By Dale P. Kurian, Advocate, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam
The new Goods and Service Tax (GST) Law
(By Dale P. Kurian, Advocate, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam)
The proposed Goods and Service Tax (GST) is to replace several taxation streams under Direct and Indirect taxation regimes. To name a few - Central Excise duties, Service tax, Countervailing Duty under the Customs Act, Value Added Tax, Central Sales tax, Luxury tax, Entertainment tax and Entry tax. The new enactment takes care of all by way of tax levies on sale of goods and rendition of services.
1. Introduction
Tax base of Goods and Service Tax (GST) would be very wide and would comprehensively extend over all goods and services up to the point of the end consumer. The Goods and Service Tax is to have two components:
1) Central Goods and Service tax (CGST) -levied by the Centre; and
2) State Goods and Service tax (SGST) -levied by the States.
The basic features of law, e.g., chargeability, definition of taxable event, taxable person (assessee), exigible transaction (incidence of levy), basis of classification etc., would be alike for both CGST and the SGST. In other words, the basis of levy of tax would be the same for both the CGST and the SGST, thereby wiping out all the disputes currently taken up by Value Added Tax authorities and Service Tax authorities, to tax a single transaction.
2. GST Legislation
After carefully reading the Finance Minister Mr. Pranab Mukherjee’s Budget speech of 2009-2010 and first discussion paper of the Empowered Committee, one can perceive that there would be one enactment for levy of central tax, i.e., CGST, and one enactment for levy of state tax i.e., SGST for each State. Therefore, there would be multiple tax statutes in India for levy of one GST. This could again bring in the same complications to the GST tax structure that had existed in the Value Added Tax (VAT) structure.
3. Taxes That Would Be Foregone
The GST would replace all the major indirect taxes that presently rule in India. Central Taxes that would be subsumed under the GST are :
a) Central Excise Duty - Levied under Excise Act, 1944;
b) Central Sales Tax (CST) - Levied under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956;
c) Additional Excise Duties - Levied under the Excise Act, 1944;
d) Excise Duty levied under the Medicinal and Toiletries Preparation Act - Levied under Medicinal and Toiletries Preparation Act, 1944;
e) Service Tax - Levied under Chapter V of Finance Act, 1944; (i.e., Service Tax Law)
f) Additional Customs Duty Commonly known as Counterveiling Duty - Levied under Customs Act, 1962;
g) Special Additional Duty of Customs - 4 per cent - Levied under Customs Act, 1962;
h) Surcharge - Levied under on any of above taxes or any other surcharges; and
i) Cess - Levied upon any of above taxes or on surcharges.
Following State taxes and levies would go submerged:
a) Value Added Tax (VAT)
b) Entertainment tax levied by the local bodies
c) Luxury tax
d) Taxes on lottery, betting and gambling
e) State Cesses and Surcharges, in so far as they relate to supply of goods and services - Levied over and upon any of above taxes or any other cesses and surcharges; and
f) Entry tax not in lieu of Octroi - Levied by any State in India.
All the taxes listed above would be consolidated under the new GST regime, thereby, reducing compliance costs of taxpayers and administrative overheads of the Government. However, there are few other indirect taxes that may or may not get subsumed under the GST regime as there is no consensus among State themselves or between the Centre and States, like -
1) Purchase Tax: States themselves are of the opinion that purchase tax should be subsumed within the GST framework and no exception should be given to any State to continue the levy of purchase tax. However, few States are getting substantial revenue from the purchase tax and, therefore, they are of the view that it should not be subsumed under the GST. There is intra-State dispute on this issue. Even the Centre is of the opinion that purchase tax is to be subsumed under GST regime.
2) Stamp Duty: It is recommended that the stamp duty would be phased out over a period of 3 years. Initially, rate of stamp duty in all States should be restricted to 4 per cent. In year 2, stamp duty is to be reduced to 2 per cent and, finally, in the year 3, stamp duty should be completely wiped out and subsumed under the GST regime.
3) Vehicle Tax: The Empowered Committee of the State Finance Ministers is silent on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the vehicle taxes levied by the State. However, the tax on vehicles levied by the State Governments could be subsumed in the GST as recommended in the report of Thirteenth Finance Commission.
4) Electricity Duty: The Empowered Committee is silent over the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the electricity duty. However, electricity duty levied by the State Governments could be subsumed in the GST as recommended in the report of Thirteenth Finance Commission.
4. Tax Rates
Until now, there has been no official announcement regarding the GST rate for India. There are disputes among the State and Centre regarding fixation of the GST rate.
Proposed rates of GST in various reports and new items
Particulars | CGST | SGST | Total GST |
Working Paper No. 1/2009-DEA | 12% | 8% | 20% |
State Minister | 8%-9% | ||
Task force implementation report | 5% | 7% | 12% |
RNR | 5% | 6% | 11% |
News updates | 8% | 8% | 16% |
In the current scenario, there is hardly any indication towards the proposed tax rates; however, the GST can be expected to be around 16 per cent to 18 per cent.
5. Levy
The GST would be levied on the value of goods and services transacted. Valuation provision would be common for both the CGST as well as the SGST. There is no specific information on this issue in any of the reports except that provisions would be simpler and more transparent.
6. Inter-State Transactions
The Centre would levy Inter-State Goods and Service Tax (IGST), which would be the CGST plus the SGST on all inter-State transactions of taxable goods and services. The inter-State sellers will pay the IGST on value addition after adjusting available credit of the IGST, the CGST, and the SGST on their purchases.
Illustration:
Mr. A manufactures goods. He bought goods for Rs. 56,000 and incurred expenses of
Rs. 74,000. These manufactured goods were sold inter-state at Rs. 1,45,000 plus applicable GST. Rate of SGST and CGST is 7 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. Compute GST payable:
Solution:
Particulars | Amount |
Cost of Goods | 56,000 |
Add: Expenses | 74,000 |
Add: Profit | 15,000 |
Sales | 1,45,000 |
IGST* 1,45,000 @ 12% | 17,400 |
Sales Price | 1,62,400 |
* IGST (12%) = Cost (5%)+SGST(7%)
7. Tax Credit
Credit would be admissible in respect of both the components of the GST, i.e., the CGST and the SGST. The CGST and the SGST are to be treated separately for the purpose of tax credit. The scheme of tax credit would be:
a) Taxes paid against the CGST shall be allowed to be taken as input tax credit for the SGST and could be utilize only against the payment of the CGST.
b) Taxes paid against the SGST shall be allowed to be taken as input tax credit for the SGST and could be utilized only against the payment of the SGST.
Cross utilization of input tax credit between the CGST and the SGST would not be allowed except under the IGST model.
Thus, the tax base of Goods and Service tax (GST) would be very wide and would comprehensively extend over all goods and services up to the end user level, saving time and money for both the parties - the tax payer as well as the state through lesser compliance time and lower compliance costs.
By P. Rajan, Advocate, Thalasserry
The Kerala Police Act - 2011 Who will Police the Police?
(P. Rajan, Advocate, Thalassery)
The Kerala Police Act -2011 came into force with effect from 03-01-2011 in the State after repealing the earlier Act of 1960. The New Act is necessitated as per the direction of the Supreme Court, reasonings rendered by the National Human Rights Commission, besides the recommendations of the Bureau of the Police Research and Development, to promulgate a model Police Act. The old Act of 1960 was an abridged one compared to the present Act, but the reason for concern is that the new Act taken shape after much deliberations and missives is effective, and sufficient to achieve the intended aim, in the hands of the law enforcing agency.
The new Act empowers the Police to act with more powers regarding minor and major offences when committed in their presence. Under the repealed Act, the application of Ss. 47 and 51 was rampant, relating to trespass willfully done in public places; the other of riotous or indecent behavior from similar places. Police were resorting to these provisions with or without considering the legal requirements needed to invoke these provisions. The present Act also has got many provisions to maintain law and order. Similar to the provision envisaged in the Abkari Act, S.15(c), identical provision is incorporated in the Police Act regarding rioting after intoxication. Other violations of law and order from public places are detailed in Ss.118,119 and 120; also speak of the Police power to detect and charge sheet certain offenders, for acts done mainly from public places.
The definition given to complaint in the present Act also is novel, apart from written or oral, even gestures and signals constitute complaints. Police are empowered to enter into private places but shall be accounted, considering the custom and privacy. Information providers are eligible for reward as shown in the section mentioning about duties and responsibilities of police officers. Criminal justice miscellaneous expense fund is to be maintained, in order to meet expenses incurred during investigation by the Police.
There are several circulars also for efficient and better policing. Weekly station work review, custodial facility, method of investigation of matters received under S.156(3) Cr.P.C. from the Magistrate Court are specifically stipulated also. Police Act with new penal provisions permits police to take action, with regard to many offences earlier being taken under other penal statutes. Careful observance to avoid harassment to the public; wrath of legal forums by ignorance or feigned ignorance, of the prosecuting side; should not be lost sight of.
Even a cursory look at the Act would reveal that if proper application of the Act by trained hands with strict adherence to the sections is done, the Kerala Police Act will prove to be worth the wait. Routine awareness camps by senior officers, their supervisory steps, will to a larger extent, help the local level police force to improve the law and order situation. In the old Act legal action against police excesses was permissible u/S.64(3) and even limitation period was relaxed by the apex court ruling, which is not incorporated in the present Act to check frivolous legal actions.
The Act of 2011 is comprehensive in content, formulated for easy application. Instead of resorting to other laws with procedural formalities, police are bestowed with ample powers under this Act to address situations relating to law and order primarly. The purpose of the new police Act is to ensure rule of law with due transparency by professional skill of dedicated police force. Let the police itself police the administration to make it enlightened and efficient, to prove it to be second to none.
Epithet- Senior Adv. Sri. T.P.K. Nambiar’s revelation of putting the cap of his ‘blue pencil’ on it forever has saddened many (2011(1) KLT Page 1). Nearly six decades of ardent association of Mr. Nambiar with the profession has made him to say things not soothing always but not harsh either. Degradation he witnessed at ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ levels is not irredeemable, one can hope. His prose, must have ruffled many a feather but they should be light hearted enough to take criticism in their stride and forget not; the famous quote -
‘I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the last, your right to say it’ - Voltaire.
By Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate
Yes, Sperm is Property !
An Australian Verdict On Reproductive Rights
(By Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
I read a judgment by Australian Supreme Court in a litigation which is in no way conventional. Assisted Reproduction Act, 2007 (ART Act) in Australia also is not a conventional legislation. With the written consent of late husband a widow is entitled to his sperm and to use it for what it is meant, by resorting to modern technology. It is a privilege based on consent in black and white. No consent; no right seems to be the legislative mandate. Ms.Jocelyn Edwards fought the case asserting her right to access to the frozen sperm of her deceased husband, even when there was no written consent. The Australian Supreme Court accepted the case and granted her the ‘property’ that she claimed.
The plaintiff Ms. Edwards was represented by counsel and by solicitors. Milne Berry Berger and Freedman is the solicitor firm. Mittu Gopalan became its partner in 2008 and Managing Partner in 2010.(Please see the interview with her in Law Society Journal). As you might have guessed with a sense of astonishment, she is a Malayali. She is a lawyer graduated from University of Sydney and associated with the solicitor firm. Since her name does not carry the brand name ‘Dandapani’, I should not omit to say that she belongs to Dandapanis, by genetics. It is a matter of joy for every Kerala lawyer to watch their counter parts reaching new heights nationally and internationally. My reference and appreciation of Mittu is not merely because she is the daughter of our Advocate General, but on account of the role which this young woman lawyer played in a historic judgment delivered by the Australian Supreme Court.
It is not the person but rather the subject matter that fascinates one. A woman’s right to get sperm from the body of the deceased husband and to conceive a child is technically and legally established. The husband, Mr.Edwards preferred to have ‘in vitro fertilization’ (IVF). But he met with an accident and breathed his last. His sperm was ‘extracted’ and preserved in frozen form in Greenwich Laboratory. The sperm was medically quite fit for in vitro fertilization.
In the absence of a written consent, could a woman succeed to the frozen sperm of the deceased, as if to his estate? Or, to put it bluntly, whether sperm would be part of the estate? Whether the hurdle created by legislation (i.e., the ART Act) could stand the test of gender rights and property rights?.
Sperm as property is no more an unfamiliar concept in legal circles. Hecht v. Superior Court demonstrates as to how property rights are legally endorsed in the case of reproductive stuff. Please see Collins JL, Univ Louis V.J.Fam Law – 1994-1995 Summer 33 (3): 661 -84. The text in Hofstra Law Rev.1993 titled “Fatherhood from the grave: an analysis of post mortem insemination” also would be an illuminating paper. Law of inheritance is bound to undergo tremendous changes in the wake of advanced reproductive technology.
Post mortem insemination asserts not only widow’s right to sperm as property but also indicates surviving fatherhood as a value and possibility. It is probably in such global background that the Australian Legislation of 2007 was subjected to judicial review.
Ms. Edwards, the plaintiff sought a declaration regarding entitlement to possession of the sperm (gametes). Since there was no written consent, whether the statutory embargo would deny her the right was precisely the question.
The Human Tissue Act, 1983 permitted removal of tissue from a deceased person. That too required consent/authorization. Separate proceedings are contemplated in situations where the body of the departed was at a hospital.
In Australia, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is vast and organic, as per Section 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1971. In an earlier decision by the Australian Supreme Court, (MAW v. Western Sydney Area Health Service(2000) NSWSC 358: (2000) 49 NSWLR 231.) a question related to removal of sperm from a man who was not capable of giving a consent was considered. The question was regarding taking of sperm from a man in coma. The question related to the scope of patriae jurisdiction. But the instant case presented questions of rights and legality in a wider and more complicated perspective. The Regenerative Rights posed unique issues - Whether one could possess human body for any purpose other than burial? Can there be ‘property’ in the dead body, as part of the body? These questions were relevantly considered in the judgment.
The Australian judgment is more than a verdict. It is an illuminating document that carries out a global precedent survey on the topic. The ratio in Williams v. Williams ((1882) 20 Ch D 659) that “there can be no property in the dead body of a human being” is no longer a good law and not even an acceptable concept. The Australian judgment however makes a reference to the 19th Century judgment and after examining a series of subsequent judgments deals with one of the most recent cases on the subject, i.e., Bazley v. Wesley Monash (IVF Pty Ltd 2010 QSC 118). Also you find Californian authorities for the proposition that the sperm is something that was capable of disposition by will. The common law approach to property is thus thoroughly redefined in the modern context of technical advancement. The submission that ‘the sperm is a real object; and that it has a value or worth in an intangible sense’ also is accepted by the Australian Supreme Court (vide para 80 of the judgment). The court held-
“….. (In) my view, Ms. Edwards is the only person in whom an entitlement to property of the deceased’s sperm would lie. The deceased was her husband. The sperm was removed on her behalf and for her purposes. No one else in the world has any interest in them. My conclusion is that ….. it would be open to the court to conclude that Ms. Edwards is entitled to possession of the sperm”.
The judgment analyses Section 17 of the ART Act in the light of Section 3 dealing with the object of the legislation. The enactment intends to protect the interest of-
(i) a person born by way of ART treatment
(ii) a person providing a gamete
(iii) a woman undergoing ART treatment (see Section 3 of ART Act)
After reading the judgment, I should conclude that a country like India has to go a long way further in updating her laws in tune with the Technology and updating Technology in tune with modern laws. There is a great challenge before the Indian Legislature and the Indian Courts. A comparison of Australian Statute of 2007 and the judgment on it, with the obsolete Indian legislation on Organ Transplantation (Please see, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND THE LAW- 2011 (3) KLT Journal 41.) is sufficient enough to ask for more and to dream more.
By R. Muralidharan (Deputy Registrar (Planning & Legal), Co-operative Department, Puducherry
A Digest of Cases 2011
(By R. Muralidharan, Deputy Registrar (Planning & Legal),
Co-operative Department, Puducherry, 605 009)
When compared to yester years, 2011 is rather a lean year for co-operative law in Kerala. Very few cases were reported in Kerala Law Times. But one cannot lose sight of implications of such decisions. These decisions are grouped chapter-wise, to facilitate easy reading and appreciate its importance.
The question before the Division Bench in Wayanad District Wholesale Consumers Co-operative Stores Ltd., v. Thomas (2011 (1) KLT SN 68 (C. No.91) is whether a milk society would fall within the classification of consumer society. The milk societies squarely fall under producer societies wherein Kerala Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation is specifically covered. If the bye laws of the appellant society are read with reference to classification of societies, the respondent societies are not consumer societies nor do they have a consumer wing. Respondent societies are essentially engaged in marketing of the products of their members, who are dairy farmers or farmers of agricultural produce which are marketing by them in bulk. These activities cannot be understood as dealing in consumer articles, which is a necessary condition for eligibility for membership in appellant society. In order to qualify for membership both in the appellant society and for representation in the board of the appellant society, the society concerned must be dealing in consumer articles, whether as a main business or as a subsidiary business by retaining a consumer wing, which is nothing but a sales outlet for the consumers to purchase articles.
Disputes
Petitioner co-operative society offered loan to the first respondent. It defaulted in repayment and hence suit was filed. The respondent agreed to settle the claim by referring the matter for arbitration. Hence Arbitration Reference (A.R.) was filed before High Court and respondent agreed to repay the loan in instalments and A.R. was disposed. However no payments were made by the respondent and suit was proceeded with. In the suit, petitioner moved an I.A. to refer the matter for arbitration. Dismissing the Writ Petition, the Court in Oiko Credit Ecumenical Development Co-operative Society v. Nirmalgram Vanitha Central Society (2011 (2) KLT 942) held that the Court cannot compel the parties to go in for arbitration or such other modes of settlement of disputes on an unwilling party. The opening sentence of S.89 CPC abundantly makes clear that there should exist elements of a settlement which may be acceptable to parties and it is feels so, then it may be referred as envisaged by the provision.
Election
(i) The returning officer cannot refuse to receive the nomination paper on the ground that it was submitted beyond the stipulated time. It can be rejected only during scrutiny of nomination papers. The words employed under R.35(3)(c)(iii) are ‘not delivered or received’ and did not authorize the returning officer to refuse to receive a nomination paper. That apart, the returning officer is empowered only to ‘reject’ and not to ‘refuse’ to receive the nomination papers. The question of rejection of nomination papers would arise only after its acceptance. After acceptance of nomination paper, it would be well within the power of the returning officer, on the appointed date to accept or reject nomination papers taking note of his certification with respect to the date and hour at which nomination paper was received, vide Nalinam v. Joint Registrar (2011 (2) KLT 991). It was also held that if rejection of nomination is patently bad, wrong, arbitrary and perverse, the High Court can interfere under Art. 226, without relegating the party to the alternative remedy under S. 69.
(ii) The earlier election was set aside and the Court ordered re-poll. Before re-poll, the Act was amended. Any election notified after amendment of statute should be consistent with the amended provisions of the Act, as held in Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala (2011 (3) KLT SN 51 (C.No.48).
Inquiry & Investigation
The question for consideration in Prakash v. State of Kerala (2011 (2) KLT 953) is whether in view of S.68A is it within the power of the Special Judge to direct the V&ACB to conduct an enquiry/investigation and the V&ACB to enquire/investigate into matters relating to co-operative societies. S. 68A provided for appointment of an officer not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General of Police as Vigilance Officer to conduct enquiry/ investigation into cases of misappropriation, corruption and other major irregularities in the society as may be referred to him by the Registrar and submit a report to the Registrar. The investigation under Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, is to culminate in a final report to the submitted before the appropriate Court as provided under S.173(2) of the said Code. If such report discloses commission of an offence, the appropriate Court is to proceed against the offender as provided in the Code. The report of the enquiry/investigation as per S.68A is not for the purpose of putting the offender on trial. It could be for the purpose of a departmental enquiry or other action as provided by the Act.
Exemption to Societies
Government is vested with wide discretional power in the matter of grant of exemption. S.12 deals with contingencies where the Registrar, if satisfied, proposes to alter the area of operation of a society for the purpose of improving the services rendered by it. S.101 operates in a totally different contingency or situation. It deals with power of the Government to grant exemption in public interest. The impugned order of the Government issued under S.101 was to obviate the legal impediment, if any, that may ensure under S. 7(1)(c) if a new society is allowed to be established in the area where the appellant is now operating. The Division Bench in Nachimuthu v. State of Kerala (2011 (1) KLT 651) held that the Government is vested with discretional power in the matter of grant of exemption and is vested with powers to relax occasional rigour of provisions of the Act and to advance its object in public interest. Both the sections (Ss.12 and 101) operate in totally different contingency and situation.
Applicability of Consumer Protection Act
On the allegation that there was deficiency of service on the part of the co-operative society, the second respondent filed a complaint before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. Overruling the contention of the society that the proceedings would be barred in view of S. 69 of the Act, the first respondent held that the proceedings would be maintainable. On appeal in Enathu Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., v. Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (2011 (1) KLT 573), the Court held that the remedies provided under Consumer Protection Act are not in derogation of those provided under other laws and that the said Act supplements and not supplants the jurisdiction of the civil courts or other statutory authorities. Going by cl.(e) of S. 2 of the Consumer Protection Act, ‘consumer dispute’ means a dispute where the persons against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint; and the definition of ‘person’ in col. (m) of S. 2 includes in sub-cl. (iii) a co-operative society. This, by itself is abundant to hold that a co-operative society is a person that could be subjected to an action before a Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum by raising a consumer dispute against such person. To creep up this decision, the Court relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Viswabharathi House Building Society (2003 (1) KLT SN 100 (C.No.133) SC = (2003) 2 SCC 412).
Employees of Societies
(i) In Philomina Dominic v. Kerala State Co-operative Housing Federation (2011 (1) KLT SN 27 (C. No.34) it was held that under R. 198, when the appointing authority is the board, the order of suspension cannot be passed by the Managing Director. An order of suspension is primarily an administrative order, but it cannot be passed without proper application of mind.
(ii) The amendment made to clause 21, vide G.O. dated 4.1.2008, to the Co-operative Societies Pension Scheme, 1994 adding the word “or” before the words “on attaining age of 50 years” is curative in nature for rectifying an omission, even though the word “substituted” finds a place. It is not a case where earlier provision was repealed and new provision was added by substitution. Hence amendment is only clarificatory and curative one and provision will relate back to time when prior provision was introduced, vide Velayudhan v. State Co-operative Employees Pension Board (2011 (1) KLT 399).
(iii) Whether an employee of a member society should continuously be employed in such society until appointment in apex/central society for purpose of claiming reservation in quota reserved thereunder was the question decided by the Division Bench in Shibi v. State of Kerala (2011 (1) KLT 873). Affirming the decision reported in 2010 (3) KLT 662, it was held that since the post in the apex/central society is reserved for employees of member societies, necessarily the status of the applicant as an employee of the member society is the requirement not only to apply for the post for such employment but such employment should continue until that person gets appointment in the apex/central society. Those who leave the service of the member societies during selection process, will cease to be employees of member society and consequently the same make them ineligible for application in the quota. Continuous employment during the whole selection process is the requirement to qualify the appointment under the quota reserved for employees of member societies in the apex/central society.
(iv) Since the power has been granted to the Government to frame rules and regulations regarding service conditions by S.83 of the Act, the Government has the necessary powers to frame rules permitting transfer of employees. Transfer is not a mode of appointment but only a mode of regulating the posting of employees. When inter -bank transfers are permitted, it cannot be said that such transfers amount to appointment that is not permissible, vide Mohandas v. State of Kerala (2011 (2) KLT SN 40 (C. No. 54)).
(v) The power of relaxation under R. 185(8) has to be used to ensure justice and equity without nullifying the operation and effectiveness of the rules in the guise of relaxing their rigour. The power of relaxation vested in the society as well as the Registrar is not allowed to be misused. Power of relaxation must be exercised only in exceptional cases and such exercise must be with utmost care, circumspection and caution. The paramount concern must be the welfare of the society and not the individual employee who might benefit from the order of relaxation is the pronouncement of the Division Bench in Karthikeyan v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies (2011 (2) KLT SN 57 (C. No.75)).
(vi) The short question that arises for consideration in Purushothaman v. Kerala State Co-operative Employees Pension Board (2011 (3) KLT 250) is whether the employees of a co-operative society who joined in the Contributory Provident Fund established by the employer society long before the Kerala Co-operative Employees Self Financing Pension Scheme, 1994 was introduced, are entitled to have their service prior to the date on which they joined the Fund reckoned for the purpose of computing the length of qualifying service for the purpose of determining the pension payable to them. It was held that in accordance with the stipulations contained in clause (1)(a) of paragraph 19 of the pension scheme, the length of service which the petitioners had commencing from the date of joining the Fund also can be treated as qualifying for pension. The third proviso to the said clause applies only to those employees who were probationers at the time when the scheme was implemented, viz., on 14.3.1995. The findings of the learned single Judge were challenged. The Division Bench, in Purushothaman v. Kerala State Co-operative Employees Pension Board (2011 (4) KLT 455) dismissed the Writ Appeal.
By N. Subramaniam, Advocate, Ernakulam
Section 148A(2) of C.P.C. -- Caveat -- Whether Requirement of Stating the Names of Party
who is likely to Initiate Proceedings is Directory or Mandatory -- Order LIV Civil Procedure Code
Regulating Lodging of Caveats in Subordinate Courts in the State
(By N. Subramaniam, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
1. The scope and object of S.148A C.P.C. seems to be to safeguard the interest of a person against an order that may be passed on an application filed or expected to be filed by a party in a suit or proceeding instituted or about to be instituted. Another object of S.148A is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
2. Section 148A(2) reads as follows:
(2) Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), the person by whom the caveat has been lodged (hereinafter referred to as the caveator) shall serve a notice of the caveat by registered post, acknowledgement due, on the person by whom the application has been, or is expected to be, made under sub-section (1).
3. There are cases in which it is not possible to know in advance, as to who will be initiating the proceedings. For example, A obtains a decree against B. B wants to defeat the decree holder A by some foul means and with this end in view manages to file a suit or proceedings against A, by colluding with his friends, challenging the decree obtained by A against B, alleging fraudulently that such obliging friend is affected by the decree or for some other reason. B may collude with his other close friends, to cause initiation of proceedings or suit against A, one after another. In such a situation, it is not possible for A to file a caveat petition against a named individual. Yet another example is, any citizen can file a suit against a person who constructs a building violating the Municipal Building Rules, even if he has not suffered any personal injury. (See 1984 KLT 428 - Saina v. Konderi; (2003 (1) KLT 245 = 2003 (3) K.L.J. 133 - Mariamma v. Thomas). There are other decisions in this aspect. There are also many other categories of cases like the ones pointed out.
4. In such cases, it is not possible to name a particular individual or individuals who may initiate proceedings or who are likely to initiate proceedings. Therefore it will not be possible to comply with S.148A(2) C.P.C.
5. The question is, in such a situation, can a party file a caveat under S.148A C.P.C. without naming or specifying a specific person as a respondent.
6. Except one decision on this question decided by Karnataka High Court reported in I.L.R. 1999 Karnt. 2986 = AIR 2000 Karnt.70, State of Karnataka v. NIL, no other decision is seen reported either of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, any other High Court including Kerala High Court.
7. Kerala High Court has framed Rules and incorporated as Order LIV C.P.C. as amended in Kerala. The rules are framed under S. 122 of C.P.C. and it has been published in Kerala Gazette dated 2.1.2001. As per the Rule 2, the name and address of the applicant or petitioner or the expected applicant or petitioner is to be mentioned in the Caveat. Rule 7 says that if the Caveat is not lodged in accordance with these rules, it shall be rejected.
8. With the above said matter in mind we can examine the question whether S.148A (2) is directory or mandatory.
9. Even in cases where the opposite party who is likely to file a suit or initiate a proceeding cannot be identified, it is submitted that, still a Caveat is maintainable and cannot be rejected as not maintainable and such a Caveat is to be registered by Court. The failure to comply with S.148A(2) (non mentioning of the person who is likely to initiate proceedings) cannot be a ground to reject the Caveat.
10. If the person who is likely to initiate proceedings could not be identified or ascertained with certainty, it is clear, that compliance with S.148A (2) is not possible. The right to file a Caveat is a substantive right of a person and that cannot be taken away under the guise of S.148A(2).
11. The provision of S.148A (2), as rightly observed by Karnataka High Court, is only directory and not mandatory. In the case of non compliance, the Court has always the discretion, if valid grounds are made out for non compliance of S.148A(2) and can direct the Registry to register it. Again as rightly observed by Karnataka High Court, the person who lodges the Caveat, should specify accurately the subject matter of dispute in suit or proceeding likely to be instituted. If that is specified, it is open to the Court in its discretion to dispense with the requirement of S.148A(2) and an application under S.151 C.P.C. may be filed praying for dispensation of requirement in S.148A(2).
12. So far as Kerala Courts are concerned they are governed by Order LIV of Civil Procedure Code, which is seen mandatory in nature. Therefore, the said Rules in Order IV will have to be amended by the Rule Making Committee or Authority to meet such contingencies, narrated above. The fact that the Rule making committee has power to do so is beyond doubt.
13. A similar situation arose in the case reported in 1990(1) KLT 596 Pathummakutty v. Kathiyumma (D.B.) decided on 22.2.1990 (C.R.P. 3506 of 1983 and C.R.P. 171/1982). The question that arose in those C.R.P.s was, whether an application under Order 21 Rule 89 is maintainable when the required deposit was made after 30 days but was within 60 days of sale. Art 127 of Limitation Act was amended by Act 104/1976. Before amendment, 30 days time had been provided to file an application under O. 21 R. 89 to set aside a sale in execution of sale. This was amended to 60 days by Act 104/1976 which came into effect from 1.2.1977. However, the deposit was to be made within 30 days from the date of sale was the provision in O.2 R.92(2) C.P.C. as in force in Kerala then. Here the Rule Making Committee of High Court, taking note of the anomaly in the time for filing the application to set aside sale under Order 21 Rule 89 amended the provision in O. 21 R. 92(2) as per C.P.C. Amendment Kerala in Kerala Government Gazette No. 6 dated 9.8.1988 (See C.P.C. Kerala as it stood prior to 1.7.2002). Thus, it is clear that the Rule Making Committee is entitled to make proper amendments and when it is felt necessary.
14. Similarly in the situation mentioned above already, namely, when it is not possible to identify a particular person, as one who is proposing to initiate proceedings, it is humbly submitted that the Rule Making Committee is not powerless to see that proper and suitable amendments are made to the Rules framed by Kerala High Court as per Order LIV C.P.C.
Therefore, it is felt that it is high time that suitable amendment is made in Order LIV C.P.C. so as to enable a party to file a caveat, without making any person as a respondent.