Whether  the  Permanent  Lok  Adalat  for  Public  Utility  

Services has  Adjudicatory  Jurisdiction ?

(By D. Pappachan, Chairman, Permanent Lok Adalat, Ernakulam)

In  L.I.C. of India v. Suresh Kumar (2011(2) KLT 970 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to decide a case on merit even where the parties fail to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. In another decision reported in Ambika Kumary v. State of Kerala (2011(2) KLT 673) a Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held that the Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services established under Section 22B of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (for short ‘the LSA Act’), has adjudicatory function, when it fails to arrive at a settlement by conciliation. In fact, when the Apex Court decision is reported in another journal (2011(2) KHC 590), in the editorial head note, it is opined that the decision in Ambika Kumary’s case is ‘per incuriam’ in view of the decision in L.I.C. of India case, supra. No doubt, those who had occasion to go through these two decisions may be confused in regard to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services constituted under Section 22B of the L.S.A. Act. This write-up is therefore a intended make clear the present legal position.

2. Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002 (37 of 2002) is incorporated as Chapter VIA in the LSA Act. Amended Section 22-C(8) of the LSA Act reads as follows:-

“Where the parties fail to reach at an agreement under sub-section (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, decide the dispute”.  (emphasis supplied)

That provision makes clear that the Permanent Lok Adalat can decide the lis on merit, when conciliation to arrive at a settled decision fails. This legal position is more clear from Sections 22D and 22-E(1) of the L.S.A. Act. Those sections read as follows:

22-D. Procedure of Permanent Lok Adalat - The Permanent Lok Adalat shall, while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under this Act, be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) “.               (emphasis supplied)

22-E.(1) Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final - (1) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act made either on merit or in terms of a settlement agreement shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them,                                    (emphasis supplied)

3. Again, as per Section 22-E(3) of the Amended Act, the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. If the award is by conciliation alone, reference to majority decision is redundant.

4.  On an earlier occasion the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered this question in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Sinha & Anr. ((2008) 7 SCC 454) and held that the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under Chapter VIA of the LSA Act has an adjudicatory role to play. In paragraph 28 of that judgement it is observed as follows:

“Here, however, the Permanent Lok Adalat does not simply adopt the role of an arbitrator whose award could be the subject matter of challenge but also the role of an adjudicator. Parliament has given the authority to the Permanent Lok Adalat to decide the matter. It has an adjudicating role to play”                  (emphasis supplied).

The statutory provisions and the decision of the Apex Court in (2008) 7 SCC 454, are therefore clear on the point that the Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services has the adjudicatory power, when its attempt to have a settlement by conciliation fails.

5. It is true that in LIC of India v. Suresh Kumar  (2011(2) KLT 970 (SC) the Apex Court observed that the Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to decide the case on merit. But in a latter decision handed down by the Apex Court on 4.7.11 in Civil Appeal No.4925/2011 (Inter Globe Aviation Ltd. v. N. Satchidanand  (2011 (3) KLT 295 (SC)) it is abundantly made clear that the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under Section 22B of the LSA Act has adjudicatory function. In that judgment the earlier decision in Suresh Kumar’s case (2011(2) KLT 970 (SC)) was referred to and held that it does not relate to Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under Section 22B of the LSA Act. The observations of the Apex Court in Para 19 of the latter decision are as follows:

“We may also at this juncture refer to the confusion caused on account of the term Permanent Lok Adalat being used to describe two different types of Lok Adalats. The LSA Act refers to two types of Lok Adalats. The first is a Lok Adalat constituted under Section 19 of the Act which has no adjudicatory functions or powers and which discharges purely conciliatory functions. The second is a Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22B(1) of LSA Act to exercise jurisdiction in respect of public utility services, having both conciliatory and adjudicatory functions. The word Permanent Lok Adalat should refer only to Permanent Lok Adalats established under Section 22B(1) of the LSA Act and not to the Lok Adalats constituted under Section 19. However in many States, when Lok Adalats are constituted under Section 19 of LSA Act for regular or continuous sittings (as contrasted from periodical sittings), they are also called as Permanent Lok Adalats even though they do not have adjudicatory functions. In LIC of India v. Suresh Kumar (2011 (2) KLT 970 (SC)), this Court observed: “It is needless to state that Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction or authority vested in it to decide any lis, as such, between the parties even where the attempt to arrive at an agreed settlement between the parties has failed”. The said decision refers to such a ‘Permanent Lok Adalat’ organized under Section 19 of the Act and should not be confused with Permanent Lok Adalats constituted under Section 22B(1) of the Act. To avoid confusion, the State Legal Services Authorities and the High Courts may ensure that Lok Adalats other than the Permanent Lok Adalats established under Section 22B(1) of the Act in regard to public utility services are not described as Permanent Lok Adalats. One way of avoiding the confusion is to refer to the Lok Adalats constituted under Section 19 of the Act on a regular or permanent basis as ‘Continuous Lok Adalats’.

In view of the above decision of the Apex Court in Inter Globe Aviation Ltd. case (2011 (3) KLT 295 (SC)) the adjudicatory function of the Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services constituted under Section 22B of Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 is no more a controversial issue.

Escheat - Meaning - Implications - And the Law on it

(By N. Subramaniam, Advocate, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam)

Escheat - Term used in law for the reversion of land to its ultimate owner because there is no other heir. It is a relic of feudal times when land was granted by the King or other Lord on the condition that in certain contingencies, it escheated or came back to him. Land also escheated when the holder was attaint, the theory being that his blood being thus corrupt his heirs could not inherit. This was abolished in England in 1870. The majority of escheats fell to the Crown. Escheat through failure of heirs is still recognized by both English and Scottish law but cases of it are not frequent. It applies to India also.

2. Escheat is a species of reversion, and it is a right, which now vests in the Crown or in the State as ultimus haeres upon the failure, natural or legal, of the last tenant. Originally it was an incidence of Feudal Law whereby a fief reverted to the Lord, when the tenant died ceased without heir, in which event the land lapsed to the Lord of the manor, or to the Crown. This feudal rule has been accepted in India with this difference that the land left by an heirless tenant lapsed as bona vacantia to the State. 

(AIR 1961 Punj. 201 at 202)  (D.B.) Dhuman Singh Prem Singh v. State of Patiala) 

3. Statutory recognition has been made to the principle of escheat under Article 296 of the Constitution of India and also under Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 34 of Indian Succession Act and Sections 83 and 111 of Muhammedan Law by Mulla.

4. This principle of escheat has been recognized and judicially accepted long back in 1860 and has been followed later. This is applicable under Mithakshara Law and Dayabaga Law.

See (1860) 8 M.I.A.500 P.C. Collector of Muslipatnam v. Cavaly Venkata 

((1875) 31.I.A. 92 (P.C.) Somet v. Mirza). 

((1868) 12 M.I.A. 448 (P.C.))  Girdharilal v. Bengal Government). 

(AIR 1927 Bom.456. Narayan v. Laxman).

(AIR 1934 Cal.399 (Satishchandra v. Haridas). 

(AIR 1968 SC 954 (Ramchandra v. Man Singh) 

There is a rider attached to vesting by escheat. That rider is this.

Whoever took the property is subject to, 

(i) the claims for maintenance, trusts, charges, mortgages created by widow for legal necessity in respect of such property and 

(ii) the debts of the deceased, if any.

1860 (8) M.I.A. 500 at 527 (Collector of Muslipatnam v. Cavaly Venkita). 

1867 (11) M.I.A. 619 P.C. (Cavaly Venkita v. Collector of Muslipatnam). 

(1847(4) M.I.A. 246 at 258 P.C. (Golab Koonwar v. Collector of Banaras).

5. It has been held that, if a limited heir alienated property without legal necessity then, if there are no reversioners, the alienations could be set aside at the instance of Crown (now State) taking the property by escheat. In other words Crown (now State) has the same power that a reversionary heir would have of protecting its interests by impeaching unauthorized alienations by the limited heir. (1861) 8 M.I.A. 529 P.C. at 553  (Collector of Muslipatnam v. Cavaly Venkita) AIR 1926 Lah.673 (Kundan v. Secretary of State).

6. Where the Government claims by escheat the onus lies on the Government to show that the last proprietor died without heirs.

(1868) 10 Weekly Reporter 31 P.C. (Girdharilal v. Bengal Government) 

(AIR 1941 Ori.337 (United Provinces through Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v.   Kanhayyalal) 

(AIR 1960 Mad. 436 (State of Madras v. Ramanatha Rao) 

(AIR 1983 SC 684 at 741 (State of Bihar v. Radhakrishna Singh) 

(AIR 1950 Cal. 473 at 474).

7. Reference can also be made to Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which also lays down the principle of escheat by including it in this Statute. Section 29 lays down that in case of failure of all the heirs recognized under Hindu Succession Act, on the death of owner intestate, his or her property devolves on the Government and the Government takes the property subject to all legal obligations and liabilities to which an heir would have been subject, if the property had devolved upon heir by succession. See AIR 1970 Bom.72 (Kothavale v. State of Maharashtra). The word “failure” used in the Section is indicative of fact that there must be total absence of heirs of the intestate. (AIR 1991 SC 2301 (State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh)).

8.  Following AIR 1983 SC 684 and AIR 1991 SC 2301, the Himachal Pradesh High Court has also held that the provision in Section 29 will not operate in favour of the State, if there was any legal heir of the estate ( 2001(4) CCC 421  Bhagat Ram through LRs v. Kuldip Raj.).

9. The Rajasthan High Court, in the decision reported in AIR 2006 Raj.101 Para 3 (Ramacharan v. State of Rajasthan) has held that the person who challenges the order of escheat will have to file a civil suit of competent jurisdiction for determination, as to whether such person is the legal heir of the deceased and he has to discharge the burden of proving his right, interest and title over the property escheated.

10.  An interesting question as to what would happen, if the owner leaves the Village and goes away and his property is taken possession by some other person or by the State. The PEPSU High Court in the decision (para 4) reported in (AIR 1954 PEPSU 34 Cal.35) D.B.). (Netram Surjia Ganesh v. The State through the Prime Minister of PEPSU) has held that the principle of escheat cannot be invoked.  But the State or the person who takes possession may get title to the property by adverse possession.

11. State cannot get by escheat the property acquired by a person by committing crime. (AIR 1962 All. 153 at 155-156 (para.3) State v. Jagannath).

12.  Dissolution of company holding interests as a permanent lessee. Interest vests in Government. AIR 1980 SC 575 at 578. AIR 1959 Cal.493 (498),  (Indian Timber and Plywood Corporation Ltd. v. State).

13. Section 34 of Indian Succession Act is the relevant section in relation to escheat which is similar to Section  29 of Hindu Succession Act. Section 16 of Cochin Christian Succession Act (VI of 1097 ME) and Section 32 of The Travancore Christian Succession Act relates to the rule of escheat. (N.B. Cochin and Travancore Christian Succession Acts stands repealed by Part B States Law Amendment Act 1950 giving place to Indian Succession Act). 

14.    Section 83 Mulla’s Muhammedan Law lays down the law regarding Hanafis (Sunnies) and Section 111 deals with escheat in relation to Shias’. (AIR 1926 Patna  941) (Mussammat Khursaidi v. Secretary of State) lays down that in failure of all natural heirs the estate of a deceased Shia Muhammedan escheats to the Government.

Escheat under different statutes.

1.   Article 296 of Constitution of India.

2.    Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act.

3.    Section 34 of Indian Succession Act.

4.    Sections 83 & 111 (Mulla’s Muhammedan Law).

A Short Note on Section 228 of Indian Penal Code

(By N. Subramaniam, Advocate, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam)

1.    Section 228 is the only Section of Indian Penal Code which deals with contempt committed against a judicial officer i.e., a court.

2.    Section 228 reads as follows : 

Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding. - Whoever intentionally offers any insult or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

3.   The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 228 are:

(i) Intention.

(ii) Insult or interruption to a public servant.

(iii) The public servant insulted or interrupted must have been sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding.

(AIR 1959 SC 102  State of M.P. v. Reva Shanker).

(iv) “Public Servant” is defined in Section 21 of I.P.C.

(v) The question some times arises as to when an accused insults an Advocate, whether  offence under Section 228 is committed? Bombay High Court has answered the question in the negative. If the insult is not against the judge, but to the advocate it is not an offence under Section 228 I.P.C.   Although the advocate is part of the machinery of the administration of justice, he is not a public servant, within the meaning of expression “Public Servant” in Section 228 I.P.C.

(AIR 1966 Bom.19 (para 17) Damayanti G. Chandramani v. S. Vaney).

(vi) An advocate engaged by the customs authority or for that matter by any government official does not become a public servant just because of his engagement.

1989 Mah. L.J. 588 at 600 = 1989 Mah. LR 1437.

(vii) If a remark is not made to a court, however rude or vulgar it may be, it cannot be made subject of an offence under Section 228, even if the court happens to over hear it.

(AIR 1943 Lah. 14 at 18  Hakumatrai v. Emperor).

(viii) Insult to an advocate is not contempt.

(AIR 1945 P.C. 134  Parasuram v. Emperor).

(ix) This is what AIR 1968 Cal.249 (Sahasrangshu Kanti Acharya v. The State) at para 6 has to say on the question of applicability of Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code:

The gravamen of the offence is that the offender must do something physical, namely insult or interrupt a public servant in any stage of a judicial proceeding, but that is not enough. There is a mental part of the offender which should also be taken into consideration and that mental part is that the offender had the intention to cause the said insult or interruption. Both these elements must co-exist in order to constitute an offence under Section 228 Indian Penal Code. The fact that the court feels insulted is no reason for inferring contempt, when no insult was so intended. To put it in a short compass, the elements of an offence under Section 228 Indian Penal Code are both objective and subjective - objective in the sense that the factum of insult or interruption must be there and subjective because the same has to be accompanied by an intention on the part of the offender to commit the same  and the entire thing must take place against the back-drop of a judicial proceeding.

4. In order to bring a case within Section 228 I.P.C. and Section 480 Criminal Procedure  Code 1898, (new Section 345 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 it must be shown that an accused intentionally offered an insult to court.

(AIR 1933 Bom. 478 (D.B.)  Chagan Lal Iswar Das Sha v. Emperor).

5. The contempt of Court is not a matter of mere form or technicality but of substance, and the jurisdiction to punish for contempt has to be very carefully and cautiously exercised. When the offence is technical or of a slight or trivial nature the court may condone it. Even if the observation on subject-matter of a proceeding is likely to interfere with course of justice and may technically amount to contempt, Court may not interfere, if it is not satisfied that such comments were calculated to prejudice fair trial.

(AIR 1930 All. 483 at 485 = 32 Cr. LJ 78 S.A. Dange v. S.T. Sheppard).

6. In the case of proceedings for contempt of court under Section 228, record must show the nature and the stage of judicial proceeding in which, court interrupted or insulted was sitting and the nature of interruption or insult and omission to set forth particulars as required by Section 481, clause (2) Cr. P.C., (now Section 345 of  Crl. P.C. 1973). It is not merely an irregularity which could be corrected by the application of Section 537 (Section 422  Crl. P.C. 1973) but is fatal to the proceedings.

(AIR 1931 Nag. 193) =  32 Crl. LJ 1221).

7. The Magistrate must record precisely the words used by the accused so as to show the nature of the interruption or insult attributed to him.

(AIR 1921 Lah. 102  at 103 = 23 Crl. LJ 9 ).

8. Although the wording of body of charge may cover an offence under Section 228, still accused might be prejudiced when no stress is laid on an essential element in a charge under Section 228, namely, that the Court must be sitting in a judicial proceeding at the time when the insult is offered.

(AIR 1936 Nag. 275  at 276 = 38 Crl. LJ 380 = ILR (1937) Nag. 145).

9. If the offender tenders apology at the earliest moment, voluntarily, unconditional, indicative of remorse, contrition, sincerety, it can be accepted by court and proceedings can be dropped and no conviction can be had.

(1980 Crl. L.J. NOC 1 State v. Pateswari Prasad)

New Law to Curb 'Honour Killing' -- Request Pragmatic ?

(By P. Rajan, Advocate, Thalassery)

The lucid expression honour killing is coined and used by the media, of late as meticulously planned, dastardly executed murder in the name of family pride takes place, when marriage is solomnised against the wish of a family defying desired propensity, often after elopement which invite the hatred of the kindred who become prepetrators for annihilation of the young duo who tied the knot. This usage gained acceptance and approval of judicial forums too and the clannish feud and the mortified feeling of the revengeful cohort, with little respect for the law of the land, up in arms, to wreck vengance in the name of self felt family honour, indulge in crime of the highest degree which are on increase barring region and religion. Check on spurt of such crimes rather alleviation, among the regressive class is a matter of serious concern before the Law Commission, due to the fervent plea from different groups for a special enactment to bring to book and try such participants of diabolic crimes.

Any murder reason what may, is punishable u/S.302 I.P.C. with the exceptions and defences detailed in Chapter XVI of the I.P.C. and of the foregoing provisions and the maximum punishment is death sentence besides fine. Capital punishment is the extreme penalty which any murderer will get, if the case is rarest of rare; if not, life imprisonment and fine. By introducing new law to punish offenders for a specified or catagorised offence, graver sentence than what is stated above cannot be incorporated. To uphold the majesty of law, indefensibile and invaluable human right, if the crime is horrendeous and proved, death sentence though rarely awarded, is the gravest, under the Indian legal system, enshrined in the penal statute. Abolition of death sentence is even a topic of unending deliberation, as opinions for and against do the rounds at regular intervals. It is not the dearth of special law to curb such offence lead to escalation of such incidents but lack of awareness even about ensuing consequences, culminating in to gruesome murder preplanned for the sake of so called family pride. Supreme Court ruled, that honour killings too, be considered as rarest of rare cases deserving capital punishment; further observed that all persons who are planning to perpetrate, such crimes should know that gallows await them (AIR 2011 SC 1863).

Social unrest affecting social harmony and peace of the society, becomes reason to resort to serious crimes. Special law or even amendments to the available enactments may not be the right measure to achieve desired goal. Examples are decipherable basing on experiences. S.498 A  I.P.C. and the recently introduced Prevention of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 speak of this. Any aberration or trivial reason in marital life presently for many, pave way for resorting to prosecutions under these enactments, making the matrimonial or family relationship further reproached. Apex Court even observed that serious look on certain provisions of such enactments is warranted (AIR 2010 SC 3363) as unmerited prosecutions out number genuine ones. Section 302 I.P.C. being the provision taking in its fold any culpable homicide amounting to murder, if more rigour is needed to it, for taking in honour killing also, proper amendment giving more teeth to the law exicisting is desirable. The evil of targetted killing is also being murder, special law is no answer unless social awarness is instilled among the ignorant, and arrogent who take law into their hands, instead of abiding it. Proverbial light at the end of the tunnel being the idea behind any law when crimes increase, as social reform measures among the law-breakers to eradicate criminal acts minor or major, becoming futile. Existing law is sufficient provided its application must be by experienced and trained hands or else even improper policing will make lockup room into cadaver cell. Any special statute or amendment to existing provisions of law will lead to challange terming it as unconstitutional before the High Court or Supreme Court as such excercise is customary rather result oriented. This hurdle also makes delayed application of even amended law. Gruesome crimes deserve investigation by agencies with improccable integrity manned by persons of proven ability.

Any one can perceive the tantrums relating to much discussed comprehensive Women’s protection law and Lokpal bill before the promulgation; and aftermath is anybody’s guess on declaration, during early days at least. Let the time tested, lacunae free provisions of penal statute bring to book even the culprits of honour killing as no honour is involved in or achieved by any killing.

Too many laws and too little justice –

like too much governments and too little administration.

        -- N.A. Palkhivala

Review of the Book Titled “Living with Laws”

By V.R. Venkatakrishnan, Lone Tree Books, 2010

A Legacy in Black and White

(By Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

To read Mr.V.R.Venkatakrishnan’s auto-biography is a different experience altogether. As a senior lawyer with vast experience, he demonstrated good advocacy and a high sense of ethics.  I was often fascinated by  VRV’s command over language and the manner in which he asserted himself in court rooms.  A cardinal principle of every intellectual discourse would be to be mild in manners and strong in arguments.  The rule applies to advocacy in Anglo Saxan Institutions.  And this was precisely VRV’s brand of advocacy.

VRV lost his father when he was 15 and lost his mother when he was 18.  Thus right in the childhood, he was “thrown into the rough terrains of life” (Living with Laws - page 7.)  .  But experience in life makes a good lawyer, which he illustrated amply.  He had the stamina to “cross the oceans”.  Though VRV refers to Thomas Carlyle, to say that industry is another form of genius, VRV in himself, had a perfect blend of Industry and genius.

VRV’s wide reading is abundantly reflected in the work.  His affinities gazed over Sanskrit and English literature. Law, in its functional forms, is closely interlinked with literature.  Reading Richard A Posner, one understands the synergy between Law and Literature. VRV’s work is a short, but meaningful illustration of in-severability of the faculties.

The author narrates incidents inside and outside the court room, which a lawyer of the present day can hardly imagine.  His experiences with senior lawyers, fellow lawyers, and junior lawyers are vivid and varied.

The honesty of a senior lawyer who prefers to quote Winston Churchill saying that like war, litigation is mainly a catalogue of blunders (Living with Laws - page 5.) is  unique.  The book contains a few prominent quotes.  Evelle Younger said that “an incompetent lawyer can delay a trial for months or year, and a competent lawyer can delay it even longer”(Living with Laws - page 21.).   Gandhiji is quoted as saying justice that love gives is surrender and justice that law gives is punishment.  The author also quotes Edison Hainess who observed -"Law is not justice and a trial is not a scientific enquiry into truth.  A trial is just a resolution of a dispute”.  He also introduces cartoonist Edgar Argoes, who observed that, “though justice is blind, she has sophisticated listening devices”.  He again quotes Gandhiji in the last part of the book – “There is a higher court than courts of justice and that in the court of conscience.  It supersedes all other courts”.  Abraham Lincoln is favourable to VRV, for the President advocated for “discouraging litigation”  (Living with Laws - See page 58.).

Even the quotes selected by VRV reflect the tenor of his life, vision and philosophy.  He knew the possibilities as well as the limits of law.  When Ivan Illich wrote the book titled “Limits to medicine”, several myths surrounding the medical profession and modern medicine were either shattered or exposed.  The principle should apply to legal profession as well.  But there is a balancing element in VRV’s book.  The senior lawyer gives several messages to the new generation and the generations to come.  He gives indications of good advocacy.  “Lawyers as a class are supposed to be bold and the sense of courage has an admirable part to play in the profession” (Living with Laws- Page 61.)  – He says.  He also rightly asks “But then where are the courageous ones in gowns?”  H.M.Seervai was usually to say that courage is the greatest virtue in advocacy, for without courage, there is no truth.

But courageous advocacy is not created artificially.  It is not even created, for that matter.  It is evolved. It needs good learning, hard work, command over language, good personality and a high sense of ethics.  The distinction which VRV draws between intellectual lawyers and intelligent lawyers is impressively authentic.  A reformist need not be necessarily a good professional.  The author even incidentally says that reformation itself is a fallacy, which of course is a debatable proposition. 

In the profession, profound preparation and hard work do reward. The passages under the title “the fruits of hard work” are exciting.  To quote VRV-

“You know, a man competent in marketing need not become a competent lawyer.  Only practice and study makes you successful.  I find some of the habits of some youngsters strange.  They have no spiritual orientation. They do not discover their own power of mind, of their own caliber. They flit from one surface to another”.

Thousands of youngsters in the profession have gained momentum from the well known guide for beginners “Learning the law” written by Glanville Williams.  In my view, good works by eminent lawyers with an auto-biographical content would act as clear guide to the green horns.  Tips of such guidance are quite spontaneous and natural.  See for example the twenty eight points, the “dos and don’ts” which Fali S.Nariman enlisted in his celebrated auto-biography (Before Memory Fades - Hay House India, 2010.)  . Even the work by Shanti Bhushan (Courting Destiny – A Memoir – Penguin/Viking, 2008.) , which narrates a series of political, historical, governmental and legal issues which are ticklish, contains implied messages, which however, are not easy to identify. But unlike these works with national and international dimensions, VRV’s work has a better utilitarian content for a young lawyer in Kerala.  The reason is obvious.  A bar has a legacy and the profession’s evolution is bar -centric.   Therefore, the voices of love, advice and admonitions in  VRV’s work are not in any way foreign. He belongs to our own Tharwad. See for example, the passages under the titles ‘Your personality and you’, ‘The English language’ ‘How language skills help you’, ‘The elements of success’   ‘Lawyer and ethics’ etc.

VRV represents an era where arguments were not merely conversational. Arguments do have the better elements of a well prepared academic presentation.  Late Sri.T.A.Ramadas, another lawyer of eminence used to point out the changes from rhetorical arguments to the present day’s conversational form.  One should add that there is no advocacy without arguments and the demise of the ‘argumentative Indian’ in the Indian Court has caused erosion of judicial standards.  The author, as a lawyer was effectively argumentative.  Naturally, VRV’s inclination was not much in favour of written arguments, which are no substitute for organic persuasions.  He also says so in categorical terms in the book (Living with Laws – See the last para under the title “Your personality and You”.).

The author also deals with the abstract, however complex categories of truth and righteousness in the realm of law and justice.  To be honest, I started to read the 3rd chapter with some element of skepticism.  I was not prepared to expect much on ethical abstractions from a practical lawyer like VRV. To my pleasant astonishment, with an illuminating survey across the thoughts of Manu, John Rawls, Mansfield,  Amartya Sen, and others he has explored the jurisprudential aspects of the matter.  He examines the philosophical aspects by blending them with the questions of practical justice.  The conclusion of the chapter by quoting justice Kapadia on ‘Rule of Justice’ as different from rule of law would help the reader to retain a sense of optimism even during the relatively darker days of Indian judiciary.  And so is VRV’s work. 

Passages on justice, jurisprudence, Judges, judgment and judicial activism are illuminating.   A Judge who acts like a Zamindar is no good Judge.  A Judge who pronounces a single lined order and subsequently writes a three paged order with drastically different contents, shows dishonesty.  VRV’s work recalls several Hon’ble Judges of the great institution who embodied high level of integrity and judicial maturity.  He has even said that he has no experience of “any situation with any bench that could even be remotely termed as corrupt”. Even the disagreements were on higher levels of egalitarianism. Dissent is the soul of democracy.

The book also contains informative narrations on topics like Bhopal litigation, backlog of cases, judicial appointment, basic structure doctrine, media, contempt laws, judicial accountability, uniform civil code, mercy killing etc.  Chapter 5 is titled “Judges, Judgment and tools of justice”.  This chapter is a unique piece of information to the lawmen and laymen.

I am nobody to evaluate a great personality like VRV.  But I am entitled to honour him for which the book under review is sufficient motivation.

Post  script:

VRV’s work convinces one of the significance of auto-biographical work by eminent lawyers.  This in turn persuades me to make a request for review of the decision in the “Last Page” written in this journal(The last page,2011 (2) KLT Journal Page 1.)  by Sri.T.P.Kelu Nambiar, doyen of  Kerala Bar. Letters are like rivers which are bound to flow on. To quote Omar Khayyam —-

“The moving finger writes; and having writ,

Moves on: nor all thy piety nor wit,

Shall lure it back to cancel half a line

Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it”

(The Rubaiyat. Translated by Edward  FitzGerald)