Sri. V.R. Krishna Iyer, The Great Humanist

(By V. Lakshmanan, Advocate, Tirupur, Tamil Nadu)

History is a scene of vivid collective spectacles and formidable individual characters, of unexpected achievements and unforgivable failures. This idea gets correlated with the common perception that every human being belongs to the great orchestration of mankind. Most of us, it must be admitted, play a very minor role or no role at all. Not everyone is able to fit in; some never succeed in finding their place; some perform just idealistic isolated endeavours which are doomed to remain as footnotes in the pages of history. Very few are favoured by fate to the extent of being allowed to compose pieces themselves. Rarer still are those privileged to hear them performed during their life time. Incontestably, Sri. Iyer is one of the personalities favoured by fate. We.......... those who had the good fortune of observing a person who is the very embodiment of passion and compassion towards his fellow-beings — belong to the 'rarer' category.

His retiremental years (only from Supreme Court judgeship) are being spent totally in caring for the dregs of humanity - the dying, decaying and the dispossessed. In other words, Sri. Iyer has turned out to be the truest modern interpreter of human rights and broadened the definition as an all embracing phenomenon in which everyone is accommodated. His intellectual inclination touched the most potent and sensitive social issue - human rights and violations of them.

A viewer in tune with the temper and tempo of times, Sri. Iyer speaks with emotive essence, excellence and exuberance and writes with courage, conviction and confidence. Whether he speaks or writes, he is a healing salve to the victims and vicissitudes of violations of human rights - a consciousness-raising experience. The vigorous tenets of equality with its universalism found its stateliest expression in his write-ups. Sri. Iyer himself relies upon the memorable lines of Charles Dickens which mirror the mind and mood of this millennium in page 9 of his book titled 'The Dialectics & Dynamism of Human Rights in India (yesterday, today and tomorrow)' which are extracted below:-

"The lurid contrast of a divided society of dire distress and dizzy delight is painted with literary power by Charles Dickens in his 'A Tale of Two Cities' of his times:

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way."

He opened new vistas of thoughts and actions to promote social engineering process in this country, nay, the world over. A powerful proponent of the inherent vitality and intrinsic dynamism of human rights, he developed new thought-patterns and redefined the concepts of change. In his battle against poverty, there is a deep rooted commitment to and an understanding of the struggle. His passionate and compassionate outpourings, enormously learned and elementally poetic as always, depict what he stands for and his vision of a world without violations of human rights.

It is beyond doubt and debate that the concept of human rights, as projected in today's content and context, enjoys the much-needed aura, the fascinating element, powerful enough to resist the temptation to be disintegrated, denigrated, degenerated and destroyed. Indisputably, firm resolve has crept into every aspect of it, dispelling misgivings over the fecundity of its functioning, and thus it is the show piece of the universe.

The life and times of Sri. Iyer is a saga of courage in the face of adversities, challenges and depicts his supreme devotion. His approach is practical and pragmatic and yet humane. He lays emphasis on appealing to human elements and sentiments. His message is simple and sound:- use the concept of human rights as a medium to realise the inner strength of human personality.

It is indeed heartening to note that such a visionary and an outstanding individual who gave the globe the concept of human rights and enhanced the enchanting vistas of human rights and equality truly received the approbation and appreciation he deserved for his contribution to the last millennium.

It is he who witnessed the iniquities and starker misseries of life, assimilated them, wrote and spoke most insightfully - a life of mission and soul-stirring saga. In India, there is none like him in sheer scale and scope of thought, action and effect. If fight for human rights as a concept is allowed to be destroyed by subjecting it to the perversity of politics and pessimism, not to speak of the over privileged, that would be the greatest ingratitude to the man who single-handedly resurrected and reignited the movement and fought against the violations of human rights as a panacea to shaping the society to face the complexities of life without a trace of trauma. It is difficult to convey with any comparable degree of eloquence and classicism that he displayed in the field of human rights. Human rights to him is both a task and an art, and, an expression that filled the senses and triggered an emotional experience as new ideas proliferated.

He appreciated the struggle of a million. He wrote for a million. He addressed for a million. He addressed a million. He lived for a million. He was adored by a million. One in a million. And. above all. a million in one, Sri. Iyer. 

1982 KLT 53 Vis-a-Vis AIR 1961 SC 1067

(By K.G. Michael, Advocate, Kodungallur)

The Ruling in Vasu v. Kallianikutty Amma reported in 1982 KLT 53 appears to be in conflict with the Ruling reported in Ganga Dutt v. Karthik Chandra Das in AIR 1961 SC 1067.

The former Ruling is under Ss.2(6)(ii) and 11(5) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The latter is a Ruling under S.116 of T.P. Act.

The gist of the former Ruling is as follows:-

"Statutory tenancy is a concept evolved by Courts to define the relation that subsists after termination of the contractual tenancy........................

A petition for eviction is normally filed after termination of the contractual tenancy, and the person continuing in possession thereafter during the pendency of the eviction proceedings is a statutory tenant. But when the petition is dismissed, S.11(15) provides that he will revert back to the old position. The tenancy shall be deemed to continue on the old terms and conditions. The contractual tenancy is thus resurrected. The statutory tenancy stands converted into the old contractual tenancy, when the eviction petition is dismissed, by virtue of S.11(15)"

The latter Ruling has held that a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined by efflux of time has not acquired the status of a tenant holding over within the meaning of S.116 of T.R Act.

The non-obstante clause in S.11(1) of the Rent Control Act contemplates only one kind of tenancy i.e. the statutory tenancy under Rent Control Act.

Hence, wherever the Rent Control Act applies, we have only one kind of tenancy i.e. statutory tenancy.

S.11(9) of the Rent Control Act is a fetter on the landlord. It is immaterial whether the tenancy is for a specified period or not. Once a tenant, he continues to be a tenant subject to the provisions of the Rent Control Act.

This position is amply clear in S.11(15) of the Act.

The former Ruling has pointed to two kinds of tenancy i.e. contractual tenancy on one hand and statutory tenancy on the other hand. This position does not appear to be sound vis-a-vis latter Ruling.

The Rent Control Act does not contemplate a holding over tenant. Under S. 11(15) of the Rent Control Act, the tenancy shall continue subject to the provisions of the Act. Any other interpretation of law may be in conflict with the SC Ruling.

Para 8 of the Ruling in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala reported in 1995 (2) KLT 848 appears to be a correct interpretation of law. 

A Critical View of Sections 11(3), 11(8) and 11(10) of the

Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act

(By P. Somarajan, Advocate, Kollam)

The object of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is to regulate the leasing of the buildings, prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants and for the control of rents. The paramount aim and primary purpose of the statute is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. As it is an ameliorative legislation intended for the benefit of tenants and to prevent unreasonable eviction, it is advisable to look into the classification of tenants under Ss.11(3) and 11(8) of the Act and its constitutionality. As far as control of rent is concerned, the decision of our Hon'ble High Court drawn by the Hon'ble Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala, reported in 1995 (2) KLT 848, canvases a fresh look into the classification of tenants under Ss.11(3) and 11 (8) and also whether it is violative of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) of the Constitution.

S.11(3) of the Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act provides that a 'Landlord' may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the Landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him.

To the sub-s. (3) there is 4 provisos among them the first proviso provides that "the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the Landlord has any such building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so".

The second proviso states that "the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the land lord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such buildings and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such persons to carry on such trade or business".

The third proviso provides that "no land lord whose rights to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer intervivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of instrument."

The fourth proviso provided that "if a land lord after obtaining an order to put in possession transfers his right in respect of the building to another person the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him".

As far as S.11(8) is concerned what is embodied in sub-section is that a landlord who is occupying only a part of a building may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession there of if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use.

It is pertinent to note that there is a classification of tenants coming under the purview of sub-ss.3 and 8 of S.11 of the Act as the requirements and benefits given to tenants under sub-ss.3 and 8 are different. A mere perusal of Ss.11(3), 11(8) and 11(10) shows that the classification is discriminatory. The treatment given to the tenants under sub-ss. 3 and 8 are different and discriminatory. Former one, deals with the requirement of (bona fide need of land lord or his dependant) land lord who is not occupying any portion of building and in the later deals with requirement of land lord (bona fide need for additional accommodation) who is occupying a portion of building. But as far as the status of tenants is concerned there is no differences at all, but sub-ss. (3) and (8) provides different treatment to the tenants though there is no difference in the status of tenants. In the former one wide protective measures are provided to the tenants. Among them the extent of 2nd proviso, is so wide, by the inclusion of the word "mainly" and it provides a protection to the tenants having other source of income, if he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in the tenanted premises, even if the land lord establishes his bona fide need. In other words, the land lord who have established his bona fide need with its rigid nature also come across the benefits provided to the tenants under its provisos. The 3rd proviso to sub-s.3, gave an absolute barring to the land lord to apply for eviction of tenants before the expiry of one year, if the right of land lord arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos; from the date of such instrument. But in the later case, the only protection given to the tenant is the comparative hardship. It is curiously enough to note that the term 'hardship' is not defined anywhere in the Act. Any way it is clear that the tenants come under the purview of sub-ss.(3) and (8) are treated in different manner in the Act, even though there is no change in the status of tenants. The main basis for such classification is the position of land lord's occupation - non occupation of part of building. Moreover the bona fide need under sub-s.3 is rigid while under sub-s. 8 is not rigid as in the case of sub-s.3. Which also gives a special treatment to the land lord who comes under the purview of sub-s. 8. It is pertinent to note that whether such classification and different treatment of tenants under sub-ss.3 and 8 on the basis of occupation or non occupation of portion of building by the land lord amounts to a reasonable classification and whether there is any intelligible differential having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved under the Act. As stated earlier the main differential of classification in between Ss.11(3) and 11(8) is on the basis of position of land lord as he occupying any portion of building or not. We cannot find any element of intelligible differential having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved under the Act as the object of the act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. More over the classification is unreasonable as it is on the basis of position of land lord. Since the statute intended for the benefit of tenants, it will be unreasonable to classify tenants in two division by giving much protection to one class and denying the same to other class. More over the classification of land lords as persons conducting business in a part of the building and giving a luxurious treatment to them and denying such treatment to the land lords, who is not occupying any part of building is virtually against object of Act and it is against the welfare of progressive society and it lacks in element of intelligence based on the welfare of progressive society. Moreover in an ameleorative legislation intended for the benefit of tenants, it is not advisable to classify the tenants on the basis of status of land lord with respect to his occupation or non occupation of part of building. The legislature has not considered the status of tenants for making such a classification. The result is to the effect that it is open to the tenant to exhaust all the benefit provided under S.11(3) if the land lord is not in occupation of any part of the building. On the other hand if the land lord is conducting a business in any part of building, the tenant has to satisfy with the benefit of comparative hardship provided in S. 11(10) of the Act. There is clear discrimination in between Ss.11(3) and 11(8), S.11(3) is actually restricting the right of a land lord to carryout business to a certain extent in the building owned by him, while S.11(8) carried a special treatment to the land lord. Likewise while S.11(3) carries much protective measures to the business of tenant, by giving special treatment, no such treatment has been afforded to the tenant under S. 11(8) but treated entirely a different manner, that too on the basis of occupation or non occupation of a part of the building by the land lord, even though there is no difference in the status of tenants.

The main difference is with respect to the position or status of land lord. Such a classification is not advisable in a legislation intended for the benefit of tenants, when there is no difference in the status of tenants. The decision drawn by Hon'ble Justice, K.S. Radhakrishnan in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala reported in 1995 (2) KLT 848 canvases a fresh look into the matter in which it is held that "Legislation while arbitrarily invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Art.19(1)(g) and the social control permitted under CI.(6) of Art.19, it must be held to be warranting in that qualities" I am of the opinion that the disparity between 11(3), 11(8)and 11(10) of the Act makes it as violative of Art.14 of the Constitution and also lacks in reasonableness and also lacks in proper balance in between freedom guaranteed in Art.19(1)(g) and the social control permitted under CI.(6) of the Art.19 of the Constitution and the Act needs suitable amendment.

Law Needs Change

(By M. Lalitha Nair, Advocate, Ernakulam)

One day a widow and a widower came to me for advice to live together, both are Central Government Employees. The judicial and legislature hurdles have made it difficult for them to live together. The widower was receiving pension from his former wife and he wanted to retain the pension and marry again. The poor widow only had her aged mother and wanted to settle down in life with the widower. We are still slaves of British Rules. We are celebrating the millennium year 2000. It is time we bring modifications in law in tune with the modern needs and requirements of the society. I really felt sad because I could not help the widow.

R.54 of the Family Pension 1964 (Swamy's Complete Manual on Establishment and Administration for Central Government Officers) is quoted below:

R.54(6).The period for which family pension is payable shall be as follows:-

i) in the case of a widow or widower upto the date of death or re-marriage, whichever is earlier.

ii) in the case of a son, until he attain the age of (twenty five) years and

iii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, until she attains the age of (twenty five) years or until she gets married whichever is earlier.

The whole role allows pension till the widow or widower is unmarried.

Now the whole concept of living together until death has changed. If a man and woman plan to marry during middle age, it is only for companionship. Another aspect is that now the cause of death are so sudden that within a short span of time the surviving spouse has to shoulder a lot of unexpected responsibilities. People remarry not because of lack of sincerity or affection, but just to preserve the family. Things are more difficult when there are minor children and the difficulties to maintain a maid servant. These days there is no assurance of financial stability and the abolition of joint family and the replacement of nuclear family have made things worse.

The Central Government Rule should not cut away the pension immediately after the widow or widower remarries. It is high time that the law is made or the above Rule is modified to the effect, that in genuine cases widow or widower as the case may be, is enabled to remarry without loosing the pensionary benefits of his or her former spouse.