നിസ്സഹായൻ്റെ ആയുധമാണ് മനസ്താപം ....
By N. Ajith, Advocate, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam
31/03/2025
നിസ്സഹായൻ്റെ ആയുധമാണ് മനസ്താപം ....
(By എന്‍.അജിത്, അഡ്വക്കേറ്റ്, എറണാകുളം)
നാട്ടിലെ കോടതികളില്‍ പതിമൂന്നോളം കൊല്ലക്കാലം സിവില്‍ ക്രിമിനല്‍ അടവുകളും നട്ടുവാങ്കവും നല്ലപോലെ പയറ്റിത്തെളിഞ്ഞ ശേഷമാണ് ഞാന്‍ എറണാകുളത്തേക്ക് എന്റെ ജീവിതം പറിച്ച് നടുന്നത്. കൊടികെട്ടിയ സീനിയര്‍ വക്കീലായ മാരാര്‍ സാറിൻ്റെ ഓഫീസിലേക്കുള്ള വഴി തുറന്ന് തന്നത് സാക്ഷാല്‍ കെ.പി.എന്‍. സാറായിരുന്നു. ഒരു സീനിയര്‍ വക്കീലാപ്പീസില്‍ ഇടം നേടാന്‍ വേറെയും ചില യോഗ്യതകള്‍ കയ്യിലുണ്ടെന്ന അഹങ്കാരത്തിലാണ് ഞാന്‍ നഗരത്തില്‍ വന്നിറങ്ങിയത്. എന്നിട്ടും കാട്ടുജാതിയായ എന്നെ പട്ടണപ്പരിഷ്‌കാരികളായ സഹജീവികള്‍ക്ക് ഉള്‍ക്കൊള്ളാനും കൂടെക്കൂട്ടാനും നന്നേ വിഷമമായിരുന്നു.
ലക്ഷങ്ങള്‍ ചിലവിട്ട് വെച്ചുപിടിപ്പിക്കുന്ന സ്റ്റെൻ്റ് നോട് തന്നെ ശരീരം ആദ്യം ഒരു അകല്‍ച്ചയാണല്ലോ കാണിക്കാറുള്ളത്, ഇതും അങ്ങനെയൊക്കെ ആയിരിക്കും എന്നൊക്കെ ഞാനും കരുതി......
കാര്‍ക്കശ്യത്തില്‍ മാരാര്‍സാറിൻ്റെ സീനിയറായിരുന്നു അക്കാലത്തെ സീനിയര്‍ മോസ്റ്റ് ജൂനിയര്‍ ആയിരുന്ന രവിവര്‍മ്മയെന്ന, ചൂടന്‍ രവിയെന്ന, അടുത്ത ചുരുക്കം ആളുകള്‍ക്ക് മാത്രം രവിയേട്ടനെന്ന് വിളിക്കാന്‍ അനുവാദമുള്ള കൊല്ലങ്കോട് സ്വരൂപത്തില്‍ രാമവര്‍മ്മ രവിവര്‍മ്മ. അതൊരു ഒന്നൊന്നര വര്‍മ്മ തന്നെയായിരുന്നു. കോടതിയിലും ജീവിതത്തിലും.
ഇന്നലെ കുംഭത്തിലെ ഉത്രം. വിളക്ക് തൊഴുതുപോരുമ്പോള്‍ ലായം റോട്ടിലെ ‘സരസ്വതി’യില്‍ കേറി. രവിയേട്ടൻ്റെ മകന്‍ ബോംബെയില്‍ ജി.എല്‍.സി. യില്‍ അവസാനവര്‍ഷം. ഇറങ്ങാന്‍ നേരം അവനെൻ്റെ കാല്‍ തൊട്ട് തൊഴാന്‍ ശ്രമിച്ചത് ഞാന്‍ തടഞ്ഞു.......
‘രവിയേട്ടന്റെ മകന്‍ ആരുടെ മുന്നിലും തല കുനിക്കരുത്... അത് മൂപ്പര്‍ക്ക് കുറച്ചിലാണ്.... അമ്മ കാത്തോളും...’. ചെറുങ്ങനെ വെള്ളം പൊടിഞ്ഞ കണ്ണ് ആരും കാണാതിരിക്കാന്‍ കണ്ണട എടുത്ത് വെച്ച് പുറത്തിറങ്ങി ഞങ്ങള്‍.
അന്നൊരു ബുധനാഴ്ചയായിരിന്നു. കേള്‍ക്കാനുണ്ടായിരുന്ന രണ്ട് അപ്പീലുകള്‍ രാവിലെതന്നെ മാറിപ്പോയി. എങ്കിലൊരു ചായയാവം എന്നുകരുതി കാന്റീനിലേക്ക് പോകുന്ന പോക്കിലൊന്ന് ചെറിയാന്‍ ജഡ്ജ്ൻ്റെ കോടതിയില്‍ ചുമ്മാ കേറിനോക്കിയതാണ്. വെറും ചുമ്മാതല്ല........ അവിടത്തെ കേസുകള്‍ നോക്കുന്ന ജൂനിയര്‍ ഈയിടെയായി നേരിട്ട് പോകാതെ മൊബൈല്‍ വഴി ‘നിര്‍ദ്ദേശികാ തല്‍പുരുഷനാ’വുന്നുണ്ടോ എന്നൊരു സംശയം ഉള്ളത് തീര്‍ക്കാനാണ് എന്ന് എനിക്ക് പോക്ക് കണ്ടപ്പോളേ മനസ്സിലായി. ചെന്ന് കേറിയ ഉടനെ മുകളില്‍ നിന്നൊരു വിളി.
‘രവി...... പാലക്കാട് ഒന്ന് പോണം.... ഒരുത്സവം നടത്തണം... ഒരാളെ കൂടി കൂട്ടിക്കോളൂ.... അയാളുടെ പേര് കൊടുത്തോളൂ ........ ഈ ശനിയാഴ്ചയാണ് ഉത്സവം. കേസ് തിങ്കളാഴ്ച്ചക്ക് വെച്ചിട്ടുണ്ട്. അന്നേക്ക് റിപ്പോര്‍ട്ട്....’
ഇടി വെട്ടിയപോലെ നിന്നുപോയി ഞങ്ങള്‍ രണ്ടാളും....... ഓഫീസിലെ ജൂനിയറിൻ്റെ കല്യാണം ആണന്ന്.
പോയാലും പ്രശ്‌നമാണ്...... പോയില്ലേല്‍ അതിലും പ്രശ്‌നമാണ്. പക്ഷേ രവിയേട്ടനല്ലേ ......... പണി മുഖ്യം ബിഗിലേ ....... അതുകൊണ്ട് ഉറപ്പിച്ചു. ഉത്സവം നടത്താന്‍ പോവാം.... പാലക്കാട് എന്ന് പറഞ്ഞെങ്കിലും അത് ജില്ല മാത്രമായിരുന്നു. തിരുവാഴിയോട് ന്ന് മംഗലാംകുന്ന് പോകുന്ന വഴിയില്‍ തൃക്കുന്നത്ത് അമ്പലത്തിലെ ഉത്രം വിളക്കാണ് നടത്തേണ്ടത്. എൻ്റെ നാട്......... രവിയേട്ടൻ്റെ അച്ഛൻ്റെ തറവാട് ........ പോരാത്തതിന് ശ്രീകൃഷ്ണപുരം.... ആനന്ദലബ്ധിക്ക് ഇനിയെന്ത് വേണ്ടൂ...
അമ്പലത്തിലെത്തിയപ്പോള്‍ നന്നേ വൈകി. കമ്മിറ്റി ഓഫീസിലാണ് താമസം ഏര്‍പ്പാടാക്കിയിരുന്നത്. കുളിയും ഭക്ഷണവുമൊക്കെ കഴിഞ്ഞ് ഒന്ന് സ്വസ്ഥമായപ്പോള്‍ രവിയേട്ടന്‍ വണ്ടിയെടുക്കാന്‍ പറഞ്ഞു.
‘നമുക്കൊരിടം വരെ പോവാം..... ഇവിടെ അടുത്താണ്... തനിക്കറിയാടോ... ഒറ്റപ്പാലം പോണ വഴി. മംഗലാംകുന്ന് വളവ് ന്ന് എടത്തോട്ട് .... ..’
ഞാന്‍ കാറെടുത്തു ....... മീന്‍കുളത്തിയും കഴിഞ്ഞ് ചെന്നെത്തിയത് നിലവിളിക്കുന്നിൻ്റെ നിറുകയില്‍....
‘ഡോ..... തനിക്കറിയോ ... ഇവിടെ വന്ന് നിലവിളിച്ചവരുടെ സങ്കടങ്ങള്‍ ദേവി തീര്‍ത്തിരുന്നു.... അതാ ഈ നാട്ടുകാരുടെ വിശ്വാസം..... ഇവിടെയുള്ള ശാന്തത താന്‍ കണ്ടോ.... അസ്വസ്ഥമായ മനസ്സുകള്‍ ഇവിടെ അല്‍പനേരം ഇരുന്ന് ശാന്തമായി ഒന്ന് ആലോചിച്ചാല്‍ തീരാവുന്ന പ്രശ്‌നങ്ങളേ ആര്‍ക്കും ഉള്ളൂ.... മരിക്കാന്‍ നൂറ് വഴികള്‍ ഉണ്ടെങ്കില്‍ ജീവിക്കാന്‍ ആയിരത്തൊന്ന്.... അതാണ് ഇവിടത്തെ സത്യം... അല്ലാതെ ഒരു ദേവിയും കേറിവന്ന് തൂവാല കൊണ്ട് കണ്ണീരൊപ്പിത്തരില്ല......നൂറ് രൂപ കയ്യില്‍ വെച്ച് തരില്ല.
ശാന്തമായി ഒരു പത്ത് മിനിറ്റ് ഇരുന്നാല്‍ എത്ര വലിയ പ്രശ്‌നത്തിനും ഒരു പരിഹാരം അവനവൻ്റെ ഉള്ളില്‍ത്തന്നെ തെളിഞ്ഞ് വരും..... ആ സത്യത്തിന് നാട്ടുകാര്‍ കൊടുത്ത ബിംബകല്പന ആണ് സങ്കടം മാറ്റുന്ന ദേവിയും ഓട്ടുവളയിട്ട കയ്യിലെ നേദ്യച്ചോറുമൊക്കെ ......... തനിക്ക് ഞാന്‍ പറയുന്നത് മനസ്സിലാവുമെന്ന് എനിക്ക് നല്ലപോലെ അറിയാം.... ഇന്നത്തെ കാലത്ത് പിഴക്കുന്നതിൻ്റെ പ്രധാന കാരണം അതുതന്നെയാണ്. കേള്‍ക്കുന്നവന് മനസ്സിലാവുന്നുണ്ടോ എന്നറിഞ്ഞല്ല സംസാരം........ പാത്രം അറിഞ്ഞല്ല വിളമ്പുന്നത്.... അവിടെയാണ് നമുക്കൊക്കെ തെറ്റിയത്... പുത്തന്‍ തലമുറ വഴി തെറ്റുന്നതും അവിടെനിന്നാണ് ...
കുറെയേറെ മൂക്കാതെ പഴുത്ത മാമ്പഴങ്ങളാഡോ നമുക്ക് ചുറ്റിലും. ചിലതൊക്കെ ഉള്ളില്‍ വിഷം നിറച്ച് പഴുപ്പിച്ചതും........ ഒരു നിലയ്ക്ക് ആലോചിച്ചാല്‍ മതിയായെടോ ഈ നാടകം കളി .... ഒരു മാതിരി ആത്മാഭിമാനമില്ലാതെ നാണം കെട്ട ജീവിതം....... മകന്‍ ഇതേ വഴിയ്ക്ക് പോകാന്‍ ആഗ്രഹിക്കുന്നൂ എന്ന് കേട്ടപ്പോ ഞാന്‍ അവനെ തടഞ്ഞതാ പലവട്ടം....മുന്നില്‍ കുഴിയാണെന്ന് പറഞ്ഞുകൊടുക്കാനേ എനിക്ക് പറ്റൂ ........ചാടാന്‍ ഒരുമ്പെട്ടവനെ പിന്മാറ്റാന്‍ എളുപ്പമല്ല’
രവിയേട്ടനെ ഇങ്ങനെ വാചാലനായി കണ്ടിട്ടില്ല...... എൻ്റെ നാക്കും വെറുതെയിരിക്കില്ല ...... ഒന്ന് ചൊറിഞ്ഞ് നോക്കീതാ....... പണിയൊന്ന് പാളി.
‘ഇന്ന് സാര്‍ മൊത്തം നെഗറ്റീവ് ആണല്ലോ.... വല്ലാത്തൊരു മുന്‍വിധികളും..... എന്തേലും പ്രശ്‌നങ്ങള്‍... പറയാവുന്നതാണേല്‍ പറയു..’
‘അതേടോ... എനിക്ക് മുന്‍വിധികളുണ്ട്... ഞാന്‍ മറ്റു പലരെയുംപോലെ തന്നെ നല്ലത് മാത്രം ചിന്തിച്ചാണീ തൊഴിലിലേക്ക് വന്നത്... നാല്പത് കൊല്ലമാവുന്നു അടുത്ത വര്‍ഷത്തേക്ക് .
ഇന്നോ..... താന്‍ നേരിട്ട് കാണുന്നതല്ലേ..... എല്ലാവര്‍ക്കും ഇരുട്ടി വെളുക്കുമ്പോളേക്കും ‘സക്‌സസ്ഫുള്‍ ലോയര്‍’ ആവണം... അല്ലേല്‍ മിനിമം ജഡ്ജിയെങ്കിലും ആകണം.... ആര്‍ക്കും ‘എക്‌സലന്റ് ലോയര്‍’ ആവണ്ട.... ‘എക്‌സലന്റ് ലോയര്‍’ ആവൂ... വിജയം നിങ്ങളുടെ പുറകെ വരും.... പറഞ്ഞാല്‍ ആര് കേള്‍ക്കാന്‍.... അത് അങ്ങനെ ഒരുകൂട്ടം. കാരണം ഉണ്ട് അതിനൊക്കെ ..... ‘സക്‌സസ്ഫുള്‍ ലോയര്‍’ ആവാന്‍ നൂറ്റൊന്ന് വഴികളുണ്ട്. പലതിലൂടെയും പലര്‍ക്കും പോകാന്‍ പറ്റും. ...... ‘എക്‌സലന്റ് ലോയര്‍’ ആവാന്‍ ഒരൊറ്റ വഴിയേ ഉള്ളൂ ...... നല്ലപോലെ അദ്ധ്വാനിക്കണം... കുറുക്കുവഴികളില്ല..... അതുകൊണ്ട് ആ വഴി അങ്ങനെ അധികമാരും പോവാന്‍ ആഗ്രഹിക്കില്ല...... സന്നിധാനത്തേക്ക് പോകുന്ന പരമ്പരാഗത കാട്ടുപാതയും സ്വാമി അയ്യപ്പന്‍ റോഡും പോലെയാണ് ........ അവരെ പറഞ്ഞിട്ട് കാര്യമില്ല... കാലിന്നടിയിലെ മണ്ണൊലിച്ച് പോയത് ഇന്നത്തെ പിള്ളേരാരേലും എന്നെങ്കിലും അറിഞ്ഞിട്ടുണ്ടോ..... താന്‍ കുറെ എഴുത്ത് കുത്തുകള്‍ നടത്തിയതിന്റെ ഫലം എന്തായീ... കഴിഞ്ഞ മാസം കൂടി സാര്‍ ചോദിച്ചിരുന്നു എന്നോട്....’
‘എന്താ രവിയേട്ടന്‍ ഉദ്ദേശിച്ചത്..... മനസ്സിലായില്ല’
‘ഇന്നോളം ഒരു ദിവസം പോലും കോടതി വരാന്തയില്‍ പോലും കേറാത്ത നിയമവിദഗ്ദ്ധര്‍ നശിപ്പിച്ചെടുത്തതല്ലേ ഇന്നത്തെ സിവില്‍ കോടതികളിലെ തെളിവെടുപ്പ് എന്ന കാട്ടിക്കൂട്ടല്‍..... എണ്ണം പറഞ്ഞ മിടുമിടുക്കന്മാരായ വക്കീലന്മാര്‍ താഴെ കോടതിയില്‍ നിന്ന് വന്നവരാണ്...... ഒരു സാക്ഷിയെ കൂട്ടില്‍ കേറ്റി നിര്‍ത്തി നിയമം തെറ്റിക്കാതെ നാല് ചോദ്യം ചോദിക്കാന്‍ നാല് മണിക്കൂര്‍ പ്രസംഗം നടത്തണ ഇവിടത്തെ പലേ സിംഹങ്ങള്‍ക്കും മുട്ടിടിക്കും. എനിക്ക് ഹൈക്കോടതിയില്‍ എന്നും നിറയെ പണിയാണ് ഞാന്‍ താഴത്തെ കോടതികളില്‍ വിസ്തരിക്കാനൊന്നും വരില്ല... വേണേല്‍ പ്രസംഗിക്കാന്‍ വരാം എന്ന് കക്ഷിയോട് സൗജന്യം വിളമ്പുന്നത് തിരക്കുള്ളതുകൊണ്ടാണെന്ന് തനിക്ക് തോന്നുന്നുണ്ടോ.... എങ്കില്‍ താന്‍ ഇനിയും കുറെ നാള്‍ കൂടി ഈ പൂരം മാറി നിന്ന് നോക്കിക്കാണേണ്ടി വരും...’
‘കേസ് തീര്‍പ്പാക്കാന്‍ വൈകുന്നത് കൊണ്ടല്ലേ ആവക പുരോഗമനപരങ്ങളായ മാറ്റങ്ങള്‍ കൊണ്ട് വന്നത്......’
‘എന്ന് തനിക്ക് തോന്നിയോ.... എങ്കില്‍ അവര്‍ ജയിച്ചു.... അത്രമാത്രം... പണ്ടൊക്കെ ഒരു ലിസ്റ്റ് കേസ് തീരാന്‍ കൃത്യം ഒരു മാസം സമയം.. ആദ്യത്തെ പത്ത് ദിവസം തെളിവ്.... രണ്ടാമത്തെ പത്ത് ദിവസത്തില്‍ പ്രസംഗം... മൂന്നാമത്തെ പത്തുദിവസത്തില്‍ തീര്‍പ്പ്... അതായിരുന്നു നടപ്പ്....ലിസ്റ്റ് സിസ്റ്റം എന്നായിരുന്നു ഓമനപ്പേര് .... ഇപ്പോളോ വിസ്താരം പുത്തന്‍കൂറ്റ് ‘നിയമജ്ഞന്‍‘ അവര്‍കള്‍ക്ക് .... സ്റ്റെനോഗ്രാഫറെപ്പോലെ ഒക്കെ കേട്ട് പകര്‍ത്തിയെഴുതി തുന്നിക്കെട്ടി റിപ്പോര്‍ട്ട് ഫയലാക്കാന്‍ അറുപത് ദിവസം.... എന്നിട്ട് വേണം പ്രസംഗം... പറയാനുള്ളത് എഴുതി കൊടുത്താല്‍ കൊടുത്തവന് കൊള്ളാം.... പിന്നെ അവന്റെ വിധി.... അത് വരാന്‍ അപ്പോ മിനിമം എത്ര നാളാവും.... താന്‍ പറയടോ......മൂന്നോ നാലോ മാസം ..... അതിനിടക്കാണ് ഓപ്പീസി സീപ്പീസി സീയാര്‍പ്പി അങ്ങനെ കുറെ എണ്ണം .... ഇതൊക്കെ അറിയണേല്‍ ചുരുങ്ങിയത് ഒരു നാലഞ്ച് കൊല്ലം കോടതി വരാന്തയിലൂടെയെങ്കിലും നടക്കണം...... നിയമവിദഗ്ധനായാല്‍ പോരാ ..........
കേസ് തീര്‍പ്പാക്കാന്‍ വൈകുന്നു.... കെട്ടിക്കിടക്കുന്നു എന്നൊക്കെ അലമുറയിടുന്നത് രാഷ്ട്രീയക്കാരാ...അവര്‍ക്ക് ലക്ഷ്യങ്ങള്‍ വേറെ പലതുമാണ് ..... .കക്ഷികള്‍ അത് പറയില്ല.... കേസ് നീണ്ടുപോകേണ്ടത് കക്ഷികളില്‍ രണ്ടിലൊരാളുടെ ആവശ്യമാണ്....’
‘സാര്‍ എന്തൊക്കെയാ ഈ പറയുന്നതെന്ന് ആലോചിച്ചിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... ചുമ്മാ കോടതിയലക്ഷ്യം വാങ്ങി വെക്കല്ലേ..... ചാര്‍ജ് വായിക്കാതെ ഊരിക്കൊണ്ട്‌ പോരാന്‍ ഞാന്‍ ആയിട്ടില്ല.... സാറിൻ്റെ ഈ സ്വഭാവം വെച്ച് വേറാരും വക്കാലത്ത് എടുക്കാനും സാധ്യത ഇല്ല......’ ഞാന്‍ ഒന്നൂടെ ആഞ്ഞ് ചൊറിഞ്ഞ് നോക്കി.
‘എടോ.... റിക്കവറി സൂട്ട് വിധിയായാല്‍ പ്രതി തൻ്റെ അടുത്ത് വന്ന് എന്താ പറയാറുള്ളത്... ഒന്ന് നീട്ടിപ്പിടിക്കണേ സാറേ... മകളുടെ കല്യാണം അടുത്ത് വരുന്നുണ്ട്.. വീട് പണി കഴിയാറായിട്ടില്ല .....മാറാന്‍ ലേശം കൂടി സമയം വേണം ..... . ഇറങ്ങിപ്പോയാല്‍ കേറിക്കിടക്കാന്‍ വേറെ വഴിയില്ല.... അങ്ങനെ അങ്ങനെ.
വാടകഒഴിപ്പിക്കല്‍ കേസിലോ... ഇതൊക്കെയല്ലേ അവസ്ഥ... പണം കൊടുക്കാന്‍ വിധിയായാല്‍ പ്രതിക്ക് എന്താ വേണ്ടത്.... ലേശം കൂടി സമയം വേണം... ഏത് കേസ് വേണേല്‍ എടുത്ത് വെച്ച് നോക്കിക്കോളൂ.... രണ്ടിലൊരാളുടെ ആവശ്യമാണ് കേസ് അനങ്ങാതെ നില്‍ക്കേണ്ടത്... അത് രാഷ്ട്രീയക്കാര്‍ക്ക് അറിയില്ല...അവരില്‍ ചിലര്‍ക്കെങ്കിലും പേരിന് മുന്‍പില്‍ അഡ്വ: ഉണ്ടെന്നേ ഉള്ളൂ ...... കാളവേലക്ക് ഒരലങ്കാരം ...അത്രമാത്രം ...... അവരോര്‍ത്തില്ലെങ്കിലും മിനിമം നമ്മളെങ്കിലും ഓര്‍ക്കണം.... രാഷ്ട്രീയക്കാര്‍ക്ക് സഭയിലോ ആകാശത്തേക്കോ തൊടുത്ത് വിടാന്‍ ഒരു ചോദ്യം മാത്രമേ വേണ്ടൂ.... നമുക്ക് മുന്നില്‍ കക്ഷി വരുന്നത് ഒരു സങ്കടവുമായാണ്. പഠിച്ച നിയമം കൊണ്ട് അവന് എന്തെങ്കിലും ഉപകാരം ചെയ്യാമോ എന്നല്ലാതെ അവനെ എങ്ങനെ ചവിട്ടിയരച്ച് രസിക്കാം എന്ന് നമ്മള്‍ ചിന്തിക്കുന്നിടത്തുനിന്നാണ് ഈ സംവിധാനം തകരാന്‍ തുടങ്ങുന്നത്....ഇക്കരെ നിന്നപ്പോള്‍ സ്റ്റേ കിട്ടാന്‍ അലമുറയിട്ട് കരഞ്ഞവര്‍ പലരും അക്കരെക്കാവില്‍ ശാന്തി തുടങ്ങിയാല്‍ മേല്‍ശാന്തിയാവുന്നതും നമ്മളൊക്കെ കാണുന്നതല്ലേ ....’
‘സര്‍ പറയുന്നത് ഒരളവുവരെ ന്യായം... പക്ഷെ ഇതൊക്കെ ചെറിയ പിള്ളേര്‍ എങ്ങനെ അറിയും... അവരെ ആരേലും പറഞ്ഞ് മനസ്സിലാക്കി കൊടുക്കണ്ടേ..... അതല്ലേ നിങ്ങളുടെയൊക്കെ ജോലി.....’
‘എക്‌സാറ്റ്‌ലി..... ദേര്‍ യൂ ആര്..... അവിടെയാണ് അടുത്ത കടമ്പ... താന്‍ മാരാര്‍ സാര്‍ റിട്ടോ അപ്പീലോ റിവിഷനോ എന്തേലും എഴുതുന്നതോ എഴുതാന്‍ ഡിക്‌റ്റെഷന്‍ കൊടുക്കുന്നതോ ഇക്കാലത്തിനിടക്ക് കണ്ടിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... കക്ഷികളെ നേരിട്ട് സംസാരിക്കുന്നത് കണ്ടിട്ടുണ്ടോ... അത് പോട്ടേ... കോടതിയില്‍ കേറി കേസ് വേറൊരു ദിവസത്തേക്ക് മാറ്റാന്‍ ചോദിക്കുന്നത് കണ്ടിട്ടുണ്ടോ..... ഇനി താന്‍ പോയി അലമാരയില്‍നിന്ന് അഡ്വക്കെറ്റ്‌സ് ആക്ട് എടുത്ത് അതിലെ പതിനാറാം വകുപ്പൊന്ന് മനസ്സിരുത്തി വായിക്കൂ.... രണ്ടാംനിര വക്കീലന്മാരെ ഒന്നാം നിരക്കാരാക്കി വാര്‍ത്തെടുക്കാന്‍ സായിപ്പ് പണ്ടേ പറഞ്ഞ് വെച്ച ഉപായമാണ് ആ വകുപ്പ്.... പറഞ്ഞുതുടങ്ങിയാല്‍ പറയാന്‍ കുറെയേറെയുണ്ട്......... അതൊക്കെ പ്രശ്‌നമാണ്...’
‘സര്‍..... സത്യത്തില്‍ ഇതൊക്കെക്കൂടി ആലോചിക്കുമ്പോള്‍ ഈ ആനമയിലൊട്ടകം കളിയിലെ സത്യാവസ്ഥകള്‍ പലതും പലര്‍ക്കും അറിയുന്നില്ലെന്നാണോ പറഞ്ഞുവരുന്നത്....’
‘ഇതൊന്നും തീര്‍ത്തും അറിയാതെ അല്ലടോ പലരും പലതും ചെയ്യുന്നത് .... ചിലതൊക്കെ അറിയാതെയും ചെയ്യുന്നുണ്ട് ഇല്ലാതില്ല ...... ‘’.
‘നമ്മളിപ്പോള്‍ ടെക്കി യുഗത്തിലല്ലേ.... ഒക്കെ പെട്ടീലാക്കലല്ലേ ഇപ്പോളത്തെ ട്രെന്‍ഡ്.... കോടതികളും വല്ലാതെ പുരോഗമിച്ചു.... പലരും ആവണപ്പലക കൊണ്ടാണ് നടപ്പും ഇരുപ്പും പ്രയോഗവും..... പലക ഇല്ലാത്തവന്‍ പിണം.... അതാണ് ഇന്നത്തെ അവസ്ഥ..... ‘
‘ജസ്റ്റിസ് ഗവായ് ഈയടുത്ത് എന്തോ അതിനെപ്പറ്റി പറഞ്ഞതായി എവിടെയോ വായിച്ചു. എടോ... സ്വന്തമായി ബുദ്ധിയും ഒറിജിനല്‍ തിങ്കിങ്ങും ഉണ്ടേല്‍ എന്തിനാടോ പുറമെ നിന്നൊരു കൃത്രിമ ബുദ്ധിയുടെ കൈത്താങ്ങ്.... ഇന്ത്യാ രാജ്യത്ത് പതിമൂന്ന് ജഡ്ജിമാര്‍ ഒരുമിച്ചിരുന്ന് എഴുതി നിയമലോകം ഇന്നും വാഴ്ത്തുന്ന ഒരേയൊരു വിധിയെ ഇന്നോളം ഉണ്ടായിട്ടുള്ളൂ.... കേശവാനന്ദ ഭാരതി കേസ്.... അതിന്റെ തുടക്കം ഒരു സിആര്‍പി ആയിരുന്നെന്ന് താന്‍ ഇന്നോളം അറിഞ്ഞിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... അതിന് ആ രണ്ട് വിധികളും മുഴുവനായി ഒരിക്കലെങ്കിലും വായിക്കണമെന്ന് ഒരിക്കലെങ്കിലും തോന്നിയിട്ടുണ്ടോ.... എങ്കില്‍ കേട്ടോളൂ..... അത്തരം ഒരു വിധിക്ക് കാരണമായ സീആര്‍പി കൈ കൊണ്ട് എഴുതി ഫയലാക്കിയത് സാക്ഷാല്‍ ടി.എസ്. വെങ്കിടേശ്വര അയ്യര്‍ ആയിരുന്നു .............. അതിന്നും സുപ്രീം കോടതി മ്യൂസിയത്തില്‍ ഇരുപ്പുണ്ട് ....... ആ ഒരു കയ്യെഴുത്ത് പ്രതിക്ക് ഇന്ത്യാരാജ്യത്തെ നിയമ രംഗത്ത് ഉണ്ടാക്കാന്‍ സാധിച്ച ഓളങ്ങളൊന്നും ഇന്നോളം ഒരു സോഫ്റ്റ് കോപ്പിക്കും സാധിച്ചിട്ടില്ലെന്ന് താനെങ്കിലും ഒന്നറിഞ്ഞിരിക്കണം.....’
‘ഇതിപ്പോ ഭീഷ്‌മോപദേശം പോലായല്ലോ സര്‍..... സമയം നല്ലോണം വൈകി... പോയി കിടക്കണ്ടേ..... നാളെയല്ലേ ഉത്സവം...’
‘ പോകാം.... ഉപദേശിക്കാന്‍ ഞാന്‍ ആരുമല്ലടോ.... ഇന്നത്തെ കാലത്ത് ഉപദേശം കേള്‍ക്കാനും ആര്‍ക്കും താല്പര്യമില്ല.... ഉപദേശിക്കാന്‍ ഞാന്‍ ശ്രമിക്കുകയുമില്ല... കാരണം.... ഉപദേശിച്ചിട്ട് വേണ്ട ഒരാള്‍ നന്നാവാന്‍.... നന്നാവാന്‍ ഒരു ‘എക്‌സ്റ്റെണല്‍ എയ്‌ഡ്’ വേണ്ട... മനസ്സ് മാത്രം മതി ...... ഞാന്‍ നന്നാവണം എന്ന് ഏറ്റവും കൂടുതല്‍ ആഗ്രഹിക്കാന്‍ എനിക്കേ പറ്റൂ ..............മറ്റുള്ളോര്‍ക്ക് അതിനുവേണ്ട സാഹചര്യം ഒരുക്കിത്തരാനേ കഴിയു ....... സ്വയം നന്നാവണം...
തന്നോട് പറഞ്ഞതിന് കാരണമുണ്ട്.... ഈ പണി ഒരു നിയോഗമാണ്.... ഗതിയഞ്ചും മുട്ടുമ്പോളാണ് ഒരാള്‍ ഒരു നിവൃത്തിക്കായി കോടതി കേറുന്നത്. നിസ്സഹായൻ്റെ അവസാനത്തെ ആയുധമാണ് ഉള്ള് ചുട്ടുള്ള ശാപം... സമയം കിട്ടുമ്പോ താന്‍ ഭാരതത്തില്‍ ജനമേജയൻ്റെ സഹോദരന്മാര്‍ ഒരു നായ്ക്കുട്ടിയെ അതിഭീകരമായി ദ്രോഹിക്കുന്നൊരു കഥയുണ്ട് ....അതൊന്ന് വായിക്കൂ ..... അമ്മയായ സരമ പരാതിയുമായി രാജസമക്ഷം ചെന്നെങ്കിലും ഒരു മറുപടിയുമില്ലാതെ നിസ്സഹായയായി തിരികെ പോകുന്നുണ്ട്.... അകാരണമായ ഒരു ഭയം ഭരണാധികാരിയില്‍ ആ നായ്ക്കുട്ടി വിതക്കുന്നുണ്ട്... കഥയുടെ മദ്ധ്യത്തില്‍കടന്ന് വരുന്ന ഏകലവ്യൻ്റെ സഹായിയായ ഒരു നായയുണ്ട്........ ഭരണാധികാരികളുടെ അധികാരഹുങ്കിനെതിരെ കുരച്ച് കൊണ്ട് വന്നവന്‍..... എല്ലാം കഴിഞ്ഞ് മഹാപ്രസ്ഥാനത്തിന് പോകുമ്പോളും ഉണ്ട് കൂട്ടിനൊരു നായ.... ഉടമയെ ആപത്തുകളില്‍ നിന്ന് സദാ ഉണര്‍ത്തിക്കൊണ്ടിരിക്കുന്നവന്‍..... കണ്ണീര് തുടക്കേണ്ടവന്‍ കണ്ണീര് വീഴ്ത്തരുത്. തൻ്റെ ചോറ് തട്ടിത്തെറിപ്പിച്ചവന്‍ വറ്റിറങ്ങാതെ ഇവിടെയെവിടെയോ ഇല്ലേ ..... ഉള്ള് ചുട്ടവൻ്റെ ശാപത്തിന് വല്ലാത്ത പൊള്ളലാണ് ........ താന്‍ ഉള്‍പ്പെട്ട പുത്തന്‍ തലമുറ അറിഞ്ഞ് അടുത്ത തലമുറയ്ക്ക് കൈമാറേണ്ട ഒന്നാണീ അറിവുകള്‍.... നല്ലതുകള്‍ മാത്രമേ കൈമാറി കൈമാറി നിലനില്‍ക്കൂ..... ഇക്കാലത്തിനിടക്ക് കണ്ട പലരേയും പലതിനെയും നമ്മള്‍ ഒരിക്കലും ഓര്‍ക്കാറു പോലുമില്ലല്ലോ ....... എന്നാല്‍ ചിലരെയും അവര്‍ തന്ന നല്ല ഓര്‍മ്മകളയേയും എന്നും ഓര്‍ക്കാറുമില്ലേ........ അക്കണക്കിന് സുഹൃത്തേ........ തനിക്ക് ഞാനീ പറഞ്ഞതൊക്കെ ഒരു ഉപദേശമായി തോന്നിയാല്‍ എനിക്ക് തെറ്റി..... കാരണം ഇത് ഉപദേശമല്ല ......... ഈ തൊഴിലിൻ്റെ സത്യമാണ്...... നീ വേണമിത് അടുത്തവന് കൈമാറാന്‍.... ‘.
പറയാന്‍ ഒട്ടേറെ ബാക്കി വെച്ച് പോയ രവിയേട്ടന്‍ ഇല്ലാത്ത മൂന്നാമത്തെ ഉത്രം വിളക്കാണിന്ന് ....... എക്കാലത്തും തെളിഞ്ഞ് നില്‍ക്കുന്ന കുംഭമാസത്തിലെ ലക്ഷ്മി ശങ്കരനാരായണ വിളക്ക്.........
Parole as the Rule, Denial as the Exception — Justice Beyond Bars
By Muhammed Farooque K.T., Advocate, Tirur
25/03/2025
Parole as the Rule, Denial as the Exception — Justice Beyond Bars
*(By Muhammed Farooque K.T., Advocate, Tirur)
E-mail : farooque.kt@gmail.com Mob.: 7012473900
“Prisoners are still ‘persons’ entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all the requirements of due process.”
-- Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting view in Pell v. Procunier (417 U.S.817 (1974)).
The rule of law and justice is not confined to free citizens; it extends to individuals whose rights and liberties are curtailed by imprisonment. Even when a prisoner’s freedom is lawfully restricted through procedure established by law, they still retain certain rights, including the right to parole and access to courts in India for the enforcement of those rights, ensuring their legal protections. In this regard, a notable observation reflecting this principle was made by Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978 KLT OnLine 1013 (SC) = AIR 1978 SC 1675, para.3):“Freedom is what Freedom does-to the last and the least-Antyodaya.”
In line with this principle, the humanism embedded in our Constitution, reflecting the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, underscores the intrinsic worth of every individual—including prisoners—as observed in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978 KLT OnLine 1013 (SC) = AIR 1978 SC 1675). Similarly, as part of our constitutional philosophy, we acknowledge the compelling statement from the British Government’s White Paper, People in Prison (Ibid.at p.423): “A society that believes in the worth of individual beings can have the quality of its belief judged, at least in part, by the quality of its prison and probation services and of the resources made available to them.”
In the same strain a British Buddhist-Christian Judge, speaking to a BBC reporter emphasized the importance of compassion in dealing with a convict (The Listener, Nov. 25, 1976, p.692): “Circuit Judge Christmas Humphreys told the BBC reporter recently that a judge looks at the man in the dock in a different way, not just a criminal to be punished, but a fellow human being, another form of life who is also a form of the same one life as oneself. In the context of karuna and punishment for karma the same Judge said: The two things are not incompatible. You do punish him for what he did, but you bring in a quality of what is sometimes called mercy, rather than an emotional hate against the man for doing something harmful. You feel with him, that is what compassion means”.
Similarly, Roger G. Lanphear, in a study, quotes a poignant letter from a prisoner that makes a powerful point: “Dear Mrs. Stender : You cannot rehabilitate a man through brutality and disrespect. Regardless of the crime a man may commit, he still is a human being and has feelings. And the main reason most inmates in prison today disrespect their keepers is because they themselves (the inmates) are disrespected and are not treated like human beings. I myself have witnessed brutal attacks upon inmates and have suffered a few myself, uncalled for. I can understand a guard or guards restraining an inmate if he becomes violent. But many a time this restraining has turned into a brutal beating. Does this type of treatment bring about respect and rehabilitation ? No. It only instills hostility and causes alienation toward the prison officials from the inmate or inmates involved. If you treat a man like an animal, then you must expect him to act like one. For every action, there is a reaction. This is only human nature. And in order for an inmate to act like a human being you must trust him as such. Treating him like an animal will only get negative results from him. You can’t spit in his face and expect him to smile and say thank you. I have seen this happen also. There is a large gap between the inmate and prison officials. And it will continue to grow until the prison officials learn that an inmate is no different than them, only in the sense that he has broken a law. He still has feelings, and he’s still human being. And until the big wheels in Sacramento and the personnel inside the prisons start practicing rehabilitation, and stop practising zoology, then they can expect continuous chaos and trouble between inmates and officials. Lewis Moore”
Parole: A Path to Prisoner Reform
In Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of A.P.(1977 KLT OnLine 1201 (SC) = (1977) 3 SCC 287), Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer emphasized that, in the modern context and in line with the views of Mahatma Gandhi—who shared the perspective of progressive criminologists worldwide—it is essential to regard offenders as patients and prisons as institutions for mental and moral rehabilitation. The community has a vital stake in the reformation of offenders. Rather than relying on intimidation or punitive measures, the focus should be on therapeutic interventions aimed at their reintegration into society. The Honourable Supreme Court observed in Mohammed Giasuddin (supra) as follows: “The subject of study takes us to our cultural heritage that there is divinity in every man which has been translated into the constitutional essence of the dignity and worth of the human person........Progressive criminologists across the world will agree that the Gandhian diagnosis of offenders as patients and his conception of prisons as hospitals - mental and moral - is the key to the pathology of delinquency and the therapeutic role of punishment. The whole man is a healthy man and every man is born good. Criminality is a curable deviance. The morality of the law may vary, but is real. The basic goodness of all human beings is a spiritual axiom a fall-out of the advaita of cosmic creation and the spring of correctional thought in criminology.........Alfieri has suggested: ‘society prepares the crime, the criminal commits it. George Micodotis, Director of Criminological Research center, Athens, Greece, maintains that ‘Crime is the result of the lack of the right kind of education.’ It is thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to anti-social behavior has to be countered not by undue cruelty but by re-culturisation. Therefore, the focus of interest in penology is the individual and goal is salvaging him for society. The infliction of harsh and savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times. The human today views sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated into criminality and the modern community has a primary stake in the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defense. We, therefore consider a therapeutic, rather than an in ‘terrorem’ outlook, should prevail in our criminal courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind.”
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr. (1981 KLT OnLine 1008 (SC) = AIR 1980 SC 2147), wisely emphasized that parole should be granted liberally to aid in the reformation of prisoners and facilitate their reintegration into society. He stated: “In our view, penal humanitarianism and rehabilitative desideratum warrant liberal paroles, subject to security safeguards, and other humanizing strategies for inmates so that the dignity and worth of the human person are not desecrated by making mass jails anthropoid zoos. Human rights awareness must infuse institutional reform and search for alternatives.”
The primary objective of therapeutic or reformatory jurisprudence is to reintegrate prisoners into society as responsible, law-abiding citizens. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and Related Recommendations, published by the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Welfare, New York, 1958, are as follows: “The treatment of prisoners should emphasize not their exclusion from the community, but their continuing part in it. Community agencies should, therefore, be enlisted wherever possible to assist the staff of the institution in the task of social rehabilitation of the prisoners. There should be in connection with every institution social workers charged with the duty of maintaining and improving all desirable relations of a prisoner with his family and with valuable social agencies. Steps should be taken to safeguard, to the minimum extent compatible with the law and the sentence the rights relating to civil interests, social security rights and other social benefits of prisoners.”
Jimmy Carter, the 39th President of the United States, though not a legal expert, made notable observations on the importance of parole and its reformative aspect in his Law Day speech at the University of Georgia while serving as Governor. His remarks are worth quoting: “Well, I do not know the theory of law, but there is one other point. I want to make, just for your own consideration. I think we’ve made great progress in the Pardons and Paroles Board since I have been in Office and since we have reorganized the Government. We have five very enlightened people there now. And on occasion they go out to the prison system to interview the inmate, to decide whether or not they are worthy to be released after they serve one third of their sentence. I think most jurors and most judges feel that when they give the sentence, they know that after a third of the sentence has gone by, they will be eligible for careful consideration. Just think for a moment about your own son or your own father or your own daughter being in prison, having served seven years of a lifetime term and being considered for a release. Don’t you think that they ought to be examined and that the pardons and Paroles Board ought to look them in the eye and ask them a question and if they are turned down, ought to give them some substantive reason why they are not released and what they can do to correct their defects?”
Parole: As the Rule
Parole is the conditional early release of a prisoner based on good behavior, requiring regular reporting to authorities while keeping the sentence intact. It is granted only after a portion of the sentence has been served. The Supreme Court, in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986), aptly defined parole and the conditions for its grant as follows: “A parole can be defined as conditional release of prisoners i.e., an early release of a prisoner, conditional on good behaviour and regular reporting to the authorities for a set period of time. It can also be defined as a form of conditional pardon by which the convict is released before the expiration of his term. Thus, the parole is granted for good behaviour on the condition that parolee regularly reports to a supervising officer for a specified period. Such a release of the prisoner on parole can also be temporarily on some basic grounds. In that eventuality, it is to be treated as mere suspension of the sentence for time being, keeping the quantum of sentence intact. Release on parole is designed to afford some relief to the prisoners in certain specified exigencies. Such paroles are normally granted in certain situations, some of which may be as follows: (i) a member of the prisoner’s family has died or is seriously ill, or the prisoner himself is seriously ill; (ii) the marriage of the prisoner himself, his son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, brother, sister, or sister’s son or daughter is to be celebrated; (iii) the temporary release of the prisoner is necessary for ploughing, sowing, harvesting, or carrying out any other agricultural operation on his land or his father’s undivided land actually in his possession; (iv) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient cause; (v) parole can be granted only after a portion of the sentence has already been served; (vi) if the conditions of parole are not abided by, the parolee may be returned to serve his sentence in prison, such conditions including the commission of a new offence; and (vii) parole may also be granted on the basis of aspects related to the health of the convict himself.”
Parole rules are generally incorporated into Jail Manuals or established through other state-specific laws. Each state has its own laws governing prisons and jails, which set out detailed regulations on parole, furlough, remission, and other aspects of prisoner management. These regulations are framed by the State Government under Section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894, the Prisoners Act, 1900, and other relevant laws enforced by the respective State Governments.
The Supreme Court aptly highlighted a prisoner’s right to claim parole in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986). The Court emphasized that the criminological objective of parole is the reformation of prisoners and that due consideration must be given to that societal aim. It concluded that parole should be granted based on factors such as the likelihood of reformation and good conduct in prison which states as follows: “A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for the period of sentence or for rest of his life in case he is a life convict. It is in this context that his release from jail for a short period has to be considered as an opportunity afforded to him not only to solve his personal and family problems but also to maintain his links with society. Convicts too must breathe fresh air for at least some time provided they maintain good conduct consistently during incarceration and show a tendency to reform themselves and become good citizens. Thus, redemption and rehabilitation of such prisoners for good of societies must receive due weightage while they are undergoing sentence of imprisonment.”
Denial of Parole as the exception:
Parole is to be denied only if the applicant poses a menace to society; otherwise, parole stands as the rule, and its denial as the exception. As aptly observed by the Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986), conviction for a serious and heinous crime cannot be the sole reason for denying parole. At the same time, if it is the only crime committed by the individual, they cannot be categorized as a hardened criminal. Wherever a person convicted has suffered incarceration for a long time, he can be granted temporary parole, irrespective of the nature of offence for which he was sentenced. In this context, the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. (1979 KLT OnLine 1032 (SC) = (1979) 3 SCC 646) emphasized that the nature of the crime is not the sole determinant while assessing a crime; rather, the reformation of the individual remains the focal point. The Court observed: “The retributive theory has had its day and is no longer valid. Deterrence and reformation are the primary social goals.” In cases where a person has been convicted of a serious offense, the competent authority, while assessing such cases, would be well advised to apply stricter standards when evaluating good conduct, prior criminal history, the likelihood of reformation, or the potential risk posed to public peace and tranquillity etc. Public interest demands that habitual offenders who may reoffend or pose a threat to law and order should not be released on parole. A prisoner’s qualification as a social menace is assessed based on factors such as habitual offending, bad conduct in prison, and the unlikelihood of reformation, which align with sentencing objectives like deterrence and prevention.
While granting parole the possibility of recurrence of crime must be considered as observed in the Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986). Because, a significant number of crimes are committed by offenders released back into society after conviction, highlighting the importance of evaluating whether a prisoner shows a tendency to reform or is likely to relapse into crime. Recidivism, the tendency to reoffend despite correctional treatment, indicates that rehabilitation efforts have failed, suggesting the individual may be a hardcore criminal beyond reform. Correctional therapy’s ineffectiveness in such cases justifies denying parole based on merit. Hardcore criminals often develop lasting associations, loyalties, and attitudes that sustain their criminal behavior, with peer pressure and social ostracization from delinquent groups further contributing to reoffending. Persistent criminal behavior may also stem from inherent pathological traits such as mental defectiveness, emotional instability, internal conflicts, criminal ecocentrism, and psychosis. Criminologist Frank Exner emphasizes that the likelihood of reoffending increases with prior arrests and that as past crimes accumulate, the interval between offenses shortens. The primary goal of criminological studies is to differentiate between offenders who can be rehabilitated and those who are habitual and irredeemable. To distinguish recidivists from non-recidivists and hardcore criminals from occasional offenders, Exner outlines several key factors in the 6th edition of Kriminologie (pp. 115-120) as follows: “(1) hereditary weakness in family life, (2) increasing tempo of criminality, (3) bad conditions in the parental home, (4) bad school progress, especially in deportment and industriousness, (5) failure to complete studies once begun, (6) irregular work habits (work shyness), (7) onset of criminality before the age of 18, (8) more than four previous sentences, (9) quick relapse into crime, (10) interlocal criminality (mobility), (11) psychopathic personality as diagnosed by an institutional doctor, (12) alcoholism, (13) release from an institution before the age of 36, (14) bad conduct in the institution, and (15) bad social and family relations during the period of release.”
Types of Parole:
When discussing parole, three related terms come to the mind of a legal practitioner: furlough, custody parole, and regular parole. As far as ‘regular parole’ is concerned, it may be granted in the following cases as observed by the Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986): (i) serious illness of a family member; (ii) critical conditions in the family on account of an accident or death of a family member; (iii) marriage of any member of the family of the convict; (iv) delivery of a child by the wife of the convict if there is no other family member to take care of the spouse at home; (v) serious damage to life or property of the family of the convict, including damage caused by natural calamities; (vi) to maintain family and social ties; and (vii) to pursue the filing of a special leave petition before this Court against a judgment delivered by the High Court convicting or upholding the conviction, as the case may be.
The same aforesaid judgment Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986) also defines custody parole and furlough. Custody parole is generally granted in emergent circumstances, such as the death or marriage of a family member, serious illness of a family member, or any other urgent situation. Furlough, on the other hand, is a temporary release from prison, granted under specific conditions, particularly in cases of long-term imprisonment. The time spent on parole will not be considered part of the sentence. However, the period of furlough will be counted as time served. In essence, furlough is granted as a remission for good conduct.
The Supreme Court and High Courts, through various pronouncements (see State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Suresh Pandurang Darvakar (2006 (2) KLT OnLine 1125 (SC) = (2006) 4 SCC 776); and State of Haryana & Ors. v. Mohinder Singh (2000 (2) KLT SN 26 (C.No.29) SC = (2000) 3 SCC 394), Charanjit Lal v. State of Delhi (1985 Cr.L.J. 1541 = 1986 2 ILR (Del.) 417), has laid down the differences between parole and furlough. Both parole and furlough are conditional release. While a prisoner can be released on parole when he is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for any offence whatsoever and irrespective of the duration of the imprisonment awarded to him, furlough can be granted only in those cases where a prisoner has been sentenced to long imprisonment i.e. five years or more. Further, it is evident that release on parole is designed to afford some relief to the prisoner in certain specified contingencies, for instance, illness or death of member of his family or marriage of the prisoner himself or any member of the family etc. whereas furlough is in the nature of a remission earned by a prisoner by consistent good conduct for over a number of years and it is granted to him as a matter of course if other conditions laid has satisfied. One of the postulates which must weigh with the authorities while granting furlough is that the prisoners release will not be hazardous or prejudicial to the public peace and tranquillity. Further the period of furlough counts as sentence undergone unless, of course, the prisoner released on furlough commits an offence outside the prison. In other words, while parole is tantamount to more suspension of the sentence for the time being keeping the quantum of sentence awarded to a prisoner in fact, furlough affords double relief in the sense that it gives not only an opportunity to the prisoner to breath fresh air and enjoy the society of his kith and kin etc. outside the prison but also counts towards the total sentence awarded to him, i.e. his total sentence is reduced to the extent he earns remission in the form of furlough by continuous good conduct.
Section 433A of Cr.P.C. doesn’t restrict parole or furlough:
It is important to remember that when a prisoner applies for parole, they would have already spent some time in jail. During this period, various reformatory measures would have been implemented, in accordance with the reformation facilities available in modern jails. While the remission of time spent outside of jail on parole, furlough, or through the release of prisoners—including life convicts—does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of Section 433A of Cr.P.C., it is subject to the condition that the prisoners who are sentenced to imprisonment for life falling under the two specified categories of Section 433A must serve a mandatory minimum of 14 years of imprisonment. After this period, an order of release may be issued under Section 432/433 of Cr.P.C. or Articles 72/161 of the Constitution. In other words, remission, whether as a reward or otherwise, cannot reduce the sentence to less than the minimum 14 year period. However, this does not preclude a life convict falling within the scope of Section 433A from being granted parole or furlough during their sentence. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer Advocates for the prison administration to liberalize parole, seeking to relieve pent-up tension and curb the rise of sexual perversion in contemporary prisons. As observed by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr. (1981 KLT OnLine 1008 (SC) = AIR 1980 SC 2147 at p.2174): “There was some argument that Section 433A is understood to be a ban on parole. Very wrong. The Section does not obligate continuous fourteen years in jail and so parole is permissible. We go further to say that our Prison Administration should liberalise parole to prevent pent-up tension and sex perversion which are popular currency in many a penitentiary (see Sethna, ‘Society and the Criminal’ Tripati publications, 4th Edn. p.296).”
It is now well established that the four primary objectives of punishment imposed by the State on an offender are deterrence, prevention, retribution, and reformation. However, the issue of penology is complex, and these objectives must be considered holistically, particularly when dealing with life convicts who, in a literal sense, are incarcerated for the rest of their lives. In this context, as the Supreme Court has held, the release of such convicts from jail, intermittently, for short periods, could be considered. This provides them with an opportunity not only to address personal and family matters but also to maintain connections with society. Provided they consistently demonstrate good conduct during their incarceration and show a genuine inclination to reform, they should be allowed to experience life outside prison for a limited time. In other words, the redemption and rehabilitation of these prisoners, for the betterment of society, must be given due consideration while they are serving their sentence. Viewed from this perspective, there is no reason why life convicts, subject to Section 433A, should not be granted periodic release, either on parole or furlough, provided they have served at least 14 years of actual imprisonment. The concept of constructive imprisonment during parole or furlough does not fall within the ambit of Section 433A, and therefore, it cannot be reasonably argued that the possibility of furlough should be entirely excluded for life convicts affected by this provision.
Denial of parole leads to institutionalization:
The provisions of parole and furlough embody a humanistic approach toward individuals incarcerated in jails. The jurisprudential purpose of parole or furlough is to allow inmates to address personal and familial matters while maintaining their connection with society. Dr.Craig Haney, in his seminal work, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), discussed how prolonged imprisonment without parole or contact with the outside world can lead to the institutionalization of prisoners, making their reintegration into society upon release significantly more challenging. Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in Mohammed Giasuddin (supra), society has a vested interest in ensuring that offenders are adequately prepared for reintegration. Prisoners released without strong support networks, employment opportunities, familiarity with their communities, or essential resources face a significantly higher risk of recidivism. Many individuals revert to crime post-release due to a lack of hope in being accepted as productive members of society. Parole and furlough serve as crucial mechanisms in facilitating their successful reintegration as observed in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986).
Conclusion:
A society that upholds human dignity can be measured by the conditions of its prisons and the rights afforded to its prisoners. In a lawful and organized system, every individual deserves a dignified life. Committing a crime does not strip a person of their humanity or justify the denial of basic rights. While prisoners’ rights may be subject to reasonable restrictions, though they remain fundamental and enforceable. A just prison system goes beyond punishment, prioritizing rehabilitation and offering hope through parole, fostering reintegration and healing. This correctional orientation is a constitutional mandate rooted in social justice, as reflected in Article 14 (anti-arbitrariness), Article 19 (anti-reasonableness) and Article 21 (sensitized processual humanism). (See - Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, (1980 KLT OnLine 1046 (SC) = (1980) 3 SCC 488), Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr., (1978 KLT OnLine 1001 (SC) = (1978) 1 SCC 248), and Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent Central Jai, Tihar, New Delhi (1978 KLT OnLine 1030 (SC) = (1978) 4 SCC 104), Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2017 (4) KLT OnLine 2003 (SC) = AIR 2017 SC 4986)).
In conclusion, as Justice Douglas warned about the arbitrary revocation of parole— which could obstruct the rehabilitation and reformation of prisoners— a concern reflected in Morrissey v. Brewer, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 505, as follows: “The rule of law is important in the stability of society. Arbitrary actions in the revocation of paroles can only impede and impair the rehabilitative aspects of modern penology. ‘Notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’, are the rudiments of due process which restore faith that our society is run for the many, not the few, and that fair dealing rather than caprice will govern the affairs of men.’”
The Necessity of Minimal Legal Practice for Judicial Appointments : Re-examining the Principles of Kerala Judiciary
By S. Balachandran (Kulasekharam), Advocate
22/03/2025
The Necessity of Minimal Legal Practice for Judicial Appointments :
Re-examining the Principles of Kerala Judiciary
(By Advocate S. Balachandran (Kulasekharam), Thiruvananthapuram)
E-mail : balachand59@gmail.com Mob.: 8387734030
1) The headline of this article may raise eyebrows, as it focuses on the contentious issue of whether fresh law graduates can be directly appointed to the positions of Munsiffs/Magistrates. This originates from my observations that the Kerala judiciary does not necessitate legal practice experience to apply for the posts of Munsiffs or Magistrates, given that the applicant possesses an LLB degree.
2) One must question why this relaxation was granted. The justification given was to provide opportunities to the intellectual law graduates who, if tied by the condition of years of legal practice, might be drawn to higher paying jobs instead of pursuing judiciary. This may imply a bias, suggesting that practicing lawyers lack intellectual capacity or comprehensive knowledge.
3) However, it’s noteworthy that specific periods of practice are explicitly required for other positions. For instance, 3 years for Assistant public prosecutor, 7 years for Public prosecutors and District judges, and 10 years for Advocate General, High Court judges, and Supreme Court judges. These regulations indicate a bias towards practical experience for effective justice dispensation
4) In the case of Munsiffs/Magistrates, no such emphasis is made on practical experience. Consequently, the opportunity for law graduates to understand the law’s intricacies, complexities faced by clients, lawyers, and judiciary staff, and practical challengesin conduction of cases, is missing. A minimum five-year legal practice could help them grasp these aspects better.Simply put, trial-and-error and practice make perfect. An analytical comparison between experienced legal practitioners and freshers who have been appointed as Munsiffs/Magistrates exposes a discernible difference in justice dispensation.
5) In times gone by, a practice of 3 to 5 years was necessary to qualify for the posts of Munsiffs/Magistrates. These judges’ prowess in drafting judgments and managing court room proceedings shone brightly, a reflection of their experience and active practice. A brief, 6-month training term in the judicial Academy doesn’t fully equip graduates to handle the hurdles of day-to-day administration of justice. As a result, wrong judgments can lead to appeals, causing additional stress and expenses for the litigants, who may accept these wrong verdicts resignedly due to financial constraints.
6) Moreover, the slow pace of case disposal causes delays, stretching out case durations from a mere couple of years in past times to a staggering 10-20 years presently, despite various alternatives for litigation resolution.
7) Additionally, the trend of reserving vacancies for clerical staff and other administrative personnel with legal education for the post of Munsiffs/Magistrates needs to be reviewed. A law degree today can be readily obtained, the curriculum barely scratching the surface of ground realities and practical aspects of law.
(8) There is an urgent need to institute a requirement of at least 5 years of practice as an advocate before elevation to the posts of Munsiffs/Magistrates. This is essential to uphold the dignity of the judiciary and increase public faith. As of now, the judiciary does seem to portray apathy towards the requirement of court practice for a specified period for the appointment of Munsiffs or Magistrates, a discrepancy that merits attentive review.
(9) In conclusion, the recurring theme of this article is the importance of coupling academic knowledge with practical experience for the efficient and accurate delivery of justice. Future revisions to current regulations should take this into account to uphold the dignity and effectiveness of our judiciary system.
Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P.(2025 KLT OnLine 1192 (SC) = 2025 INSC 126) Paradoxes Masqueraded Calvin Principle, and the Doctrine “to do a great right” court can do “a little wrong”, not applied. Law on Natural Justice Revisited
By Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam
15/03/2025
Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P.(2025 KLT OnLine 1192 (SC) = 2025 INSC 126) Paradoxes Masqueraded
Calvin Principle, and the Doctrine “to do a great right” court can do “a little wrong”, not applied. Law on Natural Justice Revisited
*(By Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam)
E-mail : Sajikoduvath@gmail.com Mob. 9400230025
Introduction
In Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. 29 January, 2025 (Sudhanshu Dhulia, Hrishikesh Roy, S.V.N.Bhatti (2025 KLT OnLine 1192 (SC)), the Supreme Court of India rendered the final verdict in a referred matter from a two-judge (split) verdict (Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2024) 4 SCR 151)). Doctrines of rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem) were considered in detail in this case.
Facts in Brief
• Some Teachers (Shiksha Karmis) were appointed in 1998.
An unsuccessful candidate challenged the selection and appointment of the Appellants.
• Nepotism, corruption and bias, in the selection process, were the allegations.
• Ten appointees were alleged to be the relatives of the members of the selection committee.
• The Collector accepted the challenge and set aside the appointments.
• The Appellants filed a Revision Petition. It was dismissed.
They filed a Writ Petition but it was also dismissed. Hence before the SC.
Contentions of the Appellants (Selected Teachers)
• They highlighted the distinction between cases of “no opportunity at all” and “adequate opportunity”. They were not heard at all by the Collector.
• Merely being relatives, undue favour cannot be presumed. Marks allocation was objective.
• Collector’s decision was violation of natural justice. They were not made parties in the appeal.
• There was No clear evidence of prejudice or unfair advantage.
• The appellants were finally heard in revision proceedings. It cured the procedural defects.
• Ultimately, it is pleaded that the appellants have been working for the last 25 years and that one of the appellants has, in fact, retired while others are on the verge of retirement.
Respondent’s Arguments
1. They contend there was no “prejudice” due to the non-compliance of the principles of natural justice by the non hearing of the Collector.
2. Even though the appellants received less marks in the basic qualifying examination, they have obtained higher marks in the interview.
3. The relatives have come to be appointed.
4. There was reasonable likelihood of bias and that the relatives of committee members have obtained higher marks during the interview.
The Supreme Court: Split Verdict by Two-Judge-Bench
• Justice K.V.Vishwanathan,concluded that the selection of appellants was erroneously set aside, in breach of the principle of audi alteram partem. The principle must be adhered to at the original stage. Furthermore, Rule 9 of the Appeal and Revision Rules, 1995 was not complied with. It was also observed that the orders of the Collector made no reference either to definition of ‘relative’ in explanation to Section 40(c) of Adhiniyam nor to the resolution providing for recusal. Non-impleadment of parties amounted to ‘no opportunity at all’ for hearing. Though found that the selection process was faulty for Collector’s decision was violation of natural justice (for they were not made parties in the appeal) upheld the selection and allowed the appeal holding as under:
• “Approaching the home stretch, one question still remains:- Whether at this distance of time should the matter be remitted back to the Collector for a fresh enquiry? The selection is of the year 1998. By virtue of interim orders through out, the appellants have functioned in office and are discharging their duties for the past more than twenty five years. One of them has even superannuated. At this distance of time, it will not be in the interest of justice to remand the matter for a fresh enquiry.”
• Justice J.K. Maheshwari upheld the decision to cancel the appointment of the appellants and opined that the first limb of natural justice i.e. ‘rule against bias’ was irrefutably proved, as reasonable likelihood of bias was established. The plea of non-impleadment was considered to be a useless formality. Unless prejudice is demonstrated, mere non-joinder at the initial stage does not violate the principles of natural justice.
• Hence, the case was before the three-Judge Bench.
Supreme Court Final Verdict by Three-Judge-Bench
The Apex Court (three-judge-bench) considered three issues.They were the following:
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A.Whether the selection is vitiated for violation of the first limb of natural justice i.e. rule against bias? B. Where it is a case of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem? Is demonstration of prejudice necessary to succeed with a claim of violation of the principle ofaudi alteram partem? C.Whether the breach of the principle of audi alteram partem at the original stage can be cured, at the Revisional stage? |
The first issue (related to nepotism, corruption and bias, in the selection process) is answered in favour of the selected persons (Appellants) as under –
• “The selection is not vitiated on account of violation of the nemo judex rule”.
The second issue (related to Collector’s decision – whether violation of natural justice, for the selected persons were not heard by him, before taking a decision against them) is also answered in favour of the (Appellants) as under –
• “In the absence of notice, the breach strikes at the fundamental core of procedural fairness, rendering the decision invalid unless exceptional circumstances justify such deviation. The vitiation of selection was not only a breach of the principles of natural justice but also contrary to the express statutory provision that required for an opportunity to show cause and an opportunity to provide self-defence. The prejudice theory must be understood as an exception to the general rule and cannot therefore be the norm. In view of the foregoing, a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem is noticed in the present case.”
The third issue related to Collector’s decision – the selected persons (Appellants) were not heard by him. This allegation of the selected persons was resisted by the
Respondents/petitioners saying that the defect had been cured by the proceedings before the revisional/appellate body. It is also answered in favour of the selected persons (Appellants) as under –
•” … it must be concluded that a defect at the initial stage cannot generally be cured at the appellate stage. Even in cases where a ‘full jurisdiction’ may be available at the appellate stage, the Courts must have the discretion to relegate it to the original stage for an opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the ex parte decision to set aside the appellants selection stands vitiated.”
The Court, in Conclusion, upheld the opinion of Justice K.V.Vishwanathan, observing as under:
• “68. The principle of audi alteram partem is the cornerstone of justice, ensuring that no person is condemned unheard. This principle transforms justice from a mere technical formality into a humane pursuit. It safeguards against arbitrary decision-making, and is needed more so in cases of unequal power dynamics (Upendra Baxi, ‘Preface: The Myth and Reality of the Indian Administrative Law’, in IP Massey(ed) ‘Administrative Law’
(8th edn, EBC 2012)).
• 69. An allegation of bias, can only be proved if facts are established after giving an opportunity of hearing. This process requires a fair and transparent procedure in which the concerned parties are given an adequate opportunity to present their case. Such an opportunity allows the accused party or the affected individuals to respond to the allegations, provide evidence, and clarify any misgivings regarding the decision-making process. Therefore, for an allegation of bias to be proved, it is imperative that the procedural safeguards of a fair hearing are observed allowing for establishment of the relevant facts.”
ISSUE A : Authorities Referred to.
• This issue related to nepotism, corruption and bias, in the selection process.
A.K.Kraipak v Union of India (1969 KLT SN 15 (C.No.29) SC = (1969) 2 SCC 262.
• When a statute specifies the procedure for administrative decision making, the principles of natural justice supplement do not substitute the statutory procedure. However, even if the statute does not provide for the administrative procedure, the authorities are bound to make decisions in adherence to the principles of natural justice.
Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759
• The principle of nemo judex causa sua found its origin in English law. In this decision the House of Lords in a case concerning pecuniary interest observed that the rule against bias extends not only to actual bias but also to the appearance of bias. This principle was later extended to other forms of interest in R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy
((1924) 1 KB 256) where it was held that ‘even a suspicion that there has been improper interference with the course of justice’, would lead to the vitiation of proceedings. Lord Hewart noted that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Lord Denning in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577) noted that, ‘if right minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a ‘real likelihood of bias’ on his part, he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision does not stand’. It was further held that ‘there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side at the expense of the other.’
R v Gough (1993 AC 646)
• The emphasis on ‘likely or probable’ as noted by Lord Denning, was considered in R.v.Gough (1993 AC 646) where the Court shifted the focus to the possibility of bias rather than its probability. The test articulated in Gough (supra), was whether there was a ‘real danger of bias’ rather than a ‘real likelihood’ of bias. It prioritised the court’s assessment of bias over the perception of a fair-minded and informed observer emphasising that the court ‘personifies the reasonable man’. This test was criticised in other common law jurisdictions for veering away from the public perception of bias.
Porter v Magill ((2002) 1 All ER 465)
• The House of Lords modified the said test in Porter v. Magill ((2002) 1 All ER 465) and pronounced as under:
• “The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased, it must then ask whether those circumstances would lead to a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased.”
Manak Lal v Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi (1957 KLT OnLine 1410 (SC) = 1957 SCC OnLine SC 10)
Also:
• Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India(1987 (2) KLT OnLine 1111 (SC) = (1987) 4 SCC 611).
• Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr.Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School(1993 (2) KLT OnLine 1107 (SC) = (1993) 4 SCC 10);
• S.Parthasarathi v. State of A.P.((1974) 3 SCC 459);
• S.K.Golap & Ors. v Bhuban Chandra Panda(1990 SCC OnLine Cal 264);
• G.N. Nayak v. Goa University((2002) 2 SCC712).
• Indian Courts have consistently adopted the ‘real likelihood’ test to determine bias CORE (Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (2024 KLT OnLine 2736 (SC) = 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219) –
• A Constitution bench speaking through D.Y.Chandrachud C.J. summarised the Indian position thus:
• “Although there have been vacillations about the test in England, the Indian courts have been largely consistent in their approach by applying the test of real likelihood of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias. Recently, the court has used the real danger of bias test. However, the above discussion shows that there is no significant difference between the real danger of bias test and the real possibility of bias test if the question of bias is inferred from the perspective of a reasonable or fair-minded person.”
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985 KLT OnLine 1209 (SC) = (1985) 3 SCC 398); Swadesh Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981 KLT OnLine 1011 (SC) = (1981) 1 SCC 664).
• The nemo judex rule is subject to the rule of necessity and yields to it.
J.Mohapatra v. State of Orissa ((1984) 4 SCC 103)
• The doctrine of necessity serves as an exception to the rule against bias.
Charanjit Singh v. Harinder Sharma ((2002) 9 SCC 732)
• In a small town like Mansa, it would be difficult to constitute a Selection Committee of total strangers. The relative of some candidate or the other is bound to find a place on the Committee. Therefore, the Court is required to see whether the prescribed balancing mechanism was followed when a relative of the member of the Selection Committee was being considered.
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985 KLT OnLine 1282 (SC) = (1985) 4 SCC 417)
• A five-judge constitution bench of this Court endorsed the decision in Javed Rasool (supra) and held that when a near relative of a member of the Public Service Commission is a member of the Selection Committee, it will be enough if the concerned member desists from interviewing his relation. He should withdraw from the committee when his relative appears for the interview and he should not participate in discussion in regards to the merit of the candidate and even the marks should not be disclosed to the concerned member.
Jaswant Singh Nerwal v. State of Punjab (1991 Supp.(1) SCC 313)
• The father of one of the selected candidates was in the selection committee conducting the interview. However, he did not participate in the deliberation when his son appeared for viva voce. It was held therein that selection was thus not vitiate
ISSUE B : Authorities Referred to.
• This issue related to Collector’s decision – whether violation of natural justice, for the selected persons were not heard by him, before taking a decision against them.
Ridge v Baldwin ((1964) AC 40)
• It is a significant landmark decision in British administrative law and is often referred to as a magna carta of natural justice.
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. (1978 KLT OnLine 1006 (SC) = (1978) 1 SCC 405).
It is held as under:
• “Today in our jurisprudence, the advances made by natural justice far exceed
old frontiers and if judicial creativity belights penumbral areas, it is only improving
the quality of government by injecting fair play into its wheels. Law lives not in a world of abstractions but in a cosmos of concreteness and to give up something good must be limited to extreme cases. If to condemn unheard is wrong, it is wrong except where it is overborne by social necessity.”
Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981 KLT OnLine 1011 (SC) = (1981) 1 SCC 664).It is held as under:
• “This rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications.”
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 KLT OnLine 1001 (SC) = (1978) 1 SCC 248)
• Justice Bhagwati, described natural justice as a profound ‘humanising principle’ designed to imbue the law with fairness and ensure justice.
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985 KLT OnLine 1238 (SC) = (1985) 3 SCC 545)
• The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds.
S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan (1980 KLT OnLine 1064 (SC) = (1980) 4 SCC 379)
• Justice Chinappa Reddy, considered such arguments to be ‘pernicious’ and held that ‘the non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary’. The Court, however, has drawn out an exception where ‘on admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law, only one penalty is permissible, then the Court may not compel the observance of natural justice.’ (Also Referred: Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981 KLT OnLine 1011 (SC) = (1981) 1 SCC 664); Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan (2000 (2) KLT OnLine 1034 (SC) = (2000) 7 SCC 529).
Professor I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edition, 2012). It is held as under:
• “Before the decision of the Highest Court in S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan, the rule was that the principles of natural justice shall apply only when an administrative action has caused some prejudice to the person, meaning thereby that he must have suffered some ‘civil consequences’.
• Therefore, the person had to show something extra in order to prove ‘prejudice’ or civil consequences. This approach had stultified the growth of administrative law within an area of highly practical significance. It is gratifying that in Jagmohan, the Court took a bold step in holding that a separate showing of prejudice is not necessary. The non-observance of natural justice is in itself prejudice caused. However, merely because facts are admitted or are undisputable it does not follow that the principles of natural justice need not be observed.”
Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma (1996 (1) KLT OnLine 930 (SC) = (1996) 3 SCC 364)
• Where an enquiry is not convened by any statutory provision and the only obligation of the administrative authority is to observe the principles of natural justice, the Court/tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of the rule of fair hearing and violation of the facet of that rule. In other words, a distinction must be made between ‘no opportunity’ or ‘no adequate opportunity’. In the case of the former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid and the authority may be asked to conduct proceedings afresh according to the rule of fair hearing. But in the latter case, the effect of violation of a facet of the rule of fair hearing has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice.
Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Dy.Comm. of Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. (2015 (2) KLT OnLine 1112 (SC) = (2015) 8 SCC 519). It is held as under:
• It is not permissible for the authority to jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground that even if hearing had been provided it would have served no useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage and such things cannot be presumed by the authority. This was so held by the English Court way back in the year 1943 in General Medical Council v. Spackman (1943 AC 627).
• This Court also spoke in the same language in Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Chitra Srivastava ((1970) 1 SCC 121)……”
State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh (2020 (5) KLT OnLine 1114 (SC) = (2021) 19 SCC 706)
• The position of law was summarised as under:
• “(1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
• (2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
• (3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
• (4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
• (5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.”
Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India (2023 KLT OnLine 1408 (SC) = (2023) 13 SCC 401). It is held as under:
• “55.1.Firstly, procedural fairness was no longer viewed merely as a means to secure a just outcome but a requirement that holds an inherent value in itself. In view of this shift, the courts are now precluded from solely assessing procedural infringements based on whether the procedure would have prejudiced the outcome of the case. (S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980 KLT OnLine 1064 (SC) = (1980) 4 SCC 379); “The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary; also see Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, ((1981) 1 SCC 664 = AIR 1981 SC 818) Instead, the courts would have to decide if the procedure that was followed infringed upon the right to a fair and reasonable procedure, independent of the outcome. In compliance with this line of thought, the courts have read the principles of natural justie into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds.(Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. (1985 KLT OnLine 1238 (SC) = (1985) 3 SCC 545); C.B.Gautam v. Union of India (1992 (2) KLT OnLine 1057 (SC) = (1993) 1 SCC 78); Sahara India (Firm) (1) v. CIT (2008 (2) KLT SN 55 (C.No.68) SC = (2008) 14 SCC 151); Kesar Enterprises Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2011 (4) KLT Suppl. 80 (SC) = (2011) 13 SCC 733).
• 55.2. Secondly, natural justice principles breathe reasonableness into the procedure. Responding to the argument that the principles of natural justice are not static but are capable of being moulded to the circumstances, it was held that the core of natural justice guarantees a reasonable procedure which is a constitutional requirement entrenched in Articles 14, 19 and 21. The facet of audi alteram partem encompasses the components of notice, contents of the notice, reports of inquiry, and materials that are available for perusal.
• While situational modifications are permissible, the rules of natural justice cannot be modified to suit the needs of the situation to such an extent that the core of the principle is abrogated because it is the core that infuses procedural reasonableness. The burden is on the applicant to prove that the procedure that was followed (or not followed) by the adjudicating authority, in effect, infringes upon the core of the right to a fair and reasonable hearing. See para 12 of Bhagwati, J.’s judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978 KLT OnLine 1001 (SC) = (1978) 1 SCC 248)”
CORE (Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML(2024 KLT OnLine 2736 (SC) = 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219). It is held as under:
• The five judge bench described the object of observing the principles of natural justice as under:
• “80. …The object of observing the principles of natural justice is to ensure that “every person whose rights are going to be affected by the proposed action gets a fair hearing.” The non-observance of natural justice is itself a prejudice to any person who has been denied justice depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The principle of procedural fairness is rooted in the principles of the rule of law and good governance. In Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India (2023 KLT OnLine 1408 (SC) =
(2023) 13 SCC 401) , this Court held that the requirement of procedural fairness “holds an inherent value in itself.”
State Government Houseless Harijan Employees Association v State of Karnataka ((2001) 1 SCC 610)
• The question about whether prejudice was caused due to non-observance of the principles of natural justice could not be raised where such principles are incorporated into statutory procedure.
Considering the above, Justice Vishwanathan noted as under:
• It is well settled that in service matters when an unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process, in a case like the present where the specific grievance was against 14 candidates under the category of relatives and when the overall figure was only 249, at least the candidates against whom specific allegations were made and who were identified ought to have been given notices and made a party. This Court has, even in cases where the selected candidates were too large, unlike in the present case, held that even while adjudicating the Writ Petitions at least some of the selected candidates ought to be impleaded even it is in a representative capacity. It has also been held that in service jurisprudence, if an unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process the selected candidates ought to be impleaded. (See J.S.Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.((2011) 6 SCC 570) (para.31) and Prabodh Verma & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (1984 KLT OnLine 1220 (SC) = (1984) 4 SCC 251) (para 28) and Ranjan Kumar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2014 (3) KLT Suppl.104 (SC) = 2014:INSC:276 = (2014) 16 SCC 187) (paras.4,5,8,9 & 13)) This is not a case where the allegation was that the mischief was so widespread and all pervasive affecting the result of the selection in a manner as to make it difficult to sift the grain from the chaff. It could not be said and it is not even the case of the State that it was not possible to segregate the allegedly tainted candidates from the untainted candidates. (See Union of India & Ors. v. G.Chakradhar (2002 (1) KLT OnLine 1082 (SC) = (2002) 3 SCC 146) (paras.7 & 8), Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik & Ors. (2021 (3) KLT OnLine 1115 (SC) = 2021:INSC:305 = (2021) 7 SCC 613 (para.72).”
East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (1962 KLT OnLine 1149 (SC) = AIR 1962 SC 1893); Uma Nath Pandey & Ors. v State of U.P. (2009 (2) KLT Suppl.474 (SC) = (2009) 12 SCC 40).
• Clear distinction has been crafted between the service of notice and the requirement of fair hearing.
Ridge v. Baldwin(1964 AC 40)
• Referring this classic case it was recorded that where there is a total violation of principles of natural justice, the violation would be of a fundamental nature. It did not deal with the violation of the first limb of audi alteram partem principles, a situation of non-service of notice. The judgment in fact explicitly records that “a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such, and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction between “no notice” “no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”, was highlighted. The judgement in S.K.Sharma (supra) is therefore inapplicable to the present matter which is a case of no notice whatsoever.
ISSUE C : Authorities Referred to.
• This issue related to Collector’s decision – the selected persons (Appellants) were not heard by him. Therefore, whether the defect had been cured (Calvin principle) by the proceedings before the revisional body.
High Court of Australia in Australian Workers’ Union v. Bowen (No. 2) ((1948) 77 C.L.R. 601).
• Bowen contested his dismissal by the General Council of the Union, claiming bias because the Union Secretary acted as both prosecutor and judge. While the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration ruled in his favour, the decision was overturned on appeal. The appellate court held that the Secretary’s role did not violate the rule against bias and, even if it had, any flaw in the original proceedings was remedied by a fair appeal to the Annual Conference, which Bowen did not dispute.
Lord Denning in Annamunthodo v Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union (1961) AC 945 (PC))
• It was ruled that a flaw in natural justice during the initial hearing could not be remedied by an appeal.
Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders((1970) 2 All ER 713)
It is a leading authority on the point that a failure of natural justice at the initial stage cannot be cured at the appellate stage. The case involved the plaintiff’s expulsion by a Branch Committee of his trade union, at a meeting about which he was unaware. He approached the Appeals Council for relief against the order of the branch Committee, which conducted a full rehearing but upheld the Branch Committee’s decision. The plaintiff then filed a writ, seeking declarations that his expulsion from union membership as well as his position as area organizer was unlawful, invalid, and void. Megarry J. held that the proper course in such a situation would be to hear the matter afresh:
• I cannot think that natural justice is satisfied by a process whereby an unfair trial, though not resulting in a valid expulsion, will nevertheless have the effect of depriving the member of a right of appeal when a valid decision to expel him is subsequently made. Such a deprivation is a powerful result to be achieved by what in law is a mere nullity; and it is no mere triviality that might be justified on the ground that natural justice does not mean perfect justice. As a general rule, at all events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body.”
Calvin v Carr((1979) 2 WLR 755)
• The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council only gave a qualified endorsement to the Leary principle. In Lloyd v McMahon ((1987) 1 AC 625), Lord Templeman considered the Calvin principle but commented that instead of laying down general principles, the question arising in that case must be answered by considering the particular statutory provisions applicable therein. In that case, a distinction was drawn between full appeals where all the evidence may be examined and limited appeals on questions of law only or where the appellate body does not investigate findings of fact.
Indian courts have applied the Leary principle as a rule. See:
• Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L. K. Ratna(1986 KLT OnLine 1443 (SC) = (1986) 4 SCC 537);
• Fareed Ahmed v. Ahmedabad Municipality(AIR 1976 SC 2095);
• Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Government of Delhi ((1975) 4 SCC 298);
•Mysore SRT Corp v. Mirza Khasim (AIR 1977 SC 747);
•Laxmidhar v. State of Orissa (AIR 1974 Ori.127);
•Kashiram Dalmia v. State (AIR 1978 Pat. 265);
• G.Rajalakshmi v. Appellate Authority(AIR 1980 AP 100);
• Serajuddin Co. v. State of Orissa (AIR 1974 Cal.296).
And the Calvin principle as an exception. See:
• Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India(1990 (1) KLT OnLine 1001 (SC) = (1990) 1 SCC 613);
• Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India(1996 (2) KLT SN 67 (C.No.78) SC =(1996) 9 SCC 650);
• United Planters’ Association of Southern India v K.G.Sangameswaran((1997) 4 SCC 741).
Professor Wade H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law ((Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982)
• It is observed as under:
• “In principle, there ought to be an observance of natural justice at both stages… If natural justice is violated at the first stage, the right to appeal is not so much a true right to appeal as a corrected initial hearing: instead of fair trial followed by appeal, the procedure is reduced to an unfair trial followed by fair trial.”
Professor Laurence Tribe Lawrence H.Tribe, ‘American Constitutional Law’ (The Foundation Press 1978)
• It is pertinently observed that whatever the outcome, a valued human interaction in which the affected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the decision that vitally concerns her is of utmost importance:
• “Both from the right to be heard and the right to be told why, are analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome; these rights to interchange express the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at atleast to be consulted about what is done with one.”
Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L.K.Ratna, (1986 KLT OnLine 1443 (SC) = (1986) 4 SCC 537
• The Supreme Court endorsed the position adopted by Megarry J. Rejecting the argument that an appeal to the High Court under Section 22A of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, could rectify the initial defect, Pathak J. declared the order null, void, and of no effect. This ruling was consistent with two earlier Supreme Court decisions in State of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh (1958 KLT OnLine 1322 (SC) = 1958 SCR 595) and (Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja Khasim) ((1977) 2 SCC 457), both of which established that an appeal cannot validate what is clearly a nullity.
Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India (1990 (1) KLT OnLine 1001 (SC) = (1990) 1 SCC 613)
• The Supreme Court has invoked the Calvin principle only in exceptional circumstances. It is a case concerning a challenge to the validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, the Court applied the Calvin principle, given the fact that the settlement fund was held to be sufficient to meet the needs of just compensation to the victims of the Bhopal gas leak tragedy, it was held that the grievance on the score of not hearing the victims first would not really survive. It recorded that “to do a great right” after all it is permissible sometimes “to do a little wrong”.
Conclusion
In this case, the Apex Court did not apply the Calvin principle, and the doctrine “to do a great right” it is permissible sometimes “to do a little wrong”. The Court was of the opinion that it is not a fit case to apply these principles as it is applied “only in exceptional circumstances“. It definitely found that violation of Natural Justice is ‘serious’. It is expressed in the following words –
• “67. Following the above discussion, it must be concluded that a defect at the initial stage cannot generally be cured at the appellate stage. Even in cases where a ‘full jurisdiction’ may be available at the appellate stage, the Courts must have the discretion to relegate it to the original stage for an opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the ex parte decision to set aside the appellants selection stands vitiated.”
Finally, the Court (though did not apply the Calvin Principle) allowed the appeal in favour of the appointees (not ‘paradoxically’; but, on sound judicial principles) observing as under:
• “71. Since the selection pertains to the year 1998, and the appellants have continuously held office and performed their duties for over twenty-five years under interim orders, remanding the matter for a fresh inquiry would hardly be a practical exercise and will be an injustice to the appointees. The time lag can be better appreciated by bearing in mind that one of the appellants has already superannuated.”
Privacy Rights in Family Law
By Vinitha B. Advocate, High Court of Kerala
15/03/2025
Privacy Rights in Family Law
(By Vinitha B., Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
E-mail : vinithahariraj@gmail.com Mob.: 9846222461
In India, the right to privacy is acknowledged as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The right to privacy is considered a fundamental aspect of the right to life and personal liberty. But just like any other fundamental right, the right to privacy is also not absolute. Reasonable restrictions on rights can be imposed to protect the national interest, sovereignty, decency, morality, contempt of court, to prevent enticement of an offence and other reasonable restrictions as outlined in Article 19. Additionally, the right to privacy may be limited when in conflict with other fundamental rights that serve the public interest.
This discussion focuses on the application of the right to privacy in the delicate context of divorce by mutual consent. It is essential to find a balance between individual privacy and the principles of judicial transparency and public access to legal proceedings.
As per Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, when both spouses mutually agree to dissolve their marriage amicably, they can start the process by filing a joint petition in court. Similar proceedings are to be initiated when spouses file a joint petition for divorce under Section 10A of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The petition so filed undergoes a thorough review by the court, which plays a vital role in ensuring that the wishes and terms expressed by both parties are fair and just, thus protecting against any potential coercion. Both individuals are mandatorily required to appear before the court for the verification process. Nonetheless, divorce proceedings often reveal deeply personal and sensitive information that can cause significant emotional distress and privacy violations.
Recently, I witnessed a heart-wrenching experience of a friend who became a client and faced the intense scrutiny of the court during a verification process after her proof affidavit was filed for divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The emotional toll this took on her was profound, as she grappled with feelings of embarrassment and shame over the potential public speculation surrounding her divorce. There is a common belief that all judicial processes should be open to the public. This is why court verification is conducted in an open courtroom, allowing anyone present to witness the examination of the parties by the court. My friend’s experience was made even more challenging by the necessity of seeing her soon-to-be ex-partner face to face, culminating in a heartbreaking moment when she broke down in the witness box.
This situation left me reflecting on the often cumbersome procedures required by our judicial system for something as personal as divorce, especially when filing a joint petition. Just like marriage, divorce is a deeply personal choice that should be treated with kindness and understanding. The process shouldn’t feel daunting or overly technical; rather, it should be simple and accessible, prioritizing the emotional well-being of those involved. We must approach this sensitive matter with empathy, ensuring that the individuals navigating this difficult time are supported, not made to feel like criminals. Everyone deserves a process that respects their dignity and mental health.
Addressing concerns regarding privacy in divorce proceedings, courts normally allow the parties to submit the petition for divorce by mutual consent through their respective power of attorney. This approach helps mitigate any discomfort associated with being exposed in open court during the filing of joint divorce petitions. By doing so, it aims to maintain confidentiality and protect the dignity of those involved from public scrutiny. However, the personal appearance of the parties is still required for judicial review after the submission of proof affidavits. This dual approach raises considerations about the privacy rights of the individuals participating in the proceedings.
The Supreme Court of India has decisively recognised the fundamental right to privacy in several landmark rulings. In the notable case of Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017 (4) KLT 1 (SC) = 2017(10) SCC 1); the Honourable Supreme Court of India made it clear
that privacy is essential to life and personal liberty, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. The Honourable Court established the crucial test of proportionality, asserting that any invasion of privacy must be directly proportional to the need for interference. Such interference must be sanctioned by law, with the state’s interest in the invasion being both legitimate and reasonable, and the method of interference must align proportionately with the intended objective.
The court underscored that privacy extends well beyond mere physical boundaries; it encompasses the safeguarding of personal choices and freedoms from external interference, whether that be from the state or other entities. While the case predominantly addressed issues of data privacy and the Aadhaar system, its implications undoubtedly stretch into the realm of family law. From this principle, it is clear that personal information should never be exposed to the public eye, as this can lead to significant humiliation or embarrassment for individuals navigating the challenging process of divorce. Such matters demand confidentiality, which underlines the need to shield them from public scrutiny.
Divorce by consent creates a less confrontational environment, encouraging a more comfortable approach between both parties. Lawyers and court personnel need to maintain confidentiality, ensuring that privacy is respected throughout the process. This duty of confidentiality applies not only to lawyers but also to all staff involved in the proceedings.
The Indian judicial system increasingly recognizes the importance of confidentiality, and the courts are progressively embracing technology in court proceedings. When public protection is insufficient, modern technology can help limit the spread of sensitive information, preventing outside parties and other lawyers from interfering. Solemnizing marriages under the Special Marriage Act through video conferencing for parties, or for one party residing abroad, was enabled by the intervention of the Honourable High Court of Kerala. Likewise, Video conferencing methods have become an essential tool for family courts, particularly in cases where one or both parties are unable to physically attend court due to residing abroad. This modern approach ensures that justice is accessible to everyone, regardless of their geographical location. In these situations, the court relies on a variety of safeguards: affidavits that have been attested by the embassy, the presence of a power of attorney, video links that are securely authorized, and compelling evidence to eliminate any possibility of coercion. Furthermore, communications such as emails sent to the court by the involved parties after the conclusion of the proceedings are thoroughly reviewed to ensure transparency and to rule out any possible coercion.
In addition to accommodating those who are abroad, the courts also recognize that physical health issues may prevent individuals from attending in person. Thus, parties who are unwell are granted the option to participate in proceedings via video conferencing, ensuring that their voices are still heard without compromising their health.
To effectively assist individuals going through the often challenging divorce process, the judicial system needs to explore and adopt innovative technological solutions. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, “no-fault” divorces allow couples to separate by mutual consent. In these cases, since all claims are settled already, the need for court appearances is minimal.
To sum it up, technological advancements could significantly contribute to ensuring that those couples who genuinely wish to pursue a divorce, free from any external pressure or coercion, may do so, without any more emotional turbulence. By embracing this approach, the courts can honour the privacy and dignity of those involved while also upholding the integrity and fairness of the judicial process, ultimately fostering a healthier path to closure for everyone.