Not Deep Enough

(By T.M. Rajasekharan, Advocate, Calicut)

How far the High Court can stretch while interpreting [and upsetting] law settled by the Supreme Court of India in deciding a matter under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? The decision of the High Court of Kerala in Tito Varghese v. The Food Inspector (2012 (4) KLT 796) forces a student of law to think aloud on this question. The High Court was deciding a petition to quash the proceedings in a case under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954. Of the two points raised on behalf of the petitioner in the case, the first was relying upon the rulings of the Kerala High Court in Narayana Swami’s case (Narayana Swami and Anr. v. The Food Inspector and Anr.  (2007 (2) KLT Supp. 158) and Rama Moorthy’s case (Rama Moorthy v. Food Inspector  (2012 (2) KLT 214). In both these cases, the question was whether there was any deprivation of right to the accused u/S.13(2) of the PFA Act, if the prosecution was delayed leaving no opportunity for the accused to get the samples analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory within the period of shelf life of the article mentioned in the label as “best before” or “use before”.

In the case under discussion, the High Court, purportedly following the ruling of the Apex Court in Babulal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1971 SC 1277) refused to follow the ruling in Narayana Swami’s case and Rama Moorthy’s case, little realizing that the Apex Court’s finding in Babulal Hargovindas’ case is not applicable to labeled articles of food. The Apex Court was discussing the plea that the sample of milk sold loose to the Food Inspector might get spoiled and would become unfit for analysis due to delay in launching prosecution. The facts in Ajith Prasad Ram Kishan Singh v. State of Maharashtra  (AIR 1972 SC 1631) is also similar in that the article of food is sweet made of milk. The Supreme Court rightly held that such a plea of the defence could not be entertained without exercising the option U/s.13(2) of the Act to get the part of sample sent to the C.F.L. According to the Supreme Court, whether the sample would become unfit for analysis is to be decided by C.F.L. alone. 

Where the High Court of Kerala erred in Tito Varghese case is that it did not apply its mind on the legislative history of Rule 32(i) of the P.F.A. Act. The prescriptions for printing “best before” in the label was introduced by the legislative vide G.S.R. 537(E) dated 13.6.2000 w.e.f. 1.9.2000 under R.32(i) for the list time. The consumers of food articles were thus benefited in that they could purchase food the quality of which is guaranteed for a particular period. The manufacturers are required to print month and year of the manufacture of articles of food in the labels and the date of manufacture in case of articles of short shelf life like milk, bread etc. This requirement limits the period of warranty to all packaged foods. It was under these circumstances, and following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in “The State of Haryana v. Unique Farmaid (P) Ltd.”, “Gupta Chemicals (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajastan” and “Medicamen Biotech Ltd. and another v. State of Rajastan”, the High Court of Kerala decided Rama Moorthy’s case. There is no error in these views.

When the manufacturer provides the date of shelf life of an article in the label as required under R.32(i) of the P.F.A. Act it automatically follows that the food is not guaranteed as fit for human consumption beyond that period. (That it may still be consumed depending upon the nature of the article is altogether a different matter). When the label explicitly declares the shelf life, it is for the authorities to provide an opportunity to the accused to get the sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory within the “best before” date. The decisions in AIR 1971 SC 1277 and AIR 1972 SC 1631 are not applicable to the cases of packaged food coming within the scope of R.32(i) as introduced in the statute book w.e.f 13.6.2000 for reasons that are plain and clear. In the case of labeled articles of food, “best before” is a statutory requirement while in the two cases decided by the Apex Court in the years 1971 and 1972, the plea was that the samples “would have been decomposed due to delay in filing complaint”. The two aspects stand on totally different poles.

The learned Judge in Tito Varghese case has unfortunately made an observation that the decision of the Apex Court in Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Food Inspector (2010 (4) KLT 706 (SC) has no application to cases other than to that particular case. Let me respectfully differ with this view. The back ground of Pepsico case is interesting to note.

S.23(1-A)(ee) and (hh) was in the statute book since the year 1976 but it was not seriously taken note of both by the bench and by the bar. The provision requires that the Govt. should notify the laboratory where the article of food was to be analyzed and also the method of analysis to be adopted by such laboratories. When the matter came up before the Kerala High Court in Pepsico (India) Holdings  (P) Ltd. v. Food Inspector, the court held that S.23(1-A) (ee) and (hh) are only enabling provisions and their non-compliance cannot be fatal to the prosecution Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Food Inspector  (2009 (2) KLT 69). No reason is attributed to this finding by the learned Judge other than that “to hold otherwise would result in grinding halt of the entire machinery under the PFA Act”. By this it was meant that the Government was not obliged to notify the laboratories and method of analysis.

This is one of the aspects decided by the Supreme Court in the well-considered judgment while overruling the decision of the Kerala High Court in Pepsico case. In express terms, the Supreme Court said that to hold that S.23(1-A)(ee) and (hh) of the PFA Act is only an enabling provision would amount to “pick and choose”. The Supreme Court has categorically stated that this section is mandatory. If one cares to read paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Apex Court’s judgment in Pepsico case, no doubts should prevail over this aspect. At any rate it is not for a single Judge of the High Court to differ with the Apex Court’s view.

There is one more reason to support the proposition that S.23(1-A)(ee) and (hh) is mandatory. There are ever so many authentic methods for analysis of various articles of food. All these methods are not identical nor would they produce the same result. Otherwise there is no need for different methods of analysis. Most of the manufacturers of food have their own laboratories managed by highly qualified analysts to test the food articles before passing them for public consumption. In a case when the manufacturers’ analysts use a particular method and passes the product, here is a public analyst who uses some other methods chosen by him on his own whims and fancies, finds defect in the sample and certifies the sample to be adulterated. This anomaly can be rectified only if the government notifies the method under which the food sample could be analyzed. This is necessary for a nation-wide uniformity in testing food samples. Same is the case regarding notification of laboratories. Public should be assured that the laboratories where food samples are tested are a well equipped and notified as such. Indecently, it may be mentioned here that the Central Government has in the year 2008 notified the methods of analysis by inserting R.4(9) with prospective effect.

There is some discussion among knowledgeable circles as to whether it was necessary for the Supreme Court (in Pepsico case) to have overruled the Kerala High Court’s finding regarding S.23(1-A)(ee) and (hh) of PFA Act. The Apex Court could have left the matter untouched after deciding the main question of testing of carbonated water. But one should realize that the Supreme Court must interfere when a patently wrong interpretation of a provision of law by a High Court is brought to its notice.

In short, the ruling in Tito Varghese case appears to be suffering from lack of depth. The learned judge, in fairness, ought to have referred the matter to a larger bench if he genuinely entertained doubts about the correctness of the decision in Rama Moorthy’s case. Conflicting judgments on the very same sets of facts and law is the bane of the judicial system.

Back to Business

(By P.Deepak, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

‘Prague is awesome, man! Take a Schengen visa and travel by Euro Rail’ boomed the not so young counsel into his unwieldy smart-phone as the capsule lift groaned and screeched upwards cramped to capacity with perspiring lawyers and irritable clerks weighed down with files perched on their sinking shoulders. The court had reopened after the summer recess and the air was thick with the acrid smell of newly dry cleaned robes. ‘Just a couple of lakhs’ the counsel continued, probably assuring his unseen caller that the whole thing was a steal and he would be better advised to try it next year. The old and wizened counsel standing beside him winced. He remembered the young man taking his first faltering steps through the corridors of the High Court tailing his senior like a shadow. A haughty fellow whose propensity to brag, even in those early days, was a byword. ‘Prague! My left foot’ the old counsel muttered under his breath, ‘the fellow wouldn’t know Ponmudi from Prague even if the National Geographic Atlas was spread out in front of him’.  He wondered how much longer the lift would take to reach the destination and whether he would have to endure the braggart any longer. 

Mercifully, the lift shuddered to a stop on the desired floor and the doors creaked open. The old counsel squeezed his way out and flopped at the nearest vacant chair trying to get his breath back. He must have closed his eyes for an instant and nodded off for he was rudely awakened by a shout from his side. ‘Pappaya’ the voice beside him was saying and for a sickening moment he wondered whether fruit vendors have also been permitted to sell their wares in the corridors of the High Court. (Improbable, yes, but definitely not impossible when you consider the fact that certain passages in the building already reminds one of having stepped into Broadway with hawkers heckling you with their diverse wares, even contraband stuff.  He listened further. Two young men sitting beside him were whispering about cheap air fares and the multifarious enticements of the Far East. The old counsel rose with hesitant steps and shuffled across to the vacant chair opposite leaving the eager raconteurs to continue with their Siamese escapades. But there was no respite this time as well. Along came a clutch of middle-agers gaggling about their feni-fuelled antics on the sun-kissed beaches of Goa. The old counsel inspected the absolute lack of tan on their puffed-up faces and the dark circles that shadowed their glassy eyes and wondered whether the buccaneers had ever ventured outside their rooms during the entire Goa sojourn. Very unlikely, he concluded. 

The Court Display screen started flickering as their lordships went about their business. A few galloped, some sauntered and several stood tethered to the starting block deaf to the gong. Conspicuous blanks in the display board bore testimony to the fact that a few sluggards were yet to take their places on the starting line.  The old counsel eased out a crumbled piece of paper from his inside pocket and scanned the list of cases meticulously jotted down by his keen junior. Just a few matters in the weekly hearing list greeted his weary eyes. He nestled comfortably in his chair absolutely assured that the odds on his matter being taken up were next to nil. 

Shuffling feet and excited voices aroused the old counsel from his slumber yet again. Opening his eyes he saw a motley group of animated counsel crowding around the notice-board and the two strips of paper pinned to the board. He could see all his former irritants there-the European traveler, the Thai duo and the Goan voyagers. All were craning their necks to read the writing on the board. A few blinked in wonder, a few rubbed their eyes and read again, a few others took a step backwards and gasped. It was the ‘Sitting Arrangements’ (‘Constitution’ in local legal parlance) to come into effect from the following day. All their thoughts of fun-filled holidays evaporated, the old counsel saw his vacation revelers reaching for their cell-phones and making frantic calls to their clerks and comrades. ‘Stop! Don’t file the Crl.MC today…’ barked the European traveler to his clerk. ‘File the R.S.A with defects…..’ one of the Thai duo advised his clerk. “Take print outs of the WPC immediately and file the same as ‘Today Moving’…” snarled the second of the Thai duo threatening his clerk with dire consequences if the WPC didn’t reach the bench that afternoon. “Make the ‘synopsis’ longer…” shouted another counsel to his junior on the other side of the wire. “Cross-check the ‘cause title’ ….” another counsel advised his junior. ‘Forget everything…just file…’ another exhorted his clerk. 

All this while the Goan buccaneers were trying to reach their travel agent and book tickets for a further extended sojourn at Pondicherry. Bail looked illusory, 482 a mere mirage and Revision, an exercise in futility. Probably, things would get better at the next shuffle and till then they might as well hole out at Pondicherry and instruct their clerks to inform their poor unsuspecting clients that they have weighty matters to attend to at the Chennai High Court or the Green Tribunal.  

The old counsel smiled. Vacation had come and gone in a trice and now it was business as usual till the next recess. He shoved his list back into his inside pocket and rose up to leave casting a wary eye on the Court Display screen again. The figure 809 was flickering in the middle column. The old counsel gasped and pulled out his list in a flash. ‘Court No: ___ : Item No: 808’. He reeled and turning around rushed headlong to the court hall. As he opened the door he could hear the booming baritone of his lordship addressing the Government Pleader and the empty court ‘Petitioner and counsel called absent, dismissed for default….’ The process continued unabated till his lordship, pausing for breath, saw the old counsel by the door. ‘Ah! Counsel, which is your matter?’ His lordship politely enquired. ‘808, My Lord’, the old counsel answered timidly. ‘Oh! There was no representation when the matter was called. I have dismissed it for default. You may file an application for restoration. It will be restored on payment of costs of  Rs 500/- to the Legal Services Authority’ his lordship explained. Glancing gleefully at the empty court his lordship whispered to the court officer….’call the next case’

The old counsel silently opened the door and sidled out leaving his lordship to indulge in his solitary culling. He could hear pattering feet as other counsel similarly jolted from their reverie rushed to the court hall. The old counsel chided himself for not having remembered that one cardinal fact, to wit, there are no urgent admission lists on the reopening day and their lordships get to meddle with the weekly hearing lists only on the reopening day! 

"Advocates' Welfare !"  or  "Advocates v. Welfare"? 

(By Jamsheed Hafiz, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

For any practicing lawyer, “Enrolment” is the vertebrae on which, a band is tied and a gown over a coat is clad. The word when conceived brings a smile on our face, which immediately takes us back to the happier memories of the day before. For many, it starts with the memories of their parents, relatives and friends who blessed them for a bright beginning, together with few confident lectures on maturity and ends up with the funniest things done in excitement of the next days’ enrolment. For many others it starts in revelry. They always wondered, why people honour them for their few years’ lethargic, ill-disciplined and unworried life until they realise the fact that they have chosen a group to survive, where only the “hard workers survive”.

But quite often the love for the above word is never recollected, maybe because of the early years of professional struggles or busy and serious commitments together in life and profession. Whatever, how many of us realised that together with the application for enrolment we have also to fill up a form for obtaining membership in the Advocates Welfare Fund (Membership under the Central Act). Though we become a member of the Central Welfare Fund with enrolment, one may also ‘choose’ or ‘unintentionally’ become a member of Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund (“unintentionally” because some organized bar associations take care of the membership to the above welfare fund in the beginning along with the membership to the association and usually the lawyer realises it only after completing his first two years of free membership period). That may or may not be, only those who vanquish the thorny paths of early career, stays for another few years! Inspite of the first five years of hard work, still if you are unable to satisfy yourself, you may start preparing a ‘Resume’. When placed outside the world of advocacy, you may come to know that your membership to the “Welfare Fund” will help you to get some money provided you qualify for a ‘Cessation of Practice’. May be because of the easy accessibility or comparatively faster availability, it is seen that the lawyers satisfying the conditions of ‘Cessation of Practice’ opt only for the amount payable from the Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund. Five years of hard work and less money, develops a starving mind which will immediately satisfy the conditions for a ‘Cessation of Practice’, by a letter or intimation to the Kerala Bar Council before they leave for their better option.

I am reminded of the humorous narration of the Civil Giant and genius, Advocate Late Vijaya Raghava Warrier, who completed his fifty years of active practice at Tirur bar, once said “ if a person practice as a lawyer for 5 years and then decides to quit and join some other service, he will definitely be back in another two or three years because, on practicing for five years, he becomes addicted to ‘laziness’ and ‘easy money’ and hence he will not be competent for any other work”. When his words are simplified; “on practicing for 5 years, an advocate will becomes a good for ‘nothing’, but for ‘advocacy’”. So now when any lawyer decides to have a comeback to his old uniform, obviously, he needs a re-entry to the Rolls of Advocates before any High Court. Here awaits the  Enrolment!!!!!

I personally know, a very good hard working lawyer, who was compelled to end his practice because of his personal problems. He then happened to satisfy a “Cessation of Practice” and obtained some amount of money from the Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund, with which he began his life at Chennai. Fate haunted him again and he was constrained to shift his residence to Cochin. Cochin compared to Chennai had only a lesser exposure for a Bachelor Degree in law, which compelled him to opt for a re-entry into the Rolls of Advocate in the State of Kerala. The application for enrolment filed was initially not acted upon. Aggrieved by the inaction on the part of State Bar Council, the lawyer through his friend approached the honourable High Court of Kerala with a Writ Petition. He obtained an order of “time bound disposal of the application for enrolment” (popularly known as Consider P2). The said application was then considered after formally hearing the said lawyer. Later the Bar Council allowed the application on a condition that the lawyer should pay the entire amount obtained from the Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund with interest. In dire straits, he opted to challenge the above conditional order. A Writ Petition moved was successfully dragged for 7 long years and ultimately he decided to engage a senior counsel for obtaining a chance of hearing. Inspite of the appearance of the senior counsel and obtaining specific postings, the matter always happened to be listed far below the queue. At last, with a timely intervention of a Hon'ble Single Judge before a fresh enrolment to be held in the year, when coupled with the mistake of  the registry, Senior counsel obtained a chance for hearing the lament of a Law Graduate.

The Acts, namely, (1) The Advocates’ Act, 1961, herein after called as “The Act’(2) The Advocates Welfare Fund Act, 2001(Central Act) herein after called as the Central Welfare Fund Act, (3) The Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund Act, 1980 and its Rules 1981 herein after mentioned as Kerala Welfare Fund Act/Rules (4) The Bar Council of India Rules,1975 and (5) The Kerala Bar Council Rules, 1979 were placed for their turns.

The Learned Senior Counsel began with Qualification and Disqualification for enrolment under Section 24 and 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961. Reading the above provisions, it was contended that “any person who is a Indian Citizen at the age of 21 or above, who has obtained a valid bachelor degree in law and who is not disqualified so by Section 24-A and subject to the rules if any made by the State Bar Council in the above Chapter III of the Act, may on payment of the requisite amount of fees be enrolled on the Rolls of Advocate in the State. The said application should be submitted before the State Bar Council (Section 25 of The Act).

The question paused was “what is the role of ‘Welfare Funds’?”. Welfare Fund legislations for Lawyer community are The Advocates Welfare Fund, 2001 (Central Act), The Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund Act, 1980 and its Rules in 1981. The Statement and Objects of both the Welfare Fund Act (Central and State) seems to be that it is enacted for the welfare of the lawyer community. May be because of the fact that a Lawyer can’t even borrow money from someone upon a promise to return it tomorrow, which is really uncertain, the Legislatures thought to extend their help by constituting a fund called as Welfare Fund to which provisions for the membership was made. The Statement and Objects of the Central Act says that the welfare fund is constituted for the welfare of lawyers and that all lawyers should compulsorily be a member of the above fund. An amount is also fixed as compulsory payment every year. Section 18 of the Central Welfare Fund reads as follows:

18. Membership in Fund 

(1) Every advocate practising, before the commencement of this Act, in any court, tribunal or other authority in a State and being a member of a State Bar Association or a State Advocates Association in that State, shall apply, within six months of the commencement of this Act, to the Trustee Committee for admission as a member of the Fund, in such form as may be prescribed.

Though it is stipulated by Section 18 (1) of the Central Welfare Fund Act that all lawyers enrolled in Rolls of Advocates in any State within 6 months of enrolment ‘should’ compulsorily take a membership in the above fund. But unfortunately the Act does not say the consequence for any violation of the section and then not becoming a member of the Fund even after 6 months. The significance of the word used “shall” in the above section is hence open to interpretations. Luckily, the State Bar Councils usually obtains application for membership to this Welfare Fund and collects amounts for the above membership to the fund along with the papers for enrolment and hence tension is so relieved.

Now the membership to the Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund is governed by Section 15 of the Kerala Welfare Fund Act. The Section 15(1) of the Act read as follows:

15. Membership in the Fund.

(1) Every Advocate practicing in any court in the State and being a member of a Bar Association recognised by the Bar Council “may apply” to the Trustee Committee for admission as a member of the fund, in such form as may be prescribed.

(1A) An advocate who is eligible for or availed for any kind of retirement benefits for the services under the Central or State Government or any Public or Private Sector Undertaking, shall not be admitted as a member of the Fund or permitted to resume membership in the fund.

(1B) A person who received retirement benefits from the Fund shall not be readmitted as a member of the Fund.

From, a mere reading of the above section it is understood that the advocates enrolled in the State “may apply’ to be a member in the above fund. Also from a comparison of the above section with that of section 18 of the Central Act, it has to be understood that the Membership to this fund is not compulsory but is only optional at the choice of the lawyers. Also sub- section (1B) above states that a person who received retirement benefits from the Fund Shall not be readmitted to the above fund. Does it impliedly permit ‘an actual practice’ without being a member to the above fund?

Further the application for enrolment to the State is filed before the Bar Council of Kerala formed as per Section 3 of the Advocates Act whereas the application for membership to the Welfare Fund is filed before the Trustee Committee formed as per Section 4 of the Kerala Welfare Fund Act. Two separate bodies under two different statutes. When enrolment of an advocate is governed by Advocates Act subject to Section 24 and 24A, the Welfare Fund Acts, neither Central nor the State, have no role in deciding the qualifications for enrolment.

But still if the Bar Council of Kerala has made any rules grabbing the powers conferred under Section 28(l)(d) r/w Section 24(l)(e) of the Advocates Act, the said rules will be an impediment in enrolling. Now the Bar Council of Kerala has amended Rule 4 and inserted “4A” reads as follows: (Approved by the Bar Council of India in its meeting held on 5.5.2007)

“4A-A person who has already ceased to be an advocate or cease to be an advocate by removal from the State Rolls on request under the provisions of Section 26A of the Advocates Act shall repay the entire amount if any received by him from the Advocates Welfare Fund with 12% interest per annum on that amount to the Welfare Fund and produce the receipt thereon”.

When the 2011 amendment to Welfare Fund Act, Section 15(1B), totally ban a readmission as a member in to the Kerala Welfare Fund Act, the legal validity of the above amendment to Kerala Bar Council Rules need not be argued or commented upon. The above rule framed by the Kerala Bar Council, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Kerala Welfare Fund Act, cannot be an impediment unless and until the Kerala Welfare Fund Act, mandates a compulsory membership. And when the enrolment cannot be denied on any grounds other than for want of qualification and disqualification in sections 24 and 24 A of the Act, why does a Welfare Fund and its rules enacted for the benefit of a lawyer stand as an impediment for enrolment? What amount do they demand for getting enrolled?

“It has to be understood that the Bar Council of State need not necessarily bother about the welfare of an advocate before the law graduates enrolment and the Trustee Committee of Welfare Fund may not be worried of his membership unless the law graduate is an advocate”.

Now coming back to the story of my friend, the above arguments of the senior Counsel was completely accepted by the honourable single Judge who expressed his mind so in the open court. Immediately, the counsel for the Bar Council of Kerala promised before the court that the request of the petitioner will be positively considered for the next week’s enrolment and prayed for two weeks time. When the matter was posted after two weeks it was very confidently reported before the court that “the petitioner was enrolled in the previous enrolment held last week and the Writ Petition hence become infructuous”.

The excuse canvassed by the Bar Council of the State for avoiding a decision on the merits was that the lawyers may take it as a chance for obtaining easy money and fund will be completely exhausted. If the Statement of Object and Reasons for the enactment itself is for providing money to the lawyers on his retirement or cessation of practice, is the snake biting the hand which fed? Situations are even more worse that it has even gone to the extent of rejecting an application filed by a former Judge who compromised his time, energy and family for speedy disposal of the grievance of the common man. Inspite of having an additional privilege as per Chapter VIII of Bar Council of India Rules, 1979, to be read along with Section 24(3)(d), he is still denied an enrolment. I will be the last person to blame the learned single Judge who let the Bar Council avoid a decision on merits because it was his wise,  benevolent and appropriate decision that made my friend sooner a busy and hard working lawyer. But what I meant is only to say that “benevolence may be after a precedent because it really bothers lawyer’s community”. However, it is time to think, whether it is “Advocates Welfare or Advocate v. Welfare”.

The Importance of Being e-Court fee Literate

(B. Premnath,  Advocate , High  Court  of  Kerala,  Ernakulam)

It’s official. Under the e-Court fee payment system, the queues and hassles for judicial stamp papers for payment of court fee will soon be a thing of a bygone era. Court fee stamps will be available 24 x 7, from anywhere. Non availability of stamp papers doesn’t matter. There is no need to deposit money in the treasury and wait for the stamp papers of higher value. The e-stamping facility will ensure trouble free transactions and prevent fraudulent practices. It will help in speedy disposal of cases. There is no wastage of paper. In the e-Court fee system, the litigant can pay the exact amount of Court fee and need no ‘rounding up’ of the amount of court fee. 

Ministry of Finance, Government of India appointed Stock Holding Corporation of India Limited as Central Record Keeping Agency (CRA) for computerisation of Stamp Duty Administration System (C-DAS). The Mumbai and Delhi High Courts have implemented the e-Court fee payment system, with the District Courts to follow. In Maharashtra, the department of Treasuries has introduced an e-challan payment gateway also known as Government Receipt Accounting system (GRAS). The Bombay High Court is using this system for e-court fee payment. Through this system, litigants and advocates can pay the court fees online using the GRAS website (https://gras.mahakosh.gov.in) and their net banking account with any of the registered banks in the GRAS website. This has to be done prior to the filing of the relevant case or document in the High Court. The payment receipt has to be attached along with other documents during the filing process in the High Court. Then the High Court registry would verify the authenticity of the receipt using the linkage of the High Court Case Management Information System (CMIS) to the GRAS system. The filing will be allowed to proceed after successful verification of the details in the payment receipt with those in the presentation form. Subsequently, the payment receipt would be defaced by the Registry. The registered user can track his transaction of e-payment and there is no risk of Court fee stamps getting damaged/lost or counterfeit stamps.

And now the Madras High Court has followed suit. In a suit before the Madras High Court, an application was filed under Order 14 Rule 8 of the Original Side Rules of the Madras High Court read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying to permit the applicant to remit Rs. 48,00,000/- towards Court Fee by Reserve Bank of India Challan payment. The cause of action for filing that application was that the Sub Treasury, Chennai was unable to provide the judicial stamp paper to the value of Rs. 48,00,000/-. The Court called for the report of the Registrar General who reported that presently there is no provision for payment of e -Court fee which will dispense the undue usage of judicial stamp paper. Then the Court permitted the applicant to remit the Court fee of Rs. 48,00,000/- on the basis of the Challan to be supplied by the Registry of the Court to the credit of the Government of Tamil Nadu and passed other directions. The Court took note of the fact that the Delhi High Court has already implemented the e-Court fee payment system and directed the Registrar to place the matter before the Chief Justice to consider implementation of e-Court fee system. The judgement also details the instructions provided for electronic payment of Court fee in the Delhi High Court. 

In the course of the said decision which is reported in 2013 (3) MLJ 129, the Court made the following observations: “In this regard, it is to be noticed that a number of high value suits that are filed before this Court and in all civil Courts including Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the District. A huge volume of judicial stamp papers is consumed while paying Court fee. This created unwanted stock of defaced judicial stamp papers which occupy a huge space in all Courts. The bundle of judicial stamp papers after lodging serves no purpose except occupying valuable Court space. If the huge volume of judicial stamp papers is dispensed with, the space can be better utilized. If use of judicial stamp papers is dispensed with by adopting e-Court fee, then the Court bundle also will get reduced and the time wasted to deface the stamp paper can be better utilized. It will be a welcome measure considering the huge volume of cases filed…………………This Court is of the view that the said e-Court Fee payment system should be adopted for Madras High Court as well in all Civil Courts including Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in the District.”

A  view  worthy  of  emulation.  Food  for  thought.  Can  Kerala  be  far  behind ?

A Requiem for the Late Justice Chinnappa Reddy

(By Justice K.T. Thomas, Former Judge, Supreme Court of India)

The news that Justice  Chinnappa Reddy passed away trickled in. The loss is irreparable.  But it did not gain news catch, perhaps, due to his own characteristic taciturnity.  As he consciously kept away from the glare of news flashes, the media did not even bother to bring it to the print and electronic blaze.  But he was indubitably one of the rarest of rare Judges of the Indian judicial scenario.  He was endowed with a sharp intellect, amazing quick grasping skill, admirable secular perception and indomitable courage.  When he was chosen as Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, little did the Bar elsewhere realize that there was one who eventually would decorate  the Indian Judiciary with his contributions.

During the dark days of the phony emergency, when most Judges buckled  and genuflected  before the  dictates of the despotic executive,  Justice Chinnappa Reddy was among the very few judges who did not bend, but  exhibited uncanny thirst to protect the freedom and liberty of the citizens.  He refused to become committed to the commands of the establishment.  He did not treat emergency provisions as overriding the guarantees enshrined in the Constitution.  The establishment viewed him as a defiant and unpliable Judge.  He was included in the first batch  to be uprooted from his parental High Court and translocated him in the far-flung North East.  Nobody raised then a little finger against such imperious transfers,  perhaps nobody knew about it due to the rigid implementation of the draconian press censorship.  When emergency waned out with Indian masses throwing  off the autocratic regime, the legal fraternity all over India came to know about those Judges who were replanted. The new administration offered him a return to the parent High Court and  to designate  as Chief Justice of the High Court.  Justice Chinnappa Reddy declined both and opted to remain where he was found at the eclipse of emergency.  No wonder he was  elevated to the Supreme Court. Looking back the country is indebted to him that he did not decline  the elevation.

The Indian legal fraternity  saw how great a Judge was Justice Chinnappa Reddy.  During his initial years in the apex court he came out with new standards in appreciating evidence, particularly in criminal cases. He accorded a ceremonial burial to the conventional anathema towards “chance witnesses” and “interested witnesses” and also “hostile witnesses” through his path breaking judgments. He informed the Bar in India that the  minutes of the court proceedings regarding what transpired in open court would be  sacrosanct, and even  conclusive, and not even the most respected counsel  would be heard  to canvass before the superior court that neither he nor his counter part in the subordinate court did or did not make concessions on any point.

Those who believed that tax avoidance is a permitted phenomenon  in fiscal  jurisprudence,  were informed by Justice Chinnappa Reddy(through his judgment in Mc Dowel v. Commissioner) that  “colourable measures for avoidance of tax by making suitable arrangements in commercial transactions must be discouraged, and that the statutes should be so construed as to disfavor tax evading that  it is high time to desist from the alluring logic of tax avoidance and disfavor the ingenious attempt to rationalize and legitimates the same.”  

He was a hard core atheist, (he asserted that he had no religions at all, and that his only identity is that of an Indian human being). Nevertheless  he exhibited judicial  zeal in  safeguarding the religious faith of Indian citizens, however  miniscule is the membership of the denomination to which the faithful belonged.  This was highlighted by Justice Reddy in his most famous judgment known as “Jehovah’s  Witnesses  case” (1986 KLT 1037 (SC)) . When three tiny tots in a government school in Kerala refused to sing “Janaganamana” (though they stood up respectfully when the anthem was sung) were expelled from the school on the ground that it was anti national conduct. The Kerala High Court upheld the  action of school authorities, but a bench headed by Justice Chinnappa Reddy in the Supreme Court opened a new vista regarding freedom of faith and set aside the action of the authorities.  In the most celebrated judgment “Bijoe Immannuel v. State of Kerala” (1986 KLT 1037 (SC),  Justice Reddy dealt with the question whether refusal to sing national anthem (on the ground that  it would be perfidy to their faith) was genuine or  a mere pretence.  He found that members of that smallest community, wherever they are, whether in England or in Germany or in USA adopted the same approach to the national anthem of those countries. He held that they have a right to adhere to their religious faith as long as they did not show any disrespect to the national anthem and that our Constitution would protect such right.  His reasoning is summed up thus:   

“We do endorse the view suggested by Davar J’s observation that the question is not whether a particular religious belief or practice appeals to our reason or sentiment but whether the belief is genuinely and conscientiously held as part of the profession or practice of religion. Our personal views and reactions are irrelevant. If the belief is genuinely and conscientiously held it attracts the protection of Art.25 but subject, of course, to the inhibitions contained therein.”

The famous sentence which became the befitting finale of his judgment in that case is:   We only  wish to add - our tradition teaches tolerance; our philosophy teaches tolerance; our Constitution practises tolerance; let us not dilute it.”

After retirement, it appears he had a busy schedule heading different Commissions and Committees.  I got an opportunity to spend a little time with him.  He impressed me as a man with fine temperament, though he skirted  publicity and controversy.  Though he was reticent, he was a good listener.  The Supreme Court Bar was full of praises for the remarkable speed of his grasp and disposal, not with cryptic orders but well reasoned analysis.  No doubt he was a judge with a difference   He is now no more. But the Republic of India cannot afford to by-pass his enriching contribution to the constitutional and jurisprudential growth.