1982 KLT 53 Vis-a-Vis AIR 1961 SC 1067

(By K.G. Michael, Advocate, Kodungallur)

The Ruling in Vasu v. Kallianikutty Amma reported in 1982 KLT 53 appears to be in conflict with the Ruling reported in Ganga Dutt v. Karthik Chandra Das in AIR 1961 SC 1067.

The former Ruling is under Ss.2(6)(ii) and 11(5) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The latter is a Ruling under S.116 of T.P. Act.

The gist of the former Ruling is as follows:-

"Statutory tenancy is a concept evolved by Courts to define the relation that subsists after termination of the contractual tenancy........................

A petition for eviction is normally filed after termination of the contractual tenancy, and the person continuing in possession thereafter during the pendency of the eviction proceedings is a statutory tenant. But when the petition is dismissed, S.11(15) provides that he will revert back to the old position. The tenancy shall be deemed to continue on the old terms and conditions. The contractual tenancy is thus resurrected. The statutory tenancy stands converted into the old contractual tenancy, when the eviction petition is dismissed, by virtue of S.11(15)"

The latter Ruling has held that a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined by efflux of time has not acquired the status of a tenant holding over within the meaning of S.116 of T.R Act.

The non-obstante clause in S.11(1) of the Rent Control Act contemplates only one kind of tenancy i.e. the statutory tenancy under Rent Control Act.

Hence, wherever the Rent Control Act applies, we have only one kind of tenancy i.e. statutory tenancy.

S.11(9) of the Rent Control Act is a fetter on the landlord. It is immaterial whether the tenancy is for a specified period or not. Once a tenant, he continues to be a tenant subject to the provisions of the Rent Control Act.

This position is amply clear in S.11(15) of the Act.

The former Ruling has pointed to two kinds of tenancy i.e. contractual tenancy on one hand and statutory tenancy on the other hand. This position does not appear to be sound vis-a-vis latter Ruling.

The Rent Control Act does not contemplate a holding over tenant. Under S. 11(15) of the Rent Control Act, the tenancy shall continue subject to the provisions of the Act. Any other interpretation of law may be in conflict with the SC Ruling.

Para 8 of the Ruling in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala reported in 1995 (2) KLT 848 appears to be a correct interpretation of law. 

A Critical View of Sections 11(3), 11(8) and 11(10) of the

Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act

(By P. Somarajan, Advocate, Kollam)

The object of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is to regulate the leasing of the buildings, prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants and for the control of rents. The paramount aim and primary purpose of the statute is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. As it is an ameliorative legislation intended for the benefit of tenants and to prevent unreasonable eviction, it is advisable to look into the classification of tenants under Ss.11(3) and 11(8) of the Act and its constitutionality. As far as control of rent is concerned, the decision of our Hon'ble High Court drawn by the Hon'ble Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala, reported in 1995 (2) KLT 848, canvases a fresh look into the classification of tenants under Ss.11(3) and 11 (8) and also whether it is violative of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) of the Constitution.

S.11(3) of the Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act provides that a 'Landlord' may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the Landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him.

To the sub-s. (3) there is 4 provisos among them the first proviso provides that "the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the Landlord has any such building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so".

The second proviso states that "the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the land lord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such buildings and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such persons to carry on such trade or business".

The third proviso provides that "no land lord whose rights to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer intervivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of instrument."

The fourth proviso provided that "if a land lord after obtaining an order to put in possession transfers his right in respect of the building to another person the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him".

As far as S.11(8) is concerned what is embodied in sub-section is that a landlord who is occupying only a part of a building may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession there of if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use.

It is pertinent to note that there is a classification of tenants coming under the purview of sub-ss.3 and 8 of S.11 of the Act as the requirements and benefits given to tenants under sub-ss.3 and 8 are different. A mere perusal of Ss.11(3), 11(8) and 11(10) shows that the classification is discriminatory. The treatment given to the tenants under sub-ss. 3 and 8 are different and discriminatory. Former one, deals with the requirement of (bona fide need of land lord or his dependant) land lord who is not occupying any portion of building and in the later deals with requirement of land lord (bona fide need for additional accommodation) who is occupying a portion of building. But as far as the status of tenants is concerned there is no differences at all, but sub-ss. (3) and (8) provides different treatment to the tenants though there is no difference in the status of tenants. In the former one wide protective measures are provided to the tenants. Among them the extent of 2nd proviso, is so wide, by the inclusion of the word "mainly" and it provides a protection to the tenants having other source of income, if he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in the tenanted premises, even if the land lord establishes his bona fide need. In other words, the land lord who have established his bona fide need with its rigid nature also come across the benefits provided to the tenants under its provisos. The 3rd proviso to sub-s.3, gave an absolute barring to the land lord to apply for eviction of tenants before the expiry of one year, if the right of land lord arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos; from the date of such instrument. But in the later case, the only protection given to the tenant is the comparative hardship. It is curiously enough to note that the term 'hardship' is not defined anywhere in the Act. Any way it is clear that the tenants come under the purview of sub-ss.(3) and (8) are treated in different manner in the Act, even though there is no change in the status of tenants. The main basis for such classification is the position of land lord's occupation - non occupation of part of building. Moreover the bona fide need under sub-s.3 is rigid while under sub-s. 8 is not rigid as in the case of sub-s.3. Which also gives a special treatment to the land lord who comes under the purview of sub-s. 8. It is pertinent to note that whether such classification and different treatment of tenants under sub-ss.3 and 8 on the basis of occupation or non occupation of portion of building by the land lord amounts to a reasonable classification and whether there is any intelligible differential having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved under the Act. As stated earlier the main differential of classification in between Ss.11(3) and 11(8) is on the basis of position of land lord as he occupying any portion of building or not. We cannot find any element of intelligible differential having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved under the Act as the object of the act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. More over the classification is unreasonable as it is on the basis of position of land lord. Since the statute intended for the benefit of tenants, it will be unreasonable to classify tenants in two division by giving much protection to one class and denying the same to other class. More over the classification of land lords as persons conducting business in a part of the building and giving a luxurious treatment to them and denying such treatment to the land lords, who is not occupying any part of building is virtually against object of Act and it is against the welfare of progressive society and it lacks in element of intelligence based on the welfare of progressive society. Moreover in an ameleorative legislation intended for the benefit of tenants, it is not advisable to classify the tenants on the basis of status of land lord with respect to his occupation or non occupation of part of building. The legislature has not considered the status of tenants for making such a classification. The result is to the effect that it is open to the tenant to exhaust all the benefit provided under S.11(3) if the land lord is not in occupation of any part of the building. On the other hand if the land lord is conducting a business in any part of building, the tenant has to satisfy with the benefit of comparative hardship provided in S. 11(10) of the Act. There is clear discrimination in between Ss.11(3) and 11(8), S.11(3) is actually restricting the right of a land lord to carryout business to a certain extent in the building owned by him, while S.11(8) carried a special treatment to the land lord. Likewise while S.11(3) carries much protective measures to the business of tenant, by giving special treatment, no such treatment has been afforded to the tenant under S. 11(8) but treated entirely a different manner, that too on the basis of occupation or non occupation of a part of the building by the land lord, even though there is no difference in the status of tenants.

The main difference is with respect to the position or status of land lord. Such a classification is not advisable in a legislation intended for the benefit of tenants, when there is no difference in the status of tenants. The decision drawn by Hon'ble Justice, K.S. Radhakrishnan in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala reported in 1995 (2) KLT 848 canvases a fresh look into the matter in which it is held that "Legislation while arbitrarily invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Art.19(1)(g) and the social control permitted under CI.(6) of Art.19, it must be held to be warranting in that qualities" I am of the opinion that the disparity between 11(3), 11(8)and 11(10) of the Act makes it as violative of Art.14 of the Constitution and also lacks in reasonableness and also lacks in proper balance in between freedom guaranteed in Art.19(1)(g) and the social control permitted under CI.(6) of the Art.19 of the Constitution and the Act needs suitable amendment.

Law Needs Change

(By M. Lalitha Nair, Advocate, Ernakulam)

One day a widow and a widower came to me for advice to live together, both are Central Government Employees. The judicial and legislature hurdles have made it difficult for them to live together. The widower was receiving pension from his former wife and he wanted to retain the pension and marry again. The poor widow only had her aged mother and wanted to settle down in life with the widower. We are still slaves of British Rules. We are celebrating the millennium year 2000. It is time we bring modifications in law in tune with the modern needs and requirements of the society. I really felt sad because I could not help the widow.

R.54 of the Family Pension 1964 (Swamy's Complete Manual on Establishment and Administration for Central Government Officers) is quoted below:

R.54(6).The period for which family pension is payable shall be as follows:-

i) in the case of a widow or widower upto the date of death or re-marriage, whichever is earlier.

ii) in the case of a son, until he attain the age of (twenty five) years and

iii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, until she attains the age of (twenty five) years or until she gets married whichever is earlier.

The whole role allows pension till the widow or widower is unmarried.

Now the whole concept of living together until death has changed. If a man and woman plan to marry during middle age, it is only for companionship. Another aspect is that now the cause of death are so sudden that within a short span of time the surviving spouse has to shoulder a lot of unexpected responsibilities. People remarry not because of lack of sincerity or affection, but just to preserve the family. Things are more difficult when there are minor children and the difficulties to maintain a maid servant. These days there is no assurance of financial stability and the abolition of joint family and the replacement of nuclear family have made things worse.

The Central Government Rule should not cut away the pension immediately after the widow or widower remarries. It is high time that the law is made or the above Rule is modified to the effect, that in genuine cases widow or widower as the case may be, is enabled to remarry without loosing the pensionary benefits of his or her former spouse. 

Castes - Reservation and the Courts

(By Dr. Chandrashekharan Pillai, Professor of Law, CUSAT, Kochi)

The Indian Constitution envisages an egalitarian society wherein there will be no role for castes. However, a perusal of constitutional provisions makes us aware that the same Constitution at the time of its enactment made special provisions for reservation in the elected bodies and bureaucracy for certain castes and communities. This was in fact the recognition of the fact by the Constitution that our past practices were discriminatory on the basis of castes and creeds and that it was necessary to straighten things by lifting those who were left out by our history. After uplifting them to the level attained by the other segments of the society the Constitution was to treat everyone equally. That was the reason why it was very particular to make reservation available only for a limited period. It is altogether a different thing that our Parliament extends this period as a matter of course probably because we could not achieve our targets of leveling the marginalised castes with others in the society within the time frame as originally envisaged.

It is interesting and rewarding if one looks into the reason for our not achieving the target. It is strongly felt that at times the constitutional aim is forgotten in the cause of heated debates on reservation. It has become a fashion for several people particularly those in politics to argue that it is to compensate for the past discrimination that reservation has been imposed. It is also quite often argued that reservation should be proportionate to the numerical strength in the population of particular castes. While these arguments may have some relevance in examining reservation in legislative bodies, they may not hold good while examining the question of reservation in the bureaucracy where there is need for efficiency and therefore merit has to have an adequate role. Our Constitution has therefore stressed on efficiency in the context of reservation to bureaucracy.

The above mentioned arguments are countered by the rival groups by saying that they are not responsible for any past discrimination. Even if somebody practiced it they do not have any connection with the present day society. Those ills were generated by the times for which the whole community should be responsible. The argument for proportional representation in bureaucracy cannot hold water as caste should have no relevance in administration. It should rather emphasise on efficiency and merit.

These arguments and counter arguments have taken us nowhere. Passion is so high that none can discuss the issues independently. The Supreme Court's attempt to solve the issue is reflected in Indra Sawhney's1 case which happily happens to be the correct interpretation of the constitutional goal.

Be that as it may, it is interesting to see that some people have been trying to get the benefit accorded by law to the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes by way of changing their castes through conversation, reconversion, adoption, marriage etc. And if one looks into the case law produced by the courts in this respect one may find it difficult to perceive what the courts intended to achieve.

The question whether a person could resort to change of caste by way of conversion and if so what impact it may have on his status has been examined by various courts at several times. As late as in 1984, the Supreme Court reached a conclusion on this question in Kailas Sankar v. Maya Dei2, wherein the court expressed thus:-

"Where a person belonging to Scheduled Caste is converted to Christianity or Islam the same involves loss of the caste unless the religion to which he is converted is liberal enough to permit the convertee to retain his caste or the family laws by which he was originally governed. There are a number of cases where members belonging to a particular caste having been converted to Christainity or even to Islam retain their caste or family laws and despite the new order they were permitted to be governed by their old laws. But this can happen only if the new religion is liberal and tolerant enough to permit such a course of action. Where the religion however does not at all accept or believe in the caste system the loss of the caste would be final and complete."3

As regards the impact of reconversion to one's own caste after his earlier conversion, the Supreme Court in the very same case commented:-

"The reconvert must exhibit a clear and genuine intention to go back to his old fold and opt the customs and practices of the said fold without any protest from members of his erstwhile caste, in order to judge this factor, it is not necessary that there should be a direct or conclusive period of the expression of the view of the community of the erstwhile caste and it wont be sufficient compliance of this condition if the exception or protest is lodged by the community members in which case the caste would revive on the reconversion of the person to his old religion."4

It is interesting to note that though in the earlier cases acceptance by the members of the erstwhile caste was considered as a condition precedent to a valid reconversion, in the present case it was held that non objection by the members of the caste is sufficient for a valid reconversion.

In the course of discussion, however, the court pointed out that the consent of the community may be essential in the case of conversion to a caste which is governed by a code of conduct or rule of law. The court's discussions are worth quoting:-

"..........If the fact of the acceptance of the members of the community is made condition precedent to the revival of the caste, it would lead to grave consequences and unnecessary exploitation sometimes motivated by political considerations. Of course, if apart from the oral views of the community there is any recognized documentary proof of a custom or code of conduct or rule of law binding on a particular caste, it may be necessary to insist on the consent of the members of the community. Otherwise in normal circumstances the caste would survive by applying the principle of doctrine of eclipse. We might pause here to add a rider to what we have said, where it appears that the person reconverted to the old religion had been converted to Christianity since several generations, it may be difficult to apply the doctrine of eclipse to the revival of caste. However, that question does not arise here."5

By way of adoption also a person could become a member of a caste. The decisions which required the acceptance of the community before a person could be admitted as a member of the caste were not applicable in the case of the adoption as signified in S.12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act6 The Delhi High Court reasoned that just as it is not open to a caste to refuse to recognise a new-born in the family of one of its members as belonging to the caste, it is not open to the caste to sit in judgment over the statutory status enjoyed by the adoptee.7

This view was dissented from by the A.P. High Court in A.S. Sailaja v. Principal, Kurnool Medical College8 where in the court reasoned:-

"..................an adoption under the Act is personal. The purpose of S.12 is that he or she becomes completely a member of the adoptive family "for all purposes" be it for religious or secular purpose but "for the purpose of the Constitution" under Arts.14, 15(4) and 16(4) the adopted child must satisfy not only that he or she belongs to the particular homogeneous group or class or tribe but also must become a member of the homogeneous group or class or tribe, also had suffered or subjected to all the disadvantage or handicaps which the members of the homogeneous group, class or tribe, are subjected to or have undergone or is undergoing in that context recognition of such a person by the caste or community elders to which the adoptee has already been assimilated or seeks an entry is a relevant factor which has to be established as a fact. The purpose of adoption under S. 12 is personal to the adoptee and is distinct and apart from the constitutional scheme under Arts.14, 15(4), 16(4)."9

Thus there is a shift of emphasis when the adopted seeks admission on the basis of his or her becoming a member of the scheduled caste by way of adoption. In order to attain the status of a member of the group the person should have suffered the disadvantages to which his adopter had been subjected. The Court ultimately held that adoption will have no impact on the constitutional provisions conferring reservation benefits to the members of the caste.

On the question whether a member of the upper caste could become a member of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe by marrying a member of the latter groups the Courts resorted to a similar reasoning.

While the A.P. High Court in H.D. Neelima v. Dean, PC Studies, A.P. Agricultural University10, declined to extend the benefits of reservation to an upper caste woman on the basis of her entry into the scheduled caste by way of marriage with a man belonging to the scheduled caste, by treating marriage as a separate issue for the purpose of interpretation under Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) the Supreme Court in Valsamma Paul v. CUSAT11 examined the issues in the constitutional perspectives and ruled that a person getting into a family of S.C. or O.B.C. by marriage may not be entitled to reservation. The Court's reasoning is illustrative:-

".........education, employment and economic empowerment are some of the programmes, the State has evolved and also provided reservation in admission into educational institution or in case of other economic benefit under Arts. 15(4) and 46, or in appointment to an office or a post under the State under Art.16(4). Therefore when a member is transplanted into the Dalits, tribes and OBCs, he/she must of necessity also undergo some handicaps, be subject to the same disabilities, disadvantages, indignities or sufferings so as to entitle the candidates to avail the facility of reservation. A candidate who had the advantageous start in life being bom in forward caste and had march of advantageous life but is transplanted in backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either under Art.15(4) or 16(4) as the case may be. Acquisition of the status of scheduled caste etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy under Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution."12

So recognition or acceptance by a community should not have any impact. Unlike in the case of change of caste by way of conversion, reconversion, adoption or marriage the determination of caste of the offspring of inter-caste marriages did not pose much problems for the courts probably because of the firm stand the executive have taken in extending the benefits of reservation to the children of inter-caste marriage if one of the parents belonged to u scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. However, the Kerala High Court could not be consistent in its ratiocination and as such there have been some conflicting decisions.

In Sapna Jacob v. State of Kerala,13 a girl born of an inter-caste marriage between an upper caste Syrian Christian and a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste was denied the benefits of reservation on the ground that she was a born Christian and that her name itself suggested that she was a Christian rather than a member of the scheduled caste. It is not known how the Court concluded that there are born Christians. As a matter of fact, there are no born Christians. It cannot be said that merely because a person has received baptism, he can be deemed to have become a Christian unless there is evidence to show that he professed the Christian religion.14 Consensus of judicial opinion is that one who professes the Christian faith, is a Christian and that neither baptism nor excommunication, is determinative. What is conclusive in eparchial law is not conclusive in temporal or civil law. Thus, to say that one is a Christian, it must be established that he professes the Christian faith.15 Thus a person becomes a Christian only if he or she professes the Christian religion. In the case of Sapna, she could perhaps have not excluded her father's name from her name. And there is nothing on record to show that she professed the Christian religion. In fact she did not have a caste as it is understood by others. To bear one's father's name and to be brought up in an arguably comfortable way should not have deprived her of the benefits available to her mother. The constitutional goal of the establishment of an egalitarian society could have been better served had the Court resorted to progressive interpretation.

It is refreshing that the Court in some subsequent decisions such as State of Kerala v. Thushara,16 Commissioner & Secretary v. Ramachandran etc.,17 has reserved this trend and tried to be in tune with Governments benign approach of propagating the programme of inter-caste marriages with members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. In the latter decision the Court did take notice of the facts that the benefit was offered by the Government to lure the members of other communities to contract marriages with members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes communities. Still, the High Court did not take a consistent stand probably because of its indebtedness in ratiocination to the decisions rendered by other High Courts and the Supreme Court in cases concerning conversion, reconversion or marriage. Indeed as extracted above, the Supreme Court reasoned that a person should have suffered disadvantages earlier in life to make him or her entitled to the benefits of reservation and that marriage into a family of S.C. and S.T. alone could not make him entitled. This reasoning in fact does not apply to a person who is an offspring of an inter-caste marriage. And as such the procedural formalities laid down by the State Government to determine the entitlement of an offspring of an inter-caste marriage need not be there. Whether one is brought up as a member of the community is immaterial. Naturally, such families must not have been treated well either by the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe communities or by the upper caste communities as this family does not belong to either of them.

In this background a recent decision of the High Court of Kerala rendered in O.P. No.22176 of 1999 should attract special attention of the legal fraternity. The Petitioner in this case was the offspring of an inter-caste marriage between a Nair and a woman belonging to Perumannan community, a scheduled caste. She was seeking admission to a professional course through common entrance examination conducted by the Government of Kerala. She was requested to produce two certificates. One indicating that she belonged to a scheduled caste and the other signifying that she was the offspring of an inter-caste marriage either of the parents belonging to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. Here she submitted the certificates first mentioned. Under the scheme her claim was scrutinised by the screening committee which referred her case for inquiry to KIRTADS Calicut. The Vigilance Officer of KIRTADS conducted an inquiry and concluded that she did not deserve reservation as she had no nexus with the scheduled caste in as much as she was brought up not as a scheduled caste. The Screening Committee conducted further inquiry in which the petitioner and her father were given opportunity of being heard and agreed with the Vigilance Officer.

Instead of following the ratiocination of earlier decisions Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan rightly fell back on the provisions of the Constitution and examined the issue in constitutional perspective. So far, our courts including the Supreme Court have been dealing with these issues not in the light of the constitutional goal of the establishment of the egalitarian society in the light of the real basis for reservation. This is perhaps the reason for the obscurity in the reasoning. For example, it is not understood that the fact of being not a disadvantaged in the earlier stages of life could deny the benefits of reservation to an upper caste woman who married a man belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. Indeed, it could be argued to counter the arguments that after all she is at least at this stage embraces all the evils and disabilities and lives with the disadvantaged man and why should the reservation be denied to her. Sufferings of disabilities and disadvantages could not perhaps be a ground in as much as there may be many at least among the OBCs who must not have suffered any disabilities or disadvantages. In any case this arguments cannot be extended to the offspring of inter cast marriages who do not actually have any 'caste' in the constitutional sense. By wrongly extending this test evolved in the context of conversion or reconversion to the case of offspring of inter caste marriages, we are in fact, indirectly though, encouraging perpetration of caste even by a group of children who do not have any caste.

Justice Radhakrishnan's ruling in the light of the above deserves approbation. He boldly declared:-

"We are of the view that the reasoning of KIRTADS as well as the Screening Committee to deny the benefit available to children of inter-caste married couple cannot be sustained. When a claim is made on the basis that the candidate is an offspring of an inter-caste married couple the question whether the offspring was brought up as a scheduled caste or not is immaterial. The only question to be considered is whether the parents had contracted an inter caste marriage and the applicant was born out of that marriage."18

And to affirm this ruling on firmer ground the Judge relied on the fundamental law of the land and essayed thus:-

".......The marriage between the appellant's parent has led to a fruitful solid base for an egalitarian social order under the Constitution and has brought harmony and integration in social fabric. Such a marriage would liberate the society and bring equality to members of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes on a par with general public. It will also do away with the disabilities, restrictions and prohibitions on the ground of caste or religion and remove untouchability".19

Commanding to his aid the philosophy underlying Articles such as 15(1), 15(4), 17 etc., he further reasons:

"...........The question whether that offspring was brought up as a member of a scheduled caste or not is immaterial. On the birth of an offspring of an inter caste married couple, the child need not be subjected to the same disabilities, indignities, restrictions, prohibitions or sufferings once suffered by a member of a Scheduled caste/tribe".20

The Court has thus contributed to the philosophical thoughts underlying justification for providing for reservation in the Constitution in the context of present day life. In fact it has provided an opportunity for the executive to review its policies and procedures in proper perspectives. Test evolved in one context does hold good for another context. The State Government should review and revise its policies and practices. This decision may hopefully influence other High Courts and State Governments, paving way for further thinking on progressive lines. The reasoning should be welcomed wholeheartedly.

__________________________________________________________________

1. (2000) 1 SCC 168. The Supreme Court categorically held in this case that the Indian Constitution is wedded to the concept of equality which is the basic feature of the Constitution. Though Indian society is caste-ridden, yet it is the constitutional mandate not to discriminate on the basis of caste alone and therefore caste alone cannot be the basis of reservation.

2. AIR 1984 SC 600

3. Ibid at 607

4. Ibid at 608

5. Id.

6. See Khazan Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Del. 60

7. Ibid at 67

8. AIR 1986 AP 209

9. Ibid at 224

10. AIR 1993 AP 229

11. AIR 1996 SC1011

12. Ibid at 1022

13. 1992 2 KLT 657

14. Sujatha v. Jose Augustine, 1994 (2) K.L.T. 4

15. Leelamma v. Dilip Kumar, A.I.R. 1993 Ker. 57 = 1992 (1) K.L.T. 651. Also see Maharam v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 All. 16S; K.J.B. David v. NeelamaniDevi, A.I.R. 1953, Orissa 10; Pakkiam Solomon v. Chelliah Pillai, A.I.R. 1924, Madras 18 (FB). Further see S.3 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 and S.3 of the Cochin Christian Civil Marriage Act, 1920 and S.2(d) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925

16.1998(1)K.L.T.717

17.1998(1)K.L.T. Case No. 68 at 70

18. Para 14 of judgment in O.P. No. 22176 of 1999

19. Para. 17

20. Para. 18