A Comment on Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act and the Division Bench Decision in 1999 (2) KLT 248

(By Tony George Kannanthanam, Advocate, Kochi)

Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act says that a decree for dissolution of marriage passed by a District Judge has to be confirmed by a Full Bench of the High Court. This confirmation is applicable only to Christians and so it is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Art.13(1), 14and 15(1) of the Constitution of India as far as Christians are concerned. The Indian Divorce Act is an enacted personal law and so it has to comply with Art. 13(1) and Part III of the Constitution. The Indian Divorce Act came into force on 1.4.1869. It extends to India the main provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 185 7 and its amendments till 1866. The object of the Act is to place the Indian law on the same footing as the English Law of Divorce. The object of the above section is to enable the Full Bench to review the evidence and come to an independent conclusion by it. The requirements for confirmation was introduced only in India and it has no parallel in the English Law. The present law in England regarding Divorce is the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The Christian Community has been demanding for making appropriate changes in the Act for a long time. The Law Commission of India in its Fifteenth report in 1960 on law relating to marriage and divorce among Christians has said on page 40 para.79 that "we see no need for such provision". As per Art.13(1) all pre constitutional laws have to be consistent with Part III of the Constitution and to the extent it is not consistent it is void. S.17 is not consistent with Part III of the Constitution since it violates Arts.14, 15(1), 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India. Since it violates Arts.14, 15(1), 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India it violates Art.13(1) of the Constitution of India.

Since this Section and confirmation is applicable only to Christians it is discriminatory arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The classification has not only to be reasonable but that reasonableness should have a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Classification between Christians and others is not reasonable and the reason for this classification has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by this classification. In effect this amounts to discrimination on the basis of religion and so is violative of Art.15(1) of the Constitution of India. Intention is immaterial in deciding the Constitutional validity. What matters in deciding the constitutional validity is the effect or consequence of the impugned section on the fundamental rights. The effect of this section is that it violates Art. 14, 15(1), 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India. Minimum six months has to elapse before a case is taken for confirmation before the Full Bench. The Full Bench may remand the case. If it is remanded then it will further lead to much delay. Parties can remarry only 6 months after confirmation. So parties have to wait for a long time and suffer in various ways during this period.

The near and dear ones of the parties are also forced to suffer because of this. This delay and suffering may effect even the looks of parties which will adversely affect their future marriage prospects especially that of females. This delay will adversely affect the right of the parties to start a fresh life. The parties will have to incur various types of expenses due to this confirmation proceedings. All this affects their right to live with dignity and right to decent life and right to life guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution of India and so is violative of Art.21 of the Constitution.

The precious time of High Courts are wasted unnecessarily due to this Section. This Section in effect violates the right to freedom of conscience and the right to freely practice religion because on the ground that one is a Christian one has to undergo the hardships, agonies and expenses of confirmation. None of the decisions relied on by the Division Bench in 1992 (2) KLT 248 is applicable. One of the decisions relied on by the Division Bench was AIR 1970 Mad 12. But the question considered in that case was entirely different. The question raised before the Division Bench was not even raised, considered and argued in the Madras case. Another decision relied on by the Division Bench was AIR 1950 Bom.84. That decision is not applicable because that decision did not consider whether enacted personal laws have to comply with Art.13(1).

In the above Bombay case the observation that personal laws will not come under Art.13 was made in reference to the Muslim Polygamy which is not an enacted personal law. The Full Bench of this Court in 1995 (1) KLT 644 had rejected the above Bombay decision and the contention that Indian Divorce Act is a Personal Law and so it will not come under Art.13 by holding that the above contention and Bombay decision will not apply to enacted personal laws. Another decision relied on by the above Division Bench was (1997) 3 SCC 573. That decision is also not applicable. The above decision of the Supreme Court did not specifically consider whether an enacted personal law has to comply with Art.13 and that question was not even argued or raised before the Apex Court. The Supreme Court in the above case was referring to non-enacted personal laws. None of the decisions referred to in the above Supreme Court decision has considered the question whether enacted personal law has to comply with Art.13. One of the decisions referred to in the above decision in AIR 1952 Bom.84 and that shows that the Supreme Court was referring only to non-enacted personal laws.

In the above Supreme Court judgment there is no discussion on the arguments made before it and none of the arguments made before it are mentioned and whether any arguments were at all made supporting the reliefs sought is also not traceable from the judgment.

The view of the Division Bench that this is a personal law and so Court cannot interfere is also not correct because this is an enacted personal law and it has to comply with Art.13 and has to be consistent with Part III of the Constitution, Even according to the Division Bench there is no justification for continuation of this procedure especially since it is applicable only to Christians and so the D.B. directed the State of Kerala to amend the law. When even according to the Division Bench there is no justification for continuation of this procedure especially since it applies only to Christians the D.B. ought to have held it as discriminatory, arbitrary, and vioaitive of Arts.14, 15(1) and 13(1) of the Constitution of India. Holding that there is no justification for continuation of this procedure especially since it applies only to Christians in effect amounts to holding that this procedure is arbitrary, discriminator and violative of Art.14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of India.

How long more the poor victims of this Section have to wait to get rid of this section and get it declared as ultra vires the Constitution and unconstitutional, discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Arts.13(1), 14, 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Manikantan Pillai Laments I

(Varghese T. Abraham, BA., LLM, Addl. District Judge, Kollam)

Born Manikantan in a blue blood Nair Tarward

Land Reforms in the State snatched away its wealth

Loss of parents eclipsed his mirth

Brought him up his sisters like apple in their eyes

Put two and two together, and went he to Law School

Toiled and moiled he in the class room

Learned he the subjects over head and ears

Secured a top and thought he to make bread and butter

Joined he the bar and weathered storm of infancy period

Burnt he the candles at both ends in the court rooms

Adorned he law as a jealous mistress in mind

Spared he no time for gossip and plays

Fought he battles with elders in the Bar

Brought he success with ease to his clients

Never he demanded fees as per rules

Nor did he chase ambulance for "Claims"

At daggers drawn were youngsters in the bar

Looked at him they with envy and venom

Judges in the Bench and elders in the Bar

Saw in him a future Patriarch in their line

Heard he then about a state-wise RACE

Stood he at sixes and seven to join or not

Judges advised and threw cold water on Grey

haired elders pursuaded him

"Societal Status, you get you know

Certainty in income will avoid your tear

Salutes of Police will put you in cheer

Step by Step to the top you can rise"

Encouraged by these joined he the race

Mediocre friends thought to test their case

Ran he as fast as he could and finished the point

Lagged behind him his friends at far away place

Another hurdle he had to cross - a tough one

Queries they put and gave he answers in hurry

Showered he tit for tat replies to their embarrassing queries

Battle he won and stood first in the victory stand

Conferred on him a seat lowest in the ladder

Sat he in that seat for a decade and more

Answers he wrote to questions beside the mark

Heard he for days lawyers on odds and ends

Wrote he verdicts and quoted he jurists

Never he cared for conjugal happiness

Yet, moved they complaints without rhyme or reason

Dharnas they held and meetings they convened

Took he bag and buggage to different places

Paid he through nose at commercial cities

Pulled he a long face through out the career

Paltry income was his wife's apple of discord

Gone he rack and ruin in finance and romance

Passed he a life through thick and thin

Suffered he all the built castles in the air

For a seat at the top of the ladder

One day he looked upwards and saw to his surprise

Above the ladder his friends who met Waterloo in the RACE

Shed he tears and cursed his caste

Sat for a while and then proceeded with that seat.

About Dishonour of Cheques

(Joseph Varghese Thattacherry, Advocate, Changnacherry)

A few questions regarding dishonour of cheques are discussed below:

1. Is a Judicial First Class Magistrate competent to try a person accused of an offence punishable u/s. 138 of Negotiable Instrument (Amendment) Act 1988, (in short the "Act") the cheque amount of which exceeds Rs.2500/-?.

2. Which is the place of offence under the Act?

3. If there is no strict compliance of the pre-conditions contained in clause (a) to (c) of S. 138 of the Act, will the section apply?

1. Competancy of the Judicial First Class Magistrate to try the offence under the Act.

The Act is one which comes under "any other law" under S.4(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Since the Act does not contain any provision for regulating the manner or place of inquiring into or trying the offence, it has to be dealt with according to the provisions of the code.S.5 of the code has no application as no special jurisdiction or power is conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by the Act. So the provisions of the code are to be applied to cases under the Act, subject only to S.142 of the Act, which has only limited operation. S.142(c) says that "No court inferior to that of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable u/s 138 of the Act." It means that courts superior to them are also empowered M try such offences. As per S.26 (b) of the code when any court is mentioned in any other law, cases under it are to be tried in such court only. By S.29 of the code the First Class Magistrate is empowered to impose a maximum fine of Rs.5000/- only, whereas the Chief Judicial Magistrate has powers to impose unlimited fine. As the drawer of a dishonoured cheque is liable to a fine of twice the amount of the cheque and the First Class Magistrate could not impose fine exceeding Rs.5000/-, he has no jurisdiction to try those cases the amount of which exceeds Rs.2500/-. His powers are limited only to cases involving cheques the amounts of which do not exceed Rs.2500/ -. Other cheque cases are exclusively trial by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

The purpose and object of the legislation is not only to punish the accused but also for the speedy recovery of the cheque amount to the payee or the holder in due course, applying S.357ofthecode. That exactly is the reason why the quantum of fine is tagged to the amount of cheque. So out of the fine realised compensation due u/s 30 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be paid to the complainant. If it is not so paid or could not be paid the very purpose of the legislation will be defeated and justice will not be meeted out to the complainant. Taking these aspects also into consideration and in view of S.29 of the code, if the amount of the dishonoured cheque exceeds Rs.2500/- such cases shall have to be tried exclusively by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

Whenever the legislature intends to invest the Magistrate with enhanced powers in excess of the powers under S.90 of the code it does so by making provisions to that effect in that special Act itself. Examples are many. S.21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, S.36ofthe Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940, S.104-E of the Karnataka Forest Act are some of them. Identical section as we find in S. 142(c) of the Act, viz "No court inferior .... shall try any offence" are contained in those Acts also. At the same time those acts contain special provision investing Metropolitan and First Class Magistrate with enhanced powers of sentencing. As such a provision is conspicuously absent in the present Act, the powers of sentencing by those Magistrates are governed only by S.29(2) of the code. Support for the above view could be found in a recent decision reported in 1990 CRL. L.J. 989. In that case it was held that, where it was crystal clear that quantum of sentence sought to be imposed was beyond the power of the Magistrate u/s. 29 of the Code, he shall commit the case to the court of session.

It is idle to contend that, if the Magistrate at the end of the trial is of opinion that the accused ought to receive more severe punishment than he is empowered to inflict he could submit the proceedings and forward the accused to the Chief Judicial Magistrate u/S.325 of the code. In that case, the case may have to be tried denovo which would be a waste of public time and money and it would also cause harassment and hardship to the accused as well as the complainant. In respect of cases u/s.138 of the Act which are beyond his jurisdiction to try and which are pending before him, the Magistrate may invoke S.201 or S.322 of the code. He may either return the complaint u/s.201 for presentation to the proper court or stay the proceeding and submit the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate along with a brief report under S.22.

2. Coming to teritorical jurisdiction the question is, which is the place of offence. In order to fix the place of offence we have to ascertain what exactly is the offence under the Act, First paragraph ofS.138 and the heading of the Act speak eloquently as to what exactly is the offence. The heading is "Of penalties in case of Dishonour of certain cheques for insufficiency of funds in the account". Penalty is for offence, and that is described therein as, dishobour of cheque. So the offence contemplated in the Act is dishobour of cheque. Again the section says" where any cheque drawn by a person.......is returned by the Bank unpaid........, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence". So the act says, the moment a cheque is returned unpaid, the offence is committed. Thus dishonour of the cheque is the gravamen of the offence and the place of offence is where the cheque is dishonoured. If the payment is made in response to the notice of demand with in the prescribed time the offence is excused and no action would lie. It is submitted, non payment is not the offence and dishobour of the cheque alone is the offence. Non payment is only a condition precedent for lodging the complaint.

In 1989 (2) KLT 740 and 1991 (1) KLT 893 it was held that on failure to make the payment, the offence is completed. Even if failure to pay is the offence or part of the offence, the question arises which is the place where the failure to pay took place?. It is at the place of residence of the drawer and not where the payee or holder in due course resides. Because it is the "non-payment" and not the "non-receipt" that is made an offence. Also it is pertinent to note that the words used in the sub clause (c) of S.138 are "the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount" and not "the payee or holder in due course fails to receive the said amount". Again if a payee in Trivandrum endorses a cheque to somebody in Delhi or Calcutta and on presentation the cheque is dishonoured and the holder in due course files a complaint, the drawer in Trivandrum will be put to the ordeal of appearing and contesting the case in that far off place. If that be so, even if the cheque is a bogus one or that the drawer has very valid contentions to make, many will not be able to defend their case. That is not a situation which the Parliament ever intend to happen. However it is a cardinal principle of interpretation that, in interpreting a statute, that interpretation which causes lesser hardship to the accused has to be accepted. Viewed in that aspect also the offence shall be deemed to have been committed at the place of residence of the accused. Payment is usually made by sending a demand draft or making a telegraphic transfer from the place of residence of the drawer. Thus in any view of the matter the place of offence shall be deemed to be where the cheque is dishonoured or if non payment is deemed to be the offence at the place of residence of the drawer.

3. Next, the act being a special one its provisos are to be strictly complied with, so if the time stipulated therein are not strictly adhered to, nothing in the Section will apply and the court shall not take cognizance of the offence. Similarly if the payee or the holder in due course makes a demand for any sum in excess of the cheque amount like interest, bank commission, notice charge etc. it will not be in compliance with clause (b) and hence invalid. In that case also S.138 of the Act will not apply.

Inimitable Sri V.R. Krishna Iyer

(By V. Lakshmanan, Advocate, Tirupur)

Venerable Sri V.R. Krishna Iyer, popularly known as V.R.K. to all is an icon. That he is a recipient of our nation's second highest civilian award Padma Vibhushan, is only a confirmation of his status as a statesman, a renowned retired Supreme Court Judge, a reviewer, a persuasive speaker, a writer par excellence, above all, a humble, noble human being-all rolled into one.

In the field of sports, it is universally accepted that champions are born and not made. Such an observation is bound to be true in the case of Sri Krishna Iyer also. Though this writer has neither the intelligence nor the requisite credentials to write on a great man, it has become necessary that a write-up on this occasion is indispensable. In fact, the great man deserves a thesis.

Sri Iyer is a many-splendoured genius. We come across personalities who excel in a particular field. But Sri Krishna Iyer mastered at least half-a-dozen spheres. On that score, Sri Iyer is unique. That an individual can achieve so much in his life is only a pointer that God's selective creations could be astonishingly amazing.

His impression son social justice, which is pitted against legal justice, are indicative of his legendary vision and gifted mind. He is a firm believer that criticism carries a crusade to cure as well as crucify. A humanist, an activist and a crusader, his ceaseless campaign for human rights and social justice is only well-known.

An illustrious example and the nearest definition of a great judge Sri Krishna Iyer has rendered time-honoured judgments. This writer is reminded of the greatest jurist of the past era, Benjamin Cardozo, who defined a Judge thus:

"The Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiments, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodised by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in social life'."

Needless to state, Sri Krishna Iyer was the quintessential Judge, stately, dispassionate, knowledgeable, well-liked, humane, rangy, resourceful and ready-witted, with performance always matching his potential. Nothing surprising that he is too familiar a name to bear repetition.

A profile on Sri Krishna Iyer must be a combined study of his Judgeship and the quality of his judgments. A savant of several innate gifts, Sri Iyer has laid down judgments of unmistakable punditry. Gliding through the length and breadth of law with precision of a master craftsman, he would bring the best of any pro vision of law with the result the subsequent judgment on the said point had no scope to emulate Sri Krishna Iyer's observation. And, his ability as a Judge is displayed in no uncertain terms in cases where he was governed by a precedent. The wizard of the art of creativity would not only restore the precedents, but would further revitalise and refurbish them with his poetry-like prose. One, on reading his judgments, has a feeling that his judgments are narratives of a poem, nay, the poem itself. The literary attainments of the Judge coupled with his ability to delicately blend law with the lusture of language guaranteed the preservation of the judgment for posterity as they are fine-tuned for the future. They are full of intense expressiveness and are infused with refinement and vitality. His English, assimilative and amorphous, had no inhibitions. This enabled Sri Krishna Iyer to lay down law not only fairy-tale creativity but also with cast-iron certainty. He never indulged in artificial and attempted expressions. They were always natural. This ability greatly enhanced the value of his judgments. The impassioned presentation in delectable diction is an unqualified tribute to his popularity.

The ability to understand the facts well and the law better enabled Sri Krishna Iyer to pronounce ageless judgments, punctuated by brilliance. His judgments are still vibrantly alive as they are a celebration of his judicial valour and prowess. They are binding precedents, the catalytic factor being judicial brilliance coupled with luminous lucidity. Those judgments are lasting works. As one reads his innumerable judgments, there is no intellectual exhaustion principally due to his virtuosity. A versatile talent with a literary bent of mind, his is a name to conjure with as he had pronounced judgments of enduring significance and pervasive influence. In short, his judgments are of all times and not of the hour.

Arguably the most original and perfound thinker within the legal firmament, Sri Krishna Iyer was destined to solve some of the intractable intricacies of law. The intrinsic principles of law were not of any challenge to him. The deeper phases of lav. foundthemselvesreborninhisjudgmentsaslawwasofunceasinginteresttohim. Small wonder that various legal vicissitudes were nowhere portrayed, explained and answered more overtly than in his judgments.

A visionary judge and venerated representation of fearless and free judiciary, he was an exponent and defender of the finest legal principles. Endowed with inexhaustible knowledge of law, his judgments were finished products, unflawed in their constructive principles of law, his governing vision of law unmistakably legendary. His judgments carry intimations of unlimited judicial energy, they resonate with powerful dynamism. An institution by himself, his style had certain austere majesty that it extorted (still extorting) a reverential awe. Not one to be shackled by dogma of tradition and whose attitude had never been one of servile acceptance, his judgments continue to be refreshingly different. A Judge of exceptional ability, he experimented with the content, form and language of his judgments that they displayed new dimensions. His endeavour was to break away from the confining walls of words (catch phrases) that the impact of his judgments, both actual and likely, echoes down the years. Sri Iyer has given us a corpus of rich heritage of judgments with heightened excellence. What sustains his judgments is the inner core of embedded erudition. Behind the glitz, grandeur and glamour his lasting judgments, one can find the spark of endearing individuality. Ably supported by stimulating eminence and erudition, and supplemented by knife-edge analytical mind (which are indispensable of his persona) he was able to pick up the crux of the litigation very early. He would understand intimately the background of facts leading up to the case. The scholar in him was always alive to the law involved with his desire to pay attention to the minutes but important details that the judgments never led to grotesque results. Hollow legal platitudes, misleading analogies, skill in meandering outside the facts of the case and astuteness in creating a labyrinth of confusion never stood a ghost of a chance of winning his approval much less his admiration. Countless were the cases/replete with knotty questions of fact and thorny questions of law-that had come up for treatment on his judicial anvil and his masterful judgments remain as irresistible precedents for the generations to come. His judgments are exotic indeed. They also have practical applications to human life.

As a speaker, he is an instant draw. His oratorial skills contain the right intonations and pauses. Even today, he is participating atleast in one meeting per day (at times two per day). His elastic intelligence absorbs all types of subjects that he could address any type of audience. He is travelling extensively with infectious enthusiasm and boyish zeal. Nothing surprising that he is extempore.

As a writer, he is simply peerless. Whether it is an article or a book review, his contributions have a touch of class. He could write on staggeringly diverse aspects. The wealth of informations, the delightful style of narrative and wide coverage of ^ observations only prove the liveliness of his faculties and sharpness of his observations. His writings are always stately, complex ideas being rendered in uncluttered, perfectly-nuanced prose, which involves careful deployments of memorable lines and use of echoing phrases, making his writings as resonant as his speech. Whether it is a judgment, a speech or a write-up, one would only be amazed at Sri Krishna Iyer's fecund farsightedness. It is difficult to make out whether his style triumphes over substance or the substance triumphes over his style.

No sad mousings. No cane chair conferences and arm chair advices but an eventful journey from a vibrant present for the future good of India. Comparisons are odious. It is incorrect that he is first among equals as he is incomparable. He is all alone in an exalted position shedding light on very many aspects of life and living. Oscar Wilde comes handy:

"It is the personality and not the principle that moves the time".

The Parkway Collision

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

This happened in the United States of America. In May, 1963 the Parkway Collision was the talk of New York City. In the City's Henry Hudson Parkway, a north bound car suddenly plunged through a six foot divider hedge, skittered into the southbound traffic and smashed head-on into another car. All of the people in the north bound car a seven year old boy, his great-grandparents, his great-aunt and a friend of the family were killed. In the midst of a gathering crowd, Gareth Martinis the driver of the other car (a young man of 23) peered into the mangled cars and advised spectators not to move the bodies. Then he ran off leaving his car parked on a nearby exit road. He was arrested a short time later but he sullenly refused to submit to the drunkometer test. He violently grabbed a Press photographer by the throat, clawed and kicked at the police struggling to pull him away and bit a cop's finger. Martinis was charged with drunken driving, reckless driving and leaving the scene of accident. He faced a maximum penalty of 1500 dollars and three years in jail.

Gareth Martinis was the son of Acting Supreme Court Judge Joseph Martinis who had sat as a Judge since 1950 in City Criminal Court, gaining a reputation for delivering strong reprimands to careless drivers. When New York City newspapers learned about the arrangements for Martinis' trial before the three-Judge-Panel in New York City Criminal Court they emitted growls of protest. But the District Attorney insisted that young Martinis would not get any special favour because of his father's position. Said the D.A. "It does not matter if he is the son of a Judge, or a President or a Governor. We treat them all alike."

Trial started. Two policemen testified that Martinis seemed drunk when he was arrested. But three other cops testified that Martinis appeared to be sober. -During the four day hearing, the prosecution case was very badly weakened by the conflicting testimony. The three judges deliberated only five minutes to find the judge's son innocent of all charges:

The State Department of Motor Vehicles held a hearing of its own. It found out that Gareth Martinis was arrested for speeding three times in 16 days in 1959, had once got his licence cancelled and then got it back by lying about past convictions. And the Department of Motor Vehicles dealt out the hardest punishment on him, after finding that Gareth was driving while drunk & was unsteady on his feet atleast one half hour after occurrence. It revoked Gareth's driving license. Euqene Kramon, a Manhattan slacks manufacturer who was the only survivor of the Parkway collision, heard of the penalty and murmured "Giant Punishment" and turned twice in his hospital bed.

Sometimes we feel really concerned about public morality. It is our chief and indeed our only protection against tyranny and exploitation. If we could not rely on our politicians to give an honest account of their official conduct and intentions, if we could not rely on our civil servants to administer affairs impartially, if we could not rely on our magistrates and Judges to enforce equality before the law, if we could not rely on the police not to practice torture and not to manufacture evidence, if we could not rely on the press to make an honest attempt to ascertain the facts and to report them fairly, not only should we be deprived of any .control over the conduct of public affairs but we should be denied the security which is essential for our private well being. Among all forms of official wickedness, the perversions of justice outrages us most. Not that the egoism, or even the stupidity of a politician or the corruption of a civil servant may not do more harm. But we look on the law as our protection against the infringement of what we take to be our rights. Even though the laws themselves may be oppressive or discriminatory there is some safeguard in their being honesty applied. And we feel most deeply threatened and wounded when a miscarriage of justice arises out of political, racial or communal prejudice.