Hasten Slowly, My Lord!

(A Critique of Madhavan V. Narayana Das, 2002 (3) KLT 493)

(By S. Parameswaran, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

I. This article is intended to drive home with force that although these sorts of cases may involve distinct substantive issues before courts, these implicate fundamental notions of rights of remedy in civil litigation and, therefore, these cases cannot be treated as isolated as one is normally prone to do. If the decisions are seriously flawed, replete with contradictory assumptions and inferences as in the present case, the impact will be far reaching and damaging. There is nothing wrong in the lawyers and the litigants expecting and it is realistic for both to do so the Judges to develop a coherent and integrated theory of interpretation to the extent to which the doctrine of interpretation adequately solved legal problems. By playing in this over­arching legal area, with respect, the decision under comment does not steer the lawyers and the litigants towards a particular answer or a plausible response. Whether one agrees with the opinion of Justice Basant or not, it is to be candidly admitted that the fodder this judgment gives the lawyers to chew as they confront the difficult, yet critical, question civil disputes raise, is, indeed, very valuable. It lays out the sorts of disputes they will, in all likelihood, eventually, confront, though it does not disclose the options available for resolving them. Despite the fact that the court can and, indeed, does use legal interpretation and current scholarship in various fields to broaden and expand the law, it is still a judicial body, not a think-tank. It lacks the capacity to seek out problems, the time or the venues to engage in any full scholarly analysis, and the authority to simply pronounce on questions as it sees fit. What the court can accomplish in initiating a discernible theory of interpretation must be judged in the context of the nature and the scope of its authority and the practical constraints under which it functions.

II.  In the welter of communication technologies, and unrestrained market place and post­modern ideals, law is increasingly becoming a spectacle, mimicking the style, techniques and logic of advertising and public relations, creating a dilemma as to how law will continue to function when interpretation of law at judicial hands results in a disconcerting unpredictability of litigation. American critics are merciless and pungent in their observation and reaction to the crafting of law by the Courts. In "Crafting Law on the Supreme Court; The Collegial Game" by Forrest Matzman, James F. Spriggs II and Paul J. Wehlbeck (Cambridge University Press 2000), the authors argue that at the heart of the process of crafting the law are policy seeking justices who are constrained by the choices made by the other justices. The authors argues by strategically using threats, signals and persuasion, Justice attempt to influence the behaviour of their colleagues on the Bench. Evidence derived from the recently released papers of the United States Supreme Court Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and Powell is used to test the authors' theory of opinion writing. As a result, the portrait of the United States Supreme Court stands in sharp contrast to the conventional portrait where justices act solely on the basis of law or their personal policy preferences. Though it is true that the Indian Judicially crafts the law not exactly in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court, one has to be watchful that it does not ship into that shoddy path.

III. This writer also respectfully feels that the judgment does not even reflect what in American political theory is called 'offensive realism' which is that each one seeks to ensure his survival by maximising his share of power. At a time when, unfortunately, judicial functioning appears to have become a spectator sport often viewed with a cynical eye by the people, it is needful to be reminded that judicial freedom entails a civic responsibility to preserve the legal documents that confer jurisdiction on the judiciary. The litigant public as much as the lawyers have the right to protect themselves from interpretation, that go unreasonably beyond the original intent of the Legislature. We cannot forget that in the past, interpretation of statutes has been abused or at least carelessly used, to justify decisions made by the Legislature and the Judicial Branches of Government that have since been overturned. Decisions that extend the powers of the Courts beyond the expressly stated limits declared in and under the Constitution and the laws of the country remain the subject of intensely debated contentions even now. When a newly brought in amendment is inteipreted the frames and foundations of the principles of interpretation of statutes should be preserved.

IV. In good old days, it was permissible for the Judges to write to the Legislature and enquire what it meant where the language of an Act was ambiguous or contradictory. But happily enough, the practice is dead and gone and there is no chance of its revival. A Legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve the difficulties (M/s. Girdharilal v. B.N. Mathur (AIR 1986 SC 1099). After Parliament has enacted the legislation, only the court may say what it meant to say; none else (M/s. Doypac Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1988 SC 782).

V. "The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself [Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar in Kannailal Surv. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan (AIR 1957 SC 907). As Justice Holmes of the American Supreme Court said in a letter "I only want to know what the words mean........their (Judges) function is merely academic, to begin with to read English intelligently. (Northern Securities Company v. United States (193 U.S. 197 at page 400). As the Privy Council observed in Pakkala Narayanaswamy v. Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47) and the Supreme Court observed in Gurmeja Singh v. Sardar Pratap Singh (AIR 1960 SC 122) undoubtedly to the extent "the referent is clearly indicated and the words have a 'plain' meaning, the courts are not to busy themselves with 'supposed intention' or with "the policy underlying the statute".

VI. It was with excessive eagerness and intellectual curiosity that I watched for the first judgment by a new recruit of great promise and potentiality to the High Bench of Kerala. My expectation of delight descended into disappointment on reading Madhavan v. Narayana Das (2002 (3) KLT 493) delivered by Justice R. Basant. The amended provisions of the CPC, which amendment just got the Presidential assent, came in handy for the learned Judge for his adventurous incursion (or excursion) in an area, which has to be trodden with care, caution and circumspection. Interpretation of statutes, great legal minds have said, is a slippery slope, negotiating which has to be done slowly, sedately and soberly, for, you are handing down a judgment which may have a lethal effect on litigation, present or future. By a clever, but. not so correct, sleight of hand, Juslice Basant gave an interpretation of the amendment of the CPC by the 1999 and 2002 Amendment Acts, which dealt a coup de grace to attempts of getting judicial correction by the High Courts of the illegal intermediate orders of the Subordinate Judiciary.

VII. Whatever may have been the legislative intention in bringing about the amendment, which according to Justice Basant, is a reduction in the delayed delivery of justice, remember, neither the Legislature nor the Law Commission did or could make even a modicum of change in O. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure with the result that the wailing of the Privy Council more than half a century ago that the headache of a litigant in India starts when he obtains a decree, rings with reverberating resonance even now.

VIII. The learned Judge observes in para 8 of his judgment, "between the category of interlocutory orders pure and simple and final orders stricto sensu lie a class of orders which can be termed as quasi final or intermediate orders. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the controversy and has held that such intermediate - quasi-final orders are revisable notwithstanding the bar under S. 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, they being not interlocutory orders. Decisions of moment affecting the rights of parties substantially cannot be reckoned as interlocutory orders so as to be beyond the Revisional Jurisdiction of the superior courts, it is now trite." Without batting an eye-lid and with bated breath as it were, the learned Judge says in para 12 of his order, "Borrowing terminology from the precedents laid down under S. 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not only interlocutory orders but also intermediate orders are not amenable to the Revisional correction under the amended S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All available indications compellingly point to that conclusion -that only final orders siriclo sensu will be revisable."

IX. When one considers that the learned Judge admittedly takes his cue from the position of Revisional Jurisdiction under S. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the mutually contradictory approach in the judgment looms large demonstrating that logic runs helter-skelter making confusion worse confounded. If, as Justice Basant observes in the earlier part of his judgment referred to supra - and rightly so, intermediate orders are amenable to revisional jurisdiction in Criminal Law, by parity of reasoning, it should be so in Civil Law as well.

X. I am not forgetful of the rule in Haydon 's case reported by Lord Coke as far back as in 1584 or the words of the illustrious American Judge Learned Hand, "statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purpose that lies behind them" (Lehivalley Coal Co. v. Yensavate, 235 US 705 (1915)), or the words of Justice Krishna Iyer "the interpretative efforts must be illumined by the goal though guided by the word." (Smt. Kama Goyel v. B.G. Palhak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 at 1661), but these external aids do not have to be employed at the outset but have to be summoned when absolutely necessary into service by widening the concept of context.

XI. It is equally true that as Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy of the Apex Court observed in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. (AIR 1987 SC 1023), "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted". To quote Justice Holmes once again "You construe a particular clause or expression by construing the whole instrument and any dominant purpose that it may express. In fact intention is a residuary clause intended to gather up whatever other aids there may be to interpretation, beside the particular words and the dictionary (Cases and Other Materials on Legislation by Reid, Mac Donald and Fordham - Second Edition, page 1005).

XII. To put it pithily in the inimitable words of Justice Iyer, "to be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul. The judicial key to construction is the composite perception of the deha and clehi of the provision (Chairman, Board of Mining Examinations etc. v. Ramji, AIR 1977 SC 965 at 968). The correct interpretation is to harmonize the words of a statute with the object of a statute

XIII. Justice Basant seems to follow American Justice Scalia's theory of originalism which limits interpretation of statutes to the rights clearly in its mind at the lime of making it and leave all other questions to the Legislature, which is a double edged sword. This theory consigns all matters beyond a very limited few to decisions by the peoples representatives rather than by the Court. This interpretation sits uneasily, however, with Justice Scalia's elaborate apologia for the institution in his dissenting opinions. Justice Basant has repeatedly referred lo Legislative wisdom presumably on account of the longevity of the Legislature and the Civil Procedure Code. The dominant perception of the learned Judge appears to be the docket explosion in the Courts rather than the grievances of the litigants. It should have been borne in mind by the learned Judge that by monitoring and calibrating the functioning of the lower courts and also of the High Courts it will be possible to avoid a docket explosion. The judiciary's levelling of the litigant's playing field could be achieved that way rather than by bulldozing the avenues of approach of the litigants seeking redressal of their grievances.

XIV. I hope that this article will generate a very holistic debate with the cognizance of the big picture and the inter relatedness of the issues involved. Variances in the assessment of the courts opinions in this field may be attributable to differences in the perspective of the legal practitioners, academics and social scientists. For lawyers and Judges, the Court's task is to decide the particular dispute before it in a way that establishes sound precedent and provides sufficient guidance for lower courts. Quite unfortunately, the contradictory positions and postures adopted by the Court in the case under comment will not achieve this goal. The legal mind-set seeks workable adjudicatory standards, fair process, "bright live" principles which alone will be useful in guiding the lower courts decision making process.

XV. Legislation in modern State is actuated by some policy to curb some public evil; or to effectuate some public benefit and directed to the problems before the Legislature, based on the information derived from past and present experiences. In the words of Gray "The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the Judge have to do is not to determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which was present in mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present in its mind, if the point had been present". (Gray, Nature and Source of Law, 2nd Edition, Page 171). The 'guess' "must be informed by the wording of the Act and arrived at in accordance with the recognized guides to legislative intention" (Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, page 235). It is true that by a process of interpretation Judges do make a lot of law, but it is only the Legislature that can create law and therefore, judicial discretion cannot be unlimited. If it has no limits then the anomaly pointed out by Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson (1942 AC 206, 299) would arise. He said, "In this case I have listened to arguments which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of King's Bench in the time of Charles I".

XVI. Perhaps unwittingly, the judgment under review demonstrates an excessive, and not so deserving, deference of the judiciary to the elected branches of the Government, forgetting that the most lasting legacy of the Court is expansion of the protected rights of the litigants.

XVII. One wishes that in the spirit of the teaching left by Benjamin Cardozo, the Judges would provide facilitative reasoning that helps to ensure that the laws remain consistent with the times and advance the welfare of the society. It is necessary to .underline the importance of having a legal system that is attuned to the "reason and passion" of the day. Passion is best accommodated by freedom from subservience to an obsession with docket explosion. Appeals to the "Original intentions" of the authors of legislation can easily end up restraining the pursuit of current desires. The potentially corrosive effect of the decision on the fate of litigation in the court below is yet to be seen and realised.

XVIII. A careful, though critical, review of judicial opinion tendered by the High Bench will not only result in heightened appreciation of the dignity of the courts, but should supply some important insights into the impulses that define the modem judicial psyche. It is impossible to read the judgment of Justice Basant without being struck by the analytical bend of mind of the newly appointed Judge and his judgment appears to be free from the shackles of judicial restraint. The fact that the Judges of the higher rung actively participate or seek to participate in the process of establishing the way of life of the community cannot be under-emphasized and Justice Basant's decision attempts to make a provocative contribution to such an exercise. As Justice Brennan of the US Supreme Court said (Brennan, Modernising The Courts, 4-5 (1957) quoted in Jurisprudence of Justice - William J. Brennan Jr. Edited by David E. Marion Rowmand - Little Field Publishers Incorporated, Lanham 1997) "the sublime mission of the legal profession required that the Judges in the legal'field should not rest until we have done everything within our power" to ensure that the judicial system does not purview to the denial of rights or perpetuate suffering due to unredressed injuries. By placing a gloss of legislative intention on the statutory provision, the learned Judge has rendered the provision useless and indefensible; one expected from the Judge and desired to legitimate judicial action that accommodated the rights oriented interpretation and import. Indeed, incombatant judicial vigilance in the service of mitigating dangers to the litigant is the only acceptable posture consistent with the judicial oath. The judiciary on its faithful judicial oath will not be neutral in the vision of preferences and practices that impose disability on the litigants and expose them needlessly to action that threatened their interests. Even if unintentional, the judgment constitutes a harm that is incompatiable with the judicial objective of libertarian dignity.

XIX. It would be unfair and even mean-minded to belittle Justice Basant's efforts or to attribute motives to his interpretation. Indeed, his opinions were painstakingly crafted to advance a jurisprudential philosophy that underlines the doctrine of audi alteram partem. The judgment combines the theme of ambitious judicial review and the legitimacy of loose constructionism which one associated with Marbury v. Madison. What is needed in the modern context is a rights-oriented jurisprudence that legitimates broad-ranging decision-making by judicial officers.

                   To My Beloved Brother Mr. Justice B.N. Srikrishna, Judge, Supreme Court

“A`n\µ\w”

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e£van, Imbn¡c

Hon”ble Mr Justice T.M. Hassan Pillai

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                                                                   JUSTICE A. LEKSHMIKUTTY

Act 46 of 1999 and Act 22 of 2002 (C.P.C. Amendment)

New Orders in Disorder

(By K.R. Giri Iyer, Advocate, Ottapalam)

O. XVIIIR. 4(1) of the New Code reads in every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies thereof shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence:

O. XVIII, R. 5 of the Code reads in cases in which an appeal is allowed, the evidence of each witness shall be,-

(a) taken down in the language of the court,-

(i) in writing by, or in the presence and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge, or

(ii) from the dictation of the Judge directly on a type writer; or

(b) if the Judge, for reasons to be recorded, so directs, recorded mechanically in the language of the court in the presence of the Judge.

The dilemma arises:-

1) Whether in appealable cases chief examination can be on affidavit?!

2) If so whether is it in conflict with O. XVIII, R. 5?

3) Whether the amendment in O.XVIIL R. 5 includes all the witnesses and party?

4) What was the actual intention of the Legislature?

Now at the outset on literal interpretation both provisions are in conflict.

It is so because O. XVIIIR. 4 mandates affidavit in all cases of chief examination whereas in O. XVIII, R. 5 the mention of appealable cases stands. So in order to avoid repugnancy it can be stated that in cases in which appeal is allowed the evidence has to be taken as mentioned in O. XVIII, R. 5. There is no special mention in the objects and reasons with regard to this provision when the Bill was introduced and passed. But in general the intention was to have a speedy disposal of cases. The Evidence Act, S. 3 defines evidence as "Evidence" means and includes-

"(1) all statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under enquiry; such statements are called oral evidence;".

And S. 138 reads witnesses shall be first examined in chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.

The examination and cross-examination must relate to the relevant facts but the cross-examination need not confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.

So there is no corresponding amendment in the Evidence Act and if affidavit is filed instead of chief examination whether it will come under the evidence as contemplated under the Evidence Act because it will not come under S. 3. Affidavit cannot be considered to be made before it and it does not come under documentary evidence also. And more over in S. 142 it is stated that leading question shall not be asked in an examination in chief where there is no amendment.

Initially the affidavit was considered as dependable for the purpose of making summary adjudications and for making interim orders like in O. XXXIX R. 1 and O. XXXVIIIR. 5 of the Code. So the value of the affidavit as per the Evidence Act and the Code as mentioned in O.XIX itself will show that it was not treated as proper evidence or a ultimate say in highly disputed issues.

While giving harmonious construction repugnancy to be avoided and construction most agreeable to justice and reason has to be taken. And even in case the principle of Repeal by implication to be adopted that should also agreeable to justice and reason. The Latin Maxim "Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat" A thing may have effect rather than be destroyed. If two interpretations are open that alternative has to be chosen which will be consistent that the smooth working of the system which it purports to be regulating and alternative has to be chosen which will introduce uncertainty, fiction or confusion, i.e. Rule of harmonious construction is to reconcile conflict. An Act shall not be rendered otiose or ineffective or nugatory. Even that may be the position as stated earlier it shall not cause injustice. In my humble view it will cause injustice in the following points or occasions if affidavit is insisted even in the case of O. XVIII, R. 5.

1) When the person who is summoned to depose before a court of Law on summons issued directly to him when comes to court has to depend someone to prepare an affidavit which is most inconvenient and moreover they will not be able to say why they were summoned before a person who prepares the affidavit and then naturally they have to contact the concerned Counsel's office which will in turn effect the trust worthiness of the witness or he will be forced to concede to the words of the party summoning him whereas if he is put directly to the box he will be having free mind to depose before the court without any compulsion, coercion cajoling or like things.

2) In the case of illiterate or semi literate person if the affidavit is prepared and given by the persons who dupes him he may not know what all things are stated in the affidavit probably that aspects may be left without cross examination and will be later taken as evidence and if it is cross examined he may say that it was included on the request of the party and he has no direct knowledge for which he may even face prosecution.

3) In the case of cross examination of Commissioners also how can a chief examination affidavit be prepared and possible.

4) Moreover it will further cause delay because when the witness who is summoned comes to the court then only he knows about the affidavit and all and he may have to come again on the next day or wait till the affidavit is prepared which will take away the valuable time of witnesses like doctors etc.

5) Another important aspect is that who will bear the expenses for preparing an affidavit who will attest or witness the solemn affirmation of the affidavit if the witness has no persons to identify or no lawyer to attest known to him or knows him especially when comes from a long distance.

6) Marking of documents through chief examination in the case of affidavit as stated in O. XVIIIR. 4 sub-r. (2) also causes threat to both sides because the opposite side cannot object the marking during the chief examination, which is relegated to the argument, or as stated in the provision subject to the orders of the court, which will cause serious impediment in adducing evidence and even effect the natural justice. For example if the document is insufficiently stamped and if it is marked without objection it cannot be later questioned according to various decisions and even suppose if such opportunity is allowed during the argument the difficulty is that if the document is found inadmissible one will know it in the judgment only so that he will not further get an opportunity to adduce evidence regarding the original cause of action independently without the document which will shut out the evidence and in turn dismissal of his case will be the result and in appellate court also no justice will be given to him. As stated in AIR 1961SC1655 unstamped document marked as exhibit in the case and has been used by parties in examination and cross examination of witness-order admitting document in evidence is not liable to be reviewed or revised at any subsequent stage and not even in appeal. It is note worthy that in the case of admissibility of documents especially under Stamp Act relating to insufficiently stamped promotes or Bill of exchange even various High Courts and the Lordships of the Apex Court are having divergent view so that poor lay man shall not suffer and moreover if it is found that they are insufficiently stamped it cannot be impounded.

So in my humble view the above limited circumstances will be sufficient to say that the amendment of O. XVIII, R. 4 if given effect to even in appealable cases with the present wordings will be denial of justice and harmonious construction shall not be given and I beg to say that justice hurried is justice buried and reasonable change is a must. Even perusing to the general intention of the Legislature in the present amendment it can be seen that the intention was to speed up and save time which will be defeated by the wordings of this provision and multiplicity of litigation will be the result in order to give effect to the amendment the concerned O. XVIII, R.4 should be given with sufficient explanation in order to avoid the above difficulties and O. XVIII, R. 5 also should be properly amended.

One other anomaly is regarding new O. XLI R. 9 i.e. Registry of memorandum of appeal. It reads as

(1) The court from whose decree an appeal lies shall entertain the memorandum of appeal and shall endorse thereon the date of presentation and shall register the appeal in a book of appeal kept for that purpose.

(2) Such book shall be called the register of appeal.

I may be forgiven to say that this is a provision without head or tail. The section does not say after presentation of the memorandum before the court which decided the suit which is to be registered there and there after what is to be done with the memorandum whether returned to the person presents or transmitted to the appellate court or to be retained and even regarding the production before it there is no direction. Moreover whether the original memorandum if given to the court decided the suit how can one file an appeal before the appellate court and if interpreted in another way it is as if filing an appeal before the court in which the suit is decreed or dismissed and not in a appellate court. Moreover, the earlier provision 0. XLIR. 13 is now omitted which was intended to give notice to the lower court. But at the same time the appendix H Form 15 to the Code still retains the original form of register of appeal which includes details to be filled like the date of presentation, day for appearance of parties and number of appeal etc. which can only be received after presenting it before the appellate court like wise the chapter head of O. XLI R. 9 still reads as Procedure on admission of appeal and moreover it will cause serious inconvenience because a person who has to prefer a appeal before the Honourable High Court from Cannannore court has to first take the bundle to the lawyer at Ernakulam then prepare the Memorandum take it back to the home court and then present it before the court which decided the suit and take back and again rush to the appellate court which will only increase the delay expense and inconvenience which is never intended by the Legislature. Now my humble view on the point is that O. XLI R. 9 may be further amended so as to avoid this confusion and it will be better to draft the provision so as to file the appeal before the appellate court and after admitting it the appellant may be directed to file a copy of the memorandum of appeal before the court which decided the suit along with day for appearance, appeal number etc. and file an affidavit before the appellate court to that effect and on such receipt the lower court can register the appeal and send the suit records to the appellate court which will expedite the proceedings and will meet the intention of speedy procedure for the purpose of calling the lower court records.

Justice at the Click of the Mouse

(By Advocate P.B. Sahasranaman)

We are potentially on the road to an electronic courtroom (e-courts). In settling the issues none of the participants need be in the same place and which could result in the demise of the courtroom as we know it. The recent proposal to have e-courts in India will change the entire judicial system. Rapid adoption of courtroom technology is changing the nature of both litigation and adjudication all over the world.

We know that most of the pleadings are created using computers. One electronic information measures are implemented, the paper on which the same is normally filed can be avoided. Digital signatures can be accepted. In its most basic form, electronic filing, now being experimented in various countries, it either permits or requires that pleadings be sent electronically to the court. Simultaneous it also provide for the dispatch of copies to all other necessary parties by electronic mail. Although electronic mail easily permits the simple communication of information it is entirely inadequate. From the court's perspective, efficiency requires that name of parties, pleaders, and other data be supplied to the court in an identifiable manner that permits the court to capture that specific information for case management purposes.

The same technology is used to make the Court record. Videotaped depositions have to be used in lieu of in-court testimony or for impeachment of a witness. Combining digital audio and video with a computer- assisted transcript produces a synchronized, multimedia transcript. When such a deposition is played in Court, ordinarily from a CD-ROM disk, counsel can present the audio, video and scrolling electronic text transcript. This virtual "deposition attendance" is an important marker on the road to the digital courtroom. As trial commences, the participants blink into existence on the computer monitors that supply the only commonality applicable to them. Judges. Advocate, parties, and witnesses appear in virtual form on each person's computer monitor. Necessary evidentiary foundations are laid by witnesses with distant counsel's questions; documentary evidence is not seen by the Judges until received by the Court. The public can see the proceedings on the Internet. The superior court can directly monitor the proceedings and issue appropriate orders, if necessary.

The collateral consequences of electronic case management, filing, and related systems are of great potential importance. Scheduling a posting is another important factor. The Judge's calendar will be critical, but if the Judge isn't assigned permanently to a given courtroom, a courthouse calendar will be required as well. At the same time, efficient scheduling should involve access to all other hearings involving the same counsel. The practice of irrelevant adjournments can be avoided. When electronic filing is implemented as well, calendaring information is augmented by the actual pleading and associated legal documents, all in electronic format. Once this information is available and electronically accessible there is little or no reason to limit it to court personnel. Trials are open to the public, and the status of filed cases, including scheduled dates for hearing are available to the public.

Legal research is a critical component for any lawyer Access to electronic legal materials has changed the nature of law practice. It has created virtual law libraries and, through on-line access, has hastened the advent of the virtual law office, one which exists wherever the lawyer may happen to be. Within the high technology courtroom, counsel and Judge have immediate electronic access to nearly all legal authorities. Further, and critically, when the courtroom is properly equipped, counsel and Judge may display their authorities to each other as an important adjunct to legal argument.

The advent of electronic legal briefs carries at least three significant implications. The first is that appellate practice may be changing. These briefs are far more comprehensive than their traditional equivalents, and, if used in an appropriately wired courtroom, they permit extraordinary electronic visual interchange of legal authority among Judges and counsel. The second implication stems from economics. Electronic appellate briefs are in part compilations of materials generated at or presented during trial. To ensure the most inexpensive preparation possible, those underlying trial matters, including transcript and evidence, should originate at trial as digital information so that the "data" can be reproduced quickly and cheaply in the brief. Lastly, these briefs can be filed, exchanged, and presented electronically, laying the ground work for a virtual appellate courtroom.

In Los Angeles and Indianapolis, motorists can pay their traffic fines by dialing in to interest sites and providing credit card information. Some California offenders can go to traffic school on-line. There are even law firms which provide services through internet. The advent of high technology courtrooms in Australia has started the "virtual trials". "Virtual trial" is a trial in which all the participants and all "information", (i.e., evidence, opening statements, closing arguments, and, in jury trials, instructions) are conveyed in electronic format to all parties. US Supreme Court has heard a case in Courtroom, with two of its five Judges appearing by separate video-conferencing systems.

In India, at the instance of Patna High Court Chief Justice Ravi S. Dhawan in video­conferencing was started. In the six months since its introduction, it has delivered swift justice, becoming one of the few success stories in the State. About 200 undertrials have been released-130 from Beur Jail, 30 from Vaishali, 25 from Muzzafarpur and 30 from Bhagalpur. All were accused of petty offences or were in jail even after completing their sentences. "In a number of cases, the Courts remain unaware that the undertrials have not been produced before Court. Through video-conferencing, on awareness is created about a particular prisoner", says the Registrar of Patna High Court. The televisions have been arranged locally while the two digital video cameras, connected through Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), are from Patna. The Court in Sasaram, like most courts in the State, gets a huge number of cases. Every month, around 400 cases are left pending. By the third day of video­conferencing, 55 inmates of the jail want to confess to their crimes, whether they are guilty or not. The Chief Justice has now asked for funds to set up video-conferencing facilities in all the five central jails and 27 district jails in the State. The proposal is pending with the State Government. Meanwhile, the two digital cameras will continue to do the rounds of different jails, delivering instant justice. The litigants will be informed of the defects in their petitions, if any, without the peed to access individual courts, and asked to rectify. Thereafter, cases will be registered and allocated to Judges/Magistrates according to the work distribution schedule already fed into the computer and dates for appearance of the parties will be set. A chronological record of the trial of each case will be maintained on the network and the final order made available on the network. Copies of the orders can be obtained on payment from the facilitation counters.

E-courts can eliminate or at the very least greatly reduce case backlogs. With the help of network links between High Courts and other Courts, the performance of Judges can be evaluated faster without waiting for the actual performance reports. The legal profession has also benefited from these technological innovations. Legal research that once took hours or days in now available in seconds through computer and Internet databases. Clients can reach their attorneys anywhere in the world through the use of cellular and video innovations. The list goes on an on. The beginning of Web-based interactive instruction makes it clear that a e-courts based upon exchange of text is now possible.

What "improves" the administration of justice is clearly a question of judgment. Initially, decreasing the time and cost necessary to resolve a dispute would appear to be in the interests of judgment. So too should be improvement in fact finder comprehension which should lead to improved accuracy in result. If barriers to delay are lightened it may be that more cases will be disposed of. This, of course, is not necessarily bad "Justice delayed is justice denied". Crime lakes a moment but justice an eternity. The value of time has to be realised. We need change from Civil Procedure Code to Electronic Procedure Code. Instead of demanding benches and sitting at local places, time will come that we will be able to conduct cases silting in front of the Computer. We are now moving from snails court to the mouse court, where justice can be delivered on the click of a mouse.