By K.G. Balasubramanian, Advocate, High Court of Kerala
Some thoughts on grounds of appeal --
to urge or not to urge ?
(By K.G. Balasubramanian, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
It was quite a relief to read Kalliani v. Balagopalan (2009 (1) KLT 288). The learned Judge has ruled, in his inimitable style, that it is not compulsory that a Memorandum of Second Appeal should raise grounds of objection to the decree appealed from. I initially thought of all that one could save in terms of time, energy, space and expense.
I felt, also: A requiem to all those grounds of appeal - many of them stereotyped over a century, quite a few of them raised after sleepless nights, some brilliant, few of them bolts out of the blue, and of course, a few during more exasperating moments - and, most of them ultimately ignored - now put to rest?
But, I did have some reservations about the proposition. Though convincing, convenient and welcome, it required further examination.
Naturally, my search took me, without any real research, to The Kerala High Court Act, 1958 and Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971.
The Preamble to the Act says it is an Act to make provision regulating the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court of the State of Kerala. The Rules are framed in exercise of powers under Art.225 & u/S.122 C.P.C.----- etc.
And I found, hidden, among the impressive provisions in that most revered - but mostly ignored - Holy Book, Rr.3 and 47.
R.3 says: All existing rules insofar as they relate to matters provided for in these rules shall stand repealed. R.47 says: The memorandum in second appeals, Civil Miscellaneous Appeals and Civil Revision Petitions shall contain a brief statement of facts of the case and shall set out the grounds of objections to the judgement or order appealed against or sought to be set aside.
Desirability aside, according to me, provisions of C.P.C. have to give way to the High Court Act/Rules. Though it is slightly debatable whether the 1976 amendment to C.P.C. affects Rr.3 and 47, it needs to be said that when S.100 says “Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force-------”, R.47 cannot be ignored (Quaere).
But, one difficult situation! The Appellate Court will continue to ask many a time: Did you raise it in the lower Court ? We have myriad precedents where appellant(s) lost because a ground/point not raised in the court below could not be urged in Appeal/Second Appeal/S.L.P. Considering the time honoured fact that two lawyers never think alike on the same point - so the bard sang - is it not in the interest of litigants and practice that grounds be insisted in any appeal without exception? Let us raise grounds, not eyebrows.
Well, “grounds” cannot be grounded after all! They too serve.
By P. Vinod Bhattathiripad, Cyber Forensic Consultant, Calicut
Judiciary-friendly Computer Forensics
(By P. Vinod Bhattathiripad, Cyber Forensic Consultant, Calicut)
The New Indian Express on 13th January 2009, carries a story that says, “The police are reported to have taken into custody for interrogation some former staff of a leading jewellery house in Palakkad in connection with a fraud of Rs 46 lakh committed by manipulating the software and data base of the computers of the firm. The frauds were committed during a three-and-a-half-year period beginning in early 2004. The police have already detected concrete proof for frauds perpetrated to the tune of Rs.15 lakh and are in the process of proving the balance amount. The case which falls in the category of cyber financial fraud was being investigated by the police since September 2007 when it was first noticed and reported by the management of the jewellery firm to the police..........”
The preliminary routine investigation by Palakkad police did not find any tangible evidence favouring the complaint. It perhaps did not occur to them at that stage that they might well be ‘fumbling in the dark’, without the assistance of a cyber forensic expert. There really was no physical evidence, but only digital evidence existed, which the police could not “see” and “feel”. It was after three months that the case was made over to Neeraj Kumar Gupta, a young Assistant Police Superintendent of Palakkad police, who sniffed out the whiff of crime in the case and sought the assistance of this author for investigating the case and as the Indian Express report (later) says, “The police unearthed all digital evidences with the help of its technical expert”. This digital evidence later got corroborated in the court by an expert commissioner, who also was a cyber forensic expert. (The final judgment of this suit is still pending in the court.)
Cases of the above type were unimaginable a few years back, but in the modern world of information and communication technology, criminals are expanding their horizons into the electronic space. The information and communication technology revolution has taken the world to greater heights, but one significant side-effect of this is the importance of the ethical, legal and practical issues related to abuse through or by the technology. Any crime related to this technology, in general, and computers, in particular, is a cyber crime, be it cyber financial fraud, identity theft, hacking, slacking, threat through email, virus, pornography, unauthorized disclosure of internal and confidential information, theft or trade of intellectual property, use of computers for personal gain, violation of company acceptable policies, launching of denial of service attacks on computer network servers, software piracy or supply of low-quality Information Technology (IT) products. There have been civil and criminal suits concerning all these areas, and the role of cyber forensic experts in identifying the crime, collecting, preserving and interpreting the evidence and in convincing the judiciary is important. The petitioners, lawyers, police and the judiciary seek the help of cyber forensic experts at various stages of the investigation, litigation and arbitration.
These developments have led on to the emergence of a new field of applied computer technology, generally called computer forensics or cyber forensics. Computer forensics, as the name indicates, is an inter-disciplinary area, largely straddling global use of computer technology and the law-enforcement and is responsible for identifying, locating, extracting, and analyzing types of data from various computers and related devices, and the cyber forensic experts interpret them to serve as legal evidence. The most important skill of a cyber forensic expert is his ability to identify and interpret the electronic evidence and communicate it in a judiciary-friendly manner. Cyber crimes occur in plenty of ways that a cyber forensic expert specialized in certain areas may not be able to do justice to other areas of cyber crime investigation. For instance, software piracy and cyber financial fraud investigations require computer engineers with hardcore experience in software engineering and database techniques while tracing the author of a threatening e-mail or a dangerous virus require expertise in computer network engineering. Because the judicial system often has difficulties in mandating and interpreting standardization for computer forensics, it becomes the responsibility of the computer engineers to assist in this endeavor.
The cliche that no man is an island is more true today of the computer community than any other, and this puts any individual computer user very much at risk in that his computer is likely to be prone and susceptible to any error or misuse originating from any part of the computer network, including the world wide web. It is probably true to say that unlike in the physical world, a person may technically be guilty of a computer crime without either the mens rea or the actus reus. It is therefore the duty of the cyber forensic experts to assist the investigators to detect and document all such electronic evidence.
Electronic evidence is in the form of data and information, stored in the computer disks or other electronic storage devices. (In IT, a distinction is often made between data and information. Roughly, information is what is available on the surface as processed version and data is how it is underlyingly represented in the raw form in computer storage.) Collecting ‘information’ is relatively easier than digging out the ‘data’, particularly if the storing of the data uses intentional and deliberate concealment techniques.
Traditionally, there are ways of storing data that control access and use of material stored. Even though most of this is fairly sophisticated, none of them are strictly beyond misuse by determined criminals. The complexities of storage and the cleverness of intrusions into the secrecy by determined criminals constitute serious problems for the expert, who, when called upon, has to wade through the morass of storage and concealment of both the encryptions and intrusions and come out with tangible and clear evidence that will be admissible to the judiciary.
Although the data is usually stored in files and data bases, there are many ways to intentionally conceal or obscure such storage. One way to conceal data is by using cryptographic algorithms in which the communications are encrypted and thus kept hidden from anyone for whom it is not intended. Only the intended recipient of the communication will have the key to decrypt the communication, back into an intelligible form. A sub-version of cryptography is a method known as Secret Sharing Scheme where ‘k’ out of ‘n’ people have enough information to decrypt the code but any set of k minus l people do not. The modern cryptographic algorithms are so perfectly designed that it is very difficult, but not impossible, for the expert to break into.
Steganography is another art of hidden writing. While cryptography enables one to keep the message unreadable, Steganography hides the secret information within a document, say, in an innocent photograph, from where the intended recipient can extract what is required by going into the data pertaining to this photograph. While cryptography and Steganography form important means of secret communication for the right kind of interactions including those involving national security, they also run the risk of being abused and misused by unscrupulous criminals. These sorts of crime investigation require cyber forensic experts specialized in the art of encryption intrusion.
Computer networks are prone to criminal invasion, and there are also several popular and ingenious techniques used for this. One concealment technique employed in the computer network, often open to abuse, is the Internet Protocol (IP). The abuse of this, called IP Spoofing, is the technique of attacking another computer by ‘spoofing’ the electronic identity (e.g. IP address) of a trusted machine in order to mask the attacker’s true IP address. Another such computer network attacking technique is ‘tapping’, which is the method of unauthorized gaining of access to a computer system by tapping somebody else’s existing login session on a computer system. Once the official user gains (or opens) a login session onto a remote computer system after giving the necessary authentication data (say, user name, password etc), the attacker too would be able to use this open path to gain another login session or get into the same remote computer system, bypassing all authentication requirements. Only experts specialized in computer networks can investigate such crimes.
A more insidious technique, used in viruses and worms, is polymorphism, which causes viruses etc. to mutate albeit by keeping the original algorithm intact and this makes the job of anti-virus and intrusion detection software difficult. Identifying the author of viruses and worms by tracing back through the computer network is a common area of investigation for cyber forensic experts.
Another invasive technique is to hide secret data in the swap file (alias virtual memory), which is the file created in the hard disk by the operating system to simulate extra RAM. As swap files are huge, it provides a way for the criminals to store secret data without the knowledge of the computer user. Once the computer is switched off, any data stored in the RAM will be lost but data stored in the swap file (though an extension of RAM) is not lost and this makes the job of the criminal easy and that of the expert, difficult.
File slacking is another data concealment technique, where the criminal makes use of the blank space of an already used cluster (usually the last cluster of a file). A cluster is the smallest block of data storage (in a hard disk, for example) on computers run on DOS, and Windows. The size of a cluster is fixed. If a stored file consumes 3.75 clusters, the last quarter of the 4th cluster would remain vacant and this blank space is called a ‘file slack’. Technically the computer informs the user that it has earmarked four clusters for the file but actually only 3.75 clusters are used. Because of this, if a criminal stores his secret file in the file slack (the balance 0.25 cluster, in the above example), the actual total storage consumption shown by the computer will not change and thus it is difficult, but not impossible, for the expert to get to know the information about the secret file thus stored.
Renaming of files is a clever method adopted by the criminals. They can introduce and store a file containing secret information and then name it as a DLL or JPEG file (or any other normal ‘harmless’ common file type) so as to escape detection or divert the attention of the cyber forensic expert. Computer criminality is so sophisticated that not only do criminals abuse the concealment techniques but also cleverly cover their tracks by concealing or obfuscating the detection of their incursions. This is generally called anti-forensics. One method used for this is spoliation, which refers to the material alteration or destruction of data thereby preventing or spoiling later access into it for the purpose of extracting information to be used as evidence of interference in potential litigation. Anti-forensic software tools like Timestamp, help concealing, editing or deleting valuable evidence in order to make it unreliable in the court. Many tools are available that can readily wipe files, directories, partitions, and hard drives. They are as sophisticated as the forensic tools they seek to defeat. The expert then has to look for evidence to establish spoliation.
There are standard, highly-specialized and judiciary-friendly procedures and software tools generally available for identifying, collecting, analyzing and documenting the above mentioned cyber crimes. Cyber forensic experts use these procedures and tools to supplement their intelligence, expertise, common sense and insight. For instance, in a sensitive case of transaction involving inter-state transportation of spirit, the Palakkad police, with the help of cyber forensic software expert, could recover already deleted digital evidence from a seized computer that was used to forge the registration documents of the three vehicles used in the crime. However, John J. Barbara, a crime laboratory analyst supervisor with Florida Department of Law Enforcement, quotes an unidentified source “......But forensic people don’t know how good or bad their tools are, and they’re going to court based on evidence gathered with those tools. You should test the validity of the tools you’re using before you go to court......”.
One area of cyber crime investigation that is still in its infancy due to the non-availability of standardization in procedures and software tools is software piracy investigation. It is simple and economical to copy software programs and so, software piracy is extensive. The nature of piracy disregards the intellectual effort and right of possessions of the original author. In addition to this, the author of the software is deprived of a fair return for his work. Software piracy has many negative consequences, not just to the author of the product, but also to the country where the pirated software is sold. Piracy can be investigated using software tools but its investigation demands a greater role for cyber forensic expert’s intelligence, expertise, common sense and insight because of the inherent complexity in software programming logic and underlying global commonalities in it.
In a software piracy context, a cyber forensic expert is the person who is often designated to compare the allegedly pirated software with the ‘original’ and prepare a report that is legally convincing and binding. The report is expected to be transparent to non-technical persons as well, and should help the judicial system in convincingly validating the legal process of resolving the situation. As programmers use underlying universal programming standards, sieving out the legally valid similarities and commonalities found in the two software programs and presenting them in a judicially convincing manner is no mean task for experts who mostly are computer engineers, untrained in legal studies.
When there is a complaint of software piracy, the legal authorities, with the assistance of an expert, seizes the digital evidence along with the physical evidence. The process of seizure itself has to be in a legally non-challengeable manner and has to take into account the concerns of not only the parties explicitly implicated in the case, but also those functionally involved in the pirated product. They include clients, customers or corporate associates of the concerned establishment. Wherever possible, the expert tries to ensure that these uninvolved parties are minimally affected by the seizure.
In order to prove in the court of law that the allegedly pirated software has been commercially exploited, the seizure procedure usually requires seizure of the allegedly pirated software from the hard disk of the computer system of the establishment which bought the software. As this computer system, mostly the main computer server, would contain live data also, it will take a minimum of one day for the concerned officials of the establishment to install another computer server with the necessary software and data, before resuming their normal operations. In the case of banks, a delay of even one hour in rendering service would create inconvenience to their innocent account holders across the globe. The process of seizure requires hashing of hard disk, a technique of electronically (mathematically) sealing the hard disk, which itself is time consuming (say, 3 to 12 hours or even more, mostly during business hours), causing inconvenience to the clients of the concerned establishment. The delay in restoring the necessary software and data in the back up system can be reduced if the cyber forensic expert, strictly at the beginning of the raid, can sympathetically let the client officials be aware of the imminent seizure of the hard disk during the raid and of the necessity of getting the back up system ready by the time of completion of the seizure. Moreover, since the client establishment per se is not accused, the expert is sympathetic but not necessarily over-lenient on the procedures of seizure. In similar situations, the author has always ensured that no operation of the concerned establishment is affected during and after the seizure. In an unusual situation, while conducting a raid in the suspected computer incident scene of a case (Sesame Software Solutions v..Perfect Software Solutions), the staff and management of the involved party (alleged pirate) appealed to the Advocate Commissioner that, if the suspected computer was seized, their day-to-day business operations would be affected in the absence of the software and databases in it. Subsequently, as directed by the Advocate Commissioner, the author himself (as the expert commissioner to conduct the raid) copied the software as well as the databases in the suspected hard disk to the firm’s network server without allowing the alleged pirate to touch the computer, and this unusual sympathetic procedure was recorded in the expert commissioner’s report submitted to the court. (The final judgment of this suit is still pending in the court.). During seizure, the cyber forensic expert should be careful not to destroy evidence by being over-sympathetic On the other hand, by being over-strict, his act of seizure should not force the raided establishment to close down its shutters for ever either.
During the analysis of the digital evidence, the expert concentrates on systematically finding and collating out the similarities and commonalities along four parameters namely the nomenclature tradition of the software company in naming various entities in the program; the logic of the program; the errors; and the comments, which is not an easy task. The duty of the cyber forensic expert is to establish the possible piracy through a rigorous formulation of statistical occurrences of the data structures, variables, data base tables, fields, modules , procedures, logic, remark, error and blunders in the allegedly pirated software and arrive at several values, preferably in percentages, to indicate the strength of piracy. For instance, while comparing the software and the data base tables as part of the software piracy investigation as the expert commissioner of the honourable Judicial I class magistrate, Kozhikode, Kerala, on the suit, Software Associates vs. Together Infotech, (Suit number: CMP 10371/2002), this author found significant statistical occurrence of fields (in the allegedly pirated data base script) bearing exactly same names, datatypes, length, context, and sequence of appearance, as in the ‘original’. Even if these fields bear moderately universal names, it is very difficult to imagine that two software engineers will program exact similarity in names, data types, length, context, as well as the sequence of appearance of fields in two commercially available complex software packages. This finding alone may not prove piracy. Yet, the expert can add it to the list of supporting evidence for suggested piracy.
Findings like this encourage the cyber forensic expert to present a very clear report to the court like for example, “There is 81% similarity as 9 out of 11 fields bear exactly same names, datatypes, length, context, and sequence of appearance in this table”. These percentages, as tangible evidence unambiguously arrived at by the technical experts, would be concrete enough to help the judge to pronounce judgment.
Software carries a thumb impression or special nomenclature patterns of the owner of the software. The presence of such thumb impression verbatim (or its logical derivatives) in the original as well as the allegedly pirated source code suggests piracy. However, identifying any type of thumb impressions in a software and establishing piracy is tougher when the software under investigation was written by one software engineer and updated at various instances later, by other software engineers, which is a serious issue due to the frequent turnover of employees in software industry. These multiple thumb impressions compatibly identified in both the ‘original’ and the ‘pirated’ source codes can prove to be vital. Here, only the cyber forensic expert’s expertise, common sense, intuition and insight can make his interpretation look more intelligent.
There is scope for extending the software piracy investigation beyond mere software comparison. Any other sundry complainant-specific data found in the computer system of the alleged pirate is also an indication of piracy. For example, from the pirate’s computer system, if the cyber forensic expert could dig out, say, files related to the complainant’s clientele or a back up copy of the live database of a client of the complainant, it can form serious evidence. Such rare instances occur when the piracy was done by performing a disk copy (of the complainant’s computer) that resulted in pirating not only the source code and data base related files but also other confidential data of the complainant. The existence of such material is stronger evidence of piracy as these are materials irrelevant for the functioning of the software and hence should not have been there in the first instance, if it was not pirated. For example, page 6 of the above mentioned expert commissioner’s report submitted to the court by the author, narrates such a rare situation, where the author could gather from the seized computer, an unaltered copy of the complainant’s original software together with the back up copy of the live database taken from one of the complainant’s client installations in Kenya. In this case, although the software comparison results were indicative of potential piracy, the presence of the back up copy of live database of a client of the complainant helped the author to unequivocally establish it. Again, the author was called in to investigate a case where a UK-based software firm alleged that one of its (former) employees had appropriated a software product of his employers and was marketing it as his own even while he was still employed in the company. The author found that the alleged culprit had created and maintained a website to market the allegedly pirated software even as he was still employed by this firm and this proof from the DNS server was enough to initiate a case in the court.
One final thing to remember is that expert opinion can be challenged in the court of law. Such challenge can generally be due to incomplete comparison leading to unreliability of evidence, and in such cases, during the subsequent cross examinations in the court of law, the lawyers will prove that there was still scope for further in-depth analysis. For example, the cyber forensic report on the suit number OS 2/2007, before the District Judge, Kozhikode (See CDAC, 2008) was later challenged in the court. The challenge was upheld by the court as the expert conceded that he had relied solely on the results of automatic comparison tools. Obviously, events like this might cause inconveniences to the jury and delay the final judgment. Hence, the first report of the technical expert itself should wherever possible be thorough, convincing and binding and it is the duty of the technical expert to avoid creating ambiguities and inconveniences to the judiciary, with the possible consequence of an unintended delay or miscarriage of justice.
Computer forensics is gaining importance in the modern digital world, to counter the intelligent activities of the cyber criminals. The cyber forensic experts are typically required to substantiate cyber issues arising from secret data concealment, patent and copyright infringements, trade secret misappropriation, and software piracy. The variety of cyber crimes are so plenty that a cyber forensic expert specialized in certain areas may not be able to do justice to other areas of cyber crime investigation. In arbitrations arising out of software piracy, even though the investigations are generally performed with the help of special software tools, the cyber forensic expert’s intelligence, expertise, common sense and insight play a bigger role in software piracy investigation. The biggest challenge before the cyber forensic expert, a non-legal professional, is to identify, collect, organize and interpret the electronic evidence and communicate the interpretation in a legally binding and judicially convincing manner.
References
Albert J. Marcella, Jr., and Doug Menendez, (2008), Cyber Forensics, New York: Auerbach Publications CDAC, (2008) Analysis report of the Resource Centre for Cyber Forensics, Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, Government of India, Thiruvananthapuram - 695 033, Kerala, Report number CDAC/RCCF/2007-20AR/Jan/2008, on the suit number OS 2/2007, District Judge, Kozhikode
Clyde W. Holsapple, Deepak lyengar, Jin Haihao., Shashank Rao, (2008), Parameters for Software Piracy Research, The Information Society, 24.4
Don L Lewis, (2009), The Hash Algorithm Dilemma - Hash Value Collisions, Forensic Magazine from http://www.forensicmag.com/Article_Print.asp?pid=238
Dr. Santhosh Baboo and Vinod Bhattathirpad P., (forthcoming), Software Piracy Forensics: Exploiting non-automated and judiciary-friendly techniques, Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, USA
Hal Berghel, 2007, Hiding Data, Forensics, and Anti-forensics, Communications of the ACM
John J. Barbara, 2009, Digital Insider: Anti-Digital Forensics, The Next Challenge, Forensic Magazine from http://www.forensicmag.com/Article_Print.asp?pid=245
Vinod Bhattathiripad P., (2002) Software Comparison report, Software Associates vs. Together Infotech, submitted to Judicial I class magistrate, Kozhikode, Kerala, India, case number CMP 10371 / 2002.
Vinod Bhattathiripad P. (2007), Report submitted to the honourable District Court, Kozhikode, Kerala on Sesame Software Solutions v. Perfect Software Solutions
By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Advocate, High Court, Ernakulam
The Canadian Connection in Election Involved in Art.324 Imbroglio
(By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Senior Advocate, High Court of Kerala)
Today is my 'Super-Friday'; therefore I thought of writing on an important subject, making a useful waste of time, putting my blue pencil to good effect.
It is trite that esteemed and responsible persons should not render curt and casual, or rehearsing, opinions on matters of moment. Such opinions bake no cake. This is specially so in regard to substantial questions relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, the 'manufacture' of the Constituent Assembly. Study carefully and opine cautiously, is the lesson I have learnt, living legal profession since 1954, (and, now, preparing for a life without 'Your Lordship'.)
I have been diligently following the recent controversy, (the Panic of 2009), over the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) of India to remove from office one of the Election Commissioners. Among those who ventured opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the action of the CEC, some leading politicians, leaders with 'big bags' and Senior Advocates, (big names in the legal profession, wearing heavy price tags, considered to be opinion power-house), figured. The speed with which they rendered their high-decibel opinions showed that the opinions were mostly off-hand, and dicey, without re-visiting the Constitution, when a hard re-look was needed sitting at the home-work desk; and, off-hand, on a vital Constitutional aspect, 'a matter of the greatest importance', according to Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, in his speech in the Constituent Assembly of India; winged words, indeed. Those who ignore this, will have to make a historic apology to the Constituent Assembly. I have the honour of acquaintance with the Constituent Assembly Debates, my weakness and my strength. I always remember that there is only one Constitution for India.
I beg to differ, with respect though, with those who went to the extent of saying, without any self-doubt, that the recommendation of the CEC was unconstitutional. (The Regret of 2009). There is too much doubt to be certain about the audacious articulation, which does not make eminent sense; and I remain unconvinced. It may not be considered that I am searching for superlatives to applaud the CEC.
The Constitutional provision concerning the aspect is in Art.324, (in Part XV -Elections).
The provision in Cl.(l) of Art.324 transfers the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls and of all elections to Parliament and the Legislatures of States and to the offices of President and Vice-President, to a body outside the Executive, to be called the Election Commission. CI.(2) says that there shall be a Chief Election Commissioner and such number of other Election Commissioners, appointed by the President. CI.(3) says that the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as the Chairman of the Election Commission. Cl.(4) provides for appointment of Regional Commissioners.
Cl.(6) provides for appointment of staff necessary for the discharge of the functions of the Election Commission.
At present, we are concerned with cl.(5) of Art.324. Therefore, it would only be appropriate to read cl.(5) here:
"(5) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the conditions of service and tenure of office of the Election Commissioners and the Regional Commissioners shall be such as the President may by rule determine:
Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court and the conditions of service of the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment:
Provided further that any other Election Commissioner or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner".
The controversy centres around the interpretation of the Second Proviso.
The present Art.324 was draft Art.289 before the Constituent Assembly. Introducing the said Article for the consideration of the Assembly, on 15th June 1949, Dr. Ambedkar said as follows:
"So far as cl.(4) is concerned, (cl.(4) of the draft Art.289 is cl.(5) of the present Art.324), we have left the matter to the President to determine the conditions of service and tenure of office of the members of the Election Commission, subject to one or two conditions, that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be liable to be removed except in the same manner as a Judge of the Supreme Court. If the object of this House is that all matters relating to Elections should be outside the control of the Executive Government of the day, it is absolutely necessary that the new machinery which we are setting up, namely the Election Commission, should be irremovable by the executive by a mere fiat. We have therefore given the Chief Election Commissioner the same status so far as removability is concerned as we have given to the Judges of the Supreme Court. We of course, do not propose to give the same status to the other members of Commission. We have left the matter to the President as to the circumstances under which he would deem fit to remove any other member of the Election Commission, subject to one condition that the Chief Election Commissioner must recommend that the removal is just and proper". (emphasis supplied for reader convenience.)
Mark, Dr.Ambedkar said very little and conveyed a lot in his speech.
Though Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena moved an amendment to the effect that both the Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commissioners should be removable in the same manner, as stated in the first Proviso, leaving the Regional Commissioners alone in the second Proviso, the amendment does not seem to have been seriously pressed; and it was not accepted by the House. Apart from the active participation of Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru and Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena, dominant intellectual forces of the Constituent Assembly like Sri.T.T. Krishnamachari, Sri H.V. Pataskarand Sri. K. M. Munshi (Advocate's Special) also shed the light of wisdom to the discussion, emphazising the need for total independence of the Election Commission.
The Provision in the Second Proviso and the address of Dr. Ambedkar relating thereto, are clear, simple, and straight-forward. That the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner is crucial, is evident. Let me put it succinctly this way: The recommendation may emanate from the Chief Election Commissioner. The President may accept or refuse to accept such a recommendation. The President may deem it necessary to remove an Election Commissioner. But he cannot do it on his own. He may take a decision to remove an Election Commissioner; but he shall seek the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. If the Chief Election Commissioner recommends, agreeing with the President for removal, the Election Commissioner can be removed. But, if the Chief Election Commissioner disagrees with the President and does not recommend that there may be a removal, it looks as though the President may not be able to remove the Election Commissioner. Therefore, either way, the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner is the deciding factor, either initially or after the Presidential action. This accords with the object that the Election Commission should be irremovable by the Executive by a mere fiat. The Executive Government is not the proprietor of the Election Commission. The position is very clear in that the President, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers alone, cannot remove an Election Commissioner, unless the CE.C. recommends such removal. Absolute independence of the Election Commission is assured by the Framers of the Constitution. This cannot be ignored. This is stark simple. The Executive Government cannot sleep-walk into the Election Commission.
It may be noted here that the matter relating to election is so important that it was thought at one point of time, when the question was before the Fundamental Rights Committee of the Constituent Assembly, that it should be included in the Fundamental Rights on the ground that the Fundamental Right of adult franchise should not only be guaranteed by the Constitution but its proper exercise should also be guaranteed in practice. (Here, I call attention to the petition pending before the Supreme Court, relating to the right to 'negative voting', to reject a candidate.)
But later it was thought appropriate to put the matter in a separate part, possibly because the matter relating to election was conceived on the basis of the Canadian Election Act. Art.289 was drafted on the lines of the provisions of the Canadian Election Act. The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly indicate that much was borrowed from the Canadian Act. The Constituent Assembly proceedings, a veritable store-house of knowledge, an enticing treasure would certainly throw light on the interpretation of the Constitutional provisions. The discussions may not be rejected, or isolated, as 'time-krred or otise. Do not interrogate the past. Old wood is appropriate for new homes. It is better that lawyers remember that legal opinion is no poll-speech.
Over to the readers.
By T.M. Rajasekharan, Advocate, Kozhikkode
Conflicting Rulings Under S.13(3) of P.F.A. Act
(By T.M. Rajasekharan, Advocate, Calicut)
The decision of the Kerala High Court in Vairamudigouda v. Food Inspector (2008 (1) KLT 762) leaves certain vital aspects of law untouched. It is difficult to support this ruling if one looks into various schemes under S.13 of the P.F.A. Act.
Citing the rulings of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram (AIR 1967 SC 970), the learned Judge held that a report of the Director Central Food Laboratory to the affect that the sample received by him is unfit for analysis should be treated in par with a report that the sample is lost or damaged. In such case, the High Court went on to say the third part of the sample should be sent for analysis. Further the High Court’s decision, as a whole, gives an impression that in the absence of an analysis by Central Food Laboratory for reasons that the sample is “unfit for analysis”, lost or damaged, the report of the public analyst must prevail.
This proposition puts a knife on the neck of the statutory rights given to an accused person under S.13(2) of the P.F.A. Act. Had the High Court looked the matter from a different (and correct) angle, the decision would otherwise have been other way round.
A sample of article of food purchased by the Food Inspector for analysis under Ss.10(2) and 11(1)(a) of the P.F.A. Act is to be divided into three parts as provided for in S.11(1)(b) of the Act. R.14 of the Rules then comes into operation. This rule says: “Manner of Sending sample for analysis. Samples of food for the purpose of analysis shall be taken in clear dry bottles or jars or any other suitable containers which shall be closed sufficiently tight to prevent leakage, evaporation or in the case of dry substance, entrance of moisture and shall be carefully sealed”. This rule is held to be mandatory by various decisions of Supreme Court and High Courts including that of Kerala. Further, R.19 of the Rules prescribes that preservatives shall be added to the sample to maintain it in condition suitable for analysis. R.19 is also held to be mandatory. It is a well settled proposition of law that non-observance of mandatory provisions of the act and rules results in acquittal of the accused regardless to any prejudice caused to him.
A sample of article of food may become unfit for analysis due to many reasons and in most cases when Rr.14 and 19 are not complied with by the Food Inspector. The article of food may loose its character, it may become obnoxious, and it may be completely spoiled by insect infestation or due to many other reasons too elaborate to pen down. But all these can only be owing to the violation of Rr.14 and 19 of the Rules. Under no circumstances can the vendor be held responsible for the consequences of such defective sampling process.
The law provides a valuable and statutory right to the accused to get the sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory. If this right is denied due to reasons attributable to the non-observance of mandatory provisions by the authorities concerned, the accused is entitled to acquittal. The report of the Public Analyst gets superceded by the report of the Central Food Laboratory. In this there can be different situations such as:-
(i) The accused may not exercise his right to get the sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory without any reason,
(ii) The accused may refrain himself from moving the Central Food Laboratory due to delay in prosecution and/or delay in receipt of notice under S.13(2) for fear the sample becoming injurious to health due to loss of shelf life and he in such case might be booked for more serious offences under the Act,
(iii) The Central Food Laboratory might find it impossible to analyze the sample of food owing to leakage, decomposition and other facts rendering the sample unfit for analysis, and
(iv) The sample may be lost or damaged in transit.
In the last named case the law provides that the 3rd part of the sample be sent to the Central Food Laboratory. But to hold that the term “unfit for analysis” is synonymous with “lost or damaged” would amount to total disregard to Rr.14 and 19.
The High Court relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 970. But the learned Judge appears to have overlooked the part of para. 7 of the said judgment which reads “.... In a case where there is denial of his right on account of the deliberate conduct of the prosecution, we think that the vendor, in his trial, is so seriously prejudiced that it would not be proper to uphold his conviction on the basis of the report of the public analyst, even though that report continues to be evidence in the case of the facts contained therein.”
Hence it is logical and clear that if the part of the sample sent to the Central Food Laboratory is unfit for analysis, the blame should squarely be on the prosecution. If one part of the sample is unfit for analysis how could it be held that the sampling process is correct or proper and that all the parts of the sample are homogenous? The inevitable conclusion in such cases would be that the authorities failed to divide and pack the sample as required by law. Nothing can be left for chance in such situation.
Once the sample of food article leaves the hands of vendor, it is the duty of the authorities to divide and pack the sample properly without giving room for leakage, deterioration etc. and make all the parts of the sample homogenous and fit for analysis. The vendor has no role in those matters. Hence the notion that an accused can be convicted on the basis of the report of the public analyst, because the Central Food Laboratory could not analyze the sample for the reasons solely attributable to the authorities concerned, appears to be very dangerous and opposed the accepted principles of criminal jurisprudence. Failure of the food department to produce the parts of sample in a condition fit for analysis for the Central Food Laboratory can not automatically lead to the conclusion that the public analyst’s report is to be relied upon.
Yet one other aspect missed for consideration by the High court is also very interesting. Suppose in a given case the Public analyst finds the sample to be unfit for analysis. Should it then mean that the second and third parts of the same sample can be sent to the public analyst for analysis without any express provision in that regard? In such a case the accused is deprived of his right to get a part of the sample to be analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory as there would be no further part of the sample left for C.F.L. at all.
Viewed from any practical angles, the earlier decision of the High Court in Coromandal Distribtors v. Food Inspector (1998 (2) KLT 657) appears to be proper and sound though for the reasons not stated therein. It may be pointed out that the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Charanj Lai v. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 80) to which reference is made by the learned Judge, stands on a different footing. In that case the Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta found the sample to be unfit for analysis due to decomposition and “requested the Magistrate to send the next part immediately”. The Magistrate after sleeping for six months over that request sent the third part to Central Food Laboratory at Ghaziabad (for, the C.F.L. changes on rotation every five years). Probably the C.F.L. Calcutta wanted to check the third part also to find out reason for decomposition. This case should be understood in its peculiar contest only and no universal law could have been propounded based on those facts.
In fact the law is well settled by the Supreme Court of India in Chetumal v. State of M.P. (AIR 1981 SC 1367). The three Judges’ bench of the Apex Court clearly held that if the sample of food article could not be analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory for no fault of the accused, the court cannot go back to the report of the public analyst and convict him. It is unfortunate that the learned single Judge has not had the occasion to refer to this decision. All the painful exercise could then have been avoided.
Innocent vendors whose rights to get the samples analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory in a fit condition would be very much prejudiced by the law propounded by the Kerala High Court in Vairamudigounda’s case which goes against the ruling of the Apex Court in Chetumal’s case.
By Laxmy R. Nambiar & Altdus Ray Frank, Semester 9, NUALS
Dowry Death in India -- A Menace to a Civilized Society
(By Laxmy R. Nambiar, 4th year student, NUALS, Kochi)
Origin and Prohibition
The concept of sthreedhan can be traced back centuries to where women were given their share of family property on marriage. Sthreedhan was exclusive property over which a woman retained sole ownership. The concept of Dowry, as it exists today, is one of the most degraded versions of this ancient tradition. Traditionally, in India, it is the duty of the parents to give their children’s hand in marriage. Dowry is that money that is extorted by the groom or his relatives from the bride or her relatives upon the threat that they will otherwise not accept the girls hand in marriage.
The menace of dowry eventually escalated to the extend where young girls were often harassed, tortured, driven to commit suicide and even brutally killed by grooms and their families over unsatisfied demands for dowry. It was taking these depraved conditions into account that the Government enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961. The salient features of this Act among others were that:
1. It made all agreements to give or receive dowry void(S.6; Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs; Dowry Prohibition Act.).
2. It imposed penalties for giving, taking (S.3; Penalty for giving or Taking Dowry, Dowry Prohibition Act.) and demanding dowry(S.4. Penalty for demanding dowry, Dowry Prohibition Act.).
3. It made provisions for any dowry given to be transferred to the bride within a prescribed period as sthreedhan(S.6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs, Dowry Prohibition Act.).
Under S.2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, ‘dowry’ is:
Any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly;
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage (The original words ‘as consideration of marriage’ was replaced with ‘ in connection with marriage’ by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) act 1984.) of said parties but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies,
Unfortunately in spite of the best interests of the framers of the Act, the menace of dowry persisted and continued to exist after the enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Despite the safeguards of the Act, young brides continued to face torment, cruelty and harassment in their marital home and the death toll continued to escalate.
Amendments to the Act
The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act was passed in 1983. It inserted S.113-A into the Indian Evidence Act. S113-A introduced a new offence and a presumption regarding the abetment of death of a married woman.
Following this, another amendment to the Dowry Prohibition Act introduced two separate sections and offences against married women. S.304-B and S.113-A introduced by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act into the Indian Penal Code and the Indian Evidence Act introduced the offence of dowry death and the presumption regarding dowry death.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
The Burden of Proof
One of most important features of dowry related offences is the acute lack of evidence to prove actual abetment of suicide or homicide of the young bride. Apart from that evidence like cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim by the accused cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt (as is required under normal circumstances) due to the fact that most dowry related offences occur within the marital home. Therefore, the most important feature of Ss.304-B of the Indian Penal Code is that once the essentials facts are proved by the prosecution, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defence. After the burden shifts, the onus is on the defence to prove that he or they did not commit the offence they are accused of. This onus is however a balance of probabilities and not one over all reasonable doubt.
S.304-B
In the case of Arun Garg v. State of Punjab (2004 (3) KLT 435 (SC) = (2004) 8 SCC 251.) a Coram of 2 Judges of the Supreme Court laid down the essentials of S.304-B, which when established will shift the burden from the prosecution to the defence.
The facts of the case showed that a dispute arose over the demand for dowry was settled within three months into the marriage. Two years later the husband brought up another demand for dowry. This however could not be met by her parents and eight months later, the deceased made a single telephone call to her father stating that her husband her in laws were conspiring to kill her. Two days later, the deceased was admitted to the hospital for ingestion of poison of which she later died of.
In para.17 of the judgment, the Court went on to state that S.304-B required 3 ingredients for the prosecution to prove prima facie. They are that:
1. The death is caused by burns, bodily injury or by means other than by ordinary means.
2. Such death occurs within 7 years of marriage.
3. It is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry by her husband or his relatives.
The Court stated that the evidence of the prosecution is to be considered in the light of these ingredients and went on to say that in this case they found the accused guilty under S.304-B of the Indian Penal Code without the aid of the presumptions under S.113-A or S.113-B of the Indian Evidence Act..
The Essentials of S.304-B
As held in the previously mentioned case, the essential ingredients of S.304-B are the following:
1. The demand for dowry.
2. The victims’ subjection to cruelty and harassment.
3. That such cruelty and harassment have happened “soon before her death”.
4. That she have died an unnatural death.
5. That the death has occurred within 7 years of the marriage.
1. The Demand for Dowry
The case of Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana(1997 (1) KLT SN 6 (C.No.7) SC = (1998) SCC 309 = AIR 1998 SC 958; Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana.) held that no direct demand for dowry is necessary and that the groom’s persistent demands for T.V., scooter etc (pertaining to the facts of the case) from the bride or her parents fell within the scope of ‘dowry’ under S.304-B of the Indian Penal Code. This section will not apply where there is noprima facie demand for dowry.(State of U.P v. Mahesh Chandra Pandey, AIR 2000 SC 3631 (2).)
Cases not Falling under Demand for Dowry
The Court in many instances has tried to detail those situations where payment of money or valuable security by one party in a marriage to another or by the relative of one party in a marriage to another would not amount to demand for dowry. Some of these instances are:
1.Customary payment of money by the parent of the wife to the husband on birth of a child cannot be said to be in connection with marriage and is therefore not dowry (Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab(2001 (3) KLT SN 74 (C.No.97) SC).).
2..Where a husband harassed his wife to transfer the property given by her father to her (as part of a customary practice) after the marriage and where such harassment led her to commit suicide, the Court held that the demand for such transfer cannot be equated with demand for dowry unless there is proof to show that such land was demanded as dowry in the first place(K. Prema S. Rao v.Yadala Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217).).
3. When a sum of Rs. 50,000 was demanded by the husbands’ family from the wife to send her brother in law abroad, the Court held that it was not a demand for dowry as it was not asked for in connection of marriage(1999, State of Punjab v. Daljit Singh.).
2. Cruely and Harassment
“A young bride enters into a marriage with great hopes and aspirations for her marriage life. There can be no greater mental torture for any bride than accusing her of bringing insufficient dowry and calling her ugly(Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana(1997 (1) KLT SN 6 (C.No.7) SC = 1998 SCC 309).) “
S.304-B of the Indian Penal Code, S.113-A and S.113-B of the Indian Evidence Act refer to cruelty an harassment that is meted out to the bride as an indispensable requirement for a death to fit into the spectrum of cases falling within the wide ambit of the definition of “dowry death.” The Explanation to S.113- A states that ‘cruelty’ will take the same meaning as in S.498 A of the Indian Panel Code.
S.498-A
S.498-A of Indian Penal Code falls under Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code. This Chapter was introduced by Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 1983, which came into force with effect from 25th December 1983. The introduction of this section under an altogether new chapter to the Penal Code reflects the anxiety of the legislators to extend protection to the weaker spouse and to deal adequately with any form of domestic violence that occurs within the confines of ‘holy matrimony.’
Chapter XX-A was enacted for these 3 primary reasons:
1. To define the substantive offence of cruelty to a woman by husbands.
2.. To introduce procedure that would make investigation in certain cases of death or violence against women mandatory.
3. To make relevant changes under the Evidence Act, so as to make conviction for certain crimes of violence against women easier.
This section pins greater responsibility and criminal liability that that under S.306B where an intended suicide is merely abetted. This is not a retrospective section. This section assumes a greater significance because in order to invoke the presumption under S.113A of the Indian Evidence Act, an offence under this section needs to be registered.
S.498-A of the Indian Penal Code states:
“Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also is liable to fine”.
Explanation
For the purpose of this section, “Cruelty” means:
(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether physical or mental) of the woman; or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
The perusal of clause (a) would show that the prosecution has to establish the following:
1. the willful conduct of the offender,
2. that the nature of such conduct was likely to:
• drive a woman to commit suicide
• Or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health.
On proof of these facts, to the satisfaction of the Court under the circumstances of a particular case, it may be held that the husband or the relatives of the husband have treated the woman with cruelty.
Clause (b) of the above mentioned explanation shows that the harassment:
1. to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable security
2. on account of the failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand; would amount to cruelty for the purpose of S.498 A of IPC.
What Amounts to Cruelty and Harassment
The expression “cruelty” takes within its sweep both mental and physical agony and torture. The concept of “cruelty” varies from place to place and individual and according to the social and economic status of the person involved. To decide the question of cruelty the relevant factors are the matrimonial relationship between the husband and wife, their cultural background and temperament, status in life, status of health, their interaction in their daily life, which dominate the aspect of cruelty. The word harassment has not been defined in S.498-A of IPC. The meaning of the word “harass” in the Webster’s Dictionary reads thus: “to subject someone to continuous vexatious attacks, questions, demands or other unpleasantness. Thus, to subject a woman to constant torment with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable security would amount to cruelty. The cruelty envisaged under this section is of such nature so as to force a woman to cause grave bodily injury to herself or to compel her to commit suicide or to fulfill illegal demands for dowry.
Though the provision covers both physical as well as mental cruelty, each and every instance of harassment is not cruelty. The harassment has to be with the object to coerce the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand. In order to come into the ambit of cruelty under clause (b) by husband, the harassment must be to extract money unlawfully from the woman by the man. Unless this is proved, no offence under S.498 A can be alleged to have been committed.
Where the accused created a fight in the deceased’s sisters house over dowry demands and the deceased stated to her sister that she would find it hard to ever face her family again, the Supreme Court held that cruelty needn’t be physical and that mental cruelty and harassment constitutes cruelty within S.304-B((1991) 1 Crimes 268.). In Kishore Kumar v. State where a woman died within 2 years of marriage and it was shown that her husband had constantly taunted her about the financial status of her family, the court held that his actions amounted to cruelty and attracted action under this section.
Where the defendant had leveled false accusations of his wife’s ability to conceive, taunted her on the birth of a girl child, accused her of adultery and took the infant away from its mother and denied her the permission to see her child amounted cruelty, the court attracted this section (Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 Crimes 268.). Where the husband demanded his wife to bring money from her family after 4 years of marriage; though the money demanded was not related to dowry, the court held that this section would apply as he caused her enough torment for her to end her life (State of Punjab v. Daljit Singh, 1999.).Shoba Rao v. Madhukar(AIR 1988 SC 121.) held that extorting money from the wife’s family for his personal use does not make it any less of a charge of cruelty for dowry.
However, this section will not apply if the wife commits suicide after 7 years after marriage(Himachal Pradesh v.Jagroop Singh.).
“Husband” and “Relative”
Anil Kumar v. State of Punjab(1997(2) All. Cri L.J. 638.) construes all blood relatives of the husband - mother, father, siblings etc as relatives; the definition may also extend to brother-in-laws, sister-in-laws and the like under the necessary circumstances. However, a family friend, no matter how close, cannot be considered to come within this definition.
A decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that if a couple were living together as husband and wife, S.498-A would apply.
Willful Conduct
Another very important element to this section is ‘willful conduct’. This word contemplates obstinate and deliberate behaviour on the part of the offender for it to amount to cruelty. Thus, mens rea is an essential ingredient(Madhuri Mukund Chitnis v. Mukund Mart and Chitnis (1992) Crl. L.J 111 (Bom).). It also contemplates that inter alia, such a conduct besides being willful must also be the primary motive that drives or pushes the married woman into suicide or into inflicting substantial injury to self.
• Cases not Falling under Cruelty and Harassment
CASE: S. Abboy Naidu v. R. Sundarrajan (1994 Crl. L.J. 641.)
The facts of the case are such. The bride’s parents voluntarily gifted the newly married couple with a dining table upon which the groom stated that he would have preferred cash instead. The Court held that such a statement would not amount to cruelty.
That which does not amount to Cruelty
Any demand that is lawful or well within another’s right to make does not amount to cruelty. Thus, the illegality of a demand is to be proven. The following does not amount to cruelty (Delhi High Court)
1. Asking back of money loaned by husband’s family even in times where the wife’s family suffers a financial problem.
2. One or 2 instances of anger.
3. A gift by the bride’s side, without any corresponding demand from the groom’s side.
4. Casual conversations regarding retrieval of the bridal jewellery from the brides house to the matrimonial home.
5. Any small comment that might drive a person of very sensitive disposition to commit grave and self-endangering acts. Thus, everything is to be understood from the point of view of a reasonable man.
CASE: Sarla Prabhakar v. State of Maharashtra ((1990) Crl. L.J 407, Sarla Prabhakar v. State of Maharashtra.)
Where the mother-in-law asked the new daughter-in-law whether she would part with a few of her jewellery pieces for her sister-in-laws marriage and the request being turned down, never ventured to pressed again, does not amount to cruelty.
3.Soon before her Death:
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab(AIR 2000 SC 2324.) brought about the idea of the proximity test, holding that circumstances showing cruelty and harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a code of conduct. The Court stated if cruelty or harassment is proved to have persisted, it shall be deemed to have been soon before her death. However, no presumption under S.113-B of the Indian Evidence Act will be drawn against the accused if it is shown that the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment or dispute stood resolved and that there was no evidence of cruelty or harassment thereafter (1991 Crl.LJ 263.).
4. Unnatural Death
In the case of Nem Chand v. State of Haryana(1995.) where the wife died due to strangulation in the husband's house, and it was shown that she had been treated with cruelty over demands for dowry, the presumption under S.113-A of the Indian Evidence Act was applied and in Kans Raj v State of Punjab (1995.) it was held that the suicide of wife within 7 years of marriage does not constitute ‘normal circumstance’.
5. Seven years of Marriage
The case of Vadde Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh(1990.) held that a husband or any of his relatives can be prosecuted for the offence of dowry death if a woman dies within seven years of marriage if harassment is proved to have been inflicted on her by the husband or any of his relatives.
This rule was used to great effect in the landmark judgement of Shanthi v. State of Haryana(1991 (1) KLT SN 22 (C.No.28) SC = AIR 1991 SC 1226.) where a woman was continuously harassed over dowry demands died under mysterious circumstances and her husband and in laws hastily cremated her body without informing her parents. The court held that since she had died within 7 years of marriage and that she had complained of cruelty in connection with demand for dowry, the presumption under S.113-B could be invoked with no further procedure.
Appreciation of Evidence
Appreciation of evidence is one of the most crucial aspects of deciding whether a case falls within the ambit of dowry death. Since dowry related issues arise within the matrimonial home, the collection of evidence regarding aspects of cruelty, harassment and to prove that such treatment was in regard to demands for dowry is normally hard to prove. In most cases the victims themselves shield their tormentors due to the fear of wrecking their marriage and with hopes for a better future. Therefore, in the case of a suspicious death of a young bride the proper appreciation of the evidence is of utmost importance in ascertaining the facts of the case.
CASE: Sant Raj v. State of Haryana (1998 SCC (Cri) 1600.)
The deceased was continuously mistreated by her husband and harassed for bringing insufficient dowry soon before her death. She died under mysterious circumstances and the accused and his family did not make any effort to inform her family on the death. The Court set aside the defences argument that she died a natural death by an unexpected stomach ache taking into consideration all the relevant facts of the case including the fact that she was in excellent health before her death. The presumption under S.113-B was introduced to convict the accused.
CASE: Shanthi v. State of Haryana
The facts of this previously mentioned case showed that the deceased died under very mysterious circumstances and that no efforts were made on the part of the accused to contact her family on her death. It was held that the evidence pointed to foul play and that S.113-B could be invoked under the given circumstances.
Second Wife; Whether A Wife for Application of S.304-B and 113-A and 113-B
There exist two conflicting decisions by two High Courts in this regard, in the case of Ram Narain v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1998.), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that a second marriage is void under Ss.5 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act and that such bigamous marriage is not a marriage in the eyes of law. It was hence held that a second wife is not a wife in the eyes of law and therefore not a wife for the purposes of S.304-B of the Indian Penal Code and S.113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
In a more recent decision of the Karnataka High Court, in the case of State of Karnataka v. Shivaraj (2002.) the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court held that it would perhaps be in the interest of justice to construe that even in a case where a marriage is declared void, at the point of time of commission of the offence the Court would still treat the parties as having deemed to be husband and wife in the larger interest of justice.
Penal Provisions
S.304-B is of relevance in the case of homicides camouflaged as accidents where there just enough evidence to make out a case under either S.299 or 300. Here, once the prosecution makes out their case prima facie, the burden shifts to the accused making it harder for wife-murderers to exploit the loop holes in the system. The penal provision dealing with dowry death is S.304-B (2) that mandates imprisonment which is to not be less than a period of 7 years.
Since the burden of the prosecution is much lesser than that in a normal criminal case and since the onus is on the accused to prove that he isn’t guilty, the law gives a concession in the sentence that is imposed as compared to that seen under S.299 and 300. Under S.304-B(2), the maximum penalty for dowry death is life imprisonment and not death itself.