• Unwed Mother's Maintenence

    By S.A. Karim, Advocate, Thiruvananthapuram

    20/12/2010

    Unwed  Mother's  Maintenence

    (By S.A. Karim, Advocate, Vanchiyoor, Thiruvananthapuram)

     

    A Tamilnad Family Court granted maintenance to one Patchaiammal. She claims one Velusamy married her in 1986. Velusamy claims she is not his wife. So, the matter reached before the Supreme Court. During the argument, Justice Markandey Katju, heading the Bench, told Velusamy’s counsel the following. “You spent 14 years with her. She lost her youth. You do not want to pay anything to her. She might not have been legally married to you. But you have an obligation”. The Bench appointed a senior counsel Jayant Bhushan to assist the Court. This is reported in 2010 (4) KLT 284 (SC) - Velusamy  v.  Patchaiammal). 

     

    The philosophy of maintenance is that no dependent shall starve for food, cloth, shelter and other necessities. So, husband has to maintain his wife, father has to maintain his children and son has to maintain his parents. Law permits to maintain his illegitimate child. An unwed mother is denied maintenance. Life partner like concubine, and girl friend comes under unwed mother.

     

    In the Indian context, there are two types of wives-legally wedded one and society accepts a woman as the wife of a man. Maintenance is not a problem to a legally wedded one. In the latter cases, various High Courts have found long company of a woman with a man equals wife and husband and granted maintenance. Law permits maintenance to illegitimate child. Why the same privilege denies to unwed mother. So, a concubine or girl friend or any other name called, deserves maintenance from her man.

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  • Exodus to the High Court

    By K. Ramakumar, Advocate, High Court of Kerala

    13/12/2010
    K. Ramakumar, Advocate, High Court of Kerala

    Exodus to the High Court

    (By K. Ramakumar, Sr.Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

     

    Subordinate Judiciary, still is the sturdy back-bone of our judicial system. It is where the client directly interacts with his Counsel, who shares his sorrows and eases his anxiety ridden mind. He watches his Counsel acting for him and feels assured. Issues of moment do arise in District Courts as well and Courts subordinate to it.

     

    The Bar in most of the District Centres was composed of men with high caliber, capacity character and integrity. Some of them were head and shoulders above their compeers in the High Court Bar. In the city Civil Court in Mumbai, there are lawyers who command far more lucrative practice than some of those in the adjoining High Court.

     

    Remember, the first Advocate General of Kerala was drawn from a District Centre. He is rated high even today as the best. It is not as if a mofussil lawyer cannot master the Constitution of India or is wholly unfamiliar with the nunsances of Administrative law. And the great lawyer who helped give us Gopalan v. State of Madras was a few months earlier, a practitioner in South Canara. It is not for nothing that our Constitution provides provisions for empowering the District Courts, even to issue Writs.

     

    Alas, the days of such stalwarts in Subordinate courts are gone. Never to come back again. This is primarily due to legislations limiting if not jettisoning the jurisdiction of those Courts. Clipping of Civil litigation also contributed to it. The days when young entrants in the Bar, excitedly watched the wizardly conduct of Sessions trials by Senior lawyers are now matters of memory. Listening to learned arguments of experienced and acknowledged leaders of the Bar is also an abecedarian habit of yester years.

     

    Where are such seniors now ?  Even in the High Court Bar?  And where are those, who are worthy of emulation.   In etiquette, court craft, decorum and decent manners – Crafty many of them, no doubt are. Because seniority these days is not hard earned through toil, training and travails in the Bar, but comes in handy and can be easily managed through other means.

     

    How then, one expects the green horns be goaded not to be too greedy, and not fall a prey to the attractive get-rich-quick syndrome.

     

    As in the Apex Court, there is no minimal number of years fixed for a practitioner to be in the High Court. From day one, arriving in a Maruthi Car, he starts adventures with Art.226 - a gold mine to lawyers after the advent of the Constitution - and starts seeking Writs, to private bodies, like schools, co-operative societies, Banks and Beauty Clubs - And they are granted too without any inconvenient query how they lie. He needs no Guru, nor does he feel like becoming a Sishya. And there are other easy avenues like Police Protection and Public Interest Litigations. Why bother about Bishop of Oxford, Wednesbury, Quin v. Leatham or R v. Speyer, when none of them is fashionable to be learnt or cited and when other easier methods work. And the Cacology in Courts have become unbearable.

     

    No wonder therefore there is an exodus to the High Court from Subordinate Courts. In some of the Subordinate courts, like Thalassery, where the British established their First Court, substantial provisions of law, than the sickening one fifty one, are insisted upon, not even which is required in Higher Courts. High Courts are no longer fantabulous forums where intricate questions of law are answered, uncertainties cleared and guidelines evolved for the guidance of courts below as not even in Second Appeals they are attempted to be answered. The Subordinate courts appear to be suffocated with circulars of doubtful validity, no play in the joints being permitted. Even senior Subordinate Judges feel hesitant to grant bail or injunctions, appoint Receivers or even to order adjournments. The catch all two twenty seven will catch them. In spite of Salini Patel (2010), Abdul Razak (2010) and Essen Deinki (2002) and the like. It is time the High Courts should amend the rules and make it mandatory that questions of law be formulated in all cases and causes entertained only on them.

     

    Look at the ultimate fall out-breaking the backbone of client friendly Courts. The Bar in those courts become weakened and forced to make a bee-line to the High Court, where they feel sky is the limit for achievements, effortlessly and by means fair or foul.

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  • 2010 (1) KLT 579 - Thirumalikumar v. State - Obiter or Directive?

    By P. Rajan, Advocate, Thalasserry

    13/12/2010

    2010 (1) KLT 579 - Thirumalikumar  v.  State - Obiter  or  Directive?

    (By P.Rajan, Advocate, Thalassery)

     

    Ruling rendered recently by the Kerala High Court, shown above says that for issuing warrant of arrest of a person, the Magistrate can rely upon even newspaper report and need not wait for any Police request, for ordering arrest. This observation no doubt, appears to be novel. The Code of Criminal Procedure speaks of arrest as detailed in Ss.46 and 47 and also regarding investigation of Crimes as specified in Chapter XII of the Code. As the facts disclose of the reported case, the Magistrate accepted the news item published along with the photograph of the accused and issued warrant. The bail application ended in dismissal, moved on behalf of the accused - Sessions Judge concurred with the Magistrate’s Order, but expressed resentment relating to the reliance given by the Magistrate to the press report.

     

    Journalism even if not coloured; often was under the Judicial scanner as no legal sanctity or authenticity can be placed unless proved as provided under the provisions of Evidence Act. Arrest of an individual patently, relates to personal liberty and Apex Court sometime back has given specific guidelines relating to arrest of a person and the same are more in breach than in practice. Even authentic report in newspapers invited not only Judicial wrath but also steps under Contempt of Courts Act 1971.

     

    Delhi based ‘Midday’ Journal Published news item regarding certain Judge’s misconduct while in office, which paved way for action by the Delhi High Court and ended in awarding jail sentence to the press persons.  Though justification basing on truth is a defence under the said Act the High Court sentenced the so called contemners without hearing the portion of truth.  The matter is now pending before the highest Court of the land, on appeal of the convicted.

     

    Journalism, by advent of innovative ideas and inventions is fast developing but personal liberty is paramount especialy when steps for arrest are taken, basing solely on news reports without any police verification regarding the nature and authenticity of the report. The Hon’ble High Court has not given any guide lines to rely upon press reports, to issue warrant of arrest and the Magistrate often issuing, should not be at the receiving end, on challenge of the order; on scrutiny by Higher Courts - More if said would have been better, for proper application.

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  • Plea Bargaining : A Revaluation

    By Dr. Abraham P. Meachinkara, Advocate, High Court of Kerala

    29/11/2010
    Dr. Abraham P. Meachinkara, Advocate, High Court of Kerala

    Plea Bargaining : A Revaluation

    (By Dr. Abraham P. Meachinkara, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

     

    1. Introduction

    The irony of our legal system is that the major legal framework of ours is an adaption of the west. Whether it is the Constitution, the Criminal Law or the Evidence, all find the better shades of the laws which were prevalent in the west. And even today, when nothing seems to work and the present legal system flatters, our law makers eye the western concept of law and justice delivery. Despite the strict approach adopted by the Apex Court towards plea bargaining, our Parliament approved1 the concept of plea bargaining with the firm belief that it could handle the massive criminal loads, which has afflicted the legal system for long.

    The concept of plea bargaining was incorporated into the statute book by an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, in the year 2006 and enforced2 on 5th July 2006. Down four years, it is high time to scrutinize the concept of plea bargaining and analyze the prospects and problems, which has been carried out in the following paragraphs.

     

    2. Principles of Criminal Trial

    Criminal trial is based on two systems, adversary system and inquisitorial system. In the inquisitorial system, even the Presiding Officer can take over the responsibility of supervising the investigation of cases and it is the responsibility of the Presiding Officer to discover the truth. The role of the parties is restricted to suggesting the question that may be put to witnesses3. It is the Presiding Officer who puts the questions to the witness and there is no cross-examination as such. The accused does not get a fair opportunity of testing the evidence tendered against him which is one of the essential requirements of fair trial.

    Unlike inquisitorial system, in the adversarial system, fairness of trial is adequately assured by the presiding officers maintaining a position of neutrality and the parties getting full opportunity of adducing evidence and cross-examining the witness. This system of criminal trial is based on the principle that every case has two sides to it. In this system the prosecutor representing the State claims that the accused is guilty, while the accused pleads innocence4. The principle underlying this model is that truth will emerge from the respective version of fact, evidence and arguments presented by the parties before an impartial Judge. For centuries, cases are determined in genuinely contested adversary proceedings.

     

    3.  Concept and Development

    The delay in the rendering of judicial decisions became enormous problem and different experiments were carried out to overcome this issue. One simple way for early disposal of cases was to try for a settlement at the pre-trial stage itself. Plea bargaining is an obvious tool that has been put into use in the process of settling dispute at the pre-trial stage. Initially, the concept was evolved and adopted by United States. In Brady v.United States5, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of plea bargaining. The Court opined that it is not unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to an accused that in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State.

     

    Plea bargaining is of three types: (i) Charge Bargaining; (ii) Sentence Bargaining; and (iii) Fact Bargaining. Plea bargaining entails pre-trial negotiation between the accused and prosecutor, where the accused has the option of admitting guilt and settling for a lesser punishment is sentence bargaining. Negotiating for the dropping of some charges, in case of multiple charge or settling for a less grave charge than one put of guilt is called charge bargaining. The third negotiation which involves an admissions to certain facts in return for an agreement not to introduce certain other facts is fact bargaining.

    In America, plea bargaining has been a success resulting into ninety-five percent of conviction in the federal level courts. The most important reasons are that6:

    (1)  Courts and Judges  tend to favour prosecutors as many Judges were former prosecutors and were appointed as Judges because of that background, with the hope and expectation that they will continue to support ‘law and order’ as seen from a prosecutor’s point of view;

    (2)  The high cost for litigation (high fee of defense lawyer and high court fee and other expenses) which many the accused does not have especially when the accused assets are attached in advance. Cost of defense is not affordable by ninety-eight percent of the accused;

    (3)  The accused must be brought to trial within six months of a not guilty plea7. If the trial is not held within six months, the case is dismissed. In most jurisdictions, they do not have enough Judges, prosecutors or court rooms to try criminal cases before a jury within six months. By plea bargaining, a prosecutor can reduce the number of cases set for trial so that cases do not get dismissed; and

    (4)  Plea bargaining acts as a pressure on the accused to plead guilty. The prosecutor uses the threat of much greater punishment resulting from trial if the accused does not accept the prosecutor’s offer of a lesser sentence.

     

    4.  Approach  of  Indian  Judiciary

    The Apex Court has examined the concept of plea bargaining and has taken a very strict approach in the following cases: Madanlal Ram Chandra Daga v. State of Maharahtra8; Murlidhar Mehgaraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra9; Kasmbhi Abdual Rehmabhai Sheik v. State of Gujarath10; Thippaswamy v.State of Karnataka11; and State of U. P. v.Chandrika12.  A crime is essentially a wrong against the society and the State. Therefore, any compromise between the accused person and the individual victim of the crime, or for that matter the State should not absolve the accused from criminal liability. It is this line of approach Indian judiciary has adopted. Indian legal system did not recognize the concept of plea bargaining and considered it as illegal and unconstitutional.

    The first case in which concept of plea bargaining was considered was Madanlal Ramachander Daga v. State of Maharashtra13, in which the Apex Court observed14:

    “In our opinion, it is very wrong for a court to enter into a bargain of this character. Offences should be tried and punished according to the guilt of the accused. If the court thinks that leniency can be shown on the facts of the case it may impose a lighter sentence. But the court should never be a party to bargain by which money is recovered for the complainant through their agency. We do not approve of the action adopted by the High Court...”

    In Murlidhar Megh Raj Loys v. State of Maharashtra15, again question of plea bargaining was considered and disapproved in the following words16:

    “To begin with are free to, we confess to a hunch that the appellants had hastened with their plea of guilt hopefully, induced by an informal, tripartite understanding of light sentence in lieu of nolo contendere stance. Many economic offenders resort to practices the American call ‘plea bargaining’, ‘plea negotiation’, ‘trading out’ and ‘compromise in criminal cases’ and the trial magistrate drowned by a docket burden nods assent to the subrosa ante-room settlement. The businessmen culprit, confronted by a sure prospect of agency and ignominy of tendency of a prison cell, ‘trades out’ of the situation, the bargain begin a plea of guilt, coupled with a promise of ‘no jail’… It is idle to speculate on the virtue of negotiated settlements of criminal cases, as obtains in the United States but in our jurisdiction, especially in the area of dangerous economic crimes and food offences this practice intrudes on society’s interest by opposing society’s decision expressed through pre-determined legislative fixation of minimum sentences and by subtly subverting the mandate of the law. The jurist across the Atlantic partly condemn the bad odour of purchased pleas of guilt and partly justified it philosophically as a sentences concession to a defendant who that has, by his plea ‘aided in ensuring the prompt and certain application of correctional measures to him’...”

    The Apex Court in cases Ganeshmal Jasraj v. Government of Gujarat and Another17 and Thippeswamy v. State of Karnataka18 set aside the order passed by the High Court’s enhancing the sentence in a food adulteration case and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for trial in accordance with law, as the conviction and sentence were based on admission of guilt as a consequence of plea bargaining. The Apex Court observed that it would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution to induce an accused to plead guilty under an assurance that he would be treated lightly and then in appeal or revision the sentence is enhanced. Such a procedure would be clearly unfair, unjust and unreasonable in view of the dimensions unfolded in Maneka Gandhi vUnion of India19.

    In Kasambhai Abdul Rehmanbhai Sheikh v. State of Gujarat20 and Kochhta Patel Shantilal Koderlal v. State of Gujarat21 the Apex Court ruled that the practice of plea bargaining in unconstitutional, illegal and would tend to encourage corruption, collusion and pollute the justice system because it might induce an innocent accused to plead guilty and to suffer a lighter and inconsequential punishment instead of going through a long and arduous criminal trial which is not only expensive and time consuming but also uncertain and unpredictable in its result. The Judge may also be deflected from the path of justice and may convict the innocent by accepting the plea of guilt or let off a guilty accused with a lighter sentence. The process of plea bargaining has squarely been criticized upon by the Apex Court in the following words22:

    “It is obvious that such convictions based on the plea of guilty entered by the appellant as result of plea bargaining cannot be sustained. It is to our mind contrary to public policy to allow a conviction to be recorded against an accused by including him to confess to a plea of guilty on an allurement being held out to him that if he enters a plea of guilt he will be let off every lightly. Such a procedure would be clearly unreasonable, unfair and unjust and would be violative of this new activist dimension of Article 21 of the Constitution unfolded inManekaGandhi’s case. It would have the effect of polluting the pure fount of justice, because it might induce an innocent accused to plead guilty to suffer a light and inconsequential punishment rather than go through a long and arduous criminal trial”.

    In Kripal Singh v. State of Haryana23 a case involving offences under Sections 392 and 397 I.P.C. where minimum punishment of seven years of rigorous imprisonment by the law has been provided, it was held by the Apex Court that concept  of plea bargaining cannot be adopted to circumvent the minimum punishment of seven years prescribed by the law. Neither the High Court nor the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to bypass the minimum limit of sentence prescribed by law on the pretext that a plea bargaining was clinched by the accused on the assumption that Court would award him punishment even less than minimum prescribed by law and let him off lightly. This procedure was held to be unfair, unjust and unreasonable and hence violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Similar observations were made by the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Nasruddin24 a case under section 304 I.P.C. where plea bargaining on the question of sentence was held to be not permissible under the law.

    The same approach was taken in State of U.P. v. Chandrika25 and has reiterated the law relating to plea bargaining. It opined that it is now a settled law, that concept of plea bargaining is not recognized and is against public policy under Indian criminal justice system. Except compounding of offences under Section 320 of Cr. P. C., the concept of negotiated settlement in criminal cases is not permissible. Mere admission of the guilt should not be a ground for reduction of sentence. The accused cannot bargain with the court that since he is pleading guilty so consequently his sentence be reduced.

    From the above cases it could be considered that: (i) court should not be a party to plea bargaining; (ii) in economic offences and food adulteration cases plea bargaining should be disapproved; (iii) enhancement of sentences by Appellate or Revisional Court on the basis of plea bargaining is unconstitutional under Article 21 of the Constitution; and (iv) that there should be no plea bargaining in non-compoundable offences. Thus we can see Indian criminal jurisprudence did not recognize concept of plea bargaining and considered it as unconstitutional, illegal, immoral and against public policy.

     

    5.  Recommendation  of  the  Law  Commission

    The criminal jurisprudence of India did recognize the concept of pleading guilty for petty offences, under Section 206(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 208(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but not the concept of plea bargaining. The Law Commission of India in its 142nd and 154th Reports26 having considered the concept of plea bargaining as is being practiced in other countries, recommended that the scheme for concessional treatment to offenders who plead guilty on their own volition in lieu of promise to reduce the charge, to drop some of the charges or getting lesser punishment be statutory. Justice Malimath Committee on Criminal Justice Reforms, 200327 also recommended the implementation of the reports of the Law Commission of India with regard to settlement of cases without trial.

    The Law Commission in its 142nd report stated that it is desirable to infuse life into reformative provisions embodied in Section 360 Cr. P. C. and the Probation of Offenders Act, which according to the Law Commission remained unutilized. Law Commission noted the advantages of plea bargaining which ensures speedy trial with benefits such as (i) speedy trial; (ii) end of uncertainty; (iii) saving of cost of litigation; and (iv) relieving of the anxiety. The Law Commission also noted that it would enable the accused to start a fresh life after undergoing a lesser sentence. Law Commission also observed that plea bargaining would be a viable alternative to be explored to deal with huge arrears of criminal cases. On the recommendation of the Malimath Committee, a new Chapter XXI-A on Plea Bargaining had been inserted in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

     

    6.  Salient Features of the Concept

    The salient features of Plea Bargaining under Chapter XXI-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 inter alia includes:

             (1)    The plea bargaining is applicable only in respect of those offences for which punishment of imprisonment is up to a period of seven years28;

             (2)    It does not apply where such offences affect the socio-economic condition of the country and has been committed against a women or a child below the age of fourteen years29;

             (3)    The application for plea bargaining should be filed by the accused voluntarily30;

             (4)    Habitual offenders are not entitled for the benefit of plea bargaining31;

             (5)    A person accused of an offence may file an application for plea bargaining in the court in which such offences is pending for trial32;

             (6)    After receiving the above application, the court shall issue notice to the public prosecutor or the complainant of the case, as the case may be, and the accused to appear on the date fixed for the case33;

             (7)    The complainant and the accused are given time to work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case, which may include giving to the victim by the accused, compensation and other expenses incurred during the case34;

             (8)    Guidelines for mutually satisfactory disposition with the basic objective that it is completed voluntarily by the parties participating in the process35;

             (9)    Where a satisfactory disposition of the case has been worked out, the Court shall dispose by awarding compensation to the victim in accordance with the disposition and it may release the accused on probation or provide the benefit any law in force36;

             (10)  Where minimum punishment has been provided under the law for the offence committed by the accused, sentence the accused to half of such minimum punishment37;

             (11)         If the offence is not covered under the above two category, the  court may sentence to one-fourth of the punishment provided or extendable for such offences38;

             (12)  The statement or facts stated by an accused in an application for plea bargaining shall not be used for any other purpose other than for plea bargaining39;

             (13)  Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment40; and

             (14)  The judgment delivered by the Court in the case of plea bargaining shall be final and no appeal shall lie in any court against such judgment41.

     

    7.   Constitutionality

    Our Constitution guarantees certain fundamental trial rights of an accused within the meaning of Articles 14, 19, 20 and 21. Plea bargaining is no more than offering of incentive to have these trial rights. Now the question as to what is waiver or doctrine of waiver.

    The doctrine of waiver has no application to the provision of law enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. It is not open to an accused person to waive or give up his constitutional right and get convicted42. Waiver of fundamental right as interpreted by the Apex Court is not possible43. The Apex Court in Muthiah and others v. Commissioner of  Income Tax,  Madras and others44 held that it is not open to a citizen to waive any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Indian Constitution. It has further held that these rights have been part in the Constitution not merely for the benefit of individual but as a matter of public policy for the benefit of the general public. It is an obligation imposed upon the State by the Constitution.

    It is the duty of the court to protect their rights against themselves. The views of the Apex Court that the doctrine of waiver, as formulated by some American Judges in interpreting the American Constitution cannot be applied in interpreting the Indian Constitution. Since, waiver of fundamental rights as interpreted by our Apex Court is not possible.

    Right against self incrimination has recommended itself to be one of the cardinal principles of administration of criminal justice system to rise to constitutional status of which Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution says “No person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”. Thus, plea bargaining makes serious intrusion into this constitutional value for the accused compelled to self-incrimination or plead guilty by the concession held out the form of either lesser charge or reduced sentences. In such a way it can be stated that his act is not voluntary or least voluntary. Mercy should be given but not be exchanged.

    Right  to  Fair  Procedure

    The Apex Court has forcefully asserted in Karta Singh v. State of Punjab45 that the procedure contemplated under Article 21 should be ‘right, just and fair’. In order that the procedure is ‘right, just and fair’ it must conform to natural justice. The plea bargaining only goes to the level of ‘mutually satisfactory disposition’ without any guiding principles to determine what this mutually satisfactory disposition is? Under Section 265D, the presiding officer of the Court has the discretion to report a mutually satisfactory disposition between two parties who enter into plea bargaining. While the judicial process of adjudication ensures that both parties are kept at an equal pedestal as far as possible. In plea bargaining provision there is no check to see whether the mutually satisfactory disposition is indeed voluntary or coerced.

    Principle of plea bargaining imply that the accused ‘voluntarily’ accept his guilt46. There are no guidelines what so ever to check whether the disposition has truly achieved the object it sought to achieve, or whether the disposition has been made according to the whims and will of only party to the bargain. Thus, granting such unfettered and uncontrolled power to the presiding officer without any guidelines throws again the gates for these procedures to be abused by an evil eye and unequal hand47. The widening definition of Article 21 encompasses the principles of natural justice. Principles of natural justice are these rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights.

     

    Right  to  Appeal

    Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice48. The decision making process should be fair, transparent and open49. Plea bargaining takes away from the accused his right to appeal as guaranteed by the Criminal Procedure Code. The only alternative left with the accused, in case he is dissatisfied with the result of the bargaining or imposed sentence is to file Writ Petition.

     

    Right  to  Equality

    Plea Bargaining fails on the touchstone of equality before law and equal protection of law as it does not satisfy the dual test. It was held by the Apex Court in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and another50 that: (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons, or things that are grouped together from others left out of group; and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by statute in question.

    The grouping done is unreasonable to the extent that it does not categorically define the offences in which the plea bargaining can be done, since the offences that constitute socio economic offences have to be notified by the Central Government from time to time. Hence, the classification is subject to change from time to time and is not pre-determined. The classification thus, being incomplete, is unreasonable and violative of Article 14.

    It can be seen that if one accused is given concessions of a certain kind and the other equally placed accused is denied those concessions, it is clearly discriminatory and the latter may complain of violation of Article 1451.

     

    Unreasonable  Classification

    Classification of persons who may enter into plea bargaining and those who may not, is dependent on the punishment of the offences. Offences which are punishable with more than seven years of imprisonment cannot be plea bargained. For example, under Section 308 ofthe I.P.C., punishment for attempt to commit culpable homicide is three years. A person who attempts to commit culpable homicide can easily take advantage of the plea bargaining provisions, even though the offence committed is of a high degree of severity. As such we can see that the number of years of punishment may not always be an indicator of the degree of severity of the offence and the object of the segregating ‘high offences’ from ‘petty offences’ is not met by this yardstick.

     

    8.   Provisions  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code

    When a Judge or a magistrate frames a charge, the charge is read and explained to the accused and the accused is asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. If the accused plead guilty the Judge or a magistrate records the plea and can in his discretion commit the accused therein. If the accused refuses to plead, or does not plead, or claims to be tried or is not convicted on his plea of guilty, the Judge or a magistrate fixes a date for examination of witnesses. If on the date of evidence, the accused wants to change his pleas and prefers to admit guilt what can the Judge or magistrate do as per the provisions of the Code.

    In a trial before a Court of Sessions, following three provisions in the Code namely Section228(2), 229 and 230 speak of the plea of guilty. Similar provisions are contained in Section 240(2), 241 and 242 of Cr. P.C. for trial of warrant cases instituted on Police Report by Magistrate. For warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report provisions for the purpose can be read in Section 246(1) to 246(4) of the Code. For trial of summons cases relevant provisions can be found in Sections 251, 252, 253(2) and 254 of the Code. Procedure for summary trial as mandated in Section 262 of the Code. Lastly, Section 313 of the Code also provides an opportunity to the accused to admit his guilt.

    The mandate of Section 4 of the Code is clear that trial shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code. A subsequent plea of guilt smacks of plea bargaining which still is not permitted by the law. The breach of the provisions of the Code indicating the stage when the plea of guilty to be recorded will “bring about the result that the trial was conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code” resulting in an illegality.  The law laid down52 by the different High Courts in this regard is in consonance with the provisions of the Code and is correct.

    The courts are required by the Code to record the plea of guilty or otherwise in the stages of trial indicated by the specific provisions of the statute and in answer to the questions under Section 313 of the Code. The recording and acting on a plea of guilty in an intermediate stage of the trial will be an illegality within Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh53 amounting to conducting a trial different from the procedure prescribed by the Code. Till the law is altered by the Legislature or by the Apex Court through interpretation it appears to be the law on the question of validity of a subsequent plea of guilt54.

     

    9.   Drawbacks

    (1)  The Amendment Act excluded offences of which punishment of death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years have been done. It also excluded all offences which have been committed against a woman or a child below 14 years or which affect the socio-economic condition of the country from its purview. Such offences constitute the bulk of cases of Indian courts and in such kinds of offences compensation is required to be given to the victims or state agencies against whom the crime is committed.

    (2)  Sections 265(C), (D) and (E) of the Cr.P.C. have been provided minimum but fixed sentence of imprisonment as punishment, there is no reason as to why these offences are being excluded from the purview of the Act.

    (3)  The Act excluded previous convicts from enjoying the benefits of plea bargaining and therefore habitual offenders cannot resort to plea bargaining. These provisions could be struck down as unconstitutional as Section 303 of I.P.C55.

    (4)  When the restrictions for contesting elections for previous convicts are still in force in the Representation of People’s Act of 1955 and restrictions for entering into any Government or other jobs are also apparent in various service codes for the previous convicts and also to get admission for higher studies, it is very unlikely that a young offender or a service holder would even come forwarded for plea bargaining even for petty offences, like that committed unintentionally under the Motor Vehicles Act.

    (5)  Crime affecting socio-economic conditions of the country is also excluded from the provisions of the Act. Socio economic offences encompass as many as nineteen acts starting from the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to most recent Acts like Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 200556. With exclusion of these Acts which added with the offences of I.P.C. etc, during submission of charge sheet after completion of investigation, the very purpose of the Amendment Act in reducing the case load of the court appears to be a distant dream.

    (6)  Proviso to Section 436 Cr.P. C. states that if an accused is unable to furnish bail within a week of his arrest, he is too treated as an indigent person and the court shall discharge him on his executing a bond without any surety.

    (7) No stipulated time frame is provided for completion of the process of plea bargaining and nothing is prescribed under Section 265 (B) 4(a) as to within how much time the mutually satisfactory disposition shall be worked out and compensation as awarded under Section265(E) (a) shall be paid to the victims.

    (8)  If the plea bargaining fails because no mutually satisfactory disposition could be arrived at or if the same become insolvency, then the trial shall commence in which event the entire period spent for plea bargaining goes waste, i.e. the trial of those cases would consume more time than trial without the offer of plea bargaining processing process.

    (9)           Engaging the same court in the plea bargaining process and not  devising any other forum as envisaged under Section 89 of C.P.C. for settlement of civil disputes would  further delay the trial of other cases pending in the same court and not subject to plea bargaining. By involving the court in plea bargaining process, the courts impartially is impugned.

    (10)                Over all conviction rate is as low as 8 to 10 percent and where the procedure of trial is quite lengthy, the accused would not volunteer for plea bargaining when he is not sure that his trial would end in conviction.

    (11)                It may discriminate against offenders who choose to pursue their legal right and contest the case.

    (12)                The concept also suffers with unnecessary involvement of police and the prosecutor, at the stage of satisfactory disposition negotiation. Involving the police in plea bargaining process would invite coercion.

    (13)                The role of prosecutor is very passive in practice and notorious to extract extraneous consideration from the accused to make the case weak.

    (14)                The Apex Court has observed that neither the Trial Court nor the High Court has jurisdiction to bypass the minimum sentence prescribed by the law in the premise that a plea bargaining was adopted by the accused57.

    (15)                Counsel representing the accused is unwilling to advise confession invoking the scheme, because there is every fear if the said advice is given; the accused loses faith in the counsel representing him and will engage another counsel.

    (16)                Country’s social condition do not justify the concept of plea bargaining. Poor will be the ultimate victims of the concept of plea bargaining.

    (17)                Involving the victim in plea bargaining process would invite corruption.

    (18)                The statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr. P. C. by the police; do not give any guarantee that the witnesses would support the prosecution case in the court in trial. A lawyer will always go for a trial than plea bargaining58.

    (19)                Accepting guilt would cast stigma on the accused which would be disadvantageous to his social position.

    (20)                If the plead guilty application of the accused is rejected then the accused would face great hardship to prove himself innocent.

     

    10.  Prospects

    In most cases, the plea bargaining is to avoid the uncertainty of the trial, and minimize the risk of undesirable results for either side. Certain inherent advantage in it inter-alia includes:

    (1)  Plea bargaining is speedier- through plea bargaining, a matter can be resolved in a matter of months, even weeks, while a trial can take years;

    (2)  Plea bargaining saves money- court costs, counsel’s fee and expert fee;

    (3)  Plea bargaining permits more participation- parties including victims may have more chances to tell their side of the story, while working for the mutual satisfactory disposition, than in court and may have more control over the outcome;

    (4)  Plea bargaining is co-operative- the accused with or without his counsel, prosecutor, victim and police officer may work out mutually satisfactory disposition among themselves;

    (5)  Plea bargaining reduces stress- the parties don’t have a trial hanging over their heads for years and it is speedier and saves money.

     

    11.  Recommendation

    Some recommendations for the better and meaningful implementation of the amended provision could be59:

    (1)  A provision may be made in Chapter XII-A of the Code making it mandatory for the Court to inform the accused who appears in connection with trial of an offence, to which Chapter XXI-A applies, that it is open to the accused to take the advantage of plea bargaining. A similar provision to some extent has been provided, obviously in a different context, in Order XXXIIA, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    (2)  The Probation Officers, Welfare Officers of the Jail and the Superintendent of Jails must be made responsible to conduct the programme among the under trial prisoners so that they may get ‘informed knowledge’ to take the benefit of the concept of plea bargaining.

    (3)  Training of Judicial Officers at the National, Regional and State Judicial Academies on the subject is very essential. By training, we could achieve positive change of attitude and concern, to invoke the provision of plea bargaining

    (4)  Training of Prosecutors and Defense lawyers by the Bar Council of India, State Bar Council, National and State Legal Service Authorities in the subject of plea bargaining under the scheme of Continuing Legal Education.

    (5)  Habitual offenders should be given at least one chance to plead guilty.

    (6)  More offences should be brought within the ambit of plea bargaining.

     

    12.  Conclusion

    After the amendment, the concept found acceptance among Judges in India. The High Court of Kerala in In re:122 Prisoner60 issued necessary direction to all Criminal Courts in the State, alerting them to invoke provisions relating to plea bargaining in appropriate cases, especially in cases involving prisoners. A similar view was taken by the High Court of Delhi in Rajinder Kumar Sharma and another v. The State and another61, in which the Court held that criminals who admit their guilt and repent upon, a lenient view should be taken, while awarding punishment. Gujarat High Court also had a similar view in State of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchanji Thakor62.              

    If the concept of plea bargaining is to be adopted in its true spirit, proper care need to be taken to scrutinize whether the ‘mutually satisfactory disposition’ reached between the parties is of voluntary nature and is not coerced. Further, a mere acceptance or admission of guilt should not be ground for reduction of sentence by way of bargaining because there being possibility that such acceptance of guilt is coerced by several dictating circumstances. The Criminal (Amendment Act) of 2005 is half baked cake. It can be made acceptable only by effecting changes. Its constitutionality can be challenged. Experience of the last four years show that the Criminal (Amendment) Act of 2005 incorporating plea bargaining is neither accepted and applied by the legal fraternity nor helpful in reducing the criminal workload.

     

     

    Foot Note:

     

    1.   Criminal Law (Amendment ) Act, 2005.

    2.   Notification No. S. O. 990 (E) dated 3rd July, 2006, Published in Gazette of India, New Delhi.

    3.     Suman Rai, Law Relating to Plea Bargaining, Orient Publishing Company, Allahabad (2007), p. 165.

    4.  K.N.Chandrasekharan Pillai, R.V.Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow. (2001).

    5. 297 U.S. 742(1970).

    6.   Suvendu Kumar Pati, A Plea Against Plea Bargaining, I.B. R.,Vol. XXXIII (2006), pp. 71-72.

    7.   Ibid., p.72. Speedy Trial Act of 1974 applied to cases prosecuted in Federal Courts.

    8.   AIR 1968 SC 1267.         

    9.  AIR 1976 SC 1929.          

    10. AIR 1980 SC 854.

    11. AIR 1983 SC 247.       

     12.  AIR 2000 SC 164.         

    13. Supra n.8.

    14.           Id. at p.1280.

    15. Supra n 9.                              

    16.  Id.at pp. 1933-1934.                        

    17.  AIR 1980 SC 264.

    18. Supra n. 11.                           

    19.  AIR 1978 SC 597.                          

    20.  Supra n. 10

    21.           AIR 1980 SC 854.       

    22.  Id.at pp. 855-856.            

    23. 1999 Crl. L.J. 5031 (SC).                                

    24.  2000 Crl. L.J. 4996(1) (SC).

    25. Supra n 12.

    26. The Law Commission of India, One Hundred and Forty Second Report on Concessional Treatment for Offenders who on their own initiative choose to Plead Guilty without any Bargaining, Government of India (1991) and Law Commission of India, 154th Report on “The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973”, 1996.

    27.           Committee headed by Justice V.S. Malimath, the former Chief Justice of Karnataka and Kerala High Courts.

    28.    Section 265-A(1), Cr. P.C.                                            

    29.  Ibid.

    30.    Section 265-B (2), Cr. P.C.

    31.  Ibid.                                 

    32.    Section 265-B (1), Cr.P.C.                                            

    33.  Section 265-B (3), Cr.P.C.              

    34.    Section 265-B (4), Cr.P.C.                                            

    35.  Section 265-C, Cr.P.C.                   

    36.    Section 265-E(a) and (b), Cr. P.C.                                

    37.  Section 265-E (c), Cr.P.C.

    38. Section 265-E (d), Cr.P.C.

    39.  Section 265-K, Cr.P.C.                                   

    40.  Section 265-I, Cr.P.C.                     

    41  Section 265-G, Cr.P.C.

    42. Behram  Khurshid Pesikaka  v . State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123 at p.146.

    43.    Basheshar Nath  v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan and another,  AIR 1959 SC 149.

    44. AIR 1956 SC 269.                                           

    45. 1994 Crl. L.J. 3139.

    46. Section 265-D Cr.P.C.                     

    47. Ramesh Thapar  v . The State of Madras, 1950 SCR 594; Chitamanrao and another  v . The State of Madhya Pradesh,  AIR 1951 SC 118.

    48.    Police Commissioner, Delhi and another v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, New Delhi, AIR 1997 SC 95.

    49. Dutta Associates Pvt. Ltd. v.  Mercantile Pvt. Ltd., (1997) 1 SCC 53 .

    50..          AIR 1952 SC 75.

    51. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,  AIR 1980 SC 1579.

    52 .  Lalji Ram  v. Corporation of Calcutta,  AIR 1928 Cal. 243; Daveed Chelayan  v . The State,  AIR 1957 T.C. 89 ; Shivanarayan  v . State,  1960 J.L.J. 1015 ; Jayanti Luxman v. State of Gujarat,  1963 (2) Crl.L.J. 86 ; In re, R Kothanadapani,  AIR 1968 Mad. 59; and K.P.Hanumappa v. The State of Mysore,  1972 Crl.L.J. 699.

    53. AIR 1956 SC 116.

    54. Ranjana Dattatray Reddy, New Horizon Opens in Criminal Law: Plea Bargaining,  2007 Crl.L.J. (J) 120 at p.128.

    55 .          Mithu v. State of Punjab,  AIR 1983 SC 473.

    56. Vide Notification No. S.O.1042 (E), dated 11th July, 2006, published in Gazette of India, Extraordinary.

    57. Kirpal Singh v. State of Haryana, 1999 Crl. L.J. 5031(SC).

    58. V.K. Babu Prakash, Plea Bargaining - A Mission That Would Fail, 2007 (3)K.L.T.(J)26.

    59. M.Y. Eqbal, Concept of Plea Bargaining, Nyaya Deep, 9(1) 2008 (Jan), 50 at pp. 58-59.

    60. 2006(4) K.L.T. 597.

    61. Crl.M.C. Nos. 1216-17 of 2006, High Court of Delhi  c.i. Saumya Misra, The Criminal Justice System and Plea Bargaining in India, 2008 Crl. L.J.(J.) 145 at p. 148.

    62.           2005 Crl.L.J. 2957(Guj.).

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  • Conservation of Wetlands : An Overview

    By Achuth Kylas, IX Sem. LLB, Cusat

    22/11/2010
    Conservation  of  Wetlands : An  Overview
     
    (By Achuth Kylas, IX Sem. LL.B., School of Legal Studies, CUSAT) 
     
     
    Introduction
     
     
    “The environment is everything that isn’t me”  - Albert Einstein
     
    This simple sentence by the greatest intellectual mankind has ever known is as close to the truth as possible. Humans as a form of existence are those that have least adapted to their environment but have exploited it the most. They have to understand that they by themselves cannot exist but need the support of their ecosystem and its resources. Right from the food we eat to air we breathe we are provided by the environment. But, it is a matter of great concern that our actions may one day lead to the destruction of our mother Gaya and although it may not happen in a fortnight, we, sure, are hastening the process! Humungous exploitation of our non renewable resources coupled with atrocious modes of pollution is slowly but surely laying waste to our beloved earth.
     
    The term ‘environment’ encompasses all living things occurring naturally on Earth and some regions thereof and hence the wetlands forming part of this environment are exposed to the perils of destruction identical to those faced by other segments of the environment. Wetlands can be defined as, “areas of marsh, fen, peat land or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with the water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six meters”1. They play an important role in maintaining ecological balance, regulate flood flows, provide habitat to aquatic and semi aquatic plants and animals and thus support the biodiversity of the landscape2. Thus understanding the important role of wetlands the International Society in the Ramsar Convention laid down its mission as, “the conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local and national actions and international co-operation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development throughout the world”3. 159 Member States are parties to the convention with a total of 1874 wetlands of international importance with a total surface area of 184,944,789 hectares4. India, along with other countries of the world has and has been trying to protect its wetlands but with mixed results thereby making its efforts seems pale in comparison to those of other member States. 
     
    Wetland   conservation   in   United   Kingdom 
     
    U.K. wetland conservation involves Government departments (at European, national and local level); a number of Government agencies with statutory powers; non-government organizations; the private sector, and individuals with particular vested interests. Among the several organizations working to protect the environment the main one is the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). DEFRA aims at achieving sustainable development through protecting and improving the rural, urban, marine and global environment; conserving and enhancing biodiversity; tackling social exclusion through the promotion of sustainable rural areas; improving enjoyment of the countryside for all; promoting sustainable farming and natural resource management; and  protecting the public interest in relation to environmental impacts and health5.DEFRA also administers grants to farmers and landowners for agro-environment schemes that involve the enhancement of wetlands, woods, moors and other important habitats. At the local level U.K. has a mixture of Borough Councils, County Councils, Metropolitan Authorities, District Councils and Unitary Authorities to protect its interest with regard to the environment related issues. Furthermore, the statutory organizations are supplemented by the efforts of non-governmental organizations like The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds6, the Windflow and Wetlands Trust7 and Wetland Vision8 .  It is the unanimous working of these bodies that has allowed U.K. to be successful in protecting its wetlands and thereby earning a total of 168 Ramsar recognized sites9. 
     
    Wetlands  in  India
     
    India is a land blessed with a multitude of ecologies. It varies from the barren sands of Rajasthan to the lush green forests of Wayanad; from the reefs of Andaman to the hilltops of Shimla. The protection of ecological treasure has been undertaken by all the three wings of our State. The Indian judiciary has played an important role in understanding the laws governing the field and applying these in accordance with their respective objectives. The judiciary has boldly upheld that the right to a clean environment exists as a basic Human Right10. The judiciary, declaring the degradation of our environment as a direct violation of Right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, held in T.Damodar Rao v. Special Officer, Muncipal Corporation of Hyderabad11 that, “the slow poisoning by the polluted atmosphere caused by environment pollution and spoliation should be regarded as a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution”12. The decision, supplemented by other cases such as Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar13, Hinchlal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi14 have fortified the judiciary’s stand in regard to the importance of the environment in our society. The Court has on more than one occasion given pre dominant consideration to the welfare of our environment over other statutory rights15.The Indian Judiciary keeping in mind the interest of the masses has taken active participation in the adoption and application of famed principles of law governing this field including the polluter pays principle16, the precautionary principle17, the public trust doctrine18 and the principle of sustainable development19  Intellectual Forum Tirupathi v. State of A.P .( A.I.R. 2002 A.P. 256);  Susheela  v.  State of T.N . (AIR 2006  SC2892);  Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.  Bombay Environment Action Group  (AIR 2006 SC 1499) , hereby striving to keep our environment in pristine condition. The Judiciary also has developed institutional innovations in justice administration through the concepts of continuing mandamus and Green Bench. 
     
    India being an equatorial country is blessed with abundant water resources compared to many other nations of the world and hence it has a number of wetlands. The Indian Government has registered 6820 inland wetlands in India and 25 Ramsar sites have also been recognized in India21. Protection of wetlands is done on the basis of a classification system generally dividing wetland into three classes namely inland wetlands, coastal wetlands and manmade wetlands22. Wetlands inter alia have their importance in matters such as maintaining ecological control, replenishing ground water23 and are subjected to ruin by agricultural conversion, direct deforestation, hydraulic alteration and destruction in the name of development24.
     
    India at present has wetlands of an area spread over 58.3 hectares25. Such a vast resource is to be protected through all means. The very fact that countries like U.K., Canada, Denmark and Italy26 U.K.-168, Canada-37, Denmark-38, Italy-51,  http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=1-36-123^23808_4000_0; viewed on : 5.12.2009  have  much more number of recognized Ramsar sites show that the steps taken to protect and conserve the wetlands in India are inadequate and inefficient in consideration to the efforts taken by countries across the globe. This shows that the Indian Legal System has been ineffective in protecting the wetlands of the Country. Even though we come across numerous cases while evaluating the judiciary’s history where primary consideration has been given to the protection of wetlands such as decisions like People’s United for Better Living in Calcutta v. State of W.B27., Consumer Action Group v. Union of India28, T.N. Godhavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India29, and M.C. Mehta v. State of Orissa30 and many more. Still we encounter some judicial trend where under the guise of sustainable development destruction of our wetlands has been permitted31. A laudable effort with regard to the protection of wetlands was initiated by the Kerala Legislature through the enactment of The Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land And Wetland Act, 2008, wherein provisions for protection of the wetlands and paddy fields have been separately but adequately provided. Special importance has been attached to the protection of paddy fields making them non convertible32. The formations of various committees, empowered with adequate authority, are solid steps towards attaining the objective of protection and conservation of wetlands. But all in all it can be said that India, a nation with abundance of wetlands is not using its resources to the maximum for protecting the wetlands within its boundaries.
     
    Conclusion
     
    “Hurt not the earth, neither the sea, nor the trees”- Bible, Revelation 7:3
     
    Forewarned we are and yet we choose to ignore it. As all other eco-systems are getting compromised for economic benefits in one way or other, the wetlands of the world also face a similar fate. It is noteworthy that even a small country like U.K. could designate 168 wetlands as Ramsar sites, India being a mega-diversity country, so far managed to delineate a mere 25 sites till date. The Government of India has identified  60,000 inland wetlands in the country spread over seven million hectares facing a grave threat from real-estate promoters and were also being used as dumping yards for municipal and industrial waste33. There is obviously much ground to be covered in our conservation efforts of wetlands.  Since wetlands are a common property resource, it is an uphill task to protect or conserve it. Enforceable law, a watchful Judiciary and last but not the least a vigilant and informed citizenry are the most essential prerequisites for the conservation of our wetlands.
     
     
    FOOTNOTES
     
    1. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterflow Habitat (Ramsar Convention) 1971, Article (1) (1).
     
    2. Nanadakumar K., “Wetland Conservation in India: Need for effective legal framework”,  http://www.nlsenlaw.org/environmental-protection/articles/wetland-conservation-in-India-need-for-effective-legal-framework/ ’; viewed on : 6.12.2009.
     
    3.  http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=140000; viewed on 5.12.2009.
     
    4. http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=1-36-123^23808_4000_0; viewed on : 5.12.2009.
     
    5 . www.defra.gov.uk.; viewed on : 10.12.2009.
     
    6. The RSPB manages a considerable area of wetland as bird reserves. It delivers its conservation work through direct action and through working with local authorities, landowners and other conservation groups to protect, improve, expand and reinstate bird habitats.;  http://www.rspb.org.uk/ourwork/policy/water/index.asp ; viewed on: 10.12.2009. 
     
    7. WWT is the UK ’s largest international wetland conservation charity. It manages around 2000 hectares of wetland bird reserves which include 6 Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), 5 Special Protection Areas (SPA) and 5 Ramsar sites.;  http://www.wwt.org.uk/; viewed on: 10.12.2009.
     
    8. The Wetland Vision is a partnership between the RSPB, the Wildlife Trusts, English Heritage, the Environment Agency and Natural England. The Wetland Vision sets out where new wetlands could be created and current wetlands restored over the next 50 years;  http://www.wetlandvision.org.uk ;   viewed on: 10.12.2009.
     
    9. http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=1-36-123^23808_4000_0; viewed on : 5.12.2009.
     
    10.  V. Lakshmipathy v.  State of Karnataka - AIR 1992 Kar.57.
     
    11. AIR 1987 - A.P.171.
     
    12. Id, p181.
     
    13. AIR 1991 SC 420: wherein it was held that “right to live include the right to enjoyment of pollution free water and air for fulfillment of life”.
     
    14. (2001) 6 SCC 436: “preservation of material resources of the community such as forests, tanks, ponds, hillocks, is needed to maintain ecological balance so that people would enjoy a quality of life which is the essence of right guaranteed under Article 21”.
     
    15. M.P. Rambabu  v. Divisional Forest Officer, AIR 2003 A.P. 256, “under Article 21 of the Constitution, the right to live a decent life, a good environment and maintenance of ecology must be held to have primacy over statutory right to hold and enjoy property”; also see  M.C. Mehta  v.  KamalNath, AIR 2000 SC 1997;  Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board  v.  C. Kenchappa, AIR  2006 SC 2038.
     
    16. M.C. Mehta v.  Union Of India , A.I.R. 1986 SC 1086;  Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action  v.  Union of  India, AIR 1996 SC1446 ;  M.C. Mehta  v.  Kamalnath  (1997) 1 SCC 388,  Deepak Niterge Limited  v.  State of Gujarat  (2004) 6 SCC 402.
     
    17. Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India ,  AIR 1996 SC 1446;  Narmada Bachao
      Andolan  v.  Union Of India,  AIR 2000 SC 3751; A.P. Pollution Control Board  v.  M.V. Nayadu, AIR 1999 SC 812.
     
    18. M.C. Mehta  v.  Kamalnath (1997) 1 SCC 388;  M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v.Radey Shyam Sabu, 
    AIR 1999 SC 2468;  M.P. Rambabu v. District Forest Officer, AIR 2002 A.P.256.
     
    19. Intellectual Forum Tirupathi v. State of A.P., AIR 2002 A.P. 256; Susheela v. State of T.N., AIR 2006  SC2892; Bombay Dyeing & manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environment Action Group, AIR 2006 SC 1499
     
    20. www.wetlandsofindia.org ;  viewed on : 12.12.2009.
     
    21. http://www.wetlandsofindia.org/wetlands/intram.jsp, viewed on: 12.12.2009,  Name Area (km²) :  Ashtamudi Wetland Kerala  (19.8.02) 614;  Bhitarkanika Mangroves Orissa (19.8.02) 650 ;  Bhoj Wetland Madhya Pradesh (19.8.2) 32; Chandertal Wetland ,  Himachal Pradesh (8.11.5) .49; Chilika Lake, Orissa  (1.10/81) 1165; Deepor Beel , Assam  (19.8.02) 40 ;  East Calcutta Wetlands, West Bengal  (19.8.02) 125; Harike Lake , Punjab (23.3.90) 41; Hokera Wetland ,  Jammu and Kashmir (8.11.05) 13.75;  Kanjli , Punjab (22.1.2) 1.83; Keoladeo National Park , Rajasthan (1.10/81) 28.73 ;  Kolleru Lake Andhra Pradesh (19.8.02) 901; Loktak Lake, Manipur (23.3/90) 266; Point Calimere Wildlife and Bird Sanctuary, Tamil Nadu  (19.8.02) 385; Pong Dam Lake, Himachal Pradesh (19.8.2) 156.62; Renuka Wetland ,  Himachal Pradesh (8/11.05) .2; Ropar , Punjab (22.1/.2) 13.65; Rudrasagar Lake, Tripura.
     
    22. http://www.wetlandsofindia.org/nwia.html, viewed on :15.12.2009, 0100 Inland Wetlands: 0101 Lakes 0102 Ox-Bow Lakes/ Cut-Off Meanders 0103 Alpine /Moraine dammed lakes 0104  Riverine Marshes/swamps 0105 Waterlogged 0106   River/stream ; 0200 Coastal Wetlands:  0201 Lagoons 0202  Creeks 0203 Sand/Beach and rocky beach 0204  Intertidal Mud/sand/ Salt flats 0205 Salt Marsh 0206   Mangroves 0207 Coral Reefs; 0300 Man-made Wetlands : 0301 Reservoirs 030  Barrages 0303 Tanks/Ponds 0304   Salt pans 0305 Waterlogged 2 Supra n.2
     
    23. S.N. Prasad, T.V. Ramachandran, N.Ahalya, T. Sengupta, Alok Kumar, A.K. Tiwari, V.S. Vijayan & Lalitha Vijayan, “Conservation of Wetlands of India – a review”, Tropical Ecology 43(1): 173-186, 2002; http://www.tropecol.com/pdf/open/PDF_43_1/43113.pdf ; viewed on : 11.12.2009
     
    24. Supra n.2
     
    25. U.K.-168, Canada-37, Denmark-38, Italy-51, http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp= 1-36-123^23808_4000_0__; viewed on : 5/12/2009
     
    26. AIR 1993 Cal. 215.
     
    27.  1994 MLJ 481.
     
    28.  (2006) 6 SCC 47.
     
    29.  A.I.R. 1992 Ori. 225.
     
    30.  EIH Ltd v. State of Rajasthan (A.I.R. 2001 Raj.236).
     
    31.  The Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land And Wetland Act, 2008, S.3(1).
     
    32. The Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land And Wetland Act, 2008, S.3(1),
     
    33. The Hindu, Monday, Nov 23, 2009, Jairam Ramesh, Union Minister of State for Environment and Forests (Independent charge). 
     
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