By E. Krishna Das, Advocate, Palakkad
"Slow Down, India !! "
(By E. Krishna Das, Advocate, Palakkad)
“WE are too wound up, at work and home. The state of the nation adds to the stress. Take it easy and have a healthy 2012!! Today, the working Indian is a bit too keyed up. There is too much pressure in our living and working environment. School kids are pressurized to perform, college students are on a suicide spree, working adults are working their butts off. The slow down movement is essential for India as we emerge as the World’s Capital for diabetes and hypertension, and we are strong contenders to be cholesterol capital as well. As lifestyle diseases of every kind hit us and as working India experiences it all first-hand, this is an idea whose time has come!!” This was the headline and the gist of an article which appeared in a leading business newspaper about two weeks back which prompted me to pen a few thoughts on the condition of the lower courts in Kerala.
The person who wrote the above article may have never visited the courts in Kerala because if he had done so, he would have written this more than a few decades ago!! If there is one department in this entire nation, which is burning the midnight oil, doing its duty undeterred, for the development of the society that is none other than the judiciary, which includes the officers, staff, and the lawyers too. 2011 showed many a sign that the lower judiciary is craving for justice. A Principal District Judge chose to end his life! A Magistrate had a paralytic stroke!! And numerous lawyers passed away well before their prime!! The reasons are obvious! There is always a big hue and cry over the huge backlog of cases. It is easy to give targets, to find fault for not achieving targets, to issue memos to officers and staff for some small mistakes done. But has anyone tried to study the root cause of the problems being faced by the lower courts?
The developed countries have an average of 70 courts for a million people and we have an abysmal 6!! The infrastructure is so poor in lower courts that a modem dairy farm would look better. Buildings of the pre-independence era, furniture and fans of the last century, old creaking wooden stands waiting to give away under the weight of the case bundles and dust accumulated over the years! There can be nothing worse in the 21st century. And it is in such hells that hundreds flock daily for justice!!
The Civil and Criminal Rules of Practice in Kerala, state that the courts shall be open on all working days from 10.30 a.m. to 5 p.m. and shall ordinarily sit from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. with an interval not exceeding one hour. A huge majority of the lower courts start functioning at 11 and the officers are in their chamber already by 9.30 am and don’t leave or rather can’t leave even by 5.30 p.m. There are courts which even sit upto 6 pm and even much, later and obviously the office staff can leave only after the officer leaves. Does anybody care for such staff and their family? There may be no other Government Department in this country other than the armed forces which starts work before time and ends the day after the lights are on. And this does not happen once in a blue moon. It happens every day, every month, every year, continuously, and the clock never stops for this department. Judicial officers, lawyers, court staff, advocate clerks, and the list goes on! Judicial Officers were given lap tops and everyone applauded the move. But now what happens is that the officer goes home and types the judgments himself in order to meet the tough targets. There are officers who dictate in the night and record it in a tape recorder and the typist would type the judgment the next morning!! Hats off to the family members!! And the biggest question is where does all this lead to? Will we be able to clean up the stables? Will we be able to bring down the back log to such a number wherein we can leisurely dispose off cases? Never ever!! The population is ever increasing. Different types of legislation are coming up and legal literacy is at its ever high. One thing is absolutely sure. We can never ever dispose off all cases and sit back as this is a never ending process. And the biggest toll is the health of all concerned. It is high time that the Government and the High Court of Kerala take serious note of the pitiable situation in the lower courts. It is high time that we take a second look at the system. Otherwise we may have many more unfortunate incidents and the next one may be one of us.
An option that may be looked into is to increase the sitting hours by half an hour daily and make Saturday a non-sitting day. The judicial officers, staff and the lawyers can work in their chambers. Thus the judicial officers would have ample time to read, prepare the judgments and do their chamber work calmly and leisurely. The lawyers would have ample time to prepare for their cases. This would give the much needed breathing space for all. If the High Court thought it fit to have a holiday on Saturday why this facility should not be extended to the lower courts too?
Let’s make 2012 a better place to live in and try to make our work enjoyable without the tensions and charged atmosphere in the court rooms. Justice hurried is said to be justice buried. Let’s take it day by day in a saner manner. Let us live life fully as human beings and not machines where in we cut, copy and paste whatever we need. Let us do away with targets, with marks and with memos! Let’s try to give full justice to everyone who approaches this temple and not capsule justice. The sky is not going to fall. We have to learn to go slow !! Go Slow India !! You have nothing to lose !
By D.B. Binu. Advocate, General Secretary, Human Rights Defence Forum, Ernakulam
Major Impediments before a Citizen Seeking Information under
Right to Information Act with Specific Reference to Kerala Experience
(By Advocate D.B. Binu, General Secretary, Human Rights Defence Forum,
Kerala R.T.I. Federation)
Right to Information Act is a revolutionary enactment empowering a citizen to audit the performance of the public authorities in a democratic polity and evaluate the success and failure of the Government returned to power through ballot. It is an enactment that put strings on the bureaucrats and a feeler to them that they are not masters but servants of the public. The Act can attain its destined object only by removing the hurdles laid in the procedure prescribed for obtaining information.
The Act recognizes the right of a citizen to seek information from any public authority without stating the purpose for seeking particular information. By a legal fiction, the presumption is that every information sought from public authorities is essentially in public interest. That is why under Section 6(2) of the Right to Information Act it is declared that an applicant “shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information”.
Section 8 of the Act deals with the exemption from disclosure of informations which include personal informations of a public servant that amounts to unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. The State Public Information Officers, the Appellate Authorities and even the State Information Commissions, when entertain an application for personal information touching matters of a public servant, mechanically issues notice under section 11 of the Act on the ground that the information sought are of third parties. This is totally unacceptable in as much they have a duty before issuing such notice to satisfy whether information sought for has any relationship to the public activity or public interest of the public servant. If on examination of the request in that perspective, only if it is found that the information sought for has nothing to do with his activity as public servant or public interest, and that the information sought, on the contrary will amount to invasion of the privacy of the individual, then alone the notice under section 11 can be justified. Further on receiving a notice under section 11, the public servant concerned has to satisfy the Public Information Officer to deny the information that the information sought is not only has no bearing with his public activity as public servant or public interest, but also, it is an invasion to his privacy. Even thereafter, it is still open to the State Public Information Officer to direct discloser, if he considers the disclosure of information is warranted in public interest. That is to say, even if it is information that invades the privacy of the public servant, the same has no immunity from disclosure when it is in public interest. That is to say the Act has upheld the supremacy of disclosure of all informations in public interest. Unfortunately, the trend among the State Information Officers, Appellate Authorities and even State Commissions is to deny information on the ground of third party information or want of his consent. The question of consent of the public servant in fact does not arise. What matter is the public interest.
The other aspect of hurdle sought to be placed before the State Public Information Officers and other authorities under the Act is to plead the status of a constitutional functionary. Institutions such as Judiciary, Legislative Assembly, and Public Service Commissions are seen claiming constitutional protection from the application of the Right to Information Act. This plea of constitutional protection is nothing but to deny the right of a constitutional entity that has concern to protect the State binding to the Constitutional goals. A citizen is a Constitutional entity and have all right to be governed by Constitutional means to achieve its goal. If these institution’s claim for constitutional protection is upheld, it will result in a conflict between two constitutional entities. It is perhaps to avoid such conflict the Act refused to concede any such right to Constitutional bodies and used the word Public authorities to encompass all authorities whether constituted under any statute or by Constitution itself. Admittedly all are Public Authorities and hence accountable to the people. It is shame on those who plead Constitutional protection without understanding this simple principle. How is our nation safe in the hands of those who refuses to account their function to its own people?
The Kerala Public Service Commission has been resisting the orders of the State Information Commission and succeeded in getting Stay Orders from the High Court. Their plea is that they are Constitutional body and cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the State Information Commission. Recently they even passed a resolution directing the officers of the PSC not to appear before the Commission. This confrontation stand is an act challenging the right to the people to know and be informed about the performance of various bodies that are being vested with many constitutional functions. An application for obtaining a copy of the resolution has been moved and it is proposed to challenge this posture of the PSC in High Court.
Another experience presently being confronted is with the PIO of the Kerala Legislative Assembly. An application was moved for getting the transcription and vedio tape of the speech made by MLA Sri. T.M.Jacob in the Assembly while addressing the non confidence motion moved against the ministry headed by the then Chief Minister Sri .Oommen Chandy. The application was filed on behalf of the Human Right Defence Forum.PIO furnished the transcription of the speech but refused to give the vedio tape.Matter was taken up in appeal. The Appellate Authority confirmed the order. In second appeal before the Commission,the Commission ordered to give copy stating that the plea of the legislative privilege is without any bona fides as the PIO has already furnished the transcription and too when the proceedings of the Parliament and Assemblies are allowed to be telecasted alive. The direction, instead of being complied , was referred to the Speaker of the Assembly by the PIO and the PIO refused compliance of the order stating that the Speaker has referred the matter to the Privilege and Ethics Committee of the Assembly. This stand of the PIO is an act questioning the very authority of the Commission and also the right of the public to know and to have the information. The case was therefore taken before the State Information Commission in a petition for execution of the order. The Commission has ordered that the PIO should appear and show cause as to why action should not be taken under section 20 of the Act.
The Competent authorities vested with powers to make rules for implementation of the Act has been successful to put as many hurdles as possible to protect their institutions from the agony of disclosing informations honorably. The rules framed by the High Court of Kerala is one of such example. Rule 12 and 13 of the Kerala High Court (Right to Information) Rules, 2006 reads thus:
“12. No application for information or document relating to any judicial proceedings hsall be entertained under these rules.”
“13. No application for information or document relating to a policy matter under consideration shall be entertained.”
The above two provisions in the rule are directly in conflict to the provisions of the Right to Information Act. Section 22 of the Act reads thus:
“22. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act 1923, and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.”
As per Section 22 of the Right to Information Act the provisions of R.T.I.Act will have effect notwithstanding anything in consistent therewith in any other law for the time being in the force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.
In the circumstance, the provisions of the Kerala High Court Rules is no impediment to make application for information or document relating to judicial proceedings. This rule therefore is ultra vires of the Act.
Further under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, Section 4 (1) (c) all Public Authorities are required to publish all relevant facts while formulating important policies or announcing the decisions which affect public. This being the mandate of the Act the High Court cannot make a rule denying “information or document relating to a policy matter under consideration”. In fact, all relevant facts while formulating important policies are matters to be published or made available on request. The Rule 13 of the Kerala High Court (Right to Information) Rules 2006 is therefore ultra vires of the Act.
Further the Rule 16(f) of the Kerala High Court (Right to Information) Rules 2006 mandate payment of Rs. 50/- for preferring Appeal. In fact, the Act does not contemplate any fee at the appellate stage and/or at the complaint or second appeal stage before the State Commissions. In fact, the rule making power under the Act does not authorize the competent authority to prescribe fee for entertaining Appeal under section 19 of the Act. It only empower to lay down the procedure to be adopted in deciding the appeals. The rule prescribing Rs. 50/- as fee to entertain appeal is therefore unauthorized by the Act.
It is now a herculean task for a citizen seeking information from various public authorities to make the prescribed fee as no uniformity is maintained by these public authorities in the matter of collecting fees. It is necessary to allot a head separately to each public authorities for making payment of fees which should be allowed to be drawn by the designated State Information Officers on production of a copy of the receipt indicating payment of the required fee and cost for supplying information under the said head. This would enable each State Public Information Officer to draw the money for meeting the expenditure at the local level from the fund remitted by the applicant without waiting for sanction orders in the matter. The simplification of the procedure will go a long way in minimizing the difficulties now faced by the State Public Information Officers of various public authorities who often complains paucity of fund to meet the cost of the information. Even budgetary allocation can be a better solution to the present problem.
Under Section 24 of the Right to Information Act certain intelligence and security organizations have been exempted from the provisions of the Act. But even in the case of these organizations information pertaining to allegations of corruption and human rights violations are not excluded. The Government of Kerala issued a Notification S.R.O. 127/06 dated 7.2.2006 under Section 24(4) of the Act enlisting the organizations to which the provisions of the Act have been exempted. In the said list it is seen mentioned “Confidential Branch in the Police Headquarters, Kerala and confidential sections in all Police Offices in Kerala” alongwith Special Branch C.I.D., Crime Branch C.I.D. etc. The Confidential Branch in Kerala Police Headquarters and confidential sections in all Police Offices do not form part of intelligence and security organizations. Such a wing infact never existed before the implementation of the R.T.I. Act. A confidential wing is provided to deny information regarding various crimes registered by the Police by referring the same to these confidential sections in the Police Stations. It is an act to subvert the object of the Act and therefore the State Information Commissions have to take exemption of such a category from being included under the list of intelligence and security organizations.
Further it is not known under what justification the District and Crime Record Bureau of the State Government have been included in the list of Intelligence and Security Organizations. In fact, this bureau is concerned with the statistics of various crimes committed in the State and therefore has absolutely no rational to seek exemption from the provisions of the Act.
These hurdles are artificially created and could be removed with certain amount of dynamism on the part of State Information Commissions and Governments/competent authorities who have a constitutional and statutory obligation to ensure transparency in all field save those deals with intelligence and security of the nation. Public awareness will also help the Government to act in proper direction lest they may become unpopular.
By V.P. Seemanthini, Sr. Advocate, Kerala
(By V.P. Seemandini, Senior Advocate, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam)
It is high time that, a provision should be incorporated in Chapter IV or XI of the High Court Rules (by adding 51A or 148 A) permitting the writ petitioners in service/appointment related matters to serve notices to the affected parties through the Appointing Authorities/Recruiting Agencies of the respective services, and further compelling such Appointing Authorities/ Recruiting Agencies, to file compliance report of such service of notices through their counsel/Standing Counsel/Govt. Pleaders (as the case may be) within the shortest possible time.
Incorporation of such a provision in the High Court Rules is absolutely necessary in the light of binding effect of the Apex Court decision in Siraj v. High Court of Kerala reported in 2006 (2) KLT 923 (paragraph 63 at page 949), in Tridipkumar Dingal v.State of West Bengal reported in (2009) 1 SCC 769 (in paragraph 41 and 42 at page 780 and 781) and (2011) 6 SCC 570 (at page 583 and 584 paragraph 31 and 32) as also the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Ravidas v. P.S.C. reported in 2009 (2) KLT 295 (paragraph 43 at page 331).
My experience as a Lawyer dealing in service cases before this Hon’ble Court gives me the impression that, 80% of the service litigation pending before the High Court relates to inter se seniority dispute/denial of legitimate timely promotion to various cadre post between service personnel. Special Rules governing different services (both State and Subordinate) treat “STATE” as unit of appointment for effecting promotion to various cadre posts. Thus State-wise seniority list in the feeder category posts are to be followed for effecting promotion to the various cadre posts.
Absence of mandatory provisions in the respective Service Special Rules or in Part II of K.S. & S.S.R. (immediately after Rule 27 of K.S. & S.S.R.) compelling the Appointing Authority to prepare, publish and circulate State-wise seniority list in each cadre posts in the respective cadre at least once in a year is causing irreparable prejudice to so many service litigants. Thus it is absolutely necessary to incorporate a provision in Part II of K.S. & S.S.R. compelling the Appointing Authorities of respective cadre posts to prepare, publish and circulate the seniority list of all cadre posts annually and to get evidence of circulation of such seniority list from the office heads of all the offices within one week from such circulation. It is also necessary to incorporate a provision mulcting the concerned officials with some penalty, for his/her failure to do such preparation/publication/circulation etc. within the stipulated time.
In corporation of such provisions are necessary in the Service Rules, because my experience teaches me that, in almost all departments in the State, 90% of the concerned staff will never be informed about their position in the seniority lists until their juniors are promoted to higher posts. That apart, large scale manipulations are being practiced in almost all the departments in the matter of preparing the seniority list, either by delaying the preparation of seniority list, or by deliberately excluding several persons from the list or by not publishing the provisional seniority list, and by publishing the final seniority list without considering any of the valid objections filed by the parties, and by effecting promotions from such final seniority list on the very date of issue of such final seniority list. Invariably such final list and consequential promotion orders will be immediately given effect to, by allowing the promoted persons to join the promoted post by bringing the order by hand, and replacing the senior person occupying such post. By such dubious practice, the legitimate claimants will be prevented from resorting to their constitutional remedies.
The result of such malpractice is that, by the time the legitimate claimants came to know about their right for promotion, many of their juniors, who are influential and have direct link with the service organization leaders, who are having allegiance to the then Ruling front would have joined the promoted post by replacing the senior legitimate claimants.
Once such genuine claimants approach this Court by challenging the seniority list or promotion orders, the process of making the case ripe for hearing itself is time consuming. Considering the pressure of work in this Court, a minimum period of three years will be taken for disposal of such cases. By that time, some times, the legitimate claimants will be attaining superannuation and will be compelled to retire from service without enjoying their legitimate promotions.
The first and foremost difficulty in filing the case challenging such seniority list is to collect the service particulars and the official address of all such juniors who are illegally placed above them in the seniority list. In fresh Recruitment case, the difficulty is to get the residential address of the persons included in the rank lists prepared for the respective posts. Thus appropriate provision should be added in the P.S.C. Rules of Procedure, compelling the P.S.C to publish the full address of all the selected candidates in the P.S.C. Rank list.
By V.B. Harinarayanan, Advocate
Effect of Deviation Clause in A Charter Party
(By V.B. Hari Narayan, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)*
The owner’s duty to pursue the contract voyage is best known by the name of its breach, i.e. deviation. The duty not to deviate is one of the most important parts of the contract of carriage, largely because of the consequences which it is reputed to have upon the ability of the shipowner to protect himself through exclusion clauses. Deviation in simple terms is any intentional departure from the usual route, i.e. the direct geographical route, for the contract voyage. Under a Charter, especially in voyage and time-trip charters the owner is under an implied duty not to deviate from the contract voyage. However, in most of the standard charter parties there is usually a clause giving the master a liberty to deviate for specified reasons. But, there are circumstances recognized under common law where deviation from the geographical route of the voyage is justifiable (For example, clause 3 of Gencon Charter). For instance, the owner is permitted to deviate in order to save life at sea and to avoid possible damage to the vessel, its cargo or crew. In Scaramanga v. Stamp ((1880) 5 CPD 295.) it was held that though deviation for the purpose of saving life is protected, any such deviation in order to salve a ship in distress so as to claim salvage is not justified and the ship owner was found liable for the loss of cargo. Therefore, to amount to an unjustifiable deviation, it must be proved that it was on account of a deliberate act on the part of the owner or master of the vessel.
In Kish v. Taylor ((1912) AC 604.), the House of Lords held that a deviation, resulting from an initial unseaworthiness of the vessel is justified. The common law has also approved deviations as justifiable, resulting from the breach of contractual obligation on the part of the charterer (Walams v.Muller (1927) 2 KB 99.). Therefore what is permitted under the common law is only justifiable deviations. But when a contract of carriage is terminated on account of an unjustifiable deviation, the carrier looses protection of all exclusion clauses in the contract, whether or not the loss complained of by the charterer was a result of the deviation. An unjustifiable deviation is a breach giving the charterer the right to claim damages from the owner for any loss suffered as a result of the deviation and also entitles the charterer to terminate the charterparty. The most crucial and controversial consequence of unjustifiable deviation is that where an owner deviates, he loses the protection of all exclusion and limitation clauses contained in the charter, whether or not the loss complained of by the charterer was a result of the deviation. This consequence of deviation will have the effect of leaving the owner in serious difficulties in as much as the protective shield of his charter falls away, as does the safety net normally provided by his P & I Club. In Hain v. Tate & Lyle ((1936) 2 All E.R.597), it was held that the consequence of any unjustifiable deviation is the non applicability of exclusion clauses in so far as it protects the rights of the carrier.
Apart from the common law as stated above, the Hague Visby Rules (Article IV Rule 4 of the Hague Visby Rules,1968.), also recognizes two types of deviations, i.e. deviation in saving or attempting to save a property at sea and any reasonable deviation. But, English courts have given a restricted interpretation to the word “reasonable deviation" although the question whether what amounts to a reasonable deviation is a question of fact. In Stag Line v. Foscolo, Mango & Co ((1932) AC 328), the House of Lords held that a slight deviation taken for the purpose of landing two fuel testing engineers was not a reasonable one and refused the ship owner protection under the Hague Rules. Infact, there are only very few instances where the English Courts have afforded protection of the Hague Visby Rules to the carriers when it comes to the interpretation of reasonable deviation. In Al Taha ((1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 117), the Court held that a deviation for repair was reasonable within the terms of Art.4 Rule 4 of the Hague Visby rules, even though the same was planned prior to the voyage.
As stated earlier, it is true that Charter parties often contain liberty clauses to deviate from the contract voyage which are inserted for the ship owner’s benefit. In common law such liberty clauses are valid, but since the same is inserted for the benefit of the ship owner, the courts will apply the principle of contra proferentem to give a narrow interpretation to such deviation clauses. The English courts have for years taken a very hostile approach to liberty to deviate clauses, interpreting them strictly in accordance with the central purpose of the charter, even where the clause seeks to include the deviation route within the contract route. In Glynn v. Margetson ((1893) AC 351), although the bill of lading contained a liberty clause permitting the owner to proceed to ‘any port or ports in any rotation’, it was held by the court that the ship owner is liable for damages to the loss of cargo as a result of the deviation to a port not on the geographical route.
Therefore it is now clear that such liberty clauses will be construed strictly applying the principle of ‘contra proferentem’ usually implying freedom to call at ports within the course of the voyage as held in Leduc v. Ward ((1888) QBD 475). But as held in Frenkel v. Macandrews ((1929) AC 545.) such freedom cannot be construed as to call at any port as the owner decides, unless commercial practice dictates a greater freedom. It is also worth mentioning at this juncture that, even if it is found that the deviation is justifiable, as held in The Isla Fernandina((2000) 2 Lloyd’s Rep.15.), the carrier is only exempt from liability for losses caused by that justifiable deviation and he is still liable for all other breaches.
By virtue of the introduction of Hague Visby Rules into the provisions of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971 (Section 1(2) of the Act.) the same now apply by force of law. If the provisions of the above Act is made applicable, clauses allowing deviation beyond the limits set in Art.IV, Rule 4 of the Hague Visby Rules, will be null and void hit by Art.III, rule 8. However, if the Act does not apply then the liberty clause is valid, subject to interpretation.
In Suisse Atlantique ((1967) 1 AC 361.), it was held that the exemption clauses must be viewed in the context of the entire contract, its terms, language and intention of the parties. Therefore, the question as to whether the owner can claim the protection of an exemption clause in the charter party, by and large depends on the construction of the clause taking into consideration all the circumstances of the contract and the requirement of reasonableness. But this view has not gained support over the traditional view. Which way is the wind blowing ?
* LL.M (Southampton), Governing Council Member, Maritime Law Association of India.
By K. Balakrishnan Nair, Former Judge, High Court of Kerala & Chairman of Ker. Administrative Tribunal
Constitutional Democracy and Government by Judges*
(By Justice K. Balakrishnan Nair, Former Judge, High Court of Kerala &
Chairman of Kerala Administrative Tribunal)
“A candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions, affecting whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigations between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent, practically resigned their own Government into the hands of that eminent Tribunal.”
-- Abraham Lincoln
I am really privileged to have been called upon to deliver this lecture dedicated to the memory of Justice K.K.Mathew who was an eminent jurist and one of the finest judges, this country has ever produced.
2. Justice K.K.Mathew (3 January 1911 - 2 May 1992) was a Judge of the Supreme Court of India, highly regarded for his scholarship and for his seminal contribution to the Constitutional and Administrative Law in India. He later served the nation as its Tenth Law Commission Chairman and also as the Chairman of the Second Press Commission.
Mr.Mathew was born into a pious Christian family; Kuttiyil, at Athirampuzha, a town in the Kottayam District of Kerala. After passing out with a Law degree from Trivandrum Law College, Mr.Mathew was called to the bar in 1935. His initial years of apprenticeship and the growing practice in the bars of Kottayam and Trivandrum, both in the erstwhile princely State of Travancore, laid the foundation for a distinguished and lucrative practice that awaited him in the newly formed Kerala High Court, where he shifted over to in 1956 after the formation of the State of Kerala in the same year. From then on, it was meteoric rise in the legal profession, fuelled by hard work and years of dedicated scholarship.
The year 1960 witnessed Mr.K.K.Mathew being appointed as the Advocate-General of Kerala and shortly thereon in 1962 as a Judge of the Kerala High Court. On October 4, 1971 he was elevated as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India, the position, which he held until his retirement on January 2, 1976.
Justice K.K.Mathew has left a rich legacy of judgments bearing high precedential value. The notable ones, to mention a few, are Bennett Coleman (AIR 1973 SC 106); Sukhdev Singh (AIR 1975 SC 1331); Ambica Mils (AIR 1974 SC 1300); St. Xavier (AIR 1974 SC 1389); Prabhu Dayal (AIR 1974 SC 183); Khan Chand (AIR 1974 SC 543); Gobind (AIR 1975 SC 1378); K.P.Joseph ( AIR 1978 SC 303); Gwalior Rayon (AIR 1974 SC 1660); Kodar (AIR 1974 SC 2272) N.M. Thomas (1976 KLT SN 5 (C.No.11) SC = AIR 1976 SC 490); Kesavananda Bharati (AIR 1973 SC 1461) and finally the Indira Gandhi Election case (AIR 1975 SC 2299).
The State utilized the long experience and scholarship of Justice K.K.Mathew by appointing him first as the Law Commission Chairman, the post which he adorned during 1981-1985. Then came the appointments as the Chairman of the L.N.Mishra’s Murder Enquiry Commission, the Boundary Commission to inquire into the boundary dispute between Haryana and Punjab, and finally as the Chairman of the Press Commission of India.
The book ‘Democracy, Equality, and Freedom’ which is a compilation of his lectures and addresses stands testimony to his wide and deep learning.
After a long and dedicated life in the service of the Indian judiciary, Justice K.K.Mathew died on May 2, 1992. As a brilliant jurist and as a dedicated judicial scholar, he had left his indelible signature upon the annals of Indian judiciary. Justice Mathew was married to Ammini Tharakan. The couple had three children; Mr.K.M.Kurian who is the manager of Air India in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Mrs.Shantha Kakkappan a housewife, and Mr.Justice K.M.Joseph, a sitting Judge of the Kerala High Court. The life and works of Justice K.K.Mathew will inspire generations of Judges and lawyers.
3. India, that is Bharath, is a republic. We, the people of India, have given unto ourselves a democratic form of Government. Democracy means rule by the people, which in practice is rule by the representatives of the people, elected based on universal adult suffrage. This is in contrast to Aristocracy, where the people had no role in the election of the Ruler and usually the lineal descendant of the King succeeded to the throne subject to the rules of the royal family. The King’s will was the law. He was the final arbiter in all disputes and his was the last word in matters of administration. Democratic form of election of the ruler was prevalent in many parts of the world even during olden times. In such cases, generally the elite among the people were the voters. The Parliamentary democracy, in its modern form, evolved in England, which is considered to be its cradle. The legislative powers of the King of England were progressively transferred to the Parliament. The powers of the King for adjudication were in due course vested in the courts and the administration was run by the King on the advice of his ministers who have majority support in the Parliament. Finally the principle that ‘the King can do no wrong’ came to be firmly established in British Parliamentary democracy. The essence of the said doctrine in the context of democracy is that the King shall always find advisers to take responsibility for his actions and such advisers should have majority support in the Parliament.In practice, it meant the King always acted on the advice of his council of ministers which had majority support in the House of Commons, the lower house of the Parliament. To put it pithily, the authorship of the actions of the King could always be traced back to the Ministers, who advised him and who, in turn were responsible to the House of Commons. India adopted the same parliamentary form of Government. Here we have a President who can, except in very limited areas, act only on the basis of advice of his council of ministers. More or less same is the position of Governors in the States. This principle is the reason for framing Article 361(1) of the Constitution of India, which grants immunity to the President and Governor before courts for their decisions, concerning exercise of their powers and functions. The areas where the President or the Governor may act independently without the advice of the council of ministers have been stated by the Apex Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC 2192) as follows:
“We declare the law of this branch of our Constitution to be that the President and Governor, custodians of all executive and other powers under various articles shall, by virtue of these provisions, exercise their formal constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers save in a few well-known exceptional situations. Without being dogmatic or exhaustive, these situations relate to (a) the choice of Prime Minister (Chief Minister), restricted though this choice is by the paramount consideration that he should command a majority in the House; (b) the dismissal of a Government which has lost its majority in the House, but refuses to quit office; (c) the dissolution of the House where an appeal to the country is necessitous, although in this area the head of State should avoid getting involved in politics and must be advised by his Prime Minister (Chief Minister) who will eventually take the responsibility for the step. We do not examine in detail the constitutional proprieties in these predicaments except to utter the caution that even here the action must be compelled by the peril to democracy and the appeal to the House or to the country must become blatantly obligatory.”
The Constitution authorises the Governors to act in their discretion in a few more circumstances also. The Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister at the Centre or by the Chief Minister in the State has to step down the moment they do not have majority support in the Lok Sabha or in the Legislative Assembly. It means the ministers can rule the State only when they command majority support in the concerned Legislature. In this speech, this aspect is highlighted only to emphasise that those who have majority support in the Legislature alone can run the executive Government under our Constitution. In other words, if persons without majority support in the Legislature are allowed to run the Government the same will be illegitimate and undemocratic.
4. The above salutary constitutional principle applies to the courts also. In other words, courts cannot discharge any executive functions as they are not responsible to the Legislature. When they leave their judicial domain and embark upon the task of advising the people’s representatives how to run the Government and issue mandatory directions concerning the running of the Government, citizens who believe in democracy would describe their actions as unauthorised and unconstitutional. More than 150 years ago, Abraham Lincoln, who was a renowned lawyer, in his first inaugural speech as the President of the United States said: “A candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions, affecting whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigations between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent, practically resigned their own Government into the hands of that eminent Tribunal.” When a democratically elected Government is suspected of having lost majority in the Legislature, immediately the Head of the Government is expected to resign. The public opinion will be unanimous on this point. If the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister claims that he has majority, notwithstanding the circumstances pointing the other way, he will be called upon to prove his majority in the Legislature by the President or the Governor as the case may be. The principle that only those, who command majority in the Legislature, can rule us is held to be sacrosanct and inviolable. But unfortunately the said principle is not strictly insisted or it is rather ignored by the public, when the courts venture to admonish the rulers for the way they run the business of the Government or order how to run it. This is because of the ignorance of the people of the powers of the superior courts in India. Ordinary courts called inferior courts consisting of Magistrate Courts, Munsiff Courts, Sub Courts, Sessions Courts, District Courts, etc. confine themselves to adjudicating the rights of parties before them. Their decisions are binding only on the parties before them and do not have any worth as precedents. So, even if any of their decisions is wrong, no one else is affected by that. The aggrieved parties will avail the remedies available to them like appeal/revision, etc. before higher courts to redress their grievance. So, the public seldom criticise their judgments. But the position of superior courts in India (Supreme Court and High Courts) is different as they are courts of record and have been conferred with the power of judicial review, which enables them to issue certain writs. Our founding fathers conferred on our Supreme Court and High Courts, the same powers enjoyed by the superior courts in England concerning issuance of certain writs, namely, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo-warranto and habeas corpus.
5. A writ in the nature of mandamus will be issued when a person or authority vested with a public duty has failed to discharge that duty and a person interested moves the court. The court will command the person or authority concerned to perform his/its duty by issuing a mandamus. If an inferior court or tribunal is proceeding in a matter without jurisdiction, it will be interdicted from proceeding further, by issuing a writ of prohibition. If an authority amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the court has acted without jurisdiction the resultant decision will be quashed by issuance of a writ of certiorari. An usurper of a public office will be ousted by the court by issuing a writ of quo warranto. A person detained wrongfully will be set at liberty by issuing a writ of habeas corpus. Unlike the courts in England, our superior courts have the power to declare an Act of the Legislature as unconstitutional and therefore void and unenforceable.
6. The powers of the superior courts to issue a writ of mandamus have been thoroughly misunderstood by the public as enabling the courts to remedy every grievance and cure all maladies afflicting the society. In some cases, it appears the Courts have also misunderstood the limits of their power. The Constitution does not authorise the courts to don the garb of Administrator or advise the people’s representatives how to run the Government. The people in the gallery fed up with the abysmal failures of the Executive and Legislature may resoundingly cheer on seeing such things, but the same should not prompt the courts to tread the forbidden terrain, which legitimately belongs to other branches of the government.
7. Judicial activism is a much debated topic. An activist judge means a judge who discharges his functions vigorously and decisively to achieve an end. The end is dispensing justice with a view to righting wrongs and moulding remedies where none exists. The traditional thinkers asserted that the role of judiciary is only to declare the law and not to make the law. Modern jurists say the ‘fairy tale about judges of not making law is a childish fiction and it has to be discarded’. The Common Law in England expanded slowly from precedent to precedent. Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes of U.S. Supreme Court conceded: “without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions”. Generally, the dos and don’ts in a society should be formulated and enforced by the society itself. Now the representatives of the society in the form of Legislature undertake the said activity of moulding rules containing dos and don’ts for the members of the society and provide for the wages of sin of violating such norms. Formerly it was done by the King according to his whims and fancies, but now the people have become their own masters and their representatives are authorised to frame the laws to be followed by them. This well entrenched terrain of the Legislature, we find occasionally, is breached by the activist judges disregarding the principle of separation of powers. The robed bretheren should realize that they have no brief to legislate under the Constitution, even assuming they have the expertise for it, and if they do so, it will be quite undemocratic and will be relegating our society to the days, when Monarchs legislated at will.
8. Our Parliament and State Legislatures are bound by the limits set on their powers by the Constitution. While legislating, if they overstep, the courts can legitimately step in and declare such legislative ventures void and therefore unenforceable. But an Act of Parliament or of the Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional by the court based on the personal philosophies, prejudices and predilections of the judges. The Legislature must be given freedom to do experimentations in exercising its powers, provided of course, it does not clearly and flagrantly violate its constitutional limits. Brandeis, J. of the US Supreme Court in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (76 L.Ed. 747) said:
“The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention,attest the value of the process of trial and error. In large measure, these advances have been due to experimentation.......There must be power in the States and the nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs......
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation.”
Justice Frankfurter while writing a biographical essay on Justice Holmes of the US Supreme Court said:
“It was not for him (Holmes) to prescribe for society or to deny it the right of experimentation within very wide limits. That was to be left for contest by the political forces in the State. The duty of the court was to keep the ring free. He reached the democratic result by the philosophic route of skepticism – by his disbelief in ultimate answers to social questions. Thereby he exhibited the judicial function at its purest.”
Earlier, Justice Frankfurter while a Professor of Law at Harvard University wrote about Justice Marshall:
“With the great men of the Supreme Court, constitutional adjudication has always been statecraft. As a mere Judge,Marshall had his superiors among his colleagues. His supremacy lay in his recognition of the practical needs of the Government. The great judges are those to whom the Constitution is not primarily a text for interpretation but the means of ordering the life of a progressive people.”
In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461)) Justice Khanna said:
“1535. In exercising the power of judicial review, the courts cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the Government. The door has to be left open for trial and error.”
9. The Legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community, by whose suffrage it comes into existence. It must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds. Seervai, an eminent Jurist in Constitutional Law, stated (Constitutional Law of India (3rd Edn. Vol. I) that “there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt; to doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve it in favour of its validity.................. A statute cannot be declared unconstitutional merely because in the opinion of the court it violates one or more of the principles of liberty, or the spirit of the Constitution, unless such principles and that spirit are found in the terms of the Constitution.”
In Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.((2001) 4 SCC 139) the Apex Court held as follows:
“There is always a presumption that the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction and the burden of establishing that the legislature has transgressed constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, is always on the person who challenges its vires. Unless it becomes clear beyond reasonable doubt that the legislation in question transgresses the limits laid down by the organic law of the Constitution it must be allowed to stand as the true expression of the national will – Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931 AC 275)................................ It is also a cardinal rule of construction that if on one construction being given the statute will become ultra vires the powers of the legislature whereas on another construction which may be open, the statute remains effective and operative, then the court will prefer the latter, on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended an excess of jurisdiction.” Justice Frankfurter of the US Supreme Court observed in American Federation of Labour v. American Sash and Door Co.(93 L.Ed. 222) as follows:
“Even where the social undesirability of a law may be convincingly urged, invalidation of the law by a court debilitates popular democratic Government. Most laws dealing with social and economic problems are matters of trial and error. That which before trial appears to be demonstrably bad may belie prophecy in actual operation. But even if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its defects should be demonstrated and removed by the legislature than that the law should be aborted by judicial fiat. Such an assertion of judicial power defeats responsibility from those on whom, in a democratic society, it ultimately rests. Hence rather than exercise judicial review, courts should ordinarily allow legislatures to correct their own mistakes wherever possible.”
Recently, the Apex Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P.Lekshmi Devi (2008) 4 SCC 720) has made a powerful call for judicial restraint while considering the constitutional validity of a legislation. Thus unless there are compelling grounds courts should be slow to interfere with legislative judgments on various issues.
10. By the decision in Kesavananda Bharati, the Supreme Court of India has asserted its power to annul any amendment to the Constitution passed under Article 368, the power under which is considered to be constituent power conferred on the Parliament. In the said decision the Supreme Court said that the basic features of the Constitution are inviolable.
‘One post-Kesavananda development of the doctrine is that the Court has declined to foreclose the list of the basic features as suggested by different Judges in the Kesavananda case. In Rajnarain’s case (Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Rajnarain (AIR 1975 SC 2299)), it has been observed that the claim of any particular feature of the Constitution to be a ‘basic’ feature would be determined by the Court in each case that comes before it. In the result, it is impossible for those responsible for amending the Constitution to guess what surprise lies in store for them before the Supreme Court. So far, quite a multitude of features have been acknowledged as ‘basic’ by different Judges, individually, in different cases, though there is no consensus as regards each of them, in particular; (a) Supremacy of the Constitution (b) Rule of law (c) The principle of separation of powers (d) The principles behind fundamental rights (e) The objectives specified in the Preamble to the Constitution (f) Judicial review, Art.32; Arts.226/227 (g)Federalism (h)Secularism (i)The sovereign, democratic, republic structure (j) Freedom and dignity of the individual (k) Unity and integrity of the Nation (l) The principle of equality; not every feature of equality, but the quintessence of equal justice (m) The rule of equality in public employment (n) The ‘essence’ of other Fundamental Rights in Part III (o) The concept of social and economic justice – to build a welfare State (p)The balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles (q) The Parliamentary system of government (r) The principles of free and fair elections (s) Limitations upon the amending power conferred by Art.368 (t) Independence of the judiciary; but within the four corners of the Constitution and not beyond that (u) Independent and efficient judicial system (v) Powers of the Supreme Court under Arts.32, 136, 141, 142 (w) Effective access to justice.
Parliamentary democracy and multi party system are an inherent part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. Basu: Shorter Constitution 14th Edition, Page 2236-2238.
11. The Constituent Assembly was not representing the vast majority of the people of India, but, in fact, it represented only about 18% of Indians. Now our Parliament represents the people across the length and breadth of India. Even if a constitutional amendment is cleared by both Houses of Parliament unanimously, still it can be declared unconstitutional by a single Judge of a High Court. This most undemocratic result is generated by the basic feature theory propounded by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati. Suppose a political party seeks the mandate of the people in the general elections for a particular constitutional amendment and the people of India vote them to power giving them the entire seats in the Lok Sabha and even if they are supported by an unanimous Rajya Sabha and also by all State Legislatures unanimously, still, the constitutional amendment passed by them could be nullified, as stated earlier, even by a single judge of any High Court, if it is found to impinge upon a basic feature. The result is that for an amendment of a feature of the Constitution which is considered to be basic, a revolution is necessary or in other words, unconstitutional methods alone could achieve that object. Was this the intention of our founding fathers? Is this interpretation in accord with the democratic aspirations of our people?
12. The original Constitution, as it stood in 1950, did not regard judicial review as indispensable. Judicial review is expressly prohibited in Articles 103(1), 136(2), 262(2), 329(a) and 363. If these Articles were not there in the original Constitution and were introduced by way of amendments, they would have been declared invalid for excluding judicial review .
13. In USA, the Judges think that the power of judicial review is given to the court by the people and the donors of that power can take it away also. Chief Justice Warren Burger of the US Supreme Court at the time of his retirement told Bill Moyers in 1986 in an interview as follows:
“Congress can review us and change us when we decide a Constitutional issue, right or wrong; that’s it until we change it. Or, the people change it. Don’t forget that. The people made it, and the people can change it. The people could abolish the Supreme Court entirely.”
“How” asked Bill Moyers.
The answer: “By a Constitutional amendment".
But in contrast, Chief Justice Bhagwati asserted S.P.Sampath Kumar v. Union of India ((1987) 1 SCC 124):
“Judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and no law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can abrogate it or take it away. If the power of judicial review is abrogated or taken away the Constitution will cease to be what it is.”
14. Coming to judicial review of administrative decisions, it has to be restated that the basis of judicial review is the doctrine of ultra vires. A decision of the Government can be set aside by the court if the same has no legal backing or is not authorised by law. If the law authorises the Government to take a decision in a particular matter and the Government takes a foolish decision, the same cannot be corrected in judicial review. Within the four corners of law Government can take wise or foolish decisions. For taking a decision which may not appear to be wise, the Government is not answerable to the court, but only to the people.
Appeal against such decisions will lie to the ballot and not to the court. Certain decisions may apparently appear within the powers of the authority. But if that decision is so perverse or is one which no man in his senses will take, then that decision can be condemned as unauthorised and therefore ultra vires. Ordinarily the judgment of the Government should be respected and judicial deference is the wise policy to be followed. A teacher can be dismissed from service for a misconduct or even for inefficient teaching. But he cannot be dismissed for being red haired. Though the disciplinary authority has power to dismiss a teacher, in the latter case, it is clear that the said power has been abused and the resultant action is unauthorised and void. But court cannot interfere even if the view taken by the Government is not the best possible view or even if it is a foolish view. The difference of opinion of the court with the administrator will not enable it to interfere with the decision. Two reasonable persons can perfectly and reasonably come to opposite conclusions on the same set of facts without forfeiting their title to be regarded as reasonable. Re.W. (an infant) 1971 AC 682,700 per Lord Hailsham LC. The very concept of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable persons to hold differing opinions as to which course is the best. The court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the administrative authority. ‘The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority, appointed by the Legislature to take the decision.Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds it acts ultra vires. The court must therefore resist temptation to draw the bounds too tightly merely according to its own opinion. The court must try to apply an objective standard which gives to the deciding authority the full range of choices which the Legislature is presumed to have intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate, but if the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the court’s function to look further into the merits’. (Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 10th Edn. P.302).
The US Supreme Court in Metropolis Theater Co. v. State of Chicago (57 L.Ed. 730) said: “The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of Government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void”.
15. While entertaining Public Interest Litigations (PIL) and issuing directions we find that the courts clearly overstep their jurisdiction in many cases. The judiciary cannot direct the Government to construct roads, erect buildings, unify a municipal area, create posts, etc. Such directions have serious fiscal and budgetary implications and will amount to breaching the principle of separation of powers and trespassing into the terrain of the Legislature and Executive. It is said that the law reached its finest moments when it succeeded in controlling the unlimited discretion vested in the Executive. The law reports are abundant with decisions where abuse of discretion by the Government was controlled by the courts. But who will guard the guards? When the courts abuse the power vested in them, the citizens will have to take the role of guarding the guards. Enlightened public opinion and its assertion through constructive criticism is one of the remedies. The judges should remember that “the judge even when he is free is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness of things. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodised by analogy, disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in social life” (Benjamin N. Cardozo - The Judicial Process).
16. Now the decisions of courts have become unpredictable. Forgetting the fundamentals, many decisions are rendered based on the personal views and preferences of the judges. In that context the Supreme Court (Union of India v. Upendra Singh (1994) 3 SCC 357) said:
“If we do not keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law, the exercise of jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided, it tends to become arbitrary and capricious. There will be no uniformity of approach and there will be the danger of the jurisdiction becoming personalized. The parameters of jurisdiction would vary from Judge to Judge and from Court to Court. (Some say, this has already happened.) Law does advance. Jurisprudence does undoubtedly develop with the passage of time, but not by forgetting the fundamentals. You have to build upon the existing foundations and not by abandoning them. It leads to confusion; it does not assist in coherence in thought or action.”
Unpredictable decisions act as unguided missiles and judicial booby-traps.
17. There was a stage in the United States when citizens looked up to the courts to solve all the maladies of the nation. The said view has been severely criticised by academics and the role of political process in solving the problems of the nation has been projected by them. Wallace Mendelson, an American Jurist, wrote an article published in 31 Vand. Law Review 71 (1978) criticising the people who looked up to the courts for the solution of all social and political problems in the following words:
“First, how legitimate is the Government by Judges? Is anything to be beyond the reach of their authority? Will anything be left for ultimate resolution by the democratic processes – for what Thayer (Prof. James Bradley, Thayer, Professor of Law of Harward University who wrote ‘The origin and scope of American Constitutional Law’ published in Harward Law Review (1893) called ‘that wide margin of considerations which address themselves only to the practical judgment of a legislative body’ representing (as courts do not) a wide range of mundane needs and aspirations? The legislative process, after all, is a major - ingredient of freedom under the Government.
Legislation is a process slow and cumbersome. It turns out a product – laws – that rarely are liked by everybody, and frequently little liked by anybody. When seen from the shining cliffs of perfection, the legislative process of compromise appears shoddy indeed. But when seen from some concentration camp as the only alternative way of life, the compromises of legislation appear but another name for what we call civilization and even revere as Christian forbearance.
Let philosophy fret about ideal justice. Politics is our substitute for civil war in a constant struggle between different conceptions of good and bad. It is far too wise to gamble for utopia or nothing – to be fooled by its own romantic verbiage. Above all, it knows that none of the numerous clashing social forces is apt to be completely without both vice and virtue. By give and take, the legislative process seeks not final truth, but an acceptable balance of community interests. In this view the harmonising and educational function of the process itself counts for more than any of its legislative products. To intrude upon its pragmatic adjustments by judicial fiat is to frustrate our chief instrument of social peace and political stability.
Second, if the Supreme Court is to be the ultimate policy-making body – without political accountability – how is it to avoid the corrupting effects of raw power? Can the court avoid the self-inflicted wounds that have marked other episodes of judicial imperialism? Can the court indeed satisfy the expectations it has already aroused?
A third cluster of questions involves the competence of the Supreme Court as a legislative body. Can any nine men master the complexities of every phase of American life which, as the post-1961 cases suggest, is now the Court’s province? Are any nine men wise enough and good enough to wield such power over the lives of millions? Are courts institutionally equipped for such burdens? Unlike legislatures, they are not representative bodies reflecting a wide range of social interest. Lacking a professional staff of trained investigators, they must rely for data almost exclusively upon the partisan advocates who appear before them. Inadequate or misleading information invites unsound decisions. If courts are to rely upon social science data as facts, they must recognise that such data are often tentative at best, subject to varying interpretations, and questionable on methodological grounds. Moreover, since social science findings and conclusions are likely to change with continuing research, they may require a system of ongoing policy reviews as new or better data become available. Is the judiciary capable of performing this function of supervision and adjustment traditionally provided by the legislative and administrative processes?
Finally, what kind of citizens will such a system of judicial activism produce – a system that trains us to look not to ourselves for the solution of our problems, but to the most elite among elites; nine judges governing our lives without political or judicial accountability? Surely this is neither democracy nor the rule of law.”
18. But in India, we have started looking to the courts for solving all the problems of administration. Such an approach is immature. Too much reliance on the courts will take us nowhere. There are several matters which the courts cannot solve or remedy. Through the political process they have to be resolved. Then what is political process? Political process in this context means vigorous involvement of the people by way of public criticism of the legislative measures which are found to be oppressive or unconstitutional. Our Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, right to assemble peaceably and the right to form associations. These rights form the foundation of freedom and liberty. The uninhibited freedom to argue and discuss is an integral part of legislative processes of democracy. By exercising the freedom of speech and communications, the temporary majority enjoyed by certain views will be reduced to minority and this is considered to be a process essential to the very concept of democracy. Professor Chafee commented that statutes, to be sound and effective, must be preceded by abundant printed and oral controversy. Discussion is really legislation in the soft. The US Supreme Court in Terminiello v. Chicago (93 L.Ed. 1131)) observed that free speech may best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, even stirs people to anger. Thus, citizens by alert exercise of their democratic rights can compel the Legislature to withdraw any law or to amend it appropriately. In India, political process has succeeded in removing the obnoxious portions of the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act 1976 by introducing 44th Constitution Amendment Act in 1978. 59th Amendment Act of 1988 suspending the fundamental rights under Article 21 in the State of Punjab, in the case of proclamation of emergency in that State,was repealed unanimously by the Parliament by Constitution 62nd Amendment Act in 1990. When this highway of political process is available for modifying the legislations, it is undesirable and undemocratic to follow the labyrinthine by-lanes of judicial review to obtain similar results. The deleterious effect of judicial review on political process was highlighted felicitously by Prof. Thayer. He was of the firm opinion that judicial review “is always attended with a serious evil” of denying people of “the political experience and moral education and stimulus that comes from fighting out the question in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors” and with the tendency “to dwarf the political capacity of the people and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility”. American Jurist Alexander Bickel highlighted the undemocratic character of judicial review in the following words:
“Judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system, since when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative Act or the act of an elected executive, it thus thwarts the will of the representatives of the people; it exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it”. Alexander Bickel’s ‘The Least Dangerous Branch".
19. Liberty and other constitutional values can be sustained and saved if only they lie in the hearts of men and women. Judge Billings Learned Hand said:
“What do we mean when we say that first of all we seek liberty? I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women. When it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it. No constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there, it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.
And what is this liberty which must lie in the hearts of men and women? It is not the ruthless, the unbridled will. It is not freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty, and leads straight to its overthrow. A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow.
What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand the minds of other men and women. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias. The spirit of liberty remembers that not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded.” The learned Judge also cautioned: “A society, so riven, that the spirit of moderation is gone, no constitution can save; a society, where that spirit flourishes, no constitution needs save; a society, which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, in the end, will perish”.
20. The liberty and other ideals by which the Constitution stands can be realised only by educating the people on those values vigorously. An enlightened citizenry can resist all excesses from the Executive, Legislature and the Courts. Woodrow Wilson forewarned “No more vital truth was ever uttered than that freedom and free institutions cannot long be maintained by any people who do not understand the nature of their own government.” The political process of educating the people will not generate the desired results, unless more and more young men of character and integrity join politics. Some consider politics as a necessary evil. It is easy to accuse that such views reflect total ignorance of constitutionalism. But a little introspection will make us realise that now politics has the appearance of a haven of careerists and opportunists. Many leaders fail to inspire confidence of the public. Then what is the solution for this crisis? The politics should be transformed into an area meant for the best persons in our society. We should discard the fallacy that gentlemen should shun politics. We should persuade the best among our children to join politics. Every family should send the best child in it to work in politics. It will be a real sacrifice for the child and the family. Let him join any party of his choice. All honest people should be persuaded to actively participate in politics. They should be taught that it is a patriotic duty expected of them by the nation. If the space meant for gentlemen remains vacant for long, it will be occupied by undesirable persons. That has already happened in politics. The space encroached by such persons should be recaptured. Now, it is fashionable to deride politics and advise that gentlemen should keep away from it. But we should realise that ‘politics is our substitute for civil war in a constant struggle between different conceptions of good and bad’. If I may say so, discouraging good people from joining politics is an anti national activity. Let us exhort all good people to join politics, so that they abound all political parties and consequently public funds will be safe in their hands, and freedom and liberty will endure for ever in our Republic. Political work is a thankless job. Let our unstinted support encourage the good people to join and continue in politics, in view of the great advantage derived by the nation from it. Let us also salute the honest men, who are working in politics braving hazardous conditions therein and are thereby strengthening constitutional democracy. No nation will progress or even survive without the sacrifices of its sons and daughters. The attitude that “everyone else should sacrifice, except me and my family” bodes ill for our country and it deprives us of our moral right to criticize politics or politicians.
21. As an insider, I have tried to point out some of the shortcomings of the functioning of courts, but it does not mean that I do not realize the great role played by the courts in India for stabilising and strengthening democracy, upholding the civil liberties of the people and running an efficient judicial system substantially free from corruption and other drawbacks. India has stabilised into the largest democracy in the world and for the same, contribution of the judiciary was enormous. But that does not mean their aberrations should not be criticised. The judges should be firmly, albeit respectfully, told that they are subject to the principles that “Even the King is subject to Law and God” and “Be you never so high, the Law will be above you”. Inherent in these words is the basic concept of Rule of Law. Every order passed by the administrator should be shown to have strict legal pedigree when challenged before the court; otherwise, the order will be quashed. Every judge passing an order remedying a failure of the administration should give clear reasons for the same, reflecting the constitutional/statutory pedigree for his order or the jurisprudential foundation for the same. The usual words “I am of the view that” such an order should be passed will not pass muster. It reminds us of the orders passed by Monarchs of yesteryears.
22. David Pannick Q.C. in his book ‘Judges’ said:
“Some politicians, and a few jurists, urge that it is unwise or even dangerous to tell the truth about the judiciary.Judge Jerome Frank of the US Court of Appeals sensibly explained that he had little patience with, or respect for, that suggestion. I am unable to conceive........ that, in a democracy, it can ever be unwise to acquaint the public with the truth about the workings of any branch of government. It is wholly undemocratic to treat the public as children who are unable to accept the inescapable shortcomings of man-made institutions ............The best way to bring about the elimination of those shortcomings of our judicial system which are capable of being eliminated is to have all our citizens informed as to how that system now functions.It is a mistake,therefore, to try to establish and maintain, through ignorance, public esteem for our courts.”
23. I conclude this speech by quoting the words of an eminent lawyer, Sri.T.R.Andhyarujina (Judicial Activism and Constitutional Democracy (1992).
“Under no Constitution can the power of courts go far to save the people from their own failure. There are too many dangers to the judiciary itself from an omnipresent and rescuing judicial review. In its own interests the Indian judiciary may sooner or later have to propound a policy of judicial non- intervention in defined areas. Such a policy is not a sign of weakness or abdication by the judiciary but only a recognition the fact that the Constitution did not make the judiciary a substitute for the failure of the other branches of government and that judicial power has its limitations".
* Speech delivered on 3rd December, 2011 at Kottayam, by Justice K.Balakrishnan Nair, Former Judge, High Court of
Kerala and Chairman of Kerala Administrative Tribunal.