Some Different Thoughts on Adverse Possession

(By K.G.Balasubramanian, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

2019 (3) KLT 865 (SC) - Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaurraises a cardinal issue on the powers of the Apex Court to lay down the law. 

I am limiting these lines to paragraph 60 of that judgement wherein their Lordships have laid down that “When we consider the law of adverse possession as has developed vis-a-vis to property dedicated to public use, courts have been loath to confer the right by adverse possession. There are instances when such properties are encroached upon and then a plea of adverse possession is raised. In such cases, on the land reserved for public utility, it is desirablethat rights should not accrue.The law of adverse possession may cause harsh consequences, hence, we are constrained to observe that it would be advisable that concerning such properties dedicated to public cause,it is made clearin the statute of limitation that no rights can accrue by adverse possession”.

If the above statements amount to declaration of law as we normally understand, please read on. Or, are the statements only advisory in nature? In “RavinderKaur Grewal vs. Manjit Kaur”, their lordships have considered the principle and scope of adverse possession in extenso. In the process, few precedents have been upset. Those situations convince me that the statements in paragraph 60 of amount to a declaration of law, despite the principle of per incuriam(infra).

The Constitution presupposes that the legislature, executive and judiciary will not overstep their respective jurisdictions. Many times, the doctrine of separation of powers is overlooked because “the terminator” line between them is hazy. I feel that the Constitution and others laws of the nation are reliquaries of many anachronistic concepts, making rule of law a shibboleth in the hands of a fractious society. We come across hundreds of occasions where courts have stepped in because the existing provisions are either insufficient or are not properly enforced. (I am reserving my opinion on the direction for payment of compensation for demolition of flats at Maradu, as it appears not to be fully in tune with “public trust” and “polluter pays” principles).

In a given case, the Constitutional Court can declare that certain statutory provision or some action by State or its organs is ultra vires, void and strike down or quash same. In some other situations, courts apply the principle of “reading down”.

Keeping that in mind, I would attempt to analyse “Ravinder Kaur Grewal”. As far as I could notice, the facts of case, as reported, do not reveal consideration of rights over public property. The judgement does not show that any of the litigants was a local authority or State.

It is well accepted that “a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”

The Limitation Act, 1963: Section 27-Extinguishment of right to property:At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. “Hereby” is, doubtless, with reference to various articles in the Schedule.

Articles 64, 65, 111 and 112 The Limitation Act:

It can be seen that Articles 111 and 112 do not contemplate adverse possession, but only possession, dispossession or discontinuance of possession as regards immovable property. Article 65 Limitation Act provides that time commences to run “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff”. The article obviously contemplates a suit by the title holder and defence of adverse possession by the defendant and not vice versa.

In other situations under analysis, commencement of running of time is from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession and not date of budding of adverse animus. Contradistinguished from Article 65, Articles 111 and 112 do not demand that possession should be adverse. In a suit governed by Article 65, hostile animus is essential over the entire period of 12 relevant years. But, in a suit covered by Articles 111 or 112, is not mere possession by a defendant of any public street or road or any part thereof or property of Government sufficient for the requisite period to extinguish title? In such cases, does a defendant have to plead and prove hostile nature of possession?

Ramiah v. N. Narayana Reddy(2004 (2) KLT OnLine 1219 (SC) = 2004) 7 SCC 541: AIR 2004 SC 4261 declares that: “Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908) is restricted to suits for possession on dispossession or discontinuance of possession. In order to bring a suit within the purview of that article, it must be shown that the suit is in terms as well as in substance based on the allegation of the plaintiff having been in possession and having subsequently lost the possession either by dispossession or by discontinuance. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908) on the other hand is a residuary article applying to suits for possession not otherwise provided for. Suits based on plaintiffs’ title in which there is no allegation of prior possession and subsequent dispossession alone can fall within article 65. The question whether the article of limitation applicable to a particular suit is article 64 or article 65 has to be decided by reference to pleadings”.

This gains importance when we apply the principle that where two or more articles may govern a suit, the litigant should be given the benefit of the more beneficial article in order to sustain his suit. Article 65 applies to public property other than public street or road or any part thereof; a person in possession of other public property can take shelter thereunder. Once Article 65 operates in favour of a person in possession of public property not coming under Article 111, Section 27 assumes the lead and says that the owner’s right to such property shall be extinguished. Despite exhaustive amendments to Limitation Act, the Parliament did not feel it necessary to provide a common time limit or character for acquisition of title by a trespasser to public property by adverse possession and limitation. It did not amalgamate Articles 65, 111 and 112 as regards different kinds of public property and as regards nature of possession with or without hostile animus. We have some other enactments which specifically provide that some rights cannot accrue in any situation.

In Navarattanmal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1961 SC 1704), a bench of 5 judges
was dealing with a challenge to the vires of Article 149 (now Article 112) Limitation Act. Their lordships turned down the challenge that Article 149 violated Article 14 of the Constitution, while answering the question whether there is a rational basis for treating the Government differently as regards the period within which claims might be put in suit between the Government on the one hand and private individuals on the other. The offshoot of the said decision is that a plea of limitation can be successfully urged against the government and public property in a given case.

In State of Kerala v. Varghese & Ors (1987 (1) KLT 62 (SC) = (1986) 4 SCC 746), the Apex Court reiterated the time honoured principle that “It is not for the court to reframe the legislation for the very good reason that the powers to ‘legislate’ have not been conferred on the court”.

As regards Article 142(1) of the Constitution, a bench of 5 judges held in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India(1998 (1) KLT SN 84 (C.No.85) SC = (1998) 4 SCC 409)
that “It, however, needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the court by Art. 142
being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. This power cannot be used to “supplant” substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the court.Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly”.

Jayant Verma & Ors. v. Union of India(2018 (1) KLT OnLine 3038 (SC)= (2018) 4 SCC 743):
declares that:Thus, “per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or authority binding on the Court concerned, or a statement of law caused by inadvertence or conclusion that has been arrived at without application of mind or proceeded without any reason so that in such a case some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. --------------- Also, the ratio decidendi of a judgment is the principle of law adopted having regard to the line of reasoning of the Judge which alone binds in future cases. Such principle can only be laid down after a discussion of the relevant provisions and the case law on the subject. If only one side is heard and a judgment is reversed, without any line of reasoning, and certain conclusions alone are arrived at, without any reference to any case law, it would be difficult to hold that such a judgment would be binding upon us and that we would have to follow it ------------”.

Were not Articles 111, 112, “Navarattanmal” and “Supreme Court Bar Association” brought to the notice of their lordships in “Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur”? Articles 111 and 112 being the law of the land, the Apex Court could not, should not and ought not to have disturbed the law.Prima facie,the question whether it could be so done in respect of public property did not arise for consideration in ‘Ravinder Kaur Grewal’’. Paragraph 60 thereof is against the principle that a Court cannot legislate, that too against a statutory provision. It declares the law on a point that is not seen (?) canvassed. It militates against the concept that law of limitation is a “statute of repose” whereby the true owner cannot riposte.  In that sense of the matter, paragraph 60 of “Ravinder Kaur Grewal vs. Manjit Kaur” is not good law. “Ravinder Kaur Grewal vs. Manjit Kaur” creates an anomalous situation rendering Articles 65, 111 and 112 non est.

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-trial-lawyer/practice/2016/when-the-judge-is-wrong/:There is no such thing as the judge being wrong. This proclamation was uttered to me by—you guessed it—a judge. It’s a judge’s job to be right, and ultimately they wear the robes, not you. However, every litigator will eventually encounter a jurist who is undeniably flat-out wrong on an issue. Whether the error is a ruling on an objection or a misapplication of the law, this scenario can leave both judge and litigator in a pickle.

Pursuit -- Par Excellence

(By P. Rajan, Advocate, Thalassery)

Hon’ble Justice P.Ubaid has bid adieu after serving as Judge of the High Court of Kerala for more than 5 years, before serving in the lower strata of the State Judiciary for about 25 years. As Judge of the High Court he was not after any sobriquet or media glare; discharged his duties with unalterable determination to render justice. The test of ability of a judge is the contents of his judgments, avoiding inexcusable delay in pronouncing orders. His language was temperate, reasonings fortified by proper expressions, not voluble but luscious. He is ineffable, well aware of the duty of a Judge - to protect the constitutional and legal rights of the litigants - the perception he never dispelled. His impeccable integrity was quiet evident as he ardently kept at bay susceptibility of simblings, during his career.

His reticence in Court was dignified, though being stickler to procedures and pleadings. No doubt his inborn characteristics have been his integrity and intellect, not acquired to suit the seat he occupied of late. We are passing through a period of anguish, when reputation and efficiency of the judicial system at the national level itself is a matter of criticism and viewed with suspicion, by the polity. The Chief Justice of India had to pull up his registry for improper listing system of cases and had to lament for, weeks’ delay in placing a missive before him, sent by the rape victim in the much publicised unnao gang sexual assault incident, in which political big brothers, too are the suspects. The complaint against the master of the roster of the top Court by a paralegal woman member ended, after a controversial in house enquiry, which had invited nation wide resentment. When a senior Judge of the Patna High Court had spoken of corruption in the High Court of Bihar - his judicial work and cases before him were withdrawn by the Chief Justice of that Court, discord evident among, Judges. The collegium’s cherry-picking for promotion of High Court Judges has been questioned before the apex court itself. Recent transfer of Madras High Court Chief Justice V.K.Tahilramani to Meghalaya High Court became a debatable issue legally too, High Court lawyers’ abstained from work in Tamil Nadu stating that the transfer order is punitive; one High Court is as good as another opined some and the order is no demotion. Whatever may be the views and opinions in this regard, systemic faults of the collegium system - lack of opaqueness even after the third judges’ case decided by the Apex Court, is inferrable some times.

State judiciary here is one of the bests in the country, though not the best, repeated in unison, by the union law ministry and many, time and again. But rarely the picture did not appear so rosy - exercise of supervisory powers, the members are subjected to, rarely lead to drastic outcome. Dis-heartening to note, a district Judge of Alappuzha had to take the extreme step of suicide, rumoured, as his performance was not to the level of approval of the higher-ups; not long ago.

Justice Ubaid had started his judicial career from the lower rung of the system and served later as Sub Judge, District Judge and as High Court Judge. Ascent to the exalted assignment never changed his attitude or approach as a person always, striven to render justice, though change is the way of life. He was not a whip-lasher in Court even if his questions remained unanswered or difficult to answer by the bar. While swearing in as the High Court Judge he had declared that he would do his job with social commitment, within the constitutional commands and constraints. To buttress this statement judgements are plethora (2015 (1) KLT page 52, 2017 (2) KLT page 713, 2019 (3) KLT page 586 to mention some).

This writer had occasion to appear before him while serving as Magistrate, Sub-Judge, District Judge and also in the High Court. His court was agile and lively-his zest was to render justice. This write-up is not an attempt of votive or vouchsafe, but narration of experience and appreciation; as Justice Ubaid being an unassuming person and erudite Judge.

It is very easy to give examples - but arduous to become an example.

Among the Most Advanced Dispute Resolution Methods

Adopted Nations in the World,India must Stand in the Forefront

with the Most Advanced and Effective Dispute Resolution Methods

(By P.R. Shaji, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

Access to justice, in its widest sense of effective resolution of disputes, whether through court based litigation or alternative dispute resolution process, is an essential aspect of ensuring the realisation of the fundamental rights recognized and given protection, by Article 39A of the Constitution of India. Establishment of the most advanced dispute resolution system, which enshrined in Article 21 (right to life includes right to life without personal troubles), which state is obliged to the people of India under Article 39A of the Constitution of India. Article 21 can be honoured by implementing the constitutional right of access to justice. Right to life includes right to live with dignity, with peace of mind by getting facility to redressel of the grievances easily and swiftly. Access to justice includes right to select the judge or forum for adjudication, except in criminal matters and public interest involved issues like taxes, matters relating to revenue etc.

To promoting the motto access to justice, a modern justice system should offer a variety of approaches and options to dispute resolution. Citizen should be empowered to find a satisfactory solution to their problem. Which include the option for selection of court or forum of dispute resolution as part among wider menu of choices.

ADR complements the role of the court in resolving the disputes, swift in speed, economic in economy, final in finality.

Let there be a parting out, from adversarial system of law practitioners to, both adversarial system of law practitioners and democratic system of law practitioners; and commanding resolution method to obligation resolution method.

Inroads among many are:

Nobody to supervise and instruct the implementation of ADR provisions in tribunals like NCLT, labour dispute tribunals, industrial disputes tribunals etc.’

Instead of, and in addition to, the current decision making method, decision of court must be, on the basis of the decision on the impasse points, which framed with the consent of the parties, for referral to the decision of the Court, during the course of mediation talk, and on the basis of such decisions mediation settlement should be signed by the parties which shall be final and no appeal thereafter.

There must be some provisions in the statute to insist at the instance of parties to the mediation or at the request of the mediator, court may issue directions to persons including public officials to be present and participate in the mediation proceeding and disobedience to the direction issued by the court in this regard will have to be treated as contemptuous.

In new amendment of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, High Court will be grantor of approval to the ADR institutions but there must be somebody just like Bar Council to lawyers, to test the competency and ability of the professional like mediators, conciliators, arbitrators, negotiators etc., and to give continuing professional education for which there must be some mechanism to achieve that goal, to prevent, reduce and resolve disputes, by conducting, coordinating, regulating, catalyzing and promoting ADR methods.

Untrained arbitrators and untrained reference jurisdiction handling judges and arbitration appellate jurisdiction of High Court will dilute the very purpose of the statute itself by delaying the process.

Government is one of the parties in majority of cases. There must be provision to settlement of government involved cases through mediation or any other ADR process for speedy disposal.

Criminal cases can be settled either way or parties can collect the documents which they are entitled to receive as a matter of right if not settled by collecting reports or information which authorities were alleged to be hesitating to provide.

In arbitration, recording evidence in support of the court of law is again to retain the elements for delay, and dependency of the court.

If any one of the party has expressed interest in settling the matter through mediation and one of the party is not, there must be a provision to prevent the other party from wriggling out from mediation without harming his interest. There must be provision for protecting the interest of any other persons whose interest will not protect by delaying tactics of the parties to the mediation.

There must some legislation for Accreditation and training of mediators, regulations for conduct of mediations, by various non-statutory and statutory bodies and individuals for assuring the quality of mediators and for regulating the code of conduct for mediators, arbitrators and Conciliators.

Reservation system of Indian public service has led to a situation of compromising of quality of services. In the case of treatment of diseases one can select the best doctor for him to consult or for obtaining best medical service or in alternate, in the absence of his choice of medical practitioner in the public service, he can resort the service of an expert from the private service, both are graduated or qualified either from the government medical college or from the private medical colleges; in that way one can opt the doctor on the basis of institutions from which he graduated or institutions in which he is working. This facility rather opportunity must be there in dispensation of justice also. As there is no role to the public in election of judges of the court of law (as in the western country) in India, but government can provide this facility rather opportunity through ADR till this facility is there in Court of law.

Right to information includes right to know about the institutions and person which/ who, are qualified to give services of the different disciplines of ADR in the nation. For judiciary there is judicial academy to train judicial officials. Who will take the authority of imparting training in Arbitration, mediation, conciliation, negotiation, Lok adalat, judicial settlement etc. in the absence of specific legislation to that effect, especially by defining these processes individually, describing its procedures deferentially, uniquely and codifiedly both in the case of definition and procedure.

Some “Flat” Thoughts -- The Dream that Became A Nightmare !!!

(By K.G.Balasubramanian, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

God’s own country -- our own paradise

With sea on one side, hills on the other

Flat ly here, dreams of breeze and sunshine

Float here, fury and wrath of Nature!

Flagged by law of the land

Flogged by Themis

Ragged by greed, robbed by men!

Men in robes fidgeting and fighting

For a cause that killed her.

The coast is gone, the cove is ugly

The waves are gone, the breeze is gone

H₂O remains a tear on parched eyes!

Flats waiting to be flattened

Men waiting to be flattered

Alas, “HOLY FAITH” has an unholy fate?!

amtd-I-Xpw, amtä-I-Xpw

(By B. Somasekharan Nair, Advocate, Punalur)

1988-- se tamt«mÀ hml\ \nb-a-¯n 2019-þ 32-þmw \¼-dmbn \ne-hn h¶ (32 of 2019) t`Z-KXn ]cs¡ NÀ¨ sN¿-s¸-Sp-I-bm-W-tÃm. A\p-Iq-e-am-bpw, {]Xn-Iq-e-ambpw \nc-h[n t]À cwK¯vh¶n-«pIv. cIp Iq«cpw X§-fpsS hmZ-ap-J-§Ä¡v Dt]m-Zv_-e-I-§-fmb \ym-bo-I-c-W-§fpw \S-¯p¶p-Iv.  F¶m hml-\-A-]-I-S-§sf \nb-{´n-¡m-\p-ff ASn-Øm-\-t`-Z-K-Xn-Isf Ipdn¨v \nb-a-ÚÀ t]mepw Nn´n¨p ImWp-¶n-Ã.

Ct¸mÄ sImIp h¶n-cn-¡p¶ t`Z-K-Xn-IÄ Hcp `mK¯v in£ AÀln-¡p¶ Ipä-§fpw, adp-`m-K¯v henb A]-I-S§Ä Hgn-hm-¡m-\p-ff {]Xn-tcm-[-hp-am-Wv.  t`Z-K-Xn-bn \nÀt±-in¨n«pff ]ng-XpI HcÀ°-¯n P\-§Ä tNmZn¨p hm§n-b-Xm-Wv. slÂaäv [cn-¡m-¯-hÀ¡pw, koäv s_Âäv CSm-¯-hÀ¡pw hn[n-¨n-cp¶ 100 cq] ]ng ]pÃp-t]mse hen-s¨-dnªv _Ô-s¸« DtZ-ym-K-ØÀ¡v ap¼n-eqsS sImª-\w-Ip¯n Nodn ]mbp¶ AhØ \nb-a-s¯-t]mepw ]cn-l-kn-¡p-¶-Xm-bn-cp-¶p. F¶m ]ng-XpI Iq«m³ Xocp-am-\n¨ tI{µ-kÀ¡mÀ “H¶p-In Bimsâ s\©¯v AsÃ-¦n If-cn¡v ]pd¯v"F¶ a«n ]e \nbaewL-\-§Ä¡pw Iq«nb XpI SmIvkn HmSn-¨pw, sXmgn sNbvXpw aäpw Pohn-¡p¶-hÀ¡v Xm§m³ Bhm¯ ØnXn-bp-am-bn. HmhÀ temUn\v \nÝ-bn-¨n-cn-¡p¶ ]ng-XpI Hc-Sn-Øm-\-hp-an-Ãm-¯-XmWv. CXv Nc¡v \o¡-s¯-t]mepw hfsc kmc-ambn _m[n-¨p. Nne-t¸mÄ Nc¡p hml-\-§-fn Ib-än-bn-cn-¡p¶ km[-\-§-fpsS hne-tb-¡mÄ henb XpI "Npa-¡p¶ IgpX sImSp-t¡In hcpw".

tamt«mÀ hml\\nb-a-t`-Z-K-Xn-bn \nÀt±-in-¡p¶-Xn-t\-¡mÄ henb ]ng-IÄ kam\ Ipä-§Ä¡v tIcf s]meokv BIvSv (Act 8 of 2011) hy-hØ sNbvXn-«pIv F¶p-ff kXyw Gsd Bfp-IÄ¡pw AÚm-X-am-Wv.  Hcp ]t£ tamt«mÀ hml-\-\n-baw t]mse e£I-W-¡n\v P\-§sf s]mXp-hmbn _m[n-¡p¶ hnjbw AÃm-¯-Xp-sIm-Imhmw ]ecpw t]meokv BIvSnse t`Z-K-Xn-IÄ {i²n-¡msX t]mbXv. t]meokv BIvSnse 118 AA\p-k-cn¨v s]mXp-Ø-e¯v aZ-y-]n¨v Ie-l-k-z-`m-hn-bm-tbm, Xs¶¯m³ Icp-Xm³ \nhr-¯n-bn-Ãm-sXtbm \n¡p¶ HcmÄ¡v 3 hÀj-tam, 10,000 cq]tbm cIpw IqSntbm in£ \ÂIm³ hy-h-Ø-bp-Iv. sXämb hmÀ¯-IÄ {]N-cn-¸n-¡p-¶-hÀ¡pw CXpXs¶-bmWv ]ng. CX-S¡w \nc-h[n in£-IÄ 118, 119 hIp-¸p-I-fn DÄs¸-Sp-¯n-bn-«pIv.

t]meokv BIvSnse 120AA\p-k-cn¨v s]mXp-P-\-§Ä¡v ie-y-tam, Aku-I-c-ytam DIm-I-¯¡ Xc-¯n hml-\-§Ä s]mXp-Ø-e-¯n«v Igp-In-bm t]mepw Hcp hÀjtam, 5000 cq]tbm \ÂIm³ hy-h-Ø-bp-Iv.  s]mXp-P-\-§Ä¡v XS-Ê-tam, Aku-I-c-ytam, A]-I-Stam DIm-I-¯¡ Xc-¯n hml\§Ä ]mÀ¡v sNbvXmepw in£ CXp-X-s¶-bm-Wv. Section 120(a)apX (q)hsc-bp-ff Ipä-§Ä¡v 5000/þ cq] hsc in£ \ÂImw. s]mXp-Ø-e¯v aq{X-sam-gn-¨mepw, que Bh-i-y-ap-f-fn-S¯v ewLn-¨mepw, in£ Hcp hÀj-hpw, 5000/= cq]-bp-amWv. F¶m Cu \nb-a-§Ä A\p-k-cn¨v in£n-¡-s¸-Sp-¶-h-cp-sS-bpw, ]nSn-Iq-S-s¸-Sp-¶-h-cp-sSbpw F®w Xmc-X-ta-y\ hfsc Ipd-hm-Wv. t`Z-KXn sN¿p-¶Xn\p ap¼p-ff t]meokv BIvSv A\p-k-cn¨v s]mXp-Ø-e¯p \n¶pw Ak-`yw ]d-bp-¶-hÀ¡v 51AA\p-k-cn¨v shdpw 50/þ cq] am{X-am-bn-cp¶p in£.

C{Xbpw ]d-ª-Xp-sImIv tamt«mÀ hml\ \nb-a-¯nse ]pXnb in£ A¸msS AwKo-I-cn-¡p¶ F¶À°-an-Ã. ]Ww IIm ]nWhpw hm s]mfn¡pw F¶p ]d-bp-¶-Xp-t]m-se, ]Ww FhnsS IImepw sImIphm F¶v Iev]n-¡p¶ Ah-Ø-bn-se-¯nb tIc-f-kÀ¡mÀ bmsXmcp Nn´-tbm, Ah-[m-\-Xtbm CÃm-sX-bmWv \nbaw tIc-f-¯n \S-¸m-¡n-b-Xv. AXnsâ A\-´-c-^-e-§-fmWv Ct¸mÄ \S-¡p¶ hnhmZ§Ä.

{]iv\w AXà Ct¸mÄ \nÝ-bn-¨n-«p-ff ]ng-IÄ Xmc-X-ta-y\ sNdp-Xpw, F¶m henb A]-I-S-§Ä¡v Imc-W-hp-am-Ip¶ Ipä-§Ä¡m-Wv. A]-I-S-§Ä DIm-bm Ct¸mÄ F´mWv AhØ? C´y³ in£m \nb-a-¯nse 279, 337, 338, 304 AhIp-¸p-IÄ A\p-k-cn-¨mWv km[m-cW KXn-bn tamt«mÀ hml\ A]-I-S-§-fp-ambn _Ô-s¸« tIkv cPn-ÌÀ sN¿m-dp-f-f-Xv. Cu hIp-¸p-I-fpsS AhØ NÀ¨ sN¿-s¸-Sp-I-bpw, Ah ]cn-l-cn-¡-s¸-Sp-Ibpw sNbvXn-sÃ-¦n  tdmU-]-I-S-§Ä¡v Dt±-in-¡p¶ ]cn-lmcw DIm-hp-I-bn-Ã.

C´-y³ in£m \nb-a-¯nse 279 hIp¸v Fs´¶pw, “Rash driving or riding on a public way” in£ Fs´¶pw hn[n-¡p¶ t]meokv `mj-bntem, tImSXn `mj-bn-tem ]d-ªm A]m-I-am-bpw, DZm-ko-\-ambpw AsÃ-¦n AXn-th-K-X-bnepw A{i-²-bnepw a\pjyPoh\v B]¯v hc-¯¡ coXn-bnepw hml\w HmSn¨v ]cp¡p ]äp-I-tbm, ]cp¡p ]ä-¯¡ coXn-bn hml-\-tam-Sn-¡p-Itbm sNbvXm-ep-ff in£ 1000 cq]-tbm, 6 amktam cIpw IqSntbm BWv.

A]-ISw aqew \nkmc ]cp-¡p-IÄ ]än-bm 279-þmw hIp-¸n-t\m-sSm¸w 337-þmw hIp¸v IqSn tNÀ¯mWv Ipä-]{Xw \ÂIp-I. Cu hIp-¸nsâ in£ 6 amk-tam, 500 cq]tbm, cIpw IqSntbm BWv.

hml-\m-]-I-S-¯n Cc-I-fm-Ip¶ Bfp-IÄ¡v Kpcp-X-c-amb ]cp-¡p-IÄ ]än-bm 279, 337 hIp-¸p-IÄ¡v ]pdta 338-þmw hIp¸v A\p-k-cn¨v IqSn Ipä-]{Xw \ÂIpw. Cu hIp-¸n hnh-cn-¨n-cn-¡p¶ in£ 1000/þ cq]-tbm, 2 hÀjtam cIpw IqSntbm BWv.

Ct¸mÄ \ne-hn h¶ tamt«mÀ hml\ t`Z-KXn \nb-a-hp-ambn X«n¨p t\m¡p-t¼mÄ Cu sshcp²yw \nb-a-¯nse Hcp A\o-Xn-bm-Wv. Kpcp-Xc ]cp-¡p-IÄ Nne-t¸mÄ ac-W-t¯-¡mÄ `bm-\-I-am-Wv. icocw sam¯w tNX-\-bäv t]mIp¶hÀ, ssIIm-ep-IÄ tOZn-¡-s¸-Sp-¶hÀ, sshcq-]yw kw`-hn-¡p-¶-hÀ, \nX-y-tcm-Kn-I-fmbn amdp¶-hÀ, ImgvN-i-àn-bpw, kwkm-c-ti-jnbpw \jvS-s¸-Sp-¶hÀ CsXms¡ Kpcp-X-c-amb ]cp-¡p-I-fpsS KW-¯n hcp-¶-Xm-Wv. acWw Hcp IpSpw-_s¯ Zp;-J-¯n-em-gv¯pw. F¶m Pohn-¨n-cn-¡p¶ c£-km-£n-IÄ F{Xtbm hÀj-§Ä BWv AhÀ¡pw, IpSpw-_-¯n\pw `mc-ambn amdp-¶-Xv. \jvS-]-cn-lmcw sImIv Cu apdn-hp-IÄ DW-§p-¶-X-Ã.

Npcp-¡-¯n 279, 337, 338 hIp-¸p-IÄ A\p-k-cn-¨p-ff Hcp tIkn {]Xn-bm-Ip¶ ss{UhÀ¡v ]c-am-h[n  In«p¶  in£  2500/þ cq]-bpsS  ]ng-bm-Wv.   AZm-e-¯n  XoÀ¯m  ]ng-kw-Jy ]Ip-Xn-bm-Ipw. {]Xn t\cn«v lmP-cm-I-W-sa-¶n-Ã. Hcp Pq\n-bÀ A`n-`m-j-I\v sNdn-sbmcp ^okv sImSp-¯v, tIkv Ipäw k½-Xn¨v XoÀ¡mw. tIknse {]Xn¡v sNbvX Ipä-¯nsâ Kuchw Hcn-¡epw t_m[-y-s¸-Sp-¶n-Ã. \nÊm-c-amb ]ng-b-S¨v hoIpw sXäp-I-fn-te¡v AhÀ hgpXn hogpw. bm{X-¡mÀ k©-cn-¡p¶ Hcp _kv aÕ-c-tbm«w \S¯n  A]-I-S-¯nÂs¸«v 50 Bfp-IÄ¡p#w Kpcp-X-c-amb ]cp¡p ]än-bmepw ]ng 2500/þ cq] Xs¶.  \nb-a-¯nse Cu ]gpXv ASt¨ aXn-bm-Iq.  tamt«mÀ hml-\-\n-b-a-t`-Z-KXn sImIv C¯cw Ipä-hm-fn-IÄ¡v amXr-Im-]-c-amb in£ e`n-¡p-I-bn-Ã.

hml-\m-]-I-S-¯n Cc-IÄ acn-¨m Section 304 AA\p-k-cn¨v tIkv cPn-ÌÀ sN¿pw. Chn-sSbpw in£ cIv hÀj-tam, ]ng-tbm, cIpw IqSntbm BWv. thW-sa-¦n hnth-N-\m-[n-Imcw D]-tbm-Kn¨v aXn-bmb Imc-W-§-fpsS ]n³_-e-¯n ]ng in£-bn HXp¡n \nI-¯m\pw tImS-Xn-IÄ¡v A[n-Im-c-ap-Iv. ]ng kwJy F{X-sb¶v Cu hIp¸v {]tX-y-I-ambn ]d-bp-¶n-sÃ-¦nepw Hcp PpUo-j-y ^Ìv ¢mÊv aPn-kvt{S-än\v ]c-am-h[n \ÂIm³ Ign-bp¶ ]ng kwJy 10,000/þ cq]-bm-Wv.

At¸mÄ A]-I-S-§Ä XS-b-W-sa-¦n IPC 279, 337, 338, 304AhIp-¸p-I-fn in£bv¡v amäw hc-Ww. ]t£ ChnsS Hcp \nba {]iv\-apIv. ta kqNn-¸n¨ 337, 338, 304 AhIp-¸p-I-fn “Any rash and negligent Act”F¶mWv Ipäs¯ \nÀh-Nn-¨n-«p-f-f-Xv. At¸mÄ tamt«mÀ hml-\ A]-I-S-§Ä am{X-aà Cu hIp-¸p-I-fpsS ]cn-[n-bn hcp-¶Xv. A§-s\-sb-¦n t`Z-KXn Cu hIp-¸nsâ ]cn-[n-bn hcp¶ FÃm Ipä-Ir-X-y-§Ä¡pw Hcpt]mse _m[-I-am-Ip¶p. AXvv Bsc-sbms¡, F§-s\-sbms¡ _m[n¡pw F¶v \nco-£n¨v a\-Ên-em-t¡-IXv \nb-a-\nÀ½m-Xm-¡Ä BWv. ta ]dª hIp-¸p-I-fn “Any Act”sâ N«-¡q-«n \n¶v hml-\m-]-I-S-§sf tamNn-¸n¨v Ahbv¡v {]tX-yI hIp-¸p-IÄ t`Z-K-Xn-bn-eqsS sImIp hcm³ Ign-bptam F¶pw Btem-Nn-¡m-hp-¶-Xm-Wv.  aäv ]e hIp-¸p-I-fnepw C¯cw t`Z-K-Xn-IÄ sImIp h¶n-«p-Iv.

C´-y³ in£m \nbaw 1860-þ \ne-hn h¶-t¸mÄ \nÝ-bn¨ XpI-bmWv 500-þ-Dw, 1000-þDw Hs¡.  Ct¸mgpw AXv amä-an-ÃmsX XpS-cp-¶p.  hnP-\-amb hoYn-I-fpw, hnc-f-amb hml-\-§-fp-ap-ff Imf-hIn bpK-¯nse in£-IÄ Hcp amä-hp-an-ÃmsX apt¶m«p t]mIp-¶p. Xmc-X-ta-y\ eLp-hmb Ipä-§Ä¡v tamt«mÀ hml-\-\n-ba t`Z-K-Xn-bn-eqsS ]ng hÀ²n-¸n-¡p-¶p. bYmÀ° Ipä-§-fpw, Ipä-hm-fn-Ifpw kaq-l-¯n s]cp-Ip¶p. Bcw-`-Im-e-L-«-¯n Npa-¯n-bn-cp¶ 500, 1000 cq]-bpsS aqe-yhpw, hnebpw IW-¡m-¡n-bm C¶s¯ e£-tam, e£-§tfm hcpw.

tamt«mÀ hml\ A]-I-S-§Ä bailable offence (Pm-ayw In«p-¶) Ipä-§-fmbn \ne-\nÀ¯p-¶-Xn sXän-Ã. ImcWw A]-cn-Nn-X-amb Hcp Øe¯v A\n-b-{´n-X-amb Imc-W-§Ä sImIv DIm-Im-hp¶  A]-I-S-¯n {]Xn tNÀ¡-s¸-Sp¶ ss{UhÀ¡v s]s«¶v Pma-y-¡msc In«m-\pw, Pmayw Dd-¸m-¡m\pw ]e-t¸mgpw _p²n-ap«v DIm-hpw. F¶m Pmayw \ÂIp-t¼mÄ Xs¶ Ipä-¯nsâ Kuchw in£-bpsS Ipd-hp-sImIv eLq-I-cn¨v In«m³ Ipä-hm-fn¡v Ah-kcw \ÂI-cp-Xv.

At¸mÄ amäw thIXv ISp¯ Ipä-§Ä¡mWv. Hcn-¡Â t]mepw Xm³ hcp¯n h¨ A]-ISw Cc-Isf _m[n-¨-Xns\ Ipdn¨v HmÀ¡m-t\m, Ipä-t_m[w tXm¶mt\m CS-bm-Im¯ kml-N-c-y-amWv C¶v \ne-\n¡p-¶-Xv.  {]Xn¡v tImS-Xn-bn t]mtIIn hcp¶n-Ã. hnNm-cW t\cn-tSIn hcp¶n-Ã.  XpSÀ Ipä-§Ä Hgn-hm-¡m³ {i²n-¡p-¶n-Ã.

CXv UnPn-ä Ime-L-«-am-Wv.  A]-I-S-¯nÂs¸Sp¶ hml-\-§Ä HmSn-¡p¶ ss{UhÀam-cpsS tIkv hnh-c-§Ä tcJ-s¸-Sp¯n kq£n-¡p-¶-Xn\v kuI-c-y-§-fp-Iv. Ipä-§Ä BhÀ¯n-¨m in£ ITn-\-am-Ipw, F¶v Dd¸p hcp-¯m³ Ign-b-Ww.

Ct¸mÄ \nÀt±-in-¡-s¸-«n-«p-ff tamt«mÀhm-l-\-t`-Z-KXn \nb-a-¯n \nÀt±-in-¡-s¸-«n-«p-ff hÀ²n-¸n¨ ]ng-Isf kw_-Ôn¨v A`n-{]mb sFIyw DIm¡n ka-hm-b-¯n F¯p-¶Xv \ÃXv Xs¶. H¸w C´-y³ in£m \nbaw 279,337, 338, 304AhIp-¸pIf-\p-k-cn-¨p-ff Ipä-Ir-X-y-§Ä \nÊm-c-h¡-cn-¡-s¸«p t]mIp-¶Xv F§s\ XS-bm³ Ignbpw F¶m-tem-Nn-¨m am{Xta bYmÀ° Ipä-Ir-X-y-§Ä Ipd-bp-I-bp-ffq AXn\v {ian-t¡-IXv \nb-a-\nÀ½m-Xm-¡-fpw.