'Is Lokayukta 'Watch Dog' of Administration With only Recommendatory Jurisdiction'?

(By N. Dharmadan, Advocate, Ernakulam)

The Lokpal/Lokayukta is the Indian nomenclature of Swedish 'Ombudsman'. It had originally envolved and was intended to function like an 'Ombudsman', in accordance with the recommendations of Administrative Reforms Commission in 1966, for the redress of grievances of the people. In Western countries the 'Ombudsman' developed as one of the components in the system of accountability closely linked with Parliament, This institution, in our country, emerged as citizen's defender and a symbol of democratic Government. According to an eminent jurist it is a "watch dog designed to look into the entire working of the administration"1 and deal with effectively "mal-administration", which is the root cause of all corruption. Its object is to "eliminate corruption in public service" and among the public servant; not by adjudicating the rights of parties as in a civil court or other judicial forum; but by examining the various aspects of the complaints, entering its finding and conclusion and leaving it to the Government or competent authority to take necessary follow up action, in implementation of it in the interest of justice. The final decision generally rests with the Government and the Legislature under the scheme of the Act2 So the role of this institution is advisory and recommendatory to establish and promote the governance of rule of law and thereby develop a system of good governance. By sending reports and its recommendations on complaints from the citizen, it bridges the gap between the citizen and administration.

The broad function of this institution is to investigate written complaints from citizen, who claims to have sustained injustice in connection with mal-administration and acts relating to the administrative machinery, and report its recommendation to the Government, who shall report back about the action taken within a specified period. If the advice of the Lokayukta is not accepted by the Government it will forward again a 'special report' to the Governor for being placed before the Legislature for consideration. But in the actual practice these reports are not laid before the House nor are they discussed in the Legislature because the legislators are not actually interested in such reports. However the most significant part of it is that in forwarding the reports and recommendations the Lokayukta can effectively meet the problems of citizens in its findings and suggestions, for the redressal of grievances, for which citizens mainly approach the Lokayukta with fervent hope of getting reliefs at the hands of competent authority with lesser expense in a limited period.

The institution of Lokayukta was modeled on the Swedish Institution of 'Ombudsman' and "Parliamentary Commissioner" in England3 The powers of 'Ombudsman' in Sweeden4 as defined in the Constitution are (i) to supervise the Judges, Government officials and civil servants, observe the laws, and (ii) to prosecute those who have acted illegally or neglected their duties. The jurisdiction embrances all national and municipal offices. There the 'Ombudsman' can initiate suo motu action and it is independent of the Government, unlike in the case of U.K., where he is an ex-officio member of Council of Tribunals5. On the other hand the jurisdiction of the Newsland6 'Ombudsman' is much wider than that of its Sweedish counter-part in as such as the former can interfere not only in cases of mal-administration, but also in cases of wrong decisions, ultravires, unreasonable, oppressive or discriminatory acts, or decisions withoutreasons7 He is not an agent of executive. He is Parliament's man; but he is not subject to the superintendence of the House or any of its committees.

In India thorough efforts were made for the establishment of some institutions at the centre for the eradication of corruption so far it did not produce any favourable results. The existing machineries for combating corruption are found to be not sufficient to meet the alarming situation. The high level corruption is increasing day-by-day. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment8. observed that corruption in "a civilised society is discease like cancer which if not detected in time is sure to malign the polity of country leading to disastrous consequences". In our democratic set up and the changing Governments the role of Lokayukta is of vital importance. In fact the institution of the Lokayukta is gaining wide acceptance among the general public as a means for ventilating and redressing the grievances of the citizen against those who occupy position in Government for it is being considered as an effective means of guaranteeing civic rights and building up confidence in the administrative activities. But in India as stated above the Governmental efforts to weedout corruption and mal-administration and all attempts to build up confidence in service have miserably failed. Now corruption is rampant and nepotism has infiltrated from the ministerial level to the lower officers damaging the public image of administration and functions of Ministers who are, majority of them, considered as dishonest and inefficient.

Unless and until we provide a basically sound and healthy society no good result should be expected from the implementation of the proposal in the Lokpal Bill framed persuant to the report of the Administrative Committee, which was set up on 5th January 1966 under the Chairmanship of Sri. Morarji Desai. It is doubtful whether this Bill will produce any appreciable improvement in the administration under the present set up. However, the creation of Two tyre" machinary viz., Lokpal at the centre and Lokayukta at the State Level h ad been recommended. Having considered this the Government introduced the Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill 1968 in the Lok Sabha on 10th May 1968. It lapsed due to dissolution the Fourth Lok Sabha. The same was the fate of Lokpal Bill 1971,1977,1985,1989 and 19%. Now Lokpal Bill of 1998 is pending consideration with Parliamentary Committee.

But some States took upon themselves the task of establishing the institution of Lokayukta by enacting state statutes. Maharashtra is the first State which established Lokayukta in 1972. Office of Lokayukta now exist in Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Himachai Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Punjab, Orissa and Delhi. The provisions in the State laws with regard to nomenclature, composition, powers and procedure vary from State to State. There is no uniformity. The variances in approach by the States will have some impact on the working of this institution. The changing role of the modem Government is to a certain extent responsible for these variances and the ineffectiveness of the Lokayukta.

The Kerala Lokayukta Act of 1999 was framed by the erstwhile L.D.F. Government, after repealing the then enactment which was in force viz. the Kerala Public Mens Corruption (Investigations and Enquiries) Act, 1987, Act 24 of 1988. This Act was repealed and reenacted with political motive. Without taking into account the very object and real purpose for the introduction of Lokayukta in the prevailing circumstances in Kerala. It is seen from experience that the State Government's interest stops after the enactment of the law in this behalf and giving wide publicity that the Government had taken effective steps to combact corruption and maintain purity of the administration. Thereafter there is no sincere and earnest efforts on the part of the Government to see that the Lokayukta works properly and efficiently. Prompt steps for the implementation of the recommendations of Lokayukta are lacking and there is no machinery for expiditing the same. The greatest draw back lies in the helplessness of Lokayukta when the Government or the concerned authority ignores or refuses to implement the recommendations in the reports of the Lokayukta.

It is under this back ground that the issue concerning the Lokayukta's jurisdiction, as to whether it is invested with all judicial power to express final and binding opinion on the legality or validity of any action or decision impugned before it, becomes relevant.

On a comparative assessment of the statutory provisions now prevailing in the various States it can be stated with certainty that Lokayukta is only an advisory authority without having the powers for adjudicating contesting issues as in the case of a court of law even though it is judicial in character. But it can enter into clear finding and arrive at final conclusion in respect of matters raised in the complaint for sending its recommendations and report to the concerned authority. They can also pass final orders on interlocutory matters in the interest of justice. The Bombay High Court9 while, considering the identical situation held "admittedly under the Act the Lokayukta has no jurisdiction to pass a binding order which will operate on its own force. However it is well established rule of construction that a power to do something essential for the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation may be implied".

For investigating the complaints wide powers are conferred on this authority. They are also coupled with duty to investigate impartially and independently. It has been held by Bombay High Court in the same case that these powers are "wider than of a court of law". The Court held:

"The million doller question before our democracy is as to who will watch the watchman? This seems to be the object behind the present legislation. It is no doubt true that the Lokayukta is invested with the power of investigation and to make a recommendatory report. However, it is not an exercise in futility".

The Lokayukta, under the present Act, has trie powers to take evidence10 by summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and production of documents, issue commission and enforce other powers of civil Court11. It can decide its own procedure for investigation. The proceedings before it are deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of S. 193 IPC. It has the power to initiate prosecution of a public servant12 who commits criminal offence, intentionally insults the Lokayukta13 interferes or interrupts with the investigation either by words or deeds. It is punishable with simple imprisonment for a term not less than six months or extending to one year and fine extending upto Rs. 5000/-. It is deemed to be a High Court for dealing with contempt coming within the purview of Contempt of Court Act, 197114. It can also initiate prosecution, when false complaints15 are filed with malicious intention, treating it as an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period upto six months and with fine of Rs.2000/- or maximum of Rs. 5000/-. In addition to all these powers the Rules, framed under S.22 of the Act, invest the Lokayukta with the powers of a civil court, while trying a suit under CPC 190816 , to grant injunction, pass interlocutory orders in the interest of justice, implead additional parties, legal representatives, review its decision, dismiss complaints for default, decide complaints ex parte set aside order of dismissal for default, pass ex parte orders etc. The provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to the application filed before the Lokayukta. All these powers are invested with the object that the Lokayukta functions as an effective machinery for investigation of the complaints of the citizen for eradicating mal-administration and corruption. But since the power to take a binding decision is lacking the end product is unsatisfactory and the object is not achieved. However, it is considered that all findings and conclusions of Lokayukta have the status of the rulings of the High Court. The Government or the competent authority cannot reverse, overrule or set aside such findings and conclusions.

The Kerala Act makes a distinction between the terms of "allegation" S. 2(b) and "grievance" S. 2(h) in the matter of dealing with the complaints. The position is the same in Maharashtra Act and Karnataka Act.

The definitions of these terms are as follows:-

2(b). "allegation", in relation to a public servant, means any affirmation that such public servant,-

(i) has abused his position as such public servant to obtain any gain or favour to himself or to any other person or to cause undue harm or hardship to any other person;

(ii) was actuated in the discharge of his functions as such public servant by personal interest or improper or corrupt motives; or

(iii) is guilty of corruption, favouritism, nepotism or lack of integrity in his capacity as such public servant;

XXX                XXX             XXX

2(h) "grievance" means a claim by a person that he sustained injustice or undue hardship in consequence of mal-administration;

S. 12(1) of the Act deals with "grievance". If the Lokayukta, after investigation of a complaint involving "grievance", is satisfied that it is a genuine one, it will forward the report in the form of a recommendation to the competent authority concerned prescribing the ways and means for remedying or redressing the grievance, which the competent authority shall consider within one month and report back to the Lokayukta about the action taken by it on the report. Then the Lokayukta would close the matter, if it is satisfied that the action taken by the competent authority on the report is due implementation of the recommendation. But if the Lokayukta is not satisfied, it would send a "special report" to the Governor, who would place it before the Legislative Assembly.

S. 12(3) makes provision for investigation of complaints involving an "allegation". While investigating such a complaint if the Lokayukta is satisfied that the allegation is substantiated and the concerned public servant should not continue to hold the post, a declaration shall be made to that effect and forward the report to the competent authority as provided in S. 14(1), which shall be accepted by the competent authority concerned without any further verification or consideration. There is no option to reject or modify it. So there is nothing wrong in assuming that this recommendation of Lokayukta and the findings and conclusions thereof in connection with the "allegation" are binding even though the Lokayukta does not make an executive order or decision by itself apart from forwarding its report or recommendation. Sri. Partric Neill, QC in his book17 has stated after a critical study that "one day it may be necessary to consider enforcement powers on this authority. The hour has come. So it is now desirable to incorporate modifications and additions in the Act for providing more teeth for the enforcement of the findings and conclusions of the Lokayukta. Even though this institution has no power or jurisdiction like the court to pass binding orders, the establishment of this institution will undoubtedly be a big step forward for improving the machinary and mechanism for redressing public grievances.

The usefulness of this institution will depend not on its character, jurisdiction, power etc., but on improving the wider frame work and maintaining three following basic and unique characteristics18, viz:

(1) The Lokayukta is an independent and non-partisum officer, who supervises the administration fairly with utmost honesty.

(2) He deals with specific complaints from the public against administrative injustice and maladministration.

(3) He has the power to investigate, criticise and report back to the Legislature but not to reverse administrative actions.

The functioning of this institution clearly reflects that there is no political will on the part of the Kerala Government and the Legislature to maintain the Lokayukta as an efficient and effective institution for building up public confidence satisfying the above requirements. The successful functioning of this institution necessarily needs a clear understanding among the political parties to keep it above party politics and favouritism. The parmount consideration must be the proper and fair functioning of the institution. It should function effectively irrespective of any change of Governments or political manipulations. The appointment of honest and upright person having atmost honesty and integrity is a sina-qua-non to make this institution an incurreptible, fearless and independent investigative machinery in which the public can have full confidence. The solemn duty of impartial investigation of allegations and grievances by this institution is allowed to be carried out by inefficient persons, against whom personal allegations and cases are pending, the citizen would develop a feeling of frustration, more so if no action is taken when complaints are filed against political head weight or influential persons. It would defeat the very object and purpose for which the institution was established in our State.

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Foot Note:

1. Dr. S.S. Singh, Professor of Indian Institution of Public Administration, in his speech in Sixth All India Conference of Lokayukta and Upalokayukta 2001

2. Kerala Lok Ayukta Act, 1999.

3. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967; the procedure is explained at page50of Vol. IHalsubury's Laws of England 4th Edn.

4. Page 43, Ombudsman, An Indian Perspective by Subhash Chandra Gupta.

5. Ibid Page43.

6. Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act, 1962.

7. Ibid Page 45.

9. Vishwas Rao v. Ayukta State of Maharashtra AIR 1985 Bom. 136.

10. Section 11 of of Kerala Lokayukta Act.

11.Sections 11 (f) and 23 (d).

12. Section 15 of Kerala Lokayukta Act.

13. Section 18 of Kerala Lokayukta Act.

14. Section 19 of Kerala Lokayukta Act.

15. Section 21 of Kerala Lokayukta Act.

16. Rule 3 of Kerala Lokayukta (Power of Civil Court) Rules, 1999.

17. Administrative Justice, Some Necessary Reforms by Sri. Patrick Neill QC Page 128,

18. Page 162 of Ombudsman, An Indian Perspective by Subash Chandra Gupta.

Power of Attorney and Cheque Case

(By S.A. Karim, Advocate, Thiruvananthapuram)

Powers of Attorney Act, 1882, hereafter refers the Act, enables one to act or perform anything on behalf of another. S. 1A of the Act speaks about the definition. It reads-

Power of attorney included any instrument empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the person executing it.

This instrument is widely used in Civil Courts and before Government and semi Government authorities. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is one of the central Acts of our country. By Act 66 of 1988, Ss. 138 to 142 have been added in the N.I. Act, with effect from 1st April, 1989. Till this date cheque cases were dealt with in civil Courts. Since then dishonoured cheque cases have been tried and disposed off either by the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class. The punishment is either imprisonment or fine or both. In criminal Courts power of attorney has no role. In my knowledge, it has been first introduced in the N.I. Act by the Kerala High Court.

In Hamsa v. Ibrahim, reported in 1993 (2) KLT, page 698, Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas of Kerala High Court held that power of attorney holder of a payee or holder in due course can make a complaint under S. 142 of the N.I. Act.   This decision has been followed in Shaji v. Reghunandanan, reported in 1999 (3) KLT, page 82, short notes and in Pandalai v. Jacob C. Alexander, reported in 2000 (2) KLT, page 59. So, the application of power of attorney is a settled position of law in Kerala State.

In S.P. Sampathy v. Manju Gupta & Anr., reported in 2002 Criminal Law Journal, page 2621, Mr. Justice Bilal Nazki and Justice Gopal Krishna Tamada of Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that complainant cannot be filed by a powers of attorney holder on behalf of payee under S. 138 of N.I. Act. The complaint can only be filed in writing by the payee or the holder in due course. Power of attorney holder has no entity in terms of S. 142 of N.I. Act. One can understand a complaint having been made under S. 142 by a holder in due course of the cheque but a power of attorney holder would not be a holder in due course of the cheque. By this decision a batch of petitions have disposed off on the same point of law.

This is the charm of judicial interpretations. It is another classic example that two heads need not think alike. But the misery is to the people. The litigants of one State enjoy the benefit of a positive interpretation and the same is denied to another State. In the case in hand, the application of power of attorney under the N.I. Act is good law in Kerala State, but the same is bad in Andhra Pradesh. This difference can be remedied only by the Apex Court.

                   To My Beloved Brother Mr. Justice B.N. Srikrishna, Judge, Supreme Court

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Pre-Cogntzance Investigation V. Post Cognizance Enquiry

(By Devan Ramachandran, Advocate, Ernakulam)

"Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of Justice,..........so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of enquiry" (Privy Council in (1944) 71 Ind App 202)

Apropos the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Joisy v. Sub Inspector of Police reported in 2002 (3) KLT 172:

The question of law which came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Court was whether a Magistrate who had taken cognizance of an offence has the power to then direct the Police to conduct further investigation into the allegations under S. 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Hon'ble High Court has answered this in the affirmative holding that"......... there is no reason for saying that after taking cognizance of the offence, a court cannot ask the investigating agency to exercise jurisdiction which has been conferred on that agency under S. 173(8) of the Code". The Hon'ble Court has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri. B.S.S.V.V. Vishwandadha Maharaj v. State of A.P., reported in AIR 1999 SC 2332. I beg to submit that a contrary view, long settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases, has perhaps escaped attention of the Hon'ble Court.

The issue whether the Magistrate has the power to order fresh investigation after taking cognizance of an offence has been dealt with by our High Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases. The judicial opinion voiced in a number of cases no doubt goes to emphasise that a Magistrate can direct the police to conduct further investigation even after the Court had taken cognizance of the offence. However, the point of controversy is as to the scope and nature of investigation the Magistrate is empowered to direct and the provision of law under which such an investigation can be ordered.

The powers of the Police to investigate into the alleged commission of an offence or offences upon receipt of information are governed by Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The police officer's power to investigate a cognizable offence is as mandated in S. 156 of the Code. The power of the Court to order investigation under S. 156(3) of the Code has been summed up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. Narayana Reddy (reported in AIR 1976 SC 1672). The Hon'ble Court opined:

"It may be noted that an order made under sub-s. 3 of S. 156 is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the Police to exercise theirplenary powers of investigation under S. 156(3). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under S. 156 and ends with a report or chargesheet under S. 173".

The question then was whether a report under S. 173 would put an end to the power of the Police to conduct any further investigation into the matter. Some High Courts took the vie that it would cease since any further investigation by the Police would trench upon the magisterial cognizance of the offence. However, the Law Commission in its 41st report recognized the position and recommended that the right of the Police to conduct further investigation should be statutorily affirmed. The Law Commission said:

"A report under S. 173 is normally the end of the investigation. Sometimes, however, the police officer submitting the report under S. 173 comes upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. We should have thought that the police officer can collect that evidence and send it to the Magistrate concerned. It appears, however, that the courts have sometimes taken the narrow view that once a final report under S. J 73 has been sent, the police cannot touch the case again and cannot reopen the investigation. This view places a hindrance in the way of the investigating agency, which can be very unfair to the prosecution and, for that matter, even to the accused. It should be made clear in S. J 73 that the competent police officer can examine such evidence and send a report to the Magistrate ".        (See AIR 1976 SC 1672)

It is thus that S. 173(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code was introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This power of the Police now statutorily recognised under S. 173(8) to conduct fresh investigation as and when new and fresh facts come into light has however been circumscribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment in Ram Lai Narang v. State reported in AIR 1979 SC 1791. The Hon'ble Court stated:

" We should not, however, be understood to say that the Police Officer should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a Court and investigate every fresh fact that comes into light as if no cognizance has been taken by the Court of any offence. We think that in the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come into light". (See also 1993 (2) KIT 49 and 1999(1) KIT 184)

The law having been thus laid, the question remains as to whether a Magistrate can direct the Police to conduct fresh investigation under S. 156(2) or 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the Court had taken cognizance of the offence.

In the judgment of Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 2401, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down certain legal propositions as to the course of action a Magistrate could take once he took cognizance of an offence. The discretion of the Magistrate to order further investigation after taking cognizance of an offence was laid down by the Hon'ble Court as under:

"The Magistrate can order investigation under S. 156(3) only at the pre-cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Ss. 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter XIV he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under S. 156(3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to S. 202, he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by S. 202 of the Code".

The power of the Magistrate to order further post cognizance investigation is therefore, beyond much doubt, but the question is under which provision and in what manner.

From the above discussion, it is beyond dispute that the Chapters XII and XV of the Code have been intended to deal with different scenarios. The former dealing with pre-cognizance action and the latter dealing with post-cognizance action (See AIR 1976 SC 1672). The Hon'ble Supreme Court had reiterated the position in the Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy case (supra). The Hon'ble Court stated as follows:

"S. 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII under the caption "Information to the Police and their power to investigate". While 5.202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading of "Of complaints to Magistrates". The power to order police investigation under S. 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by S. 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in the seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under S. 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under S. 190(1 )(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV. he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of S. 156(3)".   (emphasis supplied)

It is true that the Supreme Court was dealing with the powers of investigation under S. 156(3) of the Code. However, since S. 173 is also included in Chapter XII of the Code, it is trite that the above proposition applies to S. 173(8) also. Moreover as stated earlier, the process of investigation under Chapter XII of the Code has been defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as the "continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under S. 156 and ends with the report or chargesheet under S. 173". (see AIR 1976 SC 1672)

Thus once the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, the next stage, namely the post cognizance stage comes into being. This stage comes in at a stage when some evidence has already been collected by the Police or otherwise and the same is deemed insufficient to make a decision. In such situation the Magistrate is empowered under S. 202 to direct, within the powers circumscribed by the section, an investigation for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Thus the object of investigation at this stage is not to initiate a fresh case but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him.

Hence 1 submit for consideration that once a Magistrate, who takes cognizance of an offence under Chapter XIV of the Code, cannot thereafter revert to the pre-cognizance stage and order an investigation under S. 156(3) or 173(8) of the Code. The only power by which he can direct investigation after taking cognizance is under Chapter XV of the Code and this investigation would only be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by S. 202 of the Code.

Portriat of a Profession

(By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Senior Advocate, Ernakulam)

For some time now, I have been thinking long and hard about the Kerala High Court Bar; and what flummoxed me is the realisation that the Bar is not unwilling to wear the logo of another. We thus see a fractured portrait of our profession. Many lawyers seem to have forgotten the standards of professional conduct, especially the great principle that an advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an officer of court and a gentleman. The cardinal rule of the Bar Council of India is:

"An advocate shall, during the presentation of his case and while otherwise acting before a court, conduct himself with dignity and self-respect. He shall not be servile and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judicial officer, it shall be his right and duty to submit his grievance to proper authorities."

If this rule is remembered and followed by every member of our Association, we could retrieve our status and dignity. I would exhort my learned friends, especially the cub lawyers, to resist any affront to their status and dignity.

If anybody chooses to badmouth a lawyer or his profession, he should resist it with all his might. I venture the following indelible advice. Resist any inquisitorial hectoring by anybody. Do not allow anybody to wag his finger at you. Rule your territory that is the legal profession. Do not allow anybody to use his illegitimate power against you. Be a respectable lawyer and little else besides. Do not expect any grace mark or moderation mark for advocacy. You should always make a bold assertion of professional status and rejoice at the accretion of muscle to the profession.

Let it be virtuous to be obstinate about the above.