About Dishonour of Cheques

(Joseph Varghese Thattacherry, Advocate, Changnacherry)

A few questions regarding dishonour of cheques are discussed below:

1. Is a Judicial First Class Magistrate competent to try a person accused of an offence punishable u/s. 138 of Negotiable Instrument (Amendment) Act 1988, (in short the "Act") the cheque amount of which exceeds Rs.2500/-?.

2. Which is the place of offence under the Act?

3. If there is no strict compliance of the pre-conditions contained in clause (a) to (c) of S. 138 of the Act, will the section apply?

1. Competancy of the Judicial First Class Magistrate to try the offence under the Act.

The Act is one which comes under "any other law" under S.4(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Since the Act does not contain any provision for regulating the manner or place of inquiring into or trying the offence, it has to be dealt with according to the provisions of the code.S.5 of the code has no application as no special jurisdiction or power is conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by the Act. So the provisions of the code are to be applied to cases under the Act, subject only to S.142 of the Act, which has only limited operation. S.142(c) says that "No court inferior to that of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable u/s 138 of the Act." It means that courts superior to them are also empowered M try such offences. As per S.26 (b) of the code when any court is mentioned in any other law, cases under it are to be tried in such court only. By S.29 of the code the First Class Magistrate is empowered to impose a maximum fine of Rs.5000/- only, whereas the Chief Judicial Magistrate has powers to impose unlimited fine. As the drawer of a dishonoured cheque is liable to a fine of twice the amount of the cheque and the First Class Magistrate could not impose fine exceeding Rs.5000/-, he has no jurisdiction to try those cases the amount of which exceeds Rs.2500/-. His powers are limited only to cases involving cheques the amounts of which do not exceed Rs.2500/ -. Other cheque cases are exclusively trial by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

The purpose and object of the legislation is not only to punish the accused but also for the speedy recovery of the cheque amount to the payee or the holder in due course, applying S.357ofthecode. That exactly is the reason why the quantum of fine is tagged to the amount of cheque. So out of the fine realised compensation due u/s 30 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be paid to the complainant. If it is not so paid or could not be paid the very purpose of the legislation will be defeated and justice will not be meeted out to the complainant. Taking these aspects also into consideration and in view of S.29 of the code, if the amount of the dishonoured cheque exceeds Rs.2500/- such cases shall have to be tried exclusively by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

Whenever the legislature intends to invest the Magistrate with enhanced powers in excess of the powers under S.90 of the code it does so by making provisions to that effect in that special Act itself. Examples are many. S.21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, S.36ofthe Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940, S.104-E of the Karnataka Forest Act are some of them. Identical section as we find in S. 142(c) of the Act, viz "No court inferior .... shall try any offence" are contained in those Acts also. At the same time those acts contain special provision investing Metropolitan and First Class Magistrate with enhanced powers of sentencing. As such a provision is conspicuously absent in the present Act, the powers of sentencing by those Magistrates are governed only by S.29(2) of the code. Support for the above view could be found in a recent decision reported in 1990 CRL. L.J. 989. In that case it was held that, where it was crystal clear that quantum of sentence sought to be imposed was beyond the power of the Magistrate u/s. 29 of the Code, he shall commit the case to the court of session.

It is idle to contend that, if the Magistrate at the end of the trial is of opinion that the accused ought to receive more severe punishment than he is empowered to inflict he could submit the proceedings and forward the accused to the Chief Judicial Magistrate u/S.325 of the code. In that case, the case may have to be tried denovo which would be a waste of public time and money and it would also cause harassment and hardship to the accused as well as the complainant. In respect of cases u/s.138 of the Act which are beyond his jurisdiction to try and which are pending before him, the Magistrate may invoke S.201 or S.322 of the code. He may either return the complaint u/s.201 for presentation to the proper court or stay the proceeding and submit the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate along with a brief report under S.22.

2. Coming to teritorical jurisdiction the question is, which is the place of offence. In order to fix the place of offence we have to ascertain what exactly is the offence under the Act, First paragraph ofS.138 and the heading of the Act speak eloquently as to what exactly is the offence. The heading is "Of penalties in case of Dishonour of certain cheques for insufficiency of funds in the account". Penalty is for offence, and that is described therein as, dishobour of cheque. So the offence contemplated in the Act is dishobour of cheque. Again the section says" where any cheque drawn by a person.......is returned by the Bank unpaid........, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence". So the act says, the moment a cheque is returned unpaid, the offence is committed. Thus dishonour of the cheque is the gravamen of the offence and the place of offence is where the cheque is dishonoured. If the payment is made in response to the notice of demand with in the prescribed time the offence is excused and no action would lie. It is submitted, non payment is not the offence and dishobour of the cheque alone is the offence. Non payment is only a condition precedent for lodging the complaint.

In 1989 (2) KLT 740 and 1991 (1) KLT 893 it was held that on failure to make the payment, the offence is completed. Even if failure to pay is the offence or part of the offence, the question arises which is the place where the failure to pay took place?. It is at the place of residence of the drawer and not where the payee or holder in due course resides. Because it is the "non-payment" and not the "non-receipt" that is made an offence. Also it is pertinent to note that the words used in the sub clause (c) of S.138 are "the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount" and not "the payee or holder in due course fails to receive the said amount". Again if a payee in Trivandrum endorses a cheque to somebody in Delhi or Calcutta and on presentation the cheque is dishonoured and the holder in due course files a complaint, the drawer in Trivandrum will be put to the ordeal of appearing and contesting the case in that far off place. If that be so, even if the cheque is a bogus one or that the drawer has very valid contentions to make, many will not be able to defend their case. That is not a situation which the Parliament ever intend to happen. However it is a cardinal principle of interpretation that, in interpreting a statute, that interpretation which causes lesser hardship to the accused has to be accepted. Viewed in that aspect also the offence shall be deemed to have been committed at the place of residence of the accused. Payment is usually made by sending a demand draft or making a telegraphic transfer from the place of residence of the drawer. Thus in any view of the matter the place of offence shall be deemed to be where the cheque is dishonoured or if non payment is deemed to be the offence at the place of residence of the drawer.

3. Next, the act being a special one its provisos are to be strictly complied with, so if the time stipulated therein are not strictly adhered to, nothing in the Section will apply and the court shall not take cognizance of the offence. Similarly if the payee or the holder in due course makes a demand for any sum in excess of the cheque amount like interest, bank commission, notice charge etc. it will not be in compliance with clause (b) and hence invalid. In that case also S.138 of the Act will not apply.

Inimitable Sri V.R. Krishna Iyer

(By V. Lakshmanan, Advocate, Tirupur)

Venerable Sri V.R. Krishna Iyer, popularly known as V.R.K. to all is an icon. That he is a recipient of our nation's second highest civilian award Padma Vibhushan, is only a confirmation of his status as a statesman, a renowned retired Supreme Court Judge, a reviewer, a persuasive speaker, a writer par excellence, above all, a humble, noble human being-all rolled into one.

In the field of sports, it is universally accepted that champions are born and not made. Such an observation is bound to be true in the case of Sri Krishna Iyer also. Though this writer has neither the intelligence nor the requisite credentials to write on a great man, it has become necessary that a write-up on this occasion is indispensable. In fact, the great man deserves a thesis.

Sri Iyer is a many-splendoured genius. We come across personalities who excel in a particular field. But Sri Krishna Iyer mastered at least half-a-dozen spheres. On that score, Sri Iyer is unique. That an individual can achieve so much in his life is only a pointer that God's selective creations could be astonishingly amazing.

His impression son social justice, which is pitted against legal justice, are indicative of his legendary vision and gifted mind. He is a firm believer that criticism carries a crusade to cure as well as crucify. A humanist, an activist and a crusader, his ceaseless campaign for human rights and social justice is only well-known.

An illustrious example and the nearest definition of a great judge Sri Krishna Iyer has rendered time-honoured judgments. This writer is reminded of the greatest jurist of the past era, Benjamin Cardozo, who defined a Judge thus:

"The Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiments, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodised by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in social life'."

Needless to state, Sri Krishna Iyer was the quintessential Judge, stately, dispassionate, knowledgeable, well-liked, humane, rangy, resourceful and ready-witted, with performance always matching his potential. Nothing surprising that he is too familiar a name to bear repetition.

A profile on Sri Krishna Iyer must be a combined study of his Judgeship and the quality of his judgments. A savant of several innate gifts, Sri Iyer has laid down judgments of unmistakable punditry. Gliding through the length and breadth of law with precision of a master craftsman, he would bring the best of any pro vision of law with the result the subsequent judgment on the said point had no scope to emulate Sri Krishna Iyer's observation. And, his ability as a Judge is displayed in no uncertain terms in cases where he was governed by a precedent. The wizard of the art of creativity would not only restore the precedents, but would further revitalise and refurbish them with his poetry-like prose. One, on reading his judgments, has a feeling that his judgments are narratives of a poem, nay, the poem itself. The literary attainments of the Judge coupled with his ability to delicately blend law with the lusture of language guaranteed the preservation of the judgment for posterity as they are fine-tuned for the future. They are full of intense expressiveness and are infused with refinement and vitality. His English, assimilative and amorphous, had no inhibitions. This enabled Sri Krishna Iyer to lay down law not only fairy-tale creativity but also with cast-iron certainty. He never indulged in artificial and attempted expressions. They were always natural. This ability greatly enhanced the value of his judgments. The impassioned presentation in delectable diction is an unqualified tribute to his popularity.

The ability to understand the facts well and the law better enabled Sri Krishna Iyer to pronounce ageless judgments, punctuated by brilliance. His judgments are still vibrantly alive as they are a celebration of his judicial valour and prowess. They are binding precedents, the catalytic factor being judicial brilliance coupled with luminous lucidity. Those judgments are lasting works. As one reads his innumerable judgments, there is no intellectual exhaustion principally due to his virtuosity. A versatile talent with a literary bent of mind, his is a name to conjure with as he had pronounced judgments of enduring significance and pervasive influence. In short, his judgments are of all times and not of the hour.

Arguably the most original and perfound thinker within the legal firmament, Sri Krishna Iyer was destined to solve some of the intractable intricacies of law. The intrinsic principles of law were not of any challenge to him. The deeper phases of lav. foundthemselvesreborninhisjudgmentsaslawwasofunceasinginteresttohim. Small wonder that various legal vicissitudes were nowhere portrayed, explained and answered more overtly than in his judgments.

A visionary judge and venerated representation of fearless and free judiciary, he was an exponent and defender of the finest legal principles. Endowed with inexhaustible knowledge of law, his judgments were finished products, unflawed in their constructive principles of law, his governing vision of law unmistakably legendary. His judgments carry intimations of unlimited judicial energy, they resonate with powerful dynamism. An institution by himself, his style had certain austere majesty that it extorted (still extorting) a reverential awe. Not one to be shackled by dogma of tradition and whose attitude had never been one of servile acceptance, his judgments continue to be refreshingly different. A Judge of exceptional ability, he experimented with the content, form and language of his judgments that they displayed new dimensions. His endeavour was to break away from the confining walls of words (catch phrases) that the impact of his judgments, both actual and likely, echoes down the years. Sri Iyer has given us a corpus of rich heritage of judgments with heightened excellence. What sustains his judgments is the inner core of embedded erudition. Behind the glitz, grandeur and glamour his lasting judgments, one can find the spark of endearing individuality. Ably supported by stimulating eminence and erudition, and supplemented by knife-edge analytical mind (which are indispensable of his persona) he was able to pick up the crux of the litigation very early. He would understand intimately the background of facts leading up to the case. The scholar in him was always alive to the law involved with his desire to pay attention to the minutes but important details that the judgments never led to grotesque results. Hollow legal platitudes, misleading analogies, skill in meandering outside the facts of the case and astuteness in creating a labyrinth of confusion never stood a ghost of a chance of winning his approval much less his admiration. Countless were the cases/replete with knotty questions of fact and thorny questions of law-that had come up for treatment on his judicial anvil and his masterful judgments remain as irresistible precedents for the generations to come. His judgments are exotic indeed. They also have practical applications to human life.

As a speaker, he is an instant draw. His oratorial skills contain the right intonations and pauses. Even today, he is participating atleast in one meeting per day (at times two per day). His elastic intelligence absorbs all types of subjects that he could address any type of audience. He is travelling extensively with infectious enthusiasm and boyish zeal. Nothing surprising that he is extempore.

As a writer, he is simply peerless. Whether it is an article or a book review, his contributions have a touch of class. He could write on staggeringly diverse aspects. The wealth of informations, the delightful style of narrative and wide coverage of ^ observations only prove the liveliness of his faculties and sharpness of his observations. His writings are always stately, complex ideas being rendered in uncluttered, perfectly-nuanced prose, which involves careful deployments of memorable lines and use of echoing phrases, making his writings as resonant as his speech. Whether it is a judgment, a speech or a write-up, one would only be amazed at Sri Krishna Iyer's fecund farsightedness. It is difficult to make out whether his style triumphes over substance or the substance triumphes over his style.

No sad mousings. No cane chair conferences and arm chair advices but an eventful journey from a vibrant present for the future good of India. Comparisons are odious. It is incorrect that he is first among equals as he is incomparable. He is all alone in an exalted position shedding light on very many aspects of life and living. Oscar Wilde comes handy:

"It is the personality and not the principle that moves the time".

The Parkway Collision

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

This happened in the United States of America. In May, 1963 the Parkway Collision was the talk of New York City. In the City's Henry Hudson Parkway, a north bound car suddenly plunged through a six foot divider hedge, skittered into the southbound traffic and smashed head-on into another car. All of the people in the north bound car a seven year old boy, his great-grandparents, his great-aunt and a friend of the family were killed. In the midst of a gathering crowd, Gareth Martinis the driver of the other car (a young man of 23) peered into the mangled cars and advised spectators not to move the bodies. Then he ran off leaving his car parked on a nearby exit road. He was arrested a short time later but he sullenly refused to submit to the drunkometer test. He violently grabbed a Press photographer by the throat, clawed and kicked at the police struggling to pull him away and bit a cop's finger. Martinis was charged with drunken driving, reckless driving and leaving the scene of accident. He faced a maximum penalty of 1500 dollars and three years in jail.

Gareth Martinis was the son of Acting Supreme Court Judge Joseph Martinis who had sat as a Judge since 1950 in City Criminal Court, gaining a reputation for delivering strong reprimands to careless drivers. When New York City newspapers learned about the arrangements for Martinis' trial before the three-Judge-Panel in New York City Criminal Court they emitted growls of protest. But the District Attorney insisted that young Martinis would not get any special favour because of his father's position. Said the D.A. "It does not matter if he is the son of a Judge, or a President or a Governor. We treat them all alike."

Trial started. Two policemen testified that Martinis seemed drunk when he was arrested. But three other cops testified that Martinis appeared to be sober. -During the four day hearing, the prosecution case was very badly weakened by the conflicting testimony. The three judges deliberated only five minutes to find the judge's son innocent of all charges:

The State Department of Motor Vehicles held a hearing of its own. It found out that Gareth Martinis was arrested for speeding three times in 16 days in 1959, had once got his licence cancelled and then got it back by lying about past convictions. And the Department of Motor Vehicles dealt out the hardest punishment on him, after finding that Gareth was driving while drunk & was unsteady on his feet atleast one half hour after occurrence. It revoked Gareth's driving license. Euqene Kramon, a Manhattan slacks manufacturer who was the only survivor of the Parkway collision, heard of the penalty and murmured "Giant Punishment" and turned twice in his hospital bed.

Sometimes we feel really concerned about public morality. It is our chief and indeed our only protection against tyranny and exploitation. If we could not rely on our politicians to give an honest account of their official conduct and intentions, if we could not rely on our civil servants to administer affairs impartially, if we could not rely on our magistrates and Judges to enforce equality before the law, if we could not rely on the police not to practice torture and not to manufacture evidence, if we could not rely on the press to make an honest attempt to ascertain the facts and to report them fairly, not only should we be deprived of any .control over the conduct of public affairs but we should be denied the security which is essential for our private well being. Among all forms of official wickedness, the perversions of justice outrages us most. Not that the egoism, or even the stupidity of a politician or the corruption of a civil servant may not do more harm. But we look on the law as our protection against the infringement of what we take to be our rights. Even though the laws themselves may be oppressive or discriminatory there is some safeguard in their being honesty applied. And we feel most deeply threatened and wounded when a miscarriage of justice arises out of political, racial or communal prejudice.

United States of America v. One Package

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

In her efforts to control the number and spacing of her children, the woman down-through Centuries has resorted to many recipes. She was advised in an Egyptian papyrus of 1500 B.C. to use a concoction of acacia tips, bitter cucumber and dates mixed with honey. Dioscorides, the famous Greek medical Scientist of the First Century, prescribed willow leaves in water. Other Greek medical writers offered a choice of powerful amulets including one made of hanbane seed diluted n mare's milk. The woman of today looks back upon all these as fantastic and irksome and takes nothing more than a pink of a white or peach-coloured pill or wears a small device within the womb familiarly known as the loop. The 'mother' of the pill is Mrs. Margaret Sanger and the 'father' of the Loop Dr. Lippe.

Many people believe that the contraceptives may threaten the foundations of contemporary sexual morality, especially of the young. Newspapers have bally-hooed and struck big headlines the new promiscenity facilitated by the pill and the loop. In America 'Sex on the Campus' was a topic on television programmes; and College Health Officers have shocked parents over the country by publicly reporting that coeds steeped in their Shelly, Byron, Keats and Robert Frost found time to approach them for prescription for the 'pill'. When one such girl student made such a request, she was asked:-

"How old are you?"

"Twenty One", the girl replied.

"You have a particular man in mind?"

"Well, yes I do"

"Have you ever stopped to think you might someday want to marry a man who holds virginity in high regard?" the doctor then asked.

"Yes the girl said candidly. "But I am not at all sure I want to marry a man like that!"

It is interesting to trace the American legislation and thereby read the changing attitude towards birth control. The legislation began with the federal law of 1873, instigated by the busy New England Anti-vice Crusader, Anthony Comstock. Some 30 States soon passed, "little Comstock Laws" most calling birth control as obscene and immoral. Those were the statutes under which Mrs. Sanger's pioneer meetings were raided, her clinics closed and she herself jailed. In 1936 another birth control figure the late. Dr. Hannah Stone of New York was involved in a case known as "The United States v. One Package". The package contained diaphragms sent to her from Japan and seized by U.S. Customs. Mrs. Harriet PilpeI, a New York Lawyer' argued the package came for Dr. Stone and won. In 1963, Mrs. Pilpel was called again when the St. Louis Postmaster held up the mailing of 50,000 samples of an aerosol foam contraceptive on she ground that they were not addressed to Doctors. Mrs. Pilpel again got a favourable ruling, one that said unless the postmaster could prove the packages were being mailed for unlawful purposes, they could go through. The toughest Cormstock law in USA was Connecticut's 1879 statute making the use of any drug, medical article or instrument to prevent conception an offence punishable by a fine and up to a year in prison. Doctors were not barred from giving birth-control advice to private patients in their offices but the State law blocked wet fare clinics from giving such advice to their patients or clients. Many clinics were closed under the Law in 1939 and many of the Doctors and Nurses in attendance were arrested. When Dr. Lee Buxton arrived from New York in 1954 at. Yale's School of Medicine, he was struck by the social injustice of the Connecticut law. His feelings became more strong when he noticed the deaths and permanent incapacitations of several women patients, from medical problems seriously aggravated by unwanted pregnancies. Finally Dr. Buxton in collaboration with Mr. Fowler Harper, then Professor of Law at Yale worked up certain cases and caused to file a suit to challenge the law's constitutionality on the ground that it violated 14th Amendment assuring citizens the basic civil and human rights of personal liberty. The case was subsequently masterminded, on the death of Mr. Harper, by his Junior Miss Catharine Roraback. The law was lost in the lower courts and the Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutionality on the ground that the law in fact on the point was a dead issue. If the law was a dead issue, the proper thing was to open a contraceptive clinic and on November 1, 1961, the Planned Parenthood League opened a clinic and its doors to the public. On November 10, it was closed on the order of the prosecutor. The closing down of the Parenthood League Clinic and many other clinics along with it was challenged by Dr. Buxton and Mrs. Griswold, Execution Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. Buxton wrote to experts at every Medical College in the country. He got Support even from Roman Catholic Medical Schools. Finally on June 7, 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its historic 7 to 2 decision. Justice William O Douglas, in writing the majority opinion, declared the case concerned a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees and declared "that the Connecticut law in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating the manufacture seeks to achieve its goal by means of having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. We deal with a right of privacy older than the bill of Rights -- older than our political parties, older than our school system".

He concluded "Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred".

The two dissenting Stewart and Black, both thought the Connecticut law offensive out constitutional.

The Lighter Side of Law

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

There is a very old English saying 'manners make the man'. But clothes make a gentleman.

"I listen with little pleasure to the argument of counsel whose legs are encased in light grey trousers" once said Victorian Judge Mr. Justice Bowles. His spirit must have hovered approvingly over Gloucester Divorce Court in February 1970, when an attractive twenty-six year old woman stepped into the witness-box wearing lemon coloured trousers and matching cape - all homemade - and Judge Bulger said to her counsel:

"I dislike women wearing trousers in court."

Counsel hastily explained that he had not known his client was going to do so. "How many times have you been in a court before?" the Judge asked the woman. "Never. This is the first time", she told him.

"It is not like coming to a funfair", opined the learned Judge. But all ended well; he granted the woman a divorce without making her change her clothes-and ignoring her suggestion in the witness box that she could take her trousers off!

At the time many newspapers criticised Judge Bulger for being stuffy. Unkind remarks were made by at least woman journalist about Judge's own somewhat odd court clothing; long gown trimmed with fur, wigs etc.

This attitude of the Judges is not only English. In Dundee Burgh Court, Scotland, the following month Baillie Nigel Law, told a nineteen year old girl who appeared before him with her hair in rollers covered with a nylon scarf, "Go and take those things out of your hair and then come back to this court". And when she duly returned minus the rollers he warned her, "Never come to this court again in the state you were in the morning."

Even in the United States of America where - according at least to British ideas - court room informality is carried to lounge bar standards, the Judges sometimes speak in righteous wrath against the sartorially over-casual. "You go dress up like a lady and I will hear your case", Judge Roger Alton Pfaff told a twenty one year would be Los Angeles divorcee a few years ago. "If you want a divorce today you run out and buy yourself a dress!"

And he would not hear the case-or grant her a decree until she had swopped her yellow bell bottom slack and stripped sweater for a more lady like peach coloured cotton shift in a nearby fashion store!

On the other hand, Coventry magistrates recently allowed a twenty-four year old labourer before them, on remand, without his trousers! They had been confiscated by the police. And the man had to stand in the dock with a blanket wrapped round his waist!

No one had been able to explain why the police had not been able to supply with another pair of trousers.

The old days of the Judges not knowing anything about current fashions have long since gone. In April 1970, a twenty year old blonde shorthand typist rolled down one of her stockings in a British court to show Mr. Justice Mocatta, her knee. She was claiming damages for injuries, when knocked over by a car. "I don't and I can't go barelegged in the summer anymore because of the scars on my legs", she told the Judge. His comment: "I would have thought the maxi might have come to your aid as far as camouflage was concerned." Unfortunately, the young plaintiff was not as 'avant garde' as his Lordship: "I am afraid I don't like it, Sir", she said.

Mini-skirts, when they first came out presented quite a problem to the courts. "Was it indecent to touch the exposed knee of a mini-skirted girl?" That was the difficult legal question that came up before the High Court Judge due to take the Wlitshire January 1967 assizes. A solicitor had argued at Salisbury Magistrate's Court that exposed knees were perfectly decent and had asked: "Can it be said that it is indecent to touch a knee?"

A good legal point. The Salisbury magistrate said that was for a higher Court to decide and committed the fifty-seven year old defendant to the assizes for trial. But the Judge was saved from making legal history; the man eventually pleaded guilty!

Justice may sometimes be blind. But 'Justices' (specially male judges!) in every part of the globe keep the eyes scrupulously 'wide open' when they have to deal with cases and persons which involve mini-skirts!