CRIME IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE

By W. Clifford

(Executive Secretary, the Forth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.)

Preparations for the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders to be held at the Kyoto International Conference Hall, Kyoto, Japan, from 17 to 26 August, are gathering momentum. Registration for individual participants closed on 31 March. There are a limited number of places reserved for special; cases, but the indications are that the Congress, with official delegations, organizations and private qualified participants should already number 1,000 persons.

This Congress is unique in bringing together the policy makers, adminis­trators, scientific interests, voluntary bodies and a variety of inter-governmental and international agencies. Exchanging views with official government delegations will be representatives of the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation, the International Society for Social Defence, the International Society for Criminology, the International Society of Penal Law, Interpol, the International Commission of Jurists, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, ILO, the Council of Europe, the League of Arab States and many more. Most of the great scholars in this field will be attending, and a great many with responsibilities for the operation of services in crime prevention or correction will be involved.

Another significant aspect of the Fourth United Nations Congress is that it is the first ever to be held outside Europe. The first Congress was held at Geneva in 1955, the second at London in I960. the third at Stockholm in 1965. The costs involved have served to reduce the extent of European participation, but some of the developing countries have increased the size of their delegations. Efforts are also being made to obtain aid from private trust funds or bilateral technical aid to sponsor the participation of outstanding persons in this type of work in the poorer areas of the world.

The subjects to be discussed by the four separate sections of the Congress may be summed up as follows:

(1) Planning for Crime Prevention. This means not only planning within the specific services which deal with crime but also planning of a broader national type. It is increasingly evident that on a world basis, there is some degree of the crime associated with industrialization, urbanization, social mobility, technological change etc., which could be prevented by more effective planning. If even a part of this can be specified, then not only will developing countries benefit by being enabled to avoid the mistakes already made by developed countries in the course of their growth, but the more highly industrialized countries may obtain leads to more effective prevention.

(2) Public Participation in Crime Prevention. Although this is generally accepted as desirable, it is a relatively unexplored subject. There are limits to public involvement and even negative aspects of a "do-it-yourself" initiative illustrated by the Ku Klux Klan, certain vigilante groups and the worst effects of mob rule. What are these limits? What are the features of public involvement most in need of development? How are they to be fostered and kept within reasonable proportions?

(3) The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The idea is to look at these fifteen years after their adoption by the First United Nations Congress in 1955. What has changed? What needs to be changed? What can be done to ensure the more general acceptance and implementation of the Rules. There are interests which would extend the Rules to all offenders—or devise parallel rules for probationers, people arrested or indeed any one under any kind of legal restraint. Others prefer to concentrate on making the present Rules universally effective before increasing or extending them. One view is that they should become a convention-like on many items in the field of human rights. The Congress will only be able to give the guidelines. Any detailed work on the Rules will need to follow the Congress.

(4) The Organization of Research for Policy Development. Clearly, this subject is related to (1) above. It will concentrate not upon methodology, the nature or types of research nor the complications of research work in general. Rather, will the discussion be concerned with making research a more practical and useful handmaiden and guide for those who have to determine policy in this field. Obviously policy-making cannot be (and probably should not be) wholly scientific, and in crime prevention, the researchers do not have sufficient answers yet to satisfy the scientific policy-makers. In reality, however, the policy-maker and the research worker are often entirely out of touch, or, if in contact with each other, often not really communicating. In some parts of the world, research in this field has still not begun; elsewhere, it may be struggling to maintain itself. There are areas where even the most rudimentary collection of data has not yet begun. It is problems of this type which will concern the Congress most as the participants seek to forge national and international links between those responsible for policy and those working on research projects.

The Fourth Congress, therefore, bids fair to become one of the landmarks in the history and development of crime prevention. It is taking place at a very propitious timeat a time when developed industrial countries are becoming increasingly aware of the real costs of crime and the menace it represents for the quality of life and future progress. It comes at a time when the developing nations are becoming jealous of their traditions, conscious of the value of their social controls and aware of the opportunities that exist for them to improve a past history in the more industrialized areas.

Apart from all professional and scientific considerations, those able to get to Kyoto for the Congress will find that the Japanese are not only thoughtful and gracious hosts but very efficient ones, too, A special visit to the nearby Expo 70 is scheduled as part of the programmed. And lady participants, or wives of participants, will be specially catered toone of the royal villas they will see is not usually open for public viewing without prior arrangement. Some Japanese who wish to see it have to wait as long as six months to obtain permission to enter. Kyoto itself was an ancient capital of Japan. It is a cultural centre which has a Japanese tourist business far exceeding the numbers it attracts from outside Japan. Here are some of the most famous Zen monasteries and historic temples and shrines of superb design and surpassing charm. The Kyoto Inter­national Conference Hall is itself a tourist attraction, standing on its own grounds framed by distant hills and encompassing a tranquil lake where the graceful swan’s emphasis the beauty of the surrounding garden laid out in traditional Japanese style.

In 1970, the International Conference Hall at Kyoto will house over 600 conferences. Over 40 of these will be international gatherings. But by far the largest will be the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. The indications now are that besides being a memorable experience for those taking part (many of whom will be seeing the Far East for the first time) the Congress stands a good chance of tracing crime prevention indelibly on the world map.

A Critical Study off The Kerala Land Reforms

Act 1 off 1964 as amended by

Act 35 of 1969

(Cherian Manjooran, Advocate, Ernakulam)

Property rights are very fundamental to the Constitution of India. Deprivation of property demands authority of law. In the exercise of the power of acquisition public purpose and compensation are indispensable conditions. Public purpose needs no definition but it requires enumeration. Public purposes for acquisition depend upon the needs and development of society. In the beginning only public roads and other similar matters were public purposes. With the advent of the Republic and Constitution, public purposes increased. Consistent with the needs of the society additional public purposes came into existence. Article 31—A is an amendment of Art 31 and it has enumerated public purposes mainly governing the acquisition by the State of an estate, extinguishment and modification of the rights therein.

"Existence of a public purpose and provision for giving compensation for compulsory acquisition of property of an individual are conditions of the exercise of the power to acquire private property. If either condition be absent, the guarantee under Art. 31 (2) is impaired and the law providing for acquisition will be invalid". These findings of His Lordship Justice Shah in R.C. Cooper v. Union India show that Art. 31—A being a law providing for acquisition without compensation, will be invalid. This was never intended by the Parliament and Art. 31—A was only passed to enable the State to acquire property without resort to a special attribute of "public purpose" for the acquisition by the State of an estate and of any rights therein, and the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. The logic of this reasoning is further reinforced by the fact that Article 31—A is a further amplification with regard to –“public purposes" only, and such a restraint of Art. 31—A is consistent with the finding of His Lordship Shah J. in the Bank case. In AIR 1969 S. Cat Page 459 His Lordship Bhagavathi J. lends support to the interpretation that Art. 31—A is only an amendment of Art. 31 which only enlarged the scope of public purposes It is stated in the said judgment that where the question of acquisition by the State of an estate arises, Art 31 (2 A) should be looked into. This interpretation reconciles the apparent irreconcilability of Articles 31 and 31 A.

The above interpretation gives rise to an apparent contradiction in Art 31-A. The provision in Art 31—A is that "Notwithstanding anything contained in Articlev13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of an estate. shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or take^s away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, 19 or 31". Any law-providing for acquisition is only protected within the limits of "public purpose'' is borne out from the conspicuous omission of compensation in Art 31A in the ex. pression "the acquisition by the State of an estate". The omission was not without a purpose and Article 31A does not cover the transfer of ownership of the property acquired under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. It is a wrong interpretation Adopted by the Kerala State to exercise a blanket power to deprive the properties of citizens under the said Act and judicial protection cannot be afforded to such a device. Art. 31A approves acquisition but not compensation.

In this context to maintain the logical sequence Art. 31-A should be put within limits. Art. 31-A is just like "equity of redemption" which according to a Privy Council judge is an unruly dog which should be put under chains. Those expressions are very apt in the case of Art 31-A also. Articles 31 and 31-A have to be properly read together in the proper spirit of the Constitution to solve the apparent inconsistency and to find out the true meaning of the said Articles Under the impugned Act by vesting of properties in the State and by provisions of compensation the State actually acquires the properties.

Our next consideration is whether the Kerala Act is an Agrarian Reform as it claims to be. Agrarian Reform has not been defined so far either in law or by decisions. In any case Agrarian Reform is not purely land reforms much less taking away and distribution of lands. Distribution of lands as such cannot be Agrarian Reform though distribution of lands may be part of a scheme of an Agrarian Reform. AIR. 1965 SC. 632 in para 13 supplies some materials to define Agrarian Reform and the Kerala Act cannot be called Agrarian Reform in the wake of that decision.

The Kerala Land Reforms Act has no justification whatsoever and it cannot gain protection of Art. 31-A either as an agrarian reform or otherwise. The legislation is expropriator in character and it has not been designed under articles 38 and 39 to attain the objective of a socialistic pattern of society. Any agrarian reform should have as its aim to improve the agriculture and the lot of farmers. Better production and general well-being should be its objective.

The Kerala Act, it appears, is mainly intended to protect the trespassers practically encouraging further more trespassers. The trespassers become deem­ing Kudikidappukars and Kudikidappukars are conferred the right to purchase 3 cents of land in the Corporation, 5 cents in minor municipalities and ten cents in other places. The right to purchase granted to Kudikidappukars is not protected under Article 31-A as they do not come within the definition of estates and the interests therein. This right to purchase at 25% of the market value is granted to persons who are already the owners of land. A person who owns five cents of land is denied the right to purchase any land as of right because of his han­dicap of ownership of a small bit of land. The definition of Kudikidappukaran is prima facie discriminatory of small holders of property. Over and above this, Kudikidappukars who are occupants in the excess lands above the ceiling limits are conferred the right to purchase up to one acre of land under S. 95 of the Act. Under S. 96 a Kudikidappukaran gains from 3 to 10 cents over and above the three to ten cents in his occupation. The scheme of the whole Act consisting of 132 sections is confined to Ss. 95 and 96. Under S. 96 the Land Board will res­erve in each village the lands necessary for public purposes. This is a patent misuse of the protection provided under Art 31-A and it is a fraud upon the Con­stitution and colorable exercise of the powers Conferred upon the State.

The impugned legislation is not an agrarian reform as it contains nothing for the improvement of agriculture or for the well being of the agricultural community within the meaning of Articles 38 and 39 of .the Constitution. On the other hand it impoverishes and annihilates the small holders of land. This hardly achieves the objective of a socialistic pattern of society enshrined in the Constitution of India. There is no idea of a land reform and much less a scheme for the implementation of a socialistic pattern of society.

The Kerala legislation disfavors all interests within the estate and it practically liquidates all smallholders. The mere accident of ownership of five or ten cents of land is a handicap to such owners. The owners themselves may be living on rent but because of the ill-luck of owning a small piece of land he becomes a pauper to the advantage of some occupants in his property. There is no proper classification and the Act suffers from the vice of patent discrimination.

Kudikidappukars are mere occupants of land entitled to protection hold­ing no interest in the estates and they do not in any way come into the picture of estates contemplated in Art. 31-A. The fact that Kudikidappukars are those who have neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any Panchayat area or township in possession either as owner or as tenant on which he could erect a homestead" is a negation of all principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It is at once shocking to the conscience and it is also an unlimited favour done without any justification whatsoever. In a State where the density of the population is highest, where there are wanderers roaming in the streets without a homestead, the partiality shown in favour of the Kudiki­dappukars is unpardonable and that too happens to be provided in an Act which makes the tallest claim to distribute lands to the landless. This is further distribution of lands to owners in preference to the homeless. This is a hostile discrimination practiced against the destitute and homeless. Kudikidappukaras have the right to fixity of occupation under the Proclamation of 1122 in Cochin State and later in other parts of Kerala. In any view of the matter the right to purchase from within the ceiling limits is against all known canons of law especially violative of the second proviso in Art. 31-A.

S. 72 of the Act provides vesting free of encumbrances affecting the interests of strangers and the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in adjudications. This is a calculated move to defeat the Rule of Law. The compensation provided in the Act is illusory and the provision free of encumbrances leaves strangers paupers for the fault of putting faith in the owners of land. This is a denial of their assets to meet their obligations based upon their properties. Curiously enough there is hardly any safeguards to the owners from coercive steps that are available to their creditors. This is a penalty for past ownership which directly leads them to incarceration. The exclusion of civil Courts, Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code is a device to put the small owners in peril or at least it has that effect.

Under S. 72E, the right to rent is vested in the State and the payment of compensation is deferred by the issue of bonds. This denies the owners the right and means to make a living and the compensation that they will have received will hardly meet the obligations forced upon them for their own existence. Delay defeats them and even the illusory compensation may be written off against their obligations.

All the arrears of rent have been written off as a prize for non-payment and it is a clarian call to defaulters for future defaults. This would make the honest, dishonest and the poor the poorer. The State makes a profit in all these transactions and much of it may be eaten away under contingency and establishments. The State has employed police power to gain profits in the name of agrarian reform and it is an abuse of power by the State.

The protection to the religious denominations and their charitable institutions are all denied in usurping their right and power to administer, hold and acquire property to meet their religious obligations without the authority of law, which should ensure public order, health and morality under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The Kerala Land Reforms Act is not a law to maintain public order and protect health and morality. The law is an abuse of the powers of the State, violative of Articles 25 and 26.

The Act is neither an agrarian reform nor can it be held valid under Articles 31-A, 25 and 26. In determining the validity of the provisions the Courts will have to consider all these aspects and the law can hardly be found valid and there is a strong case to strike down the entire Act as unconstitutional and void giving a chance for the legislature to have second thoughts before they launch new legislations.

THE BAR OF RENT CONTROL PROCEEDINGS BY THE

KERALA ACT 1 OF 1957

(K. E. Gopinath, B.Sc., B.L, Advocate, Cannanore)

The definition of hut in Section 2 clause 2 of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1957, has provoked certain criticisms for the reason that it has not been happily worded. According to the definition 'hut' means any building which is constructed principally of wood, mud, leaves, grass, or thatch. One is inclined to feel that an unexpected advantage, consequent on the definition, accrues to tenants within the purview of the Madras Buildings Lease & Rent Control Act. It would appear that the definition couched in such wide and ambiguous language confers benefit to such tenants whom the Act do not seek to help.

That being so, how far the definition of hut will interfere with the proceedings under the Madras Buildings Lease & Rent Control Acis a question of some niceties. Some are of the view that a petition filed under Section 7 of the above Act for eviction on the ground of willful default, will have to be stayed, if the building in question falls within the definition of a hut. It is the propriety of such a view that is the topic for discussion in this article.

Here the question under consideration is whether the benefit which a tenant under the Madras Act, is supposed to enjoy, does really exist? In other words, whether a petition under Section 7 of the Act, for eviction of a tenant from a building which is brought within the scope of the definition of hut, is liable to be stayed under Section 4 of Act 1 of 1957? Or what exactly is the scope and extent of the saving provision in Section 3, clause (c) of Act 1 of 1957?

Sec. 3 cl (c) states:

"Nothing in this Act shall apply to buildings rented out including houses, - shops, or warehouses and the sites thereof together with the gardens or lands appurtenant thereto; Explanation:For the purpose of this clause a hut which is a kudiyiruppu shall not be deemed to be a hut."

The above section would have left the proceedings under the Madras Act uninterrupted, but for the explanation contained therein. However, a careful understanding of the section will make clear that the fact that a building of which eviction is sought, merely satisfies the definition of "hut" is not in itself sufficient, to take it outside the saving provisien. To be more accurate, only a hut which is a kudiyiruppu, is within the ambit of Act 1 of 1957.

So much so, kudiyiruppu is the guiding factor in deciding the question of stay. The term kudiyiruppu is not defined in the Act and as it is clear from Section 2 cl (3) and (4) we have to look into their definitions, as found in the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 1955 wherein;

"Kudiyiruppu" means the site so given together with the house, hut or shed thereon which is used as a place of residence by the kudikidappukaran with the permission of the owner" and

"Kudikidappukaran"means a person who has no homestead or land of his own to erect a homestead and has been permitted by an owner of land for the purpose of erecting a homestead with or without an obligation to pay rent for the use and occupation of the site so given."

An analysis of the above definitions shows that

(1). A kudiyiruppu is a site together with a building thereon;

(2) the building is built by the tenant on the site belonging to the landlord with the latter's permission.

(3) the building is a residential house, hut or shed.

So much so, a hut which is a kudiyiruppu means a building principally of mud, wood, leaves, grass or thatch, constructed by a tenant having no homestead of his own on a site granted by its owner, with the permission of the latter, with a stipulation to pay rent or not. It is only such buildings that are sought to be brought within the purview of the staying proviso.

So the fact that a building is built by a tenant is of utmost importance, because that is the sine-quo-non of a kudiyiruppu. It may be noted that an ''Ulkudi" which is the term applicable to Malabar, has the same meaning as of kudiyiruppu known in Travancore-Cochin. It follows therefore, that any sort of building, may be a hut even, belonging to the landlord and let out to people on rent, is not in the least affected and is safely beyond the clutches of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act. The legislature has made it amply clear in Sec. 3 cl. (c) that it was not its intention to thrust its hands within the province of the Rent Control Act. But it was sure and certain that relief should be afforded to Ulkudidars and Kudikidappukars who have no homestead of their own, from eviction, and that accounts for the explanation found in the section.

On a close scrutiny of the Act it will be clear beyond doubt, that the definition of “hut", though not happy, is harmless in itself; for it is not significant in consideration of any proceedings under the Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act. The question of stay will only arise in case the building is an Ulkudi or Kudiyiruppu

A NOTE ON KERALA LEGAL AID RULES

 (M. S. Kurien B. A . B. L., Advocate.Ernakulam)

One thing we are sure of. A Communist Government is never guilty of inertia. The heresy consists in the censer being always directed to an over -- Government.

All credit, to whomsoever it is due, for making the idea of Legal Aid to the poor a live issue. But I fear there is a string attached to the scheme proposed by the present regime. The simple smart thing would have been to leave to the client to choose his own advocate and then pay the advocate out of State funds. Under the rules published by the Kerala Government, Counsels are appointed by the Presiding Officers from a panel of names submitted by the Bar Association President.

My point is this. No body shall tamper with private initiative and individual choice. The right to be defended by an advocate of his own choice is no mean right. No solicitude, from whatever quarter it comes, if it swallows up the personal predilection of the citizen, is healthy enough.

I may now mention Art. 22(1) of the Indian Constitution. "No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed as soon as may be, of the grounds of such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice." The right of the client to choose his own advocate is well stressed by no less a body than the sixth Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Communist atrocities in Hungary were specially studied by them. The quintessence of all their deliberations is this. ''An accused without means shall be entitled to effective legal aid and representation by a qualified lawyer of his own choice before all the tribunals without exception." And, are not the advocates themselves who are outside the panel, prejudiced in many ways? Let as hear them.

Reasons for Administrative Orders

(P. Leelakrishnan, M.A., M.L., Lecturer in Law, University of Kerala)

The Kerala High Court decision in Ibrahim Kunju v. State of Kerala! lays stress on the essentiality of stating reasons in the order of a public authority.

The petitioner, the president of a Co-operative Society challenged the order of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies superseding the Board of the society for six months and the order of the minister endorsing the said supersession.

The Joint Registrar took the decision on the report of the Deputy Registrar recommending supersession for the alleged irregularities. The details of this report had not been put to the petitioner by the Joint Registrar before he took the decision. The petitioner appealed to the minister. On the day when the case was taken by the minister, the advocate of the petitioner sent a written adjournment petition without the knowledge of the party. The minister did not allow the adjournment petition while on the other-hand he allowed the impleading of a member of the society to oppose the appeal. The minister dismissed the appeal endorsing the order of the Joint Registrar. In the petition before the High Court the main grounds of attack were that both the authorities did not state reasons for their orders and that they did not observe the rules of natural justice.

The Court seems to have accepted the contention that Joint Registrar's conduct in not furnishing the copy of the report of the Deputy Registrar was bad (The Court directs that the Government should furnish the petitioner with a copy if the Government goes to rely on it Ibid. p.70). The Court also accepted the petitioner's plea that he had no opportunity to engage another lawyer (Ibid, p 70. The circumstance that led to this view was that the adjournment application sent by the lawyer was without the knowledge of the party and that the minister had rejected the application in his back.) Lastly the High Court held that both the orders were bad as they did not disclose any reasons in support of the conclusions.

Krishna Iyer J. has observed in the case that battle for natural justice in administrative actions had already been fought and won in countries 'where rule of law is respected. Hence we should also take the doctrine of natural justice 'as part of the humanist discipline of the executive authorities who affect rights of citizens by their acts' (Ibid. p. 67). Really the importance of the decision lies in the fact that the major part of the judgment is devoted to establish that giving reasons for an administrative order is part of this 'humanist discipline'. It has been held that the minister's non-interference with the order of the Joint Registrar without any examination of the alleged irregularities was 'an abdication of the appellate power' given to him 'rather than an exercise of it' (Ibid. p. 68.) The judge categorically lays down the principle that 'quasi-judicial obligation involves giving of reasons for orders, since justice is not expected to wear the inscrutable face of a sphinx' (Ibid). Krishna Iyer J. has taken a bold step forward in acknowledging statement of reasons in an order as part of the common law doctrine of natural justice ( Writers on Administrative Law do not specifically say that this is part of natural justice. Cf. Wade, Administrative Law (1967) p 195) while courts were hesitant (See, Chatterji. A, Natural Justice and Reasoned Decisions, 10 J. I. L. I. (1968), 241, p. 247. But the writer has quoted a Delhi decision (Jogannath v. Union of India AIR. 1967. Delhi 121 p. 124) as one which held giving reasons as part of natural justice) to take up such a stand so far.

Tracing the history of judicial dicta on the point one finds that the present case has much similarity to the M. P. Industries v. Union of India (AIR. 1966 SC. 671.)and Bhagat Raja v. Union of India (AIR. 1967 SC. 1606.). In these cases the Supreme Court held that the Central Government while rejecting the revision under Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 had to act judicially. The revision was against the State Government's order rejecting the application for license. In these cases neither the State Government nor the Central Government stated the reasons for the order rejecting the license. The Supreme Court held (The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in Bhagat Raja's case (AIR .1967 SC. 1606) bud dismissed the appeal in M. P. Industries case (AIR. 1966 SC 671) as in the latter the State Government had already notified afresh inviting applications for license) that this had vitiated the orders. In Ibrahim Kunju's case (1969 KLT. 230; AIR. 1970 Ker. 65) the same spectacle of issuing orders without stating reasons to support them is seen in both the levels of public authorities. If an appellate or provisional authority endorses an order of a subordinate tribunal or of an officer who had already given valid reasons for the decision, the order of the appellate or provisional authority will not be declared invalid on the ground that there are no separate reasons to support it. But when the reasons given by the subordinate tribunal are scrappy or nebulous and the appellate authority makes no attempt to clarify them the order will not stand. (Bhagat Raja v .Union of India AIR. 1967 SC. 1606 p. 1610.) Suppose there is an order which does not state reasons but at the same time implies the reasons. (Nandram Hunatram v. Union of India, AIR. 1966. SC. 1922. The State Government gave notice to take the colliery from the firm in the circumstances where the partners of the lessee fell out, when the usual operations could not be made and when there was apprehension that colliery would be flooded. The revision against this order was rejected by the Central Government on these apparent grounds though they were not stated.)The order will not become bad on the mere ground that reasons are not specifically laid because the circumstances are so clear that absence of reasons could not possibly leave anybody in doubt whether or what the reasons were. (Bhagat Raja v. Union of India AIR. 1967. SC. 1506 p. 1614. Mitter J., distinguished this case with Hunatram's case (AIR) 1966 SC. 1022) saying that in the latter the circumstances spoke themselves for the cancellation of the lease) in the case under comment the facts do not show that there are such implying circumstances. But on the other hand, it can be seen, the report of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies had its 'dark' influence upon the order' of supersession and had been in full accepted by the public authorities who had neither given an opportunity to the petitioner to effectively oppose the report nor exercised their mind to the explanations already given by the petitioner.

The necessity of giving reasons in administrative orders had been pointed out by courts as well as Jurists. If reasons are given, an appellate court may be in a position to canvass the correctness of the reasons given, (M.U.M. Services Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority AIR. 1953 Mad. 59 p 60. The Court held that the Regional Transport Authority should give reasons when it issues a permit instead of merely writing down that the selected person was 'most suitable'. The Court pointed out that the authority did not give reasons for the suitability of the person selected.)to quash the decisions if the reasons are not adequately given (Wade, Administrative Law. (1967) p. 216.)and thus to make a judicial review of the decisions easy and effective (Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative Law. (1962) p. 166; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd v. Shyam Sundar, AiR. 1961 SC. 1669 per Shah J., p. 1678.)If reasons are not given the right of appeal will become otiose (M.U.M Services Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority AIR. 1953, Mad. 59, per Subba Rao J., p. 63.). That-may be the main reason why Cardozo J. (The United States v. Chicago. M. St. P. & PRR, 79 L. ed. 1023, 1032; 294 U.S 499, 511 (1935). When the Interstate Commerce Commission does not precisely state its decision with such 'simplicity and clearness 'that will make 'a halting impression' ripen into 'reasonable certitude' the Supreme Court is not in a position to endorse the decision.) had stated that the judges must know what a decision meant before the duty became theirs to say whether it was right or wrong. In India, Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution expressly give the power to the Supreme Court and the High Court respectively to review the decisions of the tribunals in the country. As Mitter J. has pointed out the courts exercising the powers under these articles will be at a disadvantageous position if the tribunals do not state reasons for their decisions. (Bhagat Raja v. Union of India AIR. 1967, SC. 1606 p. 1610.)

The need for giving reasons is connected with the concept of speaking order. As Lord Cairns has held a speaking order is one which states upon the face’ the elements which had led to the decision (The Overseers of the Poor of Wallsal v. London & North Western Railway Co., (1878) 4 AC. 30 p. 40. The judge held that an unspeaking or unintelligible order would make the judicial control an impossibility). Basing these words it can be found that a speaking order means an order that gives reasons for the decision and an unspeaking order means an order which gives no reasons (R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex-parte Shah, (1951) 1. K.B. 711 per Lord Goddard C. J. p 718.) In short an order which speaks for itself or states the reasons in support of it, is a speaking order. In Joseph v. Superintendent of Post Offices, (1960. KLT. 1304; AIR. 1961. Ker. 197 per Ansari C. J. p. 199. A non-departmental branch postmaster was removed from service for his unsatisfactory work by the res­pondent without making any reasons in the order which the High Court quashed.) the Kerala High Court has laid down that an order by a quasi-judicial authority must be a speaking order and that the absence of reasons in it would be fatal to its legality.

It is to be noted that on the question of not giving reasons for the rejection of the adjournment application Krishna Iyer J., has taken a definite stand holding that it was not against natural justice. The judge is of the view that giving reasons for every incidental or interlocutory order 'would make the canons of natural justice unnatural and unjust. (1969 KLT. 230. p. 237; AIR. 1970 Ker. 65 p. 70)

It is now well-settled that it is the basic right (Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative Law, (1962) p. 164) of the litigants to know the reasons for a decision which adversely affects their person or property. If the party affected by the decision is kept in ignorance of the reasons it will clearly prejudice his right to move the provisional or appellate court (Chandra Deo Sing v. Prakash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC. 1430 per Mudhol-kar.J,,p.1435) it has been said that orders without reasons would introduce arbitrariness in administrative orders.( Schwartz, op. cit.) The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate, minimizes arbitrariness. (M. P. Industries v. Union of India, AIR. 1965 SC. 671 p. 674.) It gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made. The necessity of giving reasons can be described in no better words than those of Subba Rao J. (Ibid. pp. 674, 675.)

"If the tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are to be given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction."

The compulsory need to articulate the reasoning process upon which a decision is based will require the administrative authority to work out in its mind all the factors which are present in a case. (Schwartz, op. cit) Thus the obligation to evolve a chain of reasoning is desirable from the point of view of promoting a sense of the judicial spirit in the adjudicator no less than in promoting certainty into the body of the law. (Robson Justice and Administrative Law (1947) p. 277 this certainty into the body of law must be what Cardozo J. meant by the 'reasonable certitude'. See, n. 20, supra)

In England and U.S A. Statute makes it necessary for the administrative adjudicators to state reasons in their decision. Thus Section 12 of the Tribunals and Enquiries Act, 1958 in England requires the tribunal or minister to furnish a statement, either written or oral, of the reasons for the decision if requested, on or before the giving or notification of the decision, to state the reasons'. One has to say that the request provision in the section is unfortunate (Wade, op. cit. p. 248,) for it is a protection for the administrative adjudicators, however, in practice requ­ests are seldom made but most tribunals give their reasons as a matter of course. In the United States, the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 requires administrative decisions to be accompanied by 'findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis there for, upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record'. (Section 8 (b) In India there is neither an Administrative Procedure Act nor a Tribunals and Enquiries Act which requires the tribunals and other adjudicators to state reasons in their decision. But the evolution of the doctrine of reasoned decisions through judicial process has rather made itself as part of a growing 'common law' of natural justice in India. In this light the decision in Ibrahim Kunju v. State of Rerala (AIR. 1970. Ker. 65. p. 70.)merits appreciation especially at a time when the barriers between the administrative and the so-called quasi-judicial powers are being narrowed down (The recent trend of the courts is to pull down the artificial wall that divides the two powers for the purpose of natural justice, See, Kraipak v. Union of India AIR" 1970 SC. 150 p. 154; State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani AIR. 1967 SC. 1269 p. 1272, In re H. K. (An Infant) (1967) 2. QB. 617. p. 630.). One who understands this will certainly advocate for a special training (Krishna Iyer J. had suggested that administrative officers should be educated in Administrative Law so that 'many an unwanted babe in the writ jurisdiction would not have been born' Ibrahim Kunju v. State of Kerala 1969 KLT. 230 p. 238; AIR. 1970 Ker. 65 P. 70.) of administrative authorities on the various developing fields of natural justice.