legal profession — once steeped in oral tradition, deference to decorum, and an almost sacrosanct reverence for the courtroom — now navigates a rapidly shifting terrain shaped by the pervasive influence of digital media. The recent incident in Kerala, where a newly enrolled advocate released an Instagram reel featuring the official car of a sitting High Court Judge, has sparked a necessary national conversation on the evolving boundaries of professional conduct in the legal fraternity. The Kerala Bar Council’s issuance of a show-cause notice to the young advocate is not merely a disciplinary response — it is indicative of a broader, jurisprudential inflection point.

This moment reflects not only on rules but on the deeper values that underpin our vocation. I am reminded of a seemingly small, yet profoundly instructive episode from my own initial days of practice. I was once standing at the back of a courtroom, casually conversing with another young lawyer — my back turned inadvertently to the Bench. A hand gently fell on my shoulder. I turned to find an unfamiliar senior advocate smiling at me. In a calm but firm tone, he said, “Son, never ever stand in court with your back turned to the Bench. It’s a matter of respect, not just decorum.” I did not know who he was at the time. Days later, I learned that the man offering that quiet counsel was none other than the illustrious K.P.Dandapani, a doyen of the Bar and a name that commands enduring respect in Kerala’s legal circles.That moment has remained etched in my consciousness. It spoke volumes about the culture of respect, restraint, and invisible discipline that defines the legal profession.

It is apprehended that this culture is now in tension with a generation reared in the immediacy of likes, views, and virality. The dissonance is not generational per se—it is cultural. It reflects a lacuna in the professional conditioning of young advocates, who must be taught not only the law but the ethos of lawyering. The standards of dignity, silence, and reverence for the institution are not ornamental traditions—they are the sine qua non of legal integrity.

The reel in question depicted visuals of a High Court Judge’s official vehicle, prominently displaying the Indian Tricolour, the Ashoka Chakra, and the nameplate reading “Judge, High Court of Kerala.” While the intent may have been celebratory, the symbolism and its misappropriation carry grave implications. The Bar Council deemed the video not merely inappropriate but actively “malicious and mischievous,” further holding that it constituted a form of unprofessional solicitation and affront to judicial dignity.

Under the Advocates Act, 1961, conduct unbecoming of the legal profession can attract disciplinary proceedings, including suspension or removal from the Bar. The statute vests the Bar Council and its disciplinary committees with the authority to preserve the integrity of the profession by adjudicating on issues of misconduct. In this context, the symbolic misuse of judicial insignia—particularly in a public and promotional digital medium—risks eroding public confidence in the sanctity of judicial institutions and the independence of the legal profession.

The legal profession is rooted in time-honoured values—dignity, confidentiality, restraint, and fidelity to institutional norms. In contrast, the architecture of social media is designed to amplify the self, to prioritize visibility over virtue, and immediacy over deliberation. These platforms are not inherently inimical to legal professionalism, but their use by members of the Bar—particularly new entrants—requires a heightened sense of prudence and ethical literacy.In the words of Justice Vivian Bose, one of India’s earliest Supreme Court judges, “A profession whose members regard it as a duty to uphold its dignity is one that commands the confidence of the people.” That confidence is what is at stake when professional conduct in the legal community is trivialized—even inadvertently—in the name of modern expression.

The challenge is not merely behavioural but structural. Young lawyers entering the profession in the digital era often possess impressive technological fluency but limited exposure to the nuanced moral infrastructure that underpins legal practice. In an environment where professional image is curated as much online as it is in court, the parameters of acceptable conduct must be both reaffirmed and rearticulated.

A major factor contributing to these lapses is the systemic inadequacy of professional ethics training in Indian legal education. Most law schools devote disproportionate attention to doctrinal subjects at the expense of cultivating a deep-seated understanding of professional comportment. This pedagogical imbalance produces graduates who are proficient in black-letter law but underprepared for the ethical dilemmas of real-world practice—especially those emerging in the context of digital communications.

Topics such as the ethical use of social media, digital client confidentiality, and online representations of professional status remain conspicuously absent from most curricula. As a result, law graduates often enter the profession with only a superficial awareness of the codes of conduct expected of them, exposing them—and by extension, the profession—to reputational risk.It must be taught that alawyer’s duty to his client, to the court and to the cause of justice transcends jurisdictional borders and must now extend to cyberspace, where impressions are formed, careers are shaped, and public trust is either cemented or corroded.

In an era where digital self-expression intersects uncomfortably with the imperatives of professionalism, every post, video, or image shared by a legal practitioner must undergo a fundamental threshold test: Would this content uphold the dignity of the legal profession if viewed by a judge, a senior member of the Bar, or a client? This is not merely a rhetorical device—it is a necessary filter in a profession where credibility, restraint, and perception carry enduring consequences. The act of posting content online is no longer a private indulgence; it is a public act with profound consequences on one’s profession.

Caution must be exercised when engaging with symbols of judicial authority. Reproducing or referencing court insignia, judicial vehicles, or other institutional emblems in non-official contexts trivializes their constitutional significance. These are not to be treated as props or aesthetic enhancements—they are emblematic of the rule of law and the constitutional framework within which we operate. To repurpose them for casual or personal media is not only inappropriate but also erodes the symbolic distance that must exist between the practitioner and the institution.

A clear demarcation must be maintained between personal expression and professional identity. While individuality and authenticity have their place in the digital space, they cannot come at the expense of institutional credibility. The intermingling of personal gratification with professional representation—often manifesting in content that is performative or self-promotional—invites both ethical scrutiny and potential regulatory sanction. The legal profession has always demanded a degree of self-effacement; in the digital age, that demand has only grown more complex.

There is also a pressing need to reinforce awareness around Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India Rules, which explicitly prohibits any form of advertisement or solicitation by advocates. Many digital actions, even those cloaked in subtlety or indirect suggestion, risk violating the spirit if not the letter of this rule. Therefore, integrity, not undesirable visibility, must remain the currency of professional success.

If one chooses to maintain a presence in the digital domain, its orientation must be educational, not self-centric. The true utility of online platforms lies in their capacity to foster public legal awareness and contribute to a broader understanding of constitutionalism, justice, and rights. Thought leadership, nuanced commentary on legal developments, and responsible advocacy for the rule of law not only elevate the individual’s stature but also reinforce the profession’s public mission. In this, there is ample room for innovation—but it must be anchored in humility and public service.

Senior members of the Bar, by virtue of their experience and stature, bear an amplified responsibility. Their role is not merely to mentor on procedural efficiency or courtroom craft, but to act as custodians of professional culture. They must steer the new entrants in the right direction. Justice H.R. Khanna, a beacon of judicial integrity, once said, “The strength of the judiciary lies not in might or numbers, but in the reverence with which it is viewed by those who appear before it.” That reverence is shaped in equal measure by what happens inside courtrooms and what is carried outside—into the world, both physical and digital.

Parallelly, the onus also lies on law schools to treat digital ethics and professional comportment not as cursory modules but as core pillars of legal education. The traditional focus on legal theory and black-letter law must be complemented by a transformative pedagogy in ethics—one that engages students with real-world dilemmas and cultivates a deep sense of judgment. The ability to navigate the grey zones of digital expression with discretion and integrity is now as critical as mastering statutory interpretation.

One must never lose sight of the long-term consequences that even momentary lapses in our conduct can produce. Professional misconduct in the digital age is often not a private fall from grace—it is a public unravelling. Reputational damage, once inflicted, is rarely reversible. In a profession built almost entirely on credibility, trust, and perception, the margin for error is narrow and often unforgiving. Each indiscretion weakens not just the individual’s standing, but the collective image of the Bar in the eyes of the public.

The legal profession stands at an inflection point. The digital age offers unprecedented opportunities for legal engagement, civic education, and public discourse. But these same opportunities demand commensurate responsibility. The standards of professional conduct must extend with equal force into virtual spaces. The dignity of the legal profession—rooted in constitutional ideals and societal trust—cannot be diluted by the imperatives of digital virality.

One can only hope, perhaps even whisper a wish into the void, that the Bar Council—stern guardian of our noble profession—will temper its justice with wisdom, as it confronts the tender inexperience of this fledgling entrant. Let us pray that the winds of this misfortunate event do not sweep the young advocate into their cruel spiral. And yet, amid this uncertainty, let us cast a blessing into the future: may he, in time, become a lawyer of rare mettle, honour-bound to the truths of justice, and deeply attuned to the callings of a society that aches for integrity.