THE 17th AMENDMENT AND LAND LEGISLATION

IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOLAK NATH JUDGMENT (S.C.)

(C. S. Subramonia Iyer, Advocate, Madras)

The Supreme Court of India in Golak Nath v. State of Pun jab (1967 S, C. J. 506) declared that the 17th Amendment is void under Article 13 of the Constitution. The 17th Amendment has taken in all the provisions of Article 31A and B with amendments and it must be presumed that with the striking down of the 17th Amendment, all previous amendments of fundamental rights have also been declared void according to the interpretation of Article 13 (2) as the term 'Law' includes Constituent Law also.

The Supreme Court then considered whether retrospective operation should be given to the judgment. The principle of prospective over-ruling was evolved by the Supreme Court in order not to unsettle past transactions as giving retrospective effect to the judgment will create chaos and unsettle the conditions of our country. It at the same time felt it as its duty to prevent fundamental rights being destroyed and the country gradually and imperceptibly pass under a totalitarian rule. Therefore it laid down that the judgment should be strictly applicable to future transactions in order to protect fundamental rights and liberty. So they felt the necessity to evolve some doctrine which has roots in reason and precedents so that the past may be preserved and the future protected (page 508 SC.)

Chief Justice Subba Rao then quotes Carfield "a Court should recognize a duty to announce a new and better rule for future transactions whenever the Court has reached the conviction that an old rule (as established by precedents) is unsound even though feeling compelled by stare decis to apply the old and condemned rule to the instant case and to transactions which have already taken place." Justice Cardozo said thus "The Blackstonian rule is out of tune with the life about us. We apply to this case because the repeal might work hardship to those who have trusted to its existence. We give notice however that any one trusting to it hereafter will do so at his peril." Chief Justice Subba Rao then says that the doctrine of prospective over-ruling confines the application of stare decis to past transactions (page 511 S.C. J). Thus the 17th Amendment and with it Articles 31 A, and B (which has also been declared to be void by Justice Hidayattullah (page 56) S C. J. (1967) in regard to 9th Schedule) cease to function after the judgment in the Golak Nath case, for transaction arising after the judgment in the Golak Nath Case. But 17th Amendment and Article 31 A may continue to function for transactions effected before the judgment as in the case of other amendments which have now been absorbed by the 17th Amendment.

All State legislations which have not come into force before the judgment in Golak Nath case have to be subjected to scrutiny of Articles 13 to 34 of Part III of the Constitution and all transactions of fixing fair rents, acquisition and compensation and ceilings etc. effected after the judgment in the Golak-Nath Case are subject to scrutiny of Courts with regard to conforming to standards enunciated in the original part III of the Constitution. As Chief Justice Subba Rao says in page 511 (S.C.J.) "Even if the party filing the appeal may not be benefitted by it, in similar appeals which he may file after the change in the law he will have the benefits.

As Justice Hidayattullah put it in page 568 (1S67 S.C.J) "That this court having now laid down that fundamental rights cannot be abridged or taken away by the exercise of amendatory process in Article 368, any further inroad into these rights as they exist today will be illegal and unconstitutional unless it complies with Part III in general and Article 13(2) in particular".

The absurdity of construing these observations of the Supreme Court without relating them to observations that" prospective over-ruling is intended to confine the doctrine of stare decis to condone past transactions, will be that fun­damental rights could be completely abrogated by the 17th Amendment (31 A etc.) in States, where State agrarian legislation has been enacted, while fundamental rights will be in full observance in States where such legislation has not been enacted. As justice Subba Rao says, the very object of introducing the doctrine of prospective over-ruling is to prevent the country from passing under Totaletarian Rule. Any construction of the Supreme Court judgment as allowing the amendment to the Constitution prior to the judgment to continue to function afterwards will be against the spirit of the judgment which wants to prevent the country from passing under Totaletarian Rule. Such a construction will also offend Article 14 of the Constitution as some States will have to be tolerated for not having fundamental rights and allowed to pass under Totaletarian Rule while others will have strictly to observe them. Amendments to fundamental rights have been declared to be ab initio void, but are tolerated only to protect past tran­sactions entered into on the faith of the earlier Supreme Court Judgment but which are otherwise unconstitutional.

There is another way of looking at this point which produces the same conclusion.

Under Article 394 of the Constitution, the fundamental rights commenced only on 26th January 1950. The result of the several amendments to it has been that in regard to Agrarian Reform some of these right (Article 14, 19, 31 etc.) have ceased to function until the judgment in the Golak Nath case when they restarted to function. Applying Article 13 on the day of the judgment of Golak Nath case as being the day of recommencement of those articles of the Constitution with regard to Agrarian Reform, all laws in force before the commencement of the Constitution that are inconsistent with fundamental rights will be void and in future no law abridging or abrogating fundamental rights will be valid. Taking this rule in conjunction with the doctrine of prospective over-ruling laid down by the Supreme Court, the 17th Amendment including Article 31 A and B, are void after the judgment in Golak Nath Case. The said amendments cannot continue to function after the judgment except in transaction completed before the judgment.

It can now be definitely understood that after the judgment in Golak Nath V. State of Punjab all transactions of fixing fair rent, acquiring and compen­sation of landed property and all impositions of ceiling on land holdings arising under any land legislation in States must conform to the standards laid down in Part III of the Constitution.

CRIME IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE

By W. Clifford

(Executive Secretary, the Forth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.)

Preparations for the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders to be held at the Kyoto International Conference Hall, Kyoto, Japan, from 17 to 26 August, are gathering momentum. Registration for individual participants closed on 31 March. There are a limited number of places reserved for special; cases, but the indications are that the Congress, with official delegations, organizations and private qualified participants should already number 1,000 persons.

This Congress is unique in bringing together the policy makers, adminis­trators, scientific interests, voluntary bodies and a variety of inter-governmental and international agencies. Exchanging views with official government delegations will be representatives of the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation, the International Society for Social Defence, the International Society for Criminology, the International Society of Penal Law, Interpol, the International Commission of Jurists, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, ILO, the Council of Europe, the League of Arab States and many more. Most of the great scholars in this field will be attending, and a great many with responsibilities for the operation of services in crime prevention or correction will be involved.

Another significant aspect of the Fourth United Nations Congress is that it is the first ever to be held outside Europe. The first Congress was held at Geneva in 1955, the second at London in I960. the third at Stockholm in 1965. The costs involved have served to reduce the extent of European participation, but some of the developing countries have increased the size of their delegations. Efforts are also being made to obtain aid from private trust funds or bilateral technical aid to sponsor the participation of outstanding persons in this type of work in the poorer areas of the world.

The subjects to be discussed by the four separate sections of the Congress may be summed up as follows:

(1) Planning for Crime Prevention. This means not only planning within the specific services which deal with crime but also planning of a broader national type. It is increasingly evident that on a world basis, there is some degree of the crime associated with industrialization, urbanization, social mobility, technological change etc., which could be prevented by more effective planning. If even a part of this can be specified, then not only will developing countries benefit by being enabled to avoid the mistakes already made by developed countries in the course of their growth, but the more highly industrialized countries may obtain leads to more effective prevention.

(2) Public Participation in Crime Prevention. Although this is generally accepted as desirable, it is a relatively unexplored subject. There are limits to public involvement and even negative aspects of a "do-it-yourself" initiative illustrated by the Ku Klux Klan, certain vigilante groups and the worst effects of mob rule. What are these limits? What are the features of public involvement most in need of development? How are they to be fostered and kept within reasonable proportions?

(3) The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The idea is to look at these fifteen years after their adoption by the First United Nations Congress in 1955. What has changed? What needs to be changed? What can be done to ensure the more general acceptance and implementation of the Rules. There are interests which would extend the Rules to all offenders—or devise parallel rules for probationers, people arrested or indeed any one under any kind of legal restraint. Others prefer to concentrate on making the present Rules universally effective before increasing or extending them. One view is that they should become a convention-like on many items in the field of human rights. The Congress will only be able to give the guidelines. Any detailed work on the Rules will need to follow the Congress.

(4) The Organization of Research for Policy Development. Clearly, this subject is related to (1) above. It will concentrate not upon methodology, the nature or types of research nor the complications of research work in general. Rather, will the discussion be concerned with making research a more practical and useful handmaiden and guide for those who have to determine policy in this field. Obviously policy-making cannot be (and probably should not be) wholly scientific, and in crime prevention, the researchers do not have sufficient answers yet to satisfy the scientific policy-makers. In reality, however, the policy-maker and the research worker are often entirely out of touch, or, if in contact with each other, often not really communicating. In some parts of the world, research in this field has still not begun; elsewhere, it may be struggling to maintain itself. There are areas where even the most rudimentary collection of data has not yet begun. It is problems of this type which will concern the Congress most as the participants seek to forge national and international links between those responsible for policy and those working on research projects.

The Fourth Congress, therefore, bids fair to become one of the landmarks in the history and development of crime prevention. It is taking place at a very propitious timeat a time when developed industrial countries are becoming increasingly aware of the real costs of crime and the menace it represents for the quality of life and future progress. It comes at a time when the developing nations are becoming jealous of their traditions, conscious of the value of their social controls and aware of the opportunities that exist for them to improve a past history in the more industrialized areas.

Apart from all professional and scientific considerations, those able to get to Kyoto for the Congress will find that the Japanese are not only thoughtful and gracious hosts but very efficient ones, too, A special visit to the nearby Expo 70 is scheduled as part of the programmed. And lady participants, or wives of participants, will be specially catered toone of the royal villas they will see is not usually open for public viewing without prior arrangement. Some Japanese who wish to see it have to wait as long as six months to obtain permission to enter. Kyoto itself was an ancient capital of Japan. It is a cultural centre which has a Japanese tourist business far exceeding the numbers it attracts from outside Japan. Here are some of the most famous Zen monasteries and historic temples and shrines of superb design and surpassing charm. The Kyoto Inter­national Conference Hall is itself a tourist attraction, standing on its own grounds framed by distant hills and encompassing a tranquil lake where the graceful swan’s emphasis the beauty of the surrounding garden laid out in traditional Japanese style.

In 1970, the International Conference Hall at Kyoto will house over 600 conferences. Over 40 of these will be international gatherings. But by far the largest will be the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. The indications now are that besides being a memorable experience for those taking part (many of whom will be seeing the Far East for the first time) the Congress stands a good chance of tracing crime prevention indelibly on the world map.

A Critical Study off The Kerala Land Reforms

Act 1 off 1964 as amended by

Act 35 of 1969

(Cherian Manjooran, Advocate, Ernakulam)

Property rights are very fundamental to the Constitution of India. Deprivation of property demands authority of law. In the exercise of the power of acquisition public purpose and compensation are indispensable conditions. Public purpose needs no definition but it requires enumeration. Public purposes for acquisition depend upon the needs and development of society. In the beginning only public roads and other similar matters were public purposes. With the advent of the Republic and Constitution, public purposes increased. Consistent with the needs of the society additional public purposes came into existence. Article 31—A is an amendment of Art 31 and it has enumerated public purposes mainly governing the acquisition by the State of an estate, extinguishment and modification of the rights therein.

"Existence of a public purpose and provision for giving compensation for compulsory acquisition of property of an individual are conditions of the exercise of the power to acquire private property. If either condition be absent, the guarantee under Art. 31 (2) is impaired and the law providing for acquisition will be invalid". These findings of His Lordship Justice Shah in R.C. Cooper v. Union India show that Art. 31—A being a law providing for acquisition without compensation, will be invalid. This was never intended by the Parliament and Art. 31—A was only passed to enable the State to acquire property without resort to a special attribute of "public purpose" for the acquisition by the State of an estate and of any rights therein, and the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. The logic of this reasoning is further reinforced by the fact that Article 31—A is a further amplification with regard to –“public purposes" only, and such a restraint of Art. 31—A is consistent with the finding of His Lordship Shah J. in the Bank case. In AIR 1969 S. Cat Page 459 His Lordship Bhagavathi J. lends support to the interpretation that Art. 31—A is only an amendment of Art. 31 which only enlarged the scope of public purposes It is stated in the said judgment that where the question of acquisition by the State of an estate arises, Art 31 (2 A) should be looked into. This interpretation reconciles the apparent irreconcilability of Articles 31 and 31 A.

The above interpretation gives rise to an apparent contradiction in Art 31-A. The provision in Art 31—A is that "Notwithstanding anything contained in Articlev13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of an estate. shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or take^s away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, 19 or 31". Any law-providing for acquisition is only protected within the limits of "public purpose'' is borne out from the conspicuous omission of compensation in Art 31A in the ex. pression "the acquisition by the State of an estate". The omission was not without a purpose and Article 31A does not cover the transfer of ownership of the property acquired under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. It is a wrong interpretation Adopted by the Kerala State to exercise a blanket power to deprive the properties of citizens under the said Act and judicial protection cannot be afforded to such a device. Art. 31A approves acquisition but not compensation.

In this context to maintain the logical sequence Art. 31-A should be put within limits. Art. 31-A is just like "equity of redemption" which according to a Privy Council judge is an unruly dog which should be put under chains. Those expressions are very apt in the case of Art 31-A also. Articles 31 and 31-A have to be properly read together in the proper spirit of the Constitution to solve the apparent inconsistency and to find out the true meaning of the said Articles Under the impugned Act by vesting of properties in the State and by provisions of compensation the State actually acquires the properties.

Our next consideration is whether the Kerala Act is an Agrarian Reform as it claims to be. Agrarian Reform has not been defined so far either in law or by decisions. In any case Agrarian Reform is not purely land reforms much less taking away and distribution of lands. Distribution of lands as such cannot be Agrarian Reform though distribution of lands may be part of a scheme of an Agrarian Reform. AIR. 1965 SC. 632 in para 13 supplies some materials to define Agrarian Reform and the Kerala Act cannot be called Agrarian Reform in the wake of that decision.

The Kerala Land Reforms Act has no justification whatsoever and it cannot gain protection of Art. 31-A either as an agrarian reform or otherwise. The legislation is expropriator in character and it has not been designed under articles 38 and 39 to attain the objective of a socialistic pattern of society. Any agrarian reform should have as its aim to improve the agriculture and the lot of farmers. Better production and general well-being should be its objective.

The Kerala Act, it appears, is mainly intended to protect the trespassers practically encouraging further more trespassers. The trespassers become deem­ing Kudikidappukars and Kudikidappukars are conferred the right to purchase 3 cents of land in the Corporation, 5 cents in minor municipalities and ten cents in other places. The right to purchase granted to Kudikidappukars is not protected under Article 31-A as they do not come within the definition of estates and the interests therein. This right to purchase at 25% of the market value is granted to persons who are already the owners of land. A person who owns five cents of land is denied the right to purchase any land as of right because of his han­dicap of ownership of a small bit of land. The definition of Kudikidappukaran is prima facie discriminatory of small holders of property. Over and above this, Kudikidappukars who are occupants in the excess lands above the ceiling limits are conferred the right to purchase up to one acre of land under S. 95 of the Act. Under S. 96 a Kudikidappukaran gains from 3 to 10 cents over and above the three to ten cents in his occupation. The scheme of the whole Act consisting of 132 sections is confined to Ss. 95 and 96. Under S. 96 the Land Board will res­erve in each village the lands necessary for public purposes. This is a patent misuse of the protection provided under Art 31-A and it is a fraud upon the Con­stitution and colorable exercise of the powers Conferred upon the State.

The impugned legislation is not an agrarian reform as it contains nothing for the improvement of agriculture or for the well being of the agricultural community within the meaning of Articles 38 and 39 of .the Constitution. On the other hand it impoverishes and annihilates the small holders of land. This hardly achieves the objective of a socialistic pattern of society enshrined in the Constitution of India. There is no idea of a land reform and much less a scheme for the implementation of a socialistic pattern of society.

The Kerala legislation disfavors all interests within the estate and it practically liquidates all smallholders. The mere accident of ownership of five or ten cents of land is a handicap to such owners. The owners themselves may be living on rent but because of the ill-luck of owning a small piece of land he becomes a pauper to the advantage of some occupants in his property. There is no proper classification and the Act suffers from the vice of patent discrimination.

Kudikidappukars are mere occupants of land entitled to protection hold­ing no interest in the estates and they do not in any way come into the picture of estates contemplated in Art. 31-A. The fact that Kudikidappukars are those who have neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any Panchayat area or township in possession either as owner or as tenant on which he could erect a homestead" is a negation of all principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It is at once shocking to the conscience and it is also an unlimited favour done without any justification whatsoever. In a State where the density of the population is highest, where there are wanderers roaming in the streets without a homestead, the partiality shown in favour of the Kudiki­dappukars is unpardonable and that too happens to be provided in an Act which makes the tallest claim to distribute lands to the landless. This is further distribution of lands to owners in preference to the homeless. This is a hostile discrimination practiced against the destitute and homeless. Kudikidappukaras have the right to fixity of occupation under the Proclamation of 1122 in Cochin State and later in other parts of Kerala. In any view of the matter the right to purchase from within the ceiling limits is against all known canons of law especially violative of the second proviso in Art. 31-A.

S. 72 of the Act provides vesting free of encumbrances affecting the interests of strangers and the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in adjudications. This is a calculated move to defeat the Rule of Law. The compensation provided in the Act is illusory and the provision free of encumbrances leaves strangers paupers for the fault of putting faith in the owners of land. This is a denial of their assets to meet their obligations based upon their properties. Curiously enough there is hardly any safeguards to the owners from coercive steps that are available to their creditors. This is a penalty for past ownership which directly leads them to incarceration. The exclusion of civil Courts, Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code is a device to put the small owners in peril or at least it has that effect.

Under S. 72E, the right to rent is vested in the State and the payment of compensation is deferred by the issue of bonds. This denies the owners the right and means to make a living and the compensation that they will have received will hardly meet the obligations forced upon them for their own existence. Delay defeats them and even the illusory compensation may be written off against their obligations.

All the arrears of rent have been written off as a prize for non-payment and it is a clarian call to defaulters for future defaults. This would make the honest, dishonest and the poor the poorer. The State makes a profit in all these transactions and much of it may be eaten away under contingency and establishments. The State has employed police power to gain profits in the name of agrarian reform and it is an abuse of power by the State.

The protection to the religious denominations and their charitable institutions are all denied in usurping their right and power to administer, hold and acquire property to meet their religious obligations without the authority of law, which should ensure public order, health and morality under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The Kerala Land Reforms Act is not a law to maintain public order and protect health and morality. The law is an abuse of the powers of the State, violative of Articles 25 and 26.

The Act is neither an agrarian reform nor can it be held valid under Articles 31-A, 25 and 26. In determining the validity of the provisions the Courts will have to consider all these aspects and the law can hardly be found valid and there is a strong case to strike down the entire Act as unconstitutional and void giving a chance for the legislature to have second thoughts before they launch new legislations.

THE BAR OF RENT CONTROL PROCEEDINGS BY THE

KERALA ACT 1 OF 1957

(K. E. Gopinath, B.Sc., B.L, Advocate, Cannanore)

The definition of hut in Section 2 clause 2 of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1957, has provoked certain criticisms for the reason that it has not been happily worded. According to the definition 'hut' means any building which is constructed principally of wood, mud, leaves, grass, or thatch. One is inclined to feel that an unexpected advantage, consequent on the definition, accrues to tenants within the purview of the Madras Buildings Lease & Rent Control Act. It would appear that the definition couched in such wide and ambiguous language confers benefit to such tenants whom the Act do not seek to help.

That being so, how far the definition of hut will interfere with the proceedings under the Madras Buildings Lease & Rent Control Acis a question of some niceties. Some are of the view that a petition filed under Section 7 of the above Act for eviction on the ground of willful default, will have to be stayed, if the building in question falls within the definition of a hut. It is the propriety of such a view that is the topic for discussion in this article.

Here the question under consideration is whether the benefit which a tenant under the Madras Act, is supposed to enjoy, does really exist? In other words, whether a petition under Section 7 of the Act, for eviction of a tenant from a building which is brought within the scope of the definition of hut, is liable to be stayed under Section 4 of Act 1 of 1957? Or what exactly is the scope and extent of the saving provision in Section 3, clause (c) of Act 1 of 1957?

Sec. 3 cl (c) states:

"Nothing in this Act shall apply to buildings rented out including houses, - shops, or warehouses and the sites thereof together with the gardens or lands appurtenant thereto; Explanation:For the purpose of this clause a hut which is a kudiyiruppu shall not be deemed to be a hut."

The above section would have left the proceedings under the Madras Act uninterrupted, but for the explanation contained therein. However, a careful understanding of the section will make clear that the fact that a building of which eviction is sought, merely satisfies the definition of "hut" is not in itself sufficient, to take it outside the saving provisien. To be more accurate, only a hut which is a kudiyiruppu, is within the ambit of Act 1 of 1957.

So much so, kudiyiruppu is the guiding factor in deciding the question of stay. The term kudiyiruppu is not defined in the Act and as it is clear from Section 2 cl (3) and (4) we have to look into their definitions, as found in the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 1955 wherein;

"Kudiyiruppu" means the site so given together with the house, hut or shed thereon which is used as a place of residence by the kudikidappukaran with the permission of the owner" and

"Kudikidappukaran"means a person who has no homestead or land of his own to erect a homestead and has been permitted by an owner of land for the purpose of erecting a homestead with or without an obligation to pay rent for the use and occupation of the site so given."

An analysis of the above definitions shows that

(1). A kudiyiruppu is a site together with a building thereon;

(2) the building is built by the tenant on the site belonging to the landlord with the latter's permission.

(3) the building is a residential house, hut or shed.

So much so, a hut which is a kudiyiruppu means a building principally of mud, wood, leaves, grass or thatch, constructed by a tenant having no homestead of his own on a site granted by its owner, with the permission of the latter, with a stipulation to pay rent or not. It is only such buildings that are sought to be brought within the purview of the staying proviso.

So the fact that a building is built by a tenant is of utmost importance, because that is the sine-quo-non of a kudiyiruppu. It may be noted that an ''Ulkudi" which is the term applicable to Malabar, has the same meaning as of kudiyiruppu known in Travancore-Cochin. It follows therefore, that any sort of building, may be a hut even, belonging to the landlord and let out to people on rent, is not in the least affected and is safely beyond the clutches of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act. The legislature has made it amply clear in Sec. 3 cl. (c) that it was not its intention to thrust its hands within the province of the Rent Control Act. But it was sure and certain that relief should be afforded to Ulkudidars and Kudikidappukars who have no homestead of their own, from eviction, and that accounts for the explanation found in the section.

On a close scrutiny of the Act it will be clear beyond doubt, that the definition of “hut", though not happy, is harmless in itself; for it is not significant in consideration of any proceedings under the Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act. The question of stay will only arise in case the building is an Ulkudi or Kudiyiruppu

BAR OF RENT CONTROL PROCEEDINGS BY THE KERALA

ACT I OF 1957

(By K. S. Nambiar, Advocate, Trichur)

An article titled as "Bar of Rent Control Proceedings by the Kerala Act 1 of 1957" appeared in the K.L.T. dated 16-6-1958. In that article the scope and extent of the saving provision Sec 3, cl. (c) of Act 1 of 1957 have been discussed According to the article ''any building, may be a hut even, belonging to the landlord and let out to people on rent is not in the least affected and is safely beyond the clutches of Act 1 of 1957". According to me that view is not correct

A careful reading of the relevant provisions of the Act 1 of 1957 will lead one only to one irresistible conclusion and that is a rented building coming within the definitions of the terms hut and kudiyiruppu within the meaning of the Act is hit by it, irrespective of the fact whether the building is constructed by the landlord or the tenant.

The saving clause S. 3, sub-cl. (c) of the Act which takes the rented buildings out of the purview of the Act, by the explanation added to it makes the saving provision under it inapplicable to a hut which is a kudiyiruppu. The explanation reads as follows:

"For the purpose of this clause a hut which is a kudiyiruppu shall be deemed to be a building".

By the explanation it will be found that a building will come within the ambit of Act 1 of 1957 if the following conditions are satisfied.

(1) The building must be a hut within the meaning of S. 2, sub-cl. (2) of the Act 1 of 1957.

(2)The building must be a kudiyiruppu.

The word 'hut' has been defined as a "building which is principally made of wood, mud, leaves, grass or thatch". A "Kudikidappukaran" has been defined as follows, under S. 2, cl (3) of the Act 1 of 1957:-

"Kudikidappukaran means a kudikidappukaran as defined in the Travancore Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act 1955 and includes any person in occupation of a hut (whether constructed by him or not) in any portion of a land belonging to and in the possession of another and who has been permitted by the latter to occupy that hut, but otherwise has no interest in the land.''

Cl. (4) defines "Kudiyiruppu" as follows:

"Kudiyiruppu means a Kudiyiruppu as defined in the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act 1955 and includes a hut occupied by a Kudikidappukaran."

From these two definitions it will be clear that definition of ''Kudiyiruppu" and "Kudikidappukaran" in the Kerala Act 1 of 1957 and the Travancore-Cochin Act are not the same. The article in KLT dated 16-6-1958, it seems, does not advert to this fact. The scope of the definition of the terms Kudikidappukaran and Kudiyiruppu has been amplified in the Kerala Act so as to take in huts also irrespective of the fact whether it was constructed by the tenant or not, by which something more is added to the Travancore-Cochin definitions.

The words "hut (whether constructed by him or not)" definitely suggest that a hut to be a kudiyiruppu need not belong to the tenant. Even if it is constructed by the landlord it will be a kudiyiruppu within the meaning of the Act. The intention of the Legislature was to give absolute protection from eviction proceedings under the Act to those people who are in occupation of huts. The explanation to S. 3 cl (c) was added in the light of the definitions of the terms 'Kudikidappukaran' and 'Kudiyiruppu' contained in S. 2 of the Act 1 of 1957. From the foregoing brief discussion it will be clear that a building which is a hut within the meaning of the Act 1 of 1957 irrespective of the fact whether it was constructed by the tenant or not will be brought within the staying provisions of the Act 1 of' 57 if it satisfies the other conditions of a Kudiyiruppu. The fact that the "hut" is constructed by the tenant or landlord is of no significance in the face of the definite provisions in the Act 1 of 1957. So it is not correct to say that any building, even in the case of its being a hut, belonging to the landlord is not hit by the staying provisions of the Act.