Some Thoughts on Simplification of Court Procedures

(By Joseph Chirayath, Advocate, Thrissur)

India can be proud of the fact that we have elected governments under a democratic constitution we gave to ourselves. The Constitution of India is the supreme law of the country, the fountain source of law in India.Judiciary is the branch of government that is endowed with the authority to interpret and apply the law, adjudicate legal disputes and otherwise administer justice. Judicial system in India is one of the oldest legal systems in the world today. It is part of the inheritance India received from the British after two centuries of their colonial rule. The Supreme Court and the various high courts have the power of judicial review and have to interfere to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens, decide appeals and involve in special jurisdictions. They have got original, writ and appellate jurisdictions. All other courts including the district courts come under the category of subordinate courts. They are spread in all districts in the length and breadth of the country. It is with the said courts the people are attached with the most as complainant or accused, plaintiff or defendant, surety or witness etc. The subordinate courts are the supreme judiciary for the majority of the people in India. The system prevailing has done well in the past. But today about seven decades after independence are our courts in tune with the times? We have seen advancement in other sectors like roads, railways, telecommunication, education, health etc; but not in the lower courts. The introduction of alternate dispute redressal system may be in the right direction for bringing speedy justice. But what about the existing court system? I think degenerated practices have to be discontinued and some procedures and practices have to be simplified for imparting speedy and fair justice. I am giving below some points which if implemented will improve the system to some extent.

1. When judgement is pronounced a party has to wait for months to get a certified copy. An appeal or execution petition cannot be filed till the copy is received. As and when judgement is pronounced if copies of it are served to the concerned parties/counsel free of cost at the time of pronouncement will go a long way to ameliorate the hardship suffered by parties. Drafting of decree should be dispensed with to avoid delay. The decree holder can be allowed to include the costs etc. in the execution petition which the court can scrutinize later.

2. Execution shall follow the same suit proceeding. If the decree is to be executed in the same court no separate notice to the judgement debtors is necessary if they were not ex parteon the original side.

3. Process fee should be abolished. So also court fee for interlocutory applications. Work load of advocate clerks and court staff can thereby be reduced. The party approaching the court is paying a hefty court fee now. So it is not fair to ask him to pay for these charges.

4. In recent years courts are not issuing cheques and refund orders to advocates. They are not even handing over cheques and refund orders issued in favour of parties to advocates. The reason stated is that some advocate somewhere has committed foul play. But that is a one in a million case and  the remedy is not this. Stringent action has to be taken by the court against the delinquent under the criminal law and his practice itself can be terminated by the Bar Council. It is a pitiable sight to see very old, sick and lame people dragged to MACT verandas.  The alternative is direct transfer to the bank account of the recipients. Until that system is introduced the best way is to reinstate the practice of issuing cheques in the names of parties and handing them to the concerned advocate/s.

5. When calling cases the name of the advocate should also be mentioned. Mistakes happen when calling case numbers alone or when the numbers are not properly heard and comprehended. Sometimes suits are dismissed or defendants called ex parteor in criminal cases accused are ordered to be arrested or acquitted. It is true some bench clerks do mention the name of the advocate. But many do not. There should be general guideline.

6. Most of the court halls are congested and parties are waiting in the verandas and court yards. In congested court halls public address system should be introduced when calling cases with loud speakers put outside so that the parties can hear when their cases are called. We need larger court halls, more staff and more photostat machines. After all courts generate a good amount of revenue to the government by way of court fee and fine. Justice is not free! Many leaders have been lamenting of the fact that the justice delivery system has no speed. The general public also shares with the view. But the Kerala High Court has pitied on the “frugal budgetary support to the judicial system” (2016 (1) KLT 838). The government must understand that administration of justice is a paramount responsibility of the government.

7. For some time some courts have been publishing list of cases to be taken up on that day. But it seems it is discontinued now. It is good that it is restored. Also, steps should be taken to publish it in the court website on the previous day.

8. Often it is seen that when advocates, parties, witnesses come to court ‘no sitting’ sticker is pasted on the door of the court. There is no necessity to say that it causes much inconvenience to all. In majority of cases the presiding officers can co-operate by intimating absence beforehand which they often do not.

9. The presiding officers should be punctual. Commencement of the work should be at the appointed time both in the morning and in the afternoon sessions. If there is a likely delay in the starting of the work in the afternoon that should be informed in the open court before the court recess at noon. Some judges are doing fine well. It is necessary that there is a general guideline.

10. There is a trend that many new cases are posted to distant dates. It is not fair to drag such cases to far off dates. The person who has filed the suit must have the satisfaction that his adversary knows as early as possible that a suit has been filed against him. After the steps are completed they can be posted in the special list on a convenient date.

11. Receipt system should be introduced in courts. When a document is filed or when a payment is made there should be issued a receipt. Sometimes quarrels arise in courts about filing of vakalat, written statement etc. Along with the respective documents a receipt filled up by the concerned advocate should be got sealed by the court office.

12. When an ex partestay is granted by an appellate court, the appellant shall immediately inform the fact to the respondent by registerd post and file the acknowledgement in court.

13. When court sale is conducted one fourth of the purchase money has to be deposited at the time of sale and the balance and the value of stamp paper have to be deposited within 15 days from the date of sale. It will be better that balance and the value of stamp paper are insisted within 15 days of confirmation of sale but before issuance of sale certificate.

14. When warrants of arrest or attachment of movables are ordered the amins are deputed in most cases on the penultimate date of return of process. Unscrupulous judgement debtors just abscond temporarily on that day escaping the clutches of law thereby defeating the decree holders. That should change. “Every warrant for the arrest of a judgement debtor shall direct the officer entrusted with its execution to bring him before the Court with all convenient speed,...” as mandated by the C.P.C.

Recently, there is a computerisation drive in the courts. That will have good results if implemented responsibly. Let us hope the government wakes up to the reality and in consultation with the High Court try to develop a reformed vibrant subordinate judiciary.

How the Resolution of any Conflict between the (English) Arbitration Act 1996

and the Companies Act 2006 can Assist in the Application of Section 8 of the (Indian) Arbitration

and Conciliation Act 1996 as Amended

(By Lawrence Jacobson, In-House Barrister, Zaiwalla & Co LLP, London)

In broad terms, S.8 of the (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, as amended, appears to have a similar mandatory effect to that of Section 9 (read together with S.4¹) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the “Act”)² Act. Accordingly, it is hoped that the methods and analysis briefly mentioned below, may be of some assistance to our Indian colleagues.

In a relatively recent decision of a County Court in England³ it was held, among other things, rejecting the Defendant’s application for a stay under S.9 of the Respondent’s claim for audited accounts under S.476 of the Companies Act 2006, that a shareholder who might have been entitled to audited accounts under an arbitration agreement was also entitled to audited accounts outside the parameters of the arbitration agreement under S.476.

The decision of that court, while not binding because it is not a court of record, nevertheless may be of persuasive authority in any future proceedings on an application for a stay concerning matters provided for in an arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the decision may influence the determination of any court as to whether S.9 of the Act has primacy over the statutory rights of any counterparty to an arbitration agreement.

So far as material for the purposes of examining the cogency and efficacy of the County Court decision, the facts of the case are that the Claimant and the Defendant compromised legal proceedings, in which the Claimant had claimed damages based on the alleged market value of his shares in the Defendant Company. Previously, the Claimant had also made various requests for audited accounts to the Defendant Company under S.476 of the Companies Act 2006. No reasons are prescribed by statute for which any qualifying shareholder might make a request to a company.

The Settlement Agreement provided, among other things, that the mechanism for the valuation of the Claimant’s shares would be referred to an arbitrator for determination. It was further provided that once the shares had been valued in accordance with the terms of the agreement the Claimant, forthwith would transfer his shares to a named third party on payment of the valuation price. The parties failed to agree or to refer the matter to arbitration and the Claimant issued proceedings to enforce his request for audited accounts. In response the Defendant issued an application under S.9 to stay those proceedings in order to give effect to the arbitration clause in the Settlement Agreement. The Defendant reasoned that it was highly likely that in determining the mechanism of valuation, the arbitrator might well direct the preparation of audited accounts. In the circumstances, the Defendant formed the view that the Claimant’s claim related in whole or in part to a referred matter in the arbitration.

The Judgment comprised, among other things, the following primary finding:

The arbitration clause in the Settlement Agreement was not sufficiently widely drafted so as to exclude the Claimant’s right to bring the proceedings under S.476.

To what extent is the Judgment consonant with authority?

The Court of Appeal inFulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v. Richards⁴found that there were no express provisions in either the Act or the Companies Act 2006 which excluded arbitration as a possible means of determining disputes involving unfair prejudice to members of a company (S.994 of the Companies Act 2006). Precisely the same can be said of matters under S.476. Furthermore, it held that the Act clearly gave primacy to rights under an arbitration agreement by making a stay of court proceedings relating to the same dispute mandatory. ⁵The Court of Appeal went on to state that:”…the combined effect of an arbitration agreement which covers the dispute and Section 9(4) of the [Act] is that the agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration will exclude the parties’ right to bring or continue legal proceedings covering the same subject matter unless one of the exceptions contained in Section 9(4) is established..”⁶ Fulham Football Club is therefore authority for the proposition that where the arbitration agreement covers the dispute, S.9 has primacy over Sections 994 and 476 of the Companies Act 2006.

Moreover, an arbitration agreement remains binding and effective even if the parties agree to refer to arbitration only certain disputes that might arise from their relationship⁷.

The legal proceedings, as a whole, may be “in respect of “a referred matter although those proceedings concern both that and other matters. In those circumstances, the whole proceedings may need to be stayed if it cannot be determined without consideration of the referred parts.⁸

While it was accepted in the Judgment, that, objectively, one of the primary functions of the audited accounts was that it could be used in connection with the mechanism for valuation, it failed to take into account that such a purpose could not be severed from those functions unrelated to the arbitration agreement. In failing to do so, the Court may well have erred in fact and in law in not giving primacy to S.9 of the Act over S.476 of the Companies Act 2006 as in Fulham Football Club. It is therefore unlikely that this Judgment will be followed.

As none of the exceptions in S.9(4) was relevant, the Court, as expressly required by Parliament, firstly ought to have granted an immediate stay of the legal proceedings while the issue was referred to an arbitral tribunal and then secondly to have resumed the proceedings when the issue had been resolved in accordance with the parties’ agreement ⁹.

Foot Note:

1.     Section 9 has mandatory effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.

2.     “9(1) A party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceedings are brought …in respect of a matter which under the agreement is to be referred to arbitration may ….apply to the court in which the proceedings have been brought to stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter….(4) On an application under this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed….”.

3.     Rene Herzfeld (Claimant) v. Morton Medical Ltd.(Defendant) (13 May 2016).

4.     [2012] Ch 333 CA @341 [para.28].

5.     Ibid @341 [para.31].

6.          6.        Ibid@345 [para.42].

7.     Lombard North Central Plc v GATX Group[2012] EWHC 1067 @6 [para.16].

8.     Ibid [paras.13(i) and 16].

9.         9.    Ibid[para.16].

A Case of Judicial Contradiction

(By Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate, Supreme Court of India and High Court of Kerala)

Article 142 of the Constitution contains a peculiar provision. It empowers the Supreme Court to pass orders “for doing complete justice in any cause”.  In a recent episode, the apex court has not only erased its own judgments issued under Article 142 but rather contradicted itself, that too in a matter of great public concern.  And quite strangely, this escaped the attention of the legal fraternity and the media at large.The diametrically opposite directives in the highway liquor ban case are astounding. The court has not only erred in its conclusion, but in its processual approach as well.

The Apex Court, on 15th December 2016 in State of Tamil Nadu v. Balu (2017 (1) KLT 132 (SC)) banned liquor vends along the stretches of national and state highways across the country.  The judgment found its rationale in the repeated policy decisions in this regard by the Centre since 2007, which were however honoured only in their breach by the States.  Relying on certain statistics relating to deaths caused due to drunken driving, the court issued the unconventional directives prescribing a 500 metres minimum distance from national and state highways, for the sale of liquor.  The court justified itself by saying that by way of the ban it “does not fashion its own policy but enforces the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, based on the considered view of expert bodies”. Thus, in Balu,the court inter aliaheld that the prohibition “shall extend to and include stretches of such highways which fall within the limits of a Municipal Corporation, city, town or local authority”.The court rejected the contentions to the contrary and held that there is “no rational basis to exclude stretches of national highways and state highways which fall within the limits of a Municipal or local authority from the ambit of the suggested prohibition”.  According to the judgment, “such exclusion would defeat the policy since the presence of liquor shops along such stretches of a national or state highway would allow drivers to replenish their stock of alcohol, resulting in a situation which the policy seeks to avoid in the first place”. Any exception to such liquor vends in the cities, according to the court, would be “wholly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution”.  The verdict was hailed by the prohibitionists and the women folk in general, who howe0ver, remain unorganized.

This year, the court again rejected the plea by the liquor vendors to exempt the parts of the highways in the Municipal Corporations, cities and towns, in categorical terms, as seen from the judgment of 31^st March 2017 in Balu II ( 2017 (2) KLT 179). The court while rejecting the request even said:  “It may be attractive to the vendor to sell liquor along the highway but that is not the touchstone of a norm which protects public health and seeks to curb fatalities on the highways of the nation”. The court added that “where a balance has to be drawn between protection of public health and safety and the need to protect road users from the menace of drunken driving on the one hand and the trade of liquor on the other hand, the interest of the latter must be subordinate to the former”.

One may have different perceptions about these judgments of the court.Studies by the World Health Organisation show that the surest way to curtail liquor consumption is to reduce its availability (Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol,2010).  So viewed, the judgments were people friendly, though not populist. Those were well intended,though slightly illiberal. Unless modified by a larger bench in future, or recalled in review jurisdiction, these judgments in their entirety, had to remain as the law of the land, as mandated by Article 141 of the Constitution.

 Strangely, in a subsequent case,Arrive Safe Society of Chandigarh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (2017 (3) KLT 923 (SC), (SLP No.10243 of 2017 Order dated 11 July  2017) which came from the Punjab and Haryana High Courts, the Supreme Court  has substantially overruled both the judgments in Balu, by saying that the order of 15^th December 2016 “does not prohibit licensed establishments within Municipal areas” from selling liquor and “this clarification shall govern other municipal areas (in the country) as well”. (See paragraph 7 of the judgment). Arrive Safe Society also was a party in the earlier lis. Thus the prayer that was pointedly considered and repeatedly repelled by the court earlier, stands allowed in a subsequent case where the question of exemption of Municipal or city areas in the whole country was not even a matter in issue. This indulgence shown in paragraph 7 of the Arrive Safe verdict is also antithetical to the preceding paragraph in the very same judgment that reiterated the earlier ratio.

In the case from Chandigarh, all that the Supreme Court could have done was to dismiss that appeal.  Since the appeal was against the verdict of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that validated a notification of the Chandigrarh Administration de-notifying certain stretches of state highways in the Union Territory, a general direction for the whole country was not even called for.  The court in the Chandigarh case also said that the earlier judgments “do not prevent the administration from reclassifying intersectoral roads within the city from State highways to major district roads”.

 The Apex Court has abruptly withdrawn the substantial part of the earlier decisions, that too without offering any valid reason and without hearing all the stake holders including the other petitioners in the earlier case. The process lacked deliberations and procedural discipline.It does not set a healthy judicial precedent. A Court contradicting itself gives unpleasant signals for our democracy.

Weird Words in Judgments

(By R.P. Remesan, Advocate, Kannur)

Legal English, legal language, legal writing and legal literacy are the words which come across while dealing with the art of legal drafting. Legal English refers to the type of English as used in legal writing. It differs from ordinary language in vocabulary, morphology, syntax, and semantics, as well as other linguistic features. A specialized use of certain terms and linguistic patterns governs the teaching of legal language. Legal writing includes the ability to identify accurately the varieties of statements that a court makes in the course of judicial opinion. The term legalese is a pejorative term associated with traditional style of legal writing.

Legal drafting mainly refers preparation of plaint, petitions etc. It includes writing of judgments also. The notable difference between the two is that the former ends in the four walls of the courts and the later comes out of it. So the judgements are often referred to the analysis of the art of legal writing. We have to analyse the verdicts threadbare as part of our profession, though it is not criticism for its own sake. Indeed, we have noticed the exquisiteness of judgements. The art of drafting and linguistic expertise of the Judges in writing the judgments should not be derided, scoffed, or disdained.

While reading the judgments of High Courts and Supreme Court we could see the art of drafting and linguistic expertise. Our Judges are very affluent with their vocabularies. They have used phrases, aphorisms, connotations, maxims etc., to justify and substantiate their way of thinking. The use of weird and wonderful words is not a strange phenomenon in our legal parlance. It is interesting to note such constructions in the judgments. I may quote a few:

The word‘adscititious’means ‘forming an addition or supplement; not integral’.This word was once used by our High Court. None of other High Courts had an opportunity to use it. This is the excerpt.

He refers to Ext.P4 in W.P.(C).2791/2014 wherein the Executive Engineer has recorded that by making any change in the approved alignment as ordered in Ext.P6, an additional protection wall will have to be constructed and that theadscititious cost of W.P.(C).No.30524 of 2016, W.P.(C).No.570 of 2014, W.P.(C).No.6404 of 2014 & W.P.(C).No.15406 of 2014 such wall would escalate the total cost to be much higher than what would be required for the originally approved alignment¹.

The meaning of ‘cacoethes’ is ‘an urge to do something inadvisable’.Interestingly
I could see that Madras High Court used the said word in the following context.

I am also proceeding on the assumption that Rule 8-C is valid. I am referring to this aspect because in a number of writ petitions, the validity of Rule C is raised and it has not been settled by this Court whether that rule is valid or not. Learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to proceed in this cacoethes assumption that Rule 8-C is valid and still -wants to assert his right to quarry in his own land² .

‘To tear something up by the roots’is the dictionary meaning of ‘deracinate’. The words like root out, displace, move, stub, uproot, extirpate are the synonyms of the said words. The word deracinate is seldom used in the judgments. High Court of Madras, Delhi, Rajasthan and Supreme Court used the same a few times. The Supreme Court used the word in similar manner:

No award was passed in 1986 (i.e., within two years), or in fact even till 2006, causing grave prejudice to, nay deracinating, the Constitutional rights of the Appellant landowner³. 

In the Kerala High Court decision the said word has been used thus:

It is also an attempt to deracinate a basic feature of our Constitution to have grievances redressed by Courts established in accordance with the Constitution and the laws⁴. 

William Shakespeare used the word in Henry V

Her vine, the merry cheerer of the heart,

Unpruned dies; her hedges even-pleach’d,

Like prisoners wildly overgrown with hair,

Put forth disorder’d twigs; her fallow leas

The darnel, hemlock and rank fumitory

Doth root upon, while that the coulter rusts

That should deracinate such savagery;

The word ‘douceur’ means ‘a financial inducement or bribe’.One may think that the said word abounds in judgments. But it is rarely found in texts. The Calcutta High Court used the same in (1907) ILR 34 Cal.150. In AIR 1955 Ori. 288 Orissa High Court used the word and the same was quoted by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in
AIR 1957 SC 729. The latest judgment is reported in 1997 Cri.L.J. 2014 Guj, Extract from the judgment is given below:

‘Hasmukhbai (Ex.22) the brother of the deceased has tried to find fault with the respondent recollecting his irksome conducts on different occasions in past as well as subsequent to the incident, but he has not stated all those facts about ill-treatment, harassments, hostility douceur; and doleful life of the deceased⁵.

The meaning of word ‘incrassate’ is ‘thickened in form or consistency’.The said word in the noun form was used only by M.P.High Court so far. The flourishing and unbridled language may attract the readers.

In this Writ Petition it is imperative to bestow our anxious consideration on the long debate and deliberation that took place consuming quite a speck of time relating to contentious issues which took us in the time machine as the subject related to the past, creating defiant walls and artificial palisade and sometimes brought us to the present in captivative fascination having an ineffaceable sense and purpose of modernity and progressiveness which, at times generated a feeling of puzzlement but definitely the incrassation and intenseness of proponements [?] cannot be surveyed with disposition of a disregardant⁶. [?]

The word ‘denouement’ means ‘a resolution of a mystery; the end result’. A few High Courts used the word. Some of them are given hereunder:

Pursuant to this declaration, the Chiefs were stripped of all their governmental functions and the final denouement took place in 1852 when the British took over the collection of revenue for the jagir lands. Supreme Court ⁷.

A decision regarding punishment under disciplinary action is a denouement to an enquiry process and indeed a culmination of the same. High Court of Punjab and Haryana⁸.

A pretty damsel was snared into a trap by her employer and two other men and killed her by filling her mouth with lethal poison. Her corpse was disposed of in a faraway jungle as denouement of the plot. Kerala High court⁹.

‘Ebullience’means ‘bubbling enthusiasm’. This word has been used in a few judgments of the High Courts and Supreme Court. If the details gathered by me are right the Supreme Court used the said word only in one judgment. See the mesmerizing style.

Seven dangerously ideological teenagers, politically impatient with the deepening injustice of the economic order and ebulliently infantile in their terrorist tactics, were sentenced to seven years in prison for the offence of having robbed the State Bank of a few thousand rupees with non-violent use of crude pistols, and country bombs which, ill the language of the Penal Code, amounts to dacoity-a grave property crime¹⁰.

‘Labyrinthine’means ‘any complex or confusing situation or passage’.The word has its origin in the Greek myth of Minotaur. Many of the High Courts and Supreme Court had occasion to use the weird word very often. I may again quote.

A vivid close-up of the sequence and consequence of the dramatic and traumatic events culminating in the reference to arbitration and the impugned award is essential as factual foundation for the decision of the issues. Even so, we must condense, since labyrinthine details are not needed in a third tier judgment. Broad lines with the brush bring out the effect, not minute etches which encumber the picture¹¹.

The specific grounds of invalidation relied on by the Writ Petitioner are many and the long Judgment of the High Court has lavished discussion on these aspects. Counsels have sought to repeat the rival contentions before us. But we do not think that it is necessary to embark upon the labyrinthine details or prolix analyses which have engaged the learned Judges of the High Court¹².

The following is a quote from Shakespeare’s Henry VI where the word is used:

Oh wert thou for my selfe: but Suffolke stay,

Thou mayest not wander in that Labyrinth,

There Minotaurs and vgly Treasons lurke,

Solicite Henry with her wonderous praise.

Bethinke thee on her Vertues that surmount,

Mad naturall Graces that extinguish Art,

Repeate their semblance often on the Seas,

That when thou com’st to kneele at Henries feete,

Thou mayest bereaue him of his wits with wonder.

The word ‘palimpsest’ means ‘a manuscript on which more than one text has been written with the earlier writing incompletely erased and still visible’.The meaning of the word may give an impression that it is a word frequently used in the judgements. If my appraisal is correct the said word was once used in the year 1928 by Madras High Court¹³.

The allegation was that a valid sale-deed for A and A-1 schedule properties had been incorporated with the mortgage of B schedule properties, the signature and attestations preserved and part of the rest treated as a palimpsest, i.e., the original writing obliterated and a fresh writing superimposed thereon.

‘Serendipity’means ‘The faculty of making fortunate discoveries by accident’.
I have noted only limited instances. In W.P.(C).No.13596 of 2017 our High Court used the word as follows.

Grant of bounty is likely to allow such institutions to develop an attitude of serendipity. Such a culture is inconceivable¹⁴.

The same sentences are found in the judgment of Supreme Court also.¹⁵ Chronologically the Kerala Judgment comes first.

The word ‘vulpine’ is derived from Latin word ‘vulpes’ which means fox. Its meaning is ‘crafty and cunning’. I could notice only one instance where the said word has been used.

It is a statute for the protection of the flat purchaser and to ensure that he is not, for want of financial muscle in a given case, or because his is the one raised voice in an otherwise deafening silence, the victim of a developer’s incessant vulpine machinations that materially damage the quality of his and his family’s life and the sanctity of his home. A man’s home is his castle¹⁶.

These are only a few instances among even more freakish and odd words and phrases, lurking in the deep sea. Further investigation is necessary to bring forth gems in order to satisfy our academic interest

Foot Note:

1.     SNDP Yogam v. State dated, 3.10.16.

2.     Hind Stone v. Union Of India (AIR 1981 Mad.82).

3.     M/S.Soorajmull Nagarmull v. State of Bihar(2015 (3) KLT Suppl.103 (SC) = AIR 2015 SC 3400.

4.     George Koshy v. State of Kerala(2002 (3) KLT 503).

5.     1997 Cri.L.J. 2014 Guj.

6.     Maharshi Mahesh Yogi v. State(AIR 2002 M.P. 196).

7.     Amarjit Singh v. State(AIR 1962 SC 1305).

8.     Kanwal Singh v. State(2010 Lab IC 2245).

9.     Sathyaseelan v. State(1991 CrlLJ 2941).

10.  Lingala Vijayakumar v. Public Prosecutor(AIR 1978 SC 1485).

11.  Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd v. Union(AIR 1980 SC 1896).

12.  State of M.P. v. Ram Ragubir Prasad(AIR 1979 SC 888).

13.  Cherukuri Venkataratnam v. Bolla Guravayya AIR 1930 Mad.84.

14.  W.P.(C).No.13596 of 2017 (Y) dt. 22/6/2017.

15.  Dental Council of India v. Dr.Hedgewar Smruti Raga Seva Mandal(2017 (2) KLT SN 45 (C.No.62) SC = 2017 (3) CTC 214.

16.  Eterna Co-operative Society Ltd v. Lakeview Developers AIR 2015(2) Bom.314.

17.  Note: Data used in this article are collected from the data base of The Laws, and Legal Eagle software.

SIR, Slave I Remain

(By V.M.Balakrishnan Nambisan, Advocate, Taliparamba)

We got Independence in 1947.

But, still Slave I Remain ! SIR.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 : nearing one-and-half century : and still slave I remain, ceaselessly.

Now, let us examine some of the provisions in the Evidence Act.

1. Section 37........................any statement of it made in a recital contained in any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom........................or notification by the Crown Representative...............purporting to be the London Gazette or the Government Gazette of any Dominion colony or possession of His Majesty is a relevant fact.

2.SECTION 57(2) :

All public Acts passed or hereafter to be passed by Parliament of the United Kingdom and all local and personal Acts directed by Parliament of the United Kingdom to be judicially noticed.

3.SECTION 57(4):

The course of proceedings of Parliament of the United Kingdom...........

4. SECTION 57(5):

The accession and the sign manual of the Sovereign for the time being of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

5. SECTION 57(6) :

All seals of which English Courts take judicial notice............and all Courts out of India established by the authority of the ………..Crown Representative .............. and all seals which any person is authorized to use by the ………… United Kingdom................

6.SECTION 78(1) :-

 Acts, Orders or Notification...............of the Crown Representative..................

(3) Proclamation, Orders or regulations issued by Her Majesty or by the Privy Council or by any Department of Her Majesty’s Government

by copies or extracts contained in the London Gazette or purporting to be the Queen’s Printer.

7.SECTION   81 ;-

The court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be the London Gazette………… of any colony, dependency or possession of the British Crown or to be a newspaper or journal or to be a copy of Private Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom printed by the Queen’s Printer.........

8. SECTION 82:--

When any document is produced before any Court, purporting to be a document which, by the law in force for the time being in England or Ireland.............

SIR, Slave, I Remain, uninterruptedly !

Oh, Slavery, thy name is...................INDIA ?