The Danger From Within

(By K. Ramakumar, Advocate)

Whether one likes it or not, Smt. Indira Gandhi, was one of the most powerful Prime Ministers of the World and was viewed with veneration as well as awe in the largest democracy of the world. An American Ambassador once described her as "the only man in the Indian Cabinet clad in Saree." She was however made answerable to the people of India. The people punished her severely in the elections that followed the Emergency and threw her out of office, even inflicting upon her a personal defeat as well. The so-called illiterate dumb-driven cattle like voters of the northern India rose as one man and registered their strong disapproval of the high handed Emergency by the use of an anti-clock wise swastik rubber stamp given to them at the Polling Stations. That was the moment of triumph, for the little man, who does not matter at all, in a democracy otherwise.

In sharp contrast see how the people of India, watched helplessly to the shaking of another predominant pillar of democracy capitulating and caving in during the emergency. Chief Justice Chandrachud, seven years head of the judicial family openly confessed that he wrote ADM Jabalpur under fear. In other words, he conceded that he breached the solemn oath that he had taken at the time of his appointment that he will administer Justice "without fear or favour". The common people of India, could do nothing but heave sighs of sorrow. So was the situation a la Ramaswamy and Ajith Sen Gupta of the Calcutta High Court, who was arrested after demitting his office for alleged links with smugglers and dons of the underworld. Why? Only because an enactment called the Contempt of Court Act exists immunising as many as six hundred and fourty one citizens among the Hundred crore people of the country. Not even the Rashtrapathi or Pradhan Manthri enjoy such absolute immunity from criticism. Ironically, the Act protects the two Gills of the Public High Court, while it was used even against the Gandhi (yes, the Mahatma), the Maulana and a host of other popular leaders including E.M.S. Sounds stupid? Is n't it? That too in a country where the lowliest citizen, a washerman could criticise the Raja and the Raja pathni and the Raja responding with an 'Agnipariksha'. A country of Upanishads proclaiming that "Law is the King of Kings far more powerful than they". The constant use of the contempt power even for trivialities and the umbrella of its protection claimed even to shield demonstrable deviance from probity has naturally raised a demand at high levels including from the Attorney General of India and the Law Minister that the same needs mending or even ending.

In a democracy deriving power from its supreme document, the Constitution and from "we, the people of India", (what a magnificent concept) nobody wielding power over another, can be heard to say "I shall not be criticised, whatever may be my fault."

The recent events in the judiciary, undoubtedly have shaken the confidence of the people in that fine institution moulded and left as the legacy of the Britishers. Chief Justice Chandrachud opens one of his judgments by saying "the biggest threat to judiciary comes from within". It is the Ahamedys, the Anands, the Begs, the Gills, the Rays and Ramaswamys, that have damaged the judiciary more than thousands of Gokhales. No citizen wants a system in which 'cases of probation ends up as cases of pension'. Judicial go-slow, is as much permissible as Industrial go-slow. Incapacity or indifference or both in delivering judgments in time really, amounts to an absolute threat to Justicing system, erodes its image and therefore is contempt. Justice should continue to be according to law, and not "Law according to Justices". Are the members of the profession to which Gandhi, Lincoln and Lenin, belonged listening?

Is  Section 66A of I.T. Act A Badly Written Law

(By Faizal Ahammed & Juby K. Mariam, Advocates, Mavelikkara)

 I.T. Act of 2000 is one which is enacted for the purpose of making a field inside the purview of law, the field which was till that time outside the scope of law, it was to provide legal recognition for transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and other means of electronic communication, this act has also made amendments to the Indian Penal Code 1860, Indian Evidence Act 1872, The Bankers Books of Evidence Act 1891, and the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 in order to further the same objective. It was the period in which most of the day to day activities were slowly becoming part of cyber world. The same transformation from leaf, animal hide  or stone to paper, happened in 20th century, ie from paper to magnetic disc. The Act essentially deals with,

a.Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents

b.Legal Recognition of Digital Signatures

c.Offenses and Contraventions

d. Justice Dispensation Systems for cyber crimes.

Being the first legislation on technology, some sections of the Act  was considered as draconian and some too diluted and lenient.  Even though this piece of legislation has proved to be a big leap in the field of cyber crimes, there still was a need for further changes which can improve its efficacy.This act has defined various offences and also has laid down certain penalties as well. This act in a way has characterised the cyber crimes, which were earlier unknown to general public in India. Before the amendment in 2008  there were only a smaller area which deals with offences.ie; tampering with computer documents, hacking etc. Of course it  was only a small percentage considering the large area which was yet to come into the area of cyber world. It happened so, that more and more areas became computerised. Age old crimes gradually mutate into the one which is done on computer. Few  in the modern age will be using paper or poster for doing defamation, though much easier and efficient way is opened through computer based social networks. A rapid increase in the use of computer and internet has given rise to new forms of crimes like publishing sexually explicit materials in electronic form, video voyeurism and breach of confidentiality and leakage of data by intermediary, e-commerce frauds like personation (commonly known as Phishing), identity theft and offensive messages through communication services. So, penal provisions are required to be included in the Information Technology Act, the Indian Penal code, the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent such crimes.” Thus the need for an amendment  a detailed one was felt for the I.T. Act. Major industry bodies were consulted and advisory groups were formed to go into the perceived lacunae in the I.T. Act and comparing it with similar legislations in other nations and to suggest recommendations. Such recommendations were analysed and subsequently taken up as a comprehensive Amendment Act and after considerable administrative procedures, the consolidated amendment called the Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008 was placed in the Parliament. The 2008 Amendment Act was passed in an eventful Parliamentary session on 23 December 2008 (with no discussion in the House). The amendment was widely critisized on the ground of lack of legal and procedural safeguards to prevent violation of civil liberties of Indians. The Act has provided Indian Government with the power of surveillance, monitoring and blocking data traffic. The new powers under the amendment act tend to give Indian Government a texture and colour of being a surveillance state. The new I.T.Act provides good requirements from a national security perspective, information access misuse by unscrupulous parties, may prove to be dangerous for enterprises (as well as individuals). 

An important change that has been brought forth by the Amendment Act is that the new amendment has replaced Section 43 with Section 66. Under Section 66 the Word “hacking” has been removed, but instead hacking still remains an offence by the name of “data theft” in this section. This section has further been widened in the form of Sections 66A to 66F. Among these it is Section 66A which was widely criticised due to its draconian nature. The section reads as follows:

66 A:   Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.

Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,

a)  any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or

b)  any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently makes by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,

c)   any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages  shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two three years and with fine.

 Explanation:  For the purposes of this section, terms “Electronic mail” and “Electronic Mail Message” means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, image, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.

In short Section 66A deals with the sending of offensive messages through communication service, and causing annoyance to any electronic communication, and also includes the offence of misleading the recipient of the origin of such messages.

For getting clarity it will be better to examine what is the impact on civil liberty of the citizens through the amendment. Regarding Section 66A which punishes persons for sending offensive messages is overly broad. Section 66A has been challenged on the ground that it casts the net very wide - “all information” that is disseminated over the internet is included within its reach. The fact that some information is “grossly offensive” or that it causes “annoyance” or “inconvenience” (which is subjective) while being known to be false cannot be a reason for curbing the freedom of speech unless it is directly related to decency or morality, public order, or defamation (or any of the four other grounds listed in Art. 19(2)). None of the aforesaid terms in Section 66A are even attempted to be defined and cannot be defined, the result being that innocent persons are roped in as well as those who are not.  It is clear that Section 66A is intended to punish any person who uses the internet to disseminate any information that falls within the sub-clauses of Section 66A. The Section does not require that such message should have a clear tendency to disrupt public order. According to the section it is not necessary that the message must have any potential which could disturb the community at large. The nexus between the message and action that may be taken based on the message is conspicuously absent - there is no ingredient in this offence of inciting anybody to do anything which a reasonable man would then say would have the tendency of being an immediate threat to public safety or tranquility. On all these counts, it is clear that the Section has no proximate relationship to public order.  Section 66A is so vague that neither would an accused person be put on notice as to what exactly is the offence which has been committed nor would the authorities administering the Section be clear as to on which side of a clearly drawn line a particular communication will fall. It can be seen that some of the restrictions on freedom,  through the I.T. Act might not be intended by the Legislature, but finaly resulted in the same. For instance Section 66A(c) which is for preventing phishing and spam, due to the terms used in the section, unnecessarily curtail the liberty in using various web services, accordingly it  unintentionally prevents the organisations from using proxy servers, it prevents you from the use of anonymus remailers( a free computer service that privatizes your e-mail) it prevents the using of tunnelling(which allows for data to be sent securely). The phrasing of above said provision gives it a meaning which is unintended by the Legislature. The provision is as follows : “message for the purpose of causing annoyance OR inconvenience OR to deceive OR to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages “. Here it can be seen that for making  the provision to be presise and narrow so as to avoid the above said dilemma it must be ‘AND’ instead of ‘OR’.

In the recent  judgement of  Shreya Singhal  v  U.O.I  other provisions under Section 66 are discussed to show the contrast with  Section 66A, it will help to see the pequliarity of 66A which makes the section vague and broad, accordingly in Section 66.66B and 66C the terms used are “dishonestly or fraudulently” both defined in  I.P.C., in Section 66D it is “who ever cheats by personating” Section 66F again is a narrowly drawn section which inflicts punishment which may extend to imprisonment for life for persons who threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India. Sections 67 to 67B deal with punishment for offences for publishing or transmitting obscene material including depicting children in sexually explicit acts in electronic form.  None of the expressions used in Section 66A are defined. Even “criminal intimidation” is not defined - and the definition clause of the Information Technology Act, Section 2 does not say that words and expressions that are defined in the Penal Code will apply to this Act. Thus all other provisions related to offences, other than Section 66A can be seen to be some what presise and narrow, so as to attract specific acts, where as Section 66A is cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the mores of the day would be caught within its net. Such is the reach of the Section and if it is to withstand the test of constitutionality, the chilling effect on free speech would be total.

Another interesting feature is that a number of the expressions that occur in Section 66A occur in Section 268. It is important to notice the distinction between the Sections 268 and 66A. Whereas, in Section 268 the various expressions used are ingredients for the offence of a public nuisance, these ingredients now become offences in themselves when it comes to Section 66A. Further, under Section 268, the person should be guilty of an act or omission which is illegal in nature - legal acts are not within its net. A further ingredient is that injury, danger or annoyance must be to the public in general. Injury, danger or annoyance are not offences by themselves (as it is in Section 66A) howsoever made and to whomsoever made.

It is better to mention some of the points which are in favour of  above said provision,  accordingly  the main problem with respect to the deletion of this section is that, the door for a handfull of harmful activities are suddenly opened. For instance online defamation has suddenly become no offence, though nothing is there in Section 500 of I.P.C. which deals with defamation in cyber field.  Loose language may have been used in Section 66A to deal with novel methods of disturbing other people’s rights by using the internet as a tool to do so. Mere possibility of abuse of a provision cannot be a ground to declare a provision invalid. Further, vagueness is not a ground to declare a Statute unconstitutional if the Statute is otherwise legislatively competent and non-arbitrary.

But it can be seen that the said mere possibility of misuse happened in a number of cases from 2009 to 2012 and  thus  vagueness  in the said provision makes such an  impact, as of a law which is arbitrary. .  Law should be logical and practical for curbing something which is illogical or not practical and not vice versa.

Justice an Enigma

(By V.K.Babu Prakash, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Kollam)

Time changes,

so does the season.

Birds fly to newer places

leaving the old.

My years as a judge

are running faster to finish

to call it a day.

I have been running

in between the rising and setting sun

to catch up with it.

The sun is the same

in a relative way.

But, I am getting older

and breathing hard

unable to run

with the sun

while I was young.

I like to rest

somewhere and watch out

the setting sun.

When looking back

what had I achieved ?

Did I find truth

as a judge in my dispensation ?

Don’t know...

As only a smoke screen appears

from the shadows

obfuscating the vision

I can only feel

that the truth

was only a riddle

cleverly hidden by

the litigants and lawyers

among the thicket

of law and facts.

Sometimes, too many

procedural laws never

helped to find out

truth from the cloud of

facts which were entangled

like a cob web.

After all, I was only

a mediocre judge

who was not dare enough

to travel to the

forbidden areas to

see the magnificent truth

in its real avatar.

Truth was always elusive

in the endeavor

to render justice

to the needy.

And what is justice ?

A word which

is always a mystery

enwrapped in an enigma..

……………….

MRS. & MR. JOHN MUST WAIT

(By M.R. Hariraj, Advocate, Ernakulam)

"Orders are often issued under Art.226 as if emanating from a slot machine at the drop of a coin and pulling of a handle. This must stop".1

The lament of the then Chief Justice appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Partly due to the mounting burden of longer lists, partly due to lack of proper assistance for which we at the Bar must take the blame, orders are issued by the High Court under its extra ordinary jurisdiction just for the asking, at times without regard to even the most fundamental principles governing exercise of the said jurisdiction. With respect, the judgment in John Roji v. Marriage Officer2is a typical instance of 'hurried justice' resulting in "buried justice'.

The petitioners in the said case, having celebrated their marriage according to church ceremonies, applied for registration of their marriage under S. 15 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The application was made because the marriage certificate issued by the Church was not accepted by the Consulates for the purpose of VISA. Marriage Officer would issue the certificate, but only after the statutory notice period and after making sure that there is no objection. But the petitioners had no time to wait. They wanted the certificate urgently and hence prayed for a mandamus to dispense with the statutory notice and issuance of the certificate.

Apparently on the first day of posting itself, when the case came up for admission,3 the Honourable Court allowed the Writ Petition. The reasoning is that Church conducts the marriages only after proper scrutiny. It is directed that the Marriage Officer shall issue the certificate after obtaining sworn statements from the petitioners and registering the marriage. The judgment further provides that after such issuance the Marriage Officer may wait for objections for the statutory period and if any valid objection is there, he may recall the order. On such order being issued petitioners are directed to surrender the original certificate.

It is submitted that the judgment is totally wrong and beyond the jurisdiction of the Honourable High Court. Mandamus is issued in this case against the express statutory provisions.

Chapter III of the Act deals with Registration of marriages celebrated. S. 16 laying down the procedure for registration reads:

"Upon receipt of an application signed by both the parties to the marriage for the registration of their marriage under this chapter, the Marriage Officer shall give public notice thereof in such manner as may be prescribed and after allowing a period of thirty days for objections and after hearing any objection received within that period, shall, if satisfied that all the conditions mentioned in Section 15 are fulfilled, enter a certificate of the marriage in Marriage Certificate Book in the form specified in the Fifth Schedule, and such certificate shall be signed by the parties to the marriage and by three witnesses", (emphasis supplied)

It cannot be gainsaid that the notice period of thirty days, as also hearing the objections are mandatory statutory preconditions to registration. In case of solemnisation of marriage under the Act also, similar words are used by the Legislature. Solemnising the marriage without such a notice makes the Marriage Officer criminally liable under S.46 of the Act.

The Honourable High Court does not have a jurisdiction to issue a direction against law. This position is settled beyond any doubt. It has been held:

"Under the constitution Mandamus can be issued by the court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party againstwhom the mandamus is sought... But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law”4

In Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd.,5 the Honourable Supreme Court observed:

"The power conferred by Arts.226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law ".

It was further held that:

"We cannot imagine anything more destructive to the rule of law than a direction by the court to disobey the laws".6

Humanitarian or equitable considerations also cannot be sufficient ground to ignore law and mandate its violation.

"Consideration of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a High Court to pass an order contrary to the law "7

Courts are bound to render justice in accordance with law. True we do find at times law and justice are distant neighbours. That is no reason to ignore law. If law is unjust, capricious, and arbitrary, there may be good ground to strike them down as unconstitutional. If permissible, they can be read down to fit in to the constitutional mould. But it is impermissible for the court to ignore law or to make law. To quote Justice Holms of the Supreme Court of the United States of America,

"... Judges must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially - they are confined to from molar to molecular motion "8

The judgment not only ignores the existing statutory provisions, but also ventures to add on to the statute a procedure which was never contemplated by the legislature. The Marriage Officer has no power under the statute to recall the certificate once issued. He is permitted to correct "any error in the form or substance of any entry in the Marriage Certificate Book " as per S.49 of the Act. The said provision cannot be stretched to include a power to recall or cancel a certificate.

Further, the Honourable High Court appear to have overlooked the provision in the Act dealing with a situation where a registration is made in contravention of any conditions specifiedin clauses (a) to (e) of S. 15. Under S. 24(2) of the Act, a declaration can be made that registration of such marriage is of "no effect". The jurisdiction for such a declaration is with the District Court as per S. 31 of the Act. In a bid to cater to the urgency of the newly wed, the Honourable High Court has conferred on the Marriage Officer, the power and jurisdiction otherwise vested in the District Court.

The power to review can only be conferred by statute and in the absence of an enabling provision, there cannot be a direction to exercise such a jurisdiction.9 Court cannot by its fiat create a non-existent jurisdiction.10

It may be noted that the Honourable Court has issued mandamus believing that Church Marriages are always flawless and done after scrutiny. The emigration authorities of other nations do not appear to be naive enough to have the same belief. It is a matter to be seen how they would accept a certificate issued by the Marriage Officer without the statutory procedure. If the church could be so believed with closed eyes, why are the emigration authorities reluctant to accept their certificate? If we reach a stage where the certificate issued by the Marriage Officer is also not acceptable to the emigration authorities, whose certificate will we have to produce to prove the marriage?

Viewed in this angle, does not the ruling do the general public more harm than good? Was it logical to compromise the executive's caution mandated by legislative wisdom on the ground of individual urgency?

Was it not better to require Mrs. & Mr. John Roji to wait?

_________________________________________________________________________

Foot Note:

1. Jayachandran v. State of Kerala, 2002 (3) KLT 125.

2. 2004 (1) KLT 687

3. I drew this inference because the judgment is dated 5.1.2004, the date on which the High Court reopened after the Christmas holidays and the case number (WP (C) 93/2004) indicates that it was filed on or after 1.1.2004.

4. State of U. P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309; See also Chingelput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Co., (1984) 3 SCC 258; U.P. Sales Tax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association, (1995) 5 SCC 716; CBSE v. Sunil Kumar, 1998 (1) KLT 929 (SC).

5. (1996) 4 SCC 453.

6. APCME Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 1490.

7. Council for Indian School Certificate Examination v. Isha Mittal and Anr. (2000) 7 SCC 512; State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph's Teachers' Training Institute, (1991) 3 SCC 87.

8. South Pacific v. Jensen, 244 US 205 (1917).

9. Chiranjilal Sahailal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 507; Sivakumar v. Sreekumar 2002 (2) KLT 354 (DB).

10. A.R.Anthulayv.S.Nayak,(1988) 2 SCC 602.

C´y³ \oXn-\ymb hyh-Øbv¡v
XmÂIm-enI aPn-kvt{S«v tImS-Xn-IÄ Hcp shÃp-hnfn

(ByFw.-F-³ a·-Y³, AUz-t¡äv, `mc-Xob A`n-`m-j-I- ]-co-£¯v kwØm\ kanXn AwKw)

kwØm\ kÀ¡mcnsâ 13.05.2014se 94/2014þmw \¼À Kkäv hnÚm-]\ {]Imcw kwØm-\¯v 27 Xmev¡m-enI aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡p-hm³ Xocp-am-\n-¡p-Ibpw Ah-bn ]e tImS-Xn-Ifpw {]hÀ¯\w XpS-§p-I-bp-ap-Im-bn. 13þmw [\-Imcy I½o-j³ cmPy¯v kmbmÓ tImS-Xn-Ifpw {]tXyI tImS-Xn-Ifpw Øm]n-¡p-¶-Xn\v A\p-h-Zn-¨n-«pÅ ^Ip]-tbm-Kn-¨mWv ta ]dª XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡p-¶-Xv. 27 XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-Ifn 24 F®w FhnsSÃmamWv F¶Xpw Sn hnÚm-]-\-¯n ]dªn«p-Iv.

24 tImS-Xn-I-fn ]Xn-\©v F®hpw Fd-Wm-Ipfw PnÃ-bn-em-Wv. Ah-bn H¶p-t]mepw \ne-hn-epÅ tImSXn tI{µ-§-tfmSv tNÀ¶n-«-Ã-Xm-\pw. \ne-hn-epÅ tIkp-I-Ä F{Xbpw s]s«¶v XoÀ¸v Iev]n¨v sI«n InS-¡p¶ tIkp-I-fpsS F®w Ipd¨v s]mXp P\-§-fpsS  _p²n-ap-«p-IÄ Ipdbv¡pI F¶p-Å-XmWv {]Jym-]nX e£yw. F¶m ]pXp-Xmbn PnÃ-bpsS hnhn[ `mK-§-fn-embnØm]n-¨n-«pÅ Xmev¡m-enI aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-IÄ ta ]dª {]Jym-]nX e£ywssIh-cn-¡p-¶-Xn\v ]cym-]vX-a-öpw adn¨v `cWLS\ hncp-²hpw ISp¯ a\p-jym-h-ImiewL-\-§Ä¡v  Imc-W-am-Ip-¶-Xpam-Wv. F´psImImWv \ne-hn-epÅ Øncw tImS-Xn-I-tfmSv tNÀ¶v ta ]dª tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡m-¯Xv F¶p-Å-Xns\ kw_-Ôn¨v ta ]dª hnÚm-]\w au\w ]men-¡p-¶p. s]mXp P\-§-fpsS kuI-cymÀ°-amWv hnhn[ t]meokv tÌj-³ ]cn-[n-I-fn tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡p-hm³ ImcWw F¶mWv A\u-tZym-KnIambn ]dªp tIÄ¡p-¶-Xv. F¶m tImS-Xn-IÄ {]tXy-In¨v {Inan-\ tImS-Xn-IÄ hnhn[ Øe-§-fnembn Øm]n-¡p-¶Xv sImIv s]mXpP\-§Ä¡v kuI-cy-t¯-¡m-tfsd km¼-¯n-I-ambpw AÃm-sXbpw IqSp-X _p²n-ap-«p-IÄ krjvSn-¡p-I-am-{X-amWv sN¿p-¶-Xv. ^e-¯n {]Jym-]nX e£yw ssIh-cn-¡p-¶-Xn\v ]Icw 13þmw [\-Imcy I½o-j³ A\p-h-Zn-¨n-«pÅ ^Insâ ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw am{X-amWv kw`-hn-¡p-¶-Xv. Hcp {]tXyI e£yw ssIh-cn-¡p-¶-Xn\v A\p-h-Zn-¡p¶ ^Iv e£ywad¶v GsX-¦nepw hn[¯n hn\n-tbm-Kn-¡p-¶Xv ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw am{X-am-Wv. Hmtcm tImS-Xn-IÄ  Øm]n-¡p-¶-Xn\pw Ahn-Sps¯ ASn-Øm\ kuI-cy-§Ä GÀs¸-Sp-¯p-¶-Xn\pw e£ IW-¡n\v cq]-bmWv D]-tbm-Kn-¡p-¶-Xv. \ne-hn-epÅ tImS-Xn-I-fnse ASn-Øm\ kuI-cy-§Ä hÀ²n-¸n¨pw Ah-tbmSv tNÀ¶v thW-sa-¦n IqSp-X tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n¨pw ssIh-cn-¡m-am-bn-cp¶ e£yw ad-¶mWv C¯-c-¯n s]mXpapX ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw sN¿p-¶-Xv.

Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-Ifpw {]tXy-In¨v Xmev¡m-enI \ymbm-[n-]³amcpw C´y³ \oXn-\ymb hyh-Øbv¡v A\p-Nn-Xhpw AXnsâ hnizm-ky-Xbv¡v If¦w DIm-¡p-¶-Xp-am-Wv.  sslt¡m-S-Xn-bpsS \nb-{´-W-¯n \S-¯-s¸-Sp¶ Fgp¯p ]co-£-bp-sSbpw CâÀhyq-hn-sâbpw ASnØm-\-¯n sXc-sª-Sp-¡-s¸-Sp¶ tbmKy-cmb \nb-a-_n-cpZ[mcn-IÄ¡v ZoÀL-Im-es¯ ]cn-io-e\w \ÂIn-b-Xn\p tij-amWv \ne-hn IogvtIm-S-Xn-I-fn ap³kn^v/aPn-kvt{Sävamcmbn \nb-a\w \ÂIp-¶-Xv. AhÀ¡v \nb-a-\-¯n\v ap³]v \ne-hn-epÅ \ymbm-[n-]³am-cpsS IqsS tImS-Xn-I-fn Ccp¯n tImSXn \S-]Sn {Ia-§-sf-¡p-dn¨v ]cn-io-e\w \ÂIp-¶p-Iv. F¶m ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ Xm¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn _lp`qcn-]-£-¯nepw \nb-a -_n-cp-Z-[m-cn-I-fmb tImSXn Poh-\-¡m-tcbpw aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-I-fnse F.-]n.-]n. amtcbpw BWv \ymbm-[n-]³am-cmbn \nb-an-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. CXv `c-W-L-S-\m-hn-cp-²hpw ISp¯ a\p-jym-h-Imi ewL-\-§Ä¡v Imc-W-am-Ip-¶-Xm-Wv. \ne-hn-epÅ Øncw tImS-Xn-I-fnepw ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ Xm¡m-enI tImSXnIfnepw Htc-X-c-¯n-epÅ tIkp-IÄ BWv ssIImcyw sN¿p-¶-Xv. ]ns¶ F´p-sImImWv Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn ]cm-Xn-¡m-c-\mtbm {]Xn-bmtbm lmP-cm-tIIn hcp-¶-h-tcmSv C¯-c-¯n-epÅ Hcp hnth-N-\-w Im«p-¶Xv F¶v hyà-a-Ã. \½psS `c-W-L-S\ A\p-im-kn-¡p¶ XpeyÀ¡v Xpey-]-cn-K-W\ F¶ auen-Im-h-Im-i-¯nsâ ewL-\-am-Wv. Øncw tImS-Xn-I-fnse \ymbm-[n-]³amsc Xnc-sª-Sp-¡p-¶-Xn\v thIn sslt¡m-SXn t\cn«v \S-¯nb Fgp¯p ]co-£-bnse aqey-\nÀ®-b-¯nse ]mI-]n-g-Isf tNmZyw sN¿p¶ tIkp-IÄ kp{]ow tImSXn hsc F¯n-\n-ev¡p-¶p F¶ ]c-amÀ°w \ap¡v hnkva-cn-¨pIqSm. Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fnse \ymbm-[n-]sâ ]cn-io-e-\-¡p-dthm AdnhvtISv sImtIm Pmayw \ntj-[n-bv¡-s¸t«m in£n-¡-s¸t«m PbnÂhmkw  A\p-`-hn-t¡In-h-cp¶ Hcp ]ucsâbSp¯v a\p-jym-h-Imi ewL-\-¯n\v BcmWv kam-[m\w ]d-bp-I. CXv `c-W-L-S\ A\p-im-kn-¡p¶ Hcp ]ucsâ Pohn-¡p-hm-\pÅ auen-Im-h-Im-i-¯nsâ IqSn ewL-\-am-Wv. ImcWw Pohn-¡p-hm-\pÅ Ah-Imiw F¶Xv sImIv am\y-ambpw FÃm \nb-a-]-cnc£-tbmSv IqSnbpw Pohn-¡pI F¶Xv IqSn-bmWv Dt±-in-¡p-¶-Xv. tImSXn Poh-\-¡m-tcbpw F.-]n.-]n.amtcbpw C¯-c-¯n \ymbm-[n-]³am-cmbn \nb-an-¡p-¶Xv t£{X-¯nse Ig-I-¡m-cs\ im´n-¡m-c-\mbn \nb-an-¡p-¶-Xp-t]m-setbm aqÀ¯n-bmbn {]Xn-jvTn-¡p-¶Xp t]msetbm BWv. aq¶v hÀj-¡m-e-t¯-¡mWv Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-Ifpw Ahn-Sps¯ Xmev¡m-enI \ymbm-[n-]³am-tcbpw \nb-an-¡p-¶-Xv. AXv Ign-ªm AhÀ¡v hoIpw ]gb Øe-t¯¡v aS-t§-In-h-cp-¶Xpw F´v A]-lm-ky-am-Wv. Hcp Iogvt¡m-SXn \ymbm-[n-]-\n \n¶v \mw {]Xo-£n-¡p¶ \njv]-£X, hnizm-kyX taÂt¡m-S-Xn-I-tfm-SpÅ {]Xn-]-¯nbpw Hcp Xmev¡m-enI \ymbm-[n-]-\n \n¶v DIm-Ip-sa¶v \ap¡v hniz-kn-¡p-hmt\m {]Xo£n¡phmt\m Ign-bn-Ã. AXp-sImIvXs¶ Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-Ifpw \ymbm-[n-]³amcpw C´y³ \oXn ]oT-§Ä¡v \ne-hn-epÅ hnizm-ky-Xbv¡v If¦w krjvSn¡pw F¶p-ÅXv XÀ¡-aä kwK-Xn-bm-Wv.

]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ Hmtcm tImS-Xn-I-fnepw  \ymbm-[n-]³am-cpÄs¸sS 10 Poh-\-¡m-sc-bmWv A\p-h-Zn-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. AXn ssS¸nÌv DÄs¸sS Bdv t]À 179 Znh-k-t¯¡v  IcmÀ ASn-Øm-\-¯n \nb-an-¡-s¸-Sp-¶-h-cm-Wv. \½psS tImS-Xn-I-fn Hcn-¡-se-¦nepw kµÀin-¨n-«p-Å-hÀ¡v Adnbmw F{X emL-h-t¯m-sS-bmWv sXmIn apX-ep-IÄ AhnsS kq£n-¨n-«p-Å-sX¶v.  knhn tIkp-I-fn \jvS-s¸-Sp¶ dn¡mÀUpIÄ ]p\xkwL-Sn-¸n-¡m-hp-¶-Xm-Wv. F¶m {Inan-\ tIkp-I-fnse sXmInap-X-ep-IÄ \jvS-s¸-Sp-Itbm amän ]Icw hbv¡pItbm sNbvXm-ep-Im-Ip¶ AhØ F´mWv  F¶p-ÅXv \ap¡v Adn-hp-Å-Xm-Wv. IcmÀ ASn-Øm-\-¯n tIhew 179  Znh-k-t¯¡v \nb-an-¡-s¸-Sp¶ Poh-\-¡m-cn \n¶v IqSp-X kpc-£n-XXzw \ap¡v {]Xo-£n-¨p-Iq-Sm. ]e _lp-cmjv{S I¼-\n-Ifpw Øncw Poh-\-¡msc \nb-an-¡p-¶Xpaqe-apÅ km¼-¯nI _m[yX Hgn-hm-¡p-¶-Xn\pw tPmen-IÄ F{Xbpw s]s«¶v sNbvXp XoÀ¡p-¶-Xn\pw ]pdw IcmÀ sImSp-¡m-dpIv. F¶m A¯cw \S-]-Sn-IÄ km[m-c-W-¡m-csâ Ah-km\ B{i-b-amb tImS-Xn-IÄ¡v H«pw tNÀ¶-X-Ã. tImS-Xn-bnse ¢dn-¡Â Ìm^n-s\bpw aäv Poh-\-¡m-tcbpw AhÀ¡v F´v hnZym-`ymk tbmKy-X-bp-Iv F¶ Hä- Im-c-W-¯m Ahsc \ymbm-[n-]³am-cmbn \nb-an-¡p-¶Xv s]mXp kaq-l-t¯m-SpÅ ISp¯ shÃp-hn-fn-bm-Wv. ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n¨ ]e Xmev¡m-enI aPn-kvt{Säv  tImS-Xn-I-fnepw FÃm- Zn-h-khpw knän-§p-IÄ DIm-Im-dn-Ã. Hcp aPn-kvt{Säv BgvN-bn Ht¶m ctIm Znhkw Hcp tImS-Xn-bnepw ASp¯ Znh-k-§-fn asämcp tImSXn-bnepw \ymbm-[n-]-\mbn Ccn-t¡-In-h-cp-¶p. Hcp aPn-kvt{Säv Hmtcm Znh-khpw Hmtcm tImS-Xn-bn Ccp-¶m sI«n-In-S-¡p¶ tIkp-I-fpsS F®w Ipd-bv¡p-hm³ Ign-bp-I-bn-Ã. ^e-¯n {]Jym-]n-X-e£yw ssIh-cn-¡m³ ]pXnb Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ¡v Ign-bp-I-bn-Ã. Xs¶-bp-aà kÀ¡m-dns\  {]Xn-\o-[o-I-cn-bv¡p¶ ]»n¡v t{]mkn-¡p-«-dpsS tkh\w Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn FÃm Znh-khpw e`y-aÃ. X·qew Pmaym-t]-£-IÄ t]mepw FÃm Znh-khpw ]cn-K-Wn-¡p-¶-Xn\v Ign-bm¯ Ah-Ø-bm-Wv. Hcp ]»n¡v t{]mkn-Iy-«ÀXs¶ ]e Øe-§-fn-epÅ aäv aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-I-fnepw t]mIWw X·qew Hcp tImS-Xn-bn-tebpw \S-]-Sn-IÄ icnbmb coXn-bn \S-¡p-I-bn-Ã. Hcp Znhkw am{Xw aPn-kvt{Säv  DÅ tImS-Xn-I-fn aäv Znh-k-§-fn Poh-\-¡mÀ¡v bmsXm¶pw sN¿m-\n-Ãm¯ Ah-Ø-bm-Wv.  F´p-sIm-ImWv ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n¨ tImS-Xn-IÄ PnÃ-bpsS hnhn[ `mK-§-fn A`n-`m-j-IÀ¡pw tIknse I£n-IÄ¡pw F¯n-tN-cm³ Hcp-t]mse _p²n-ap-«pÅ Øe-§-fn Øm]n-¨n-«p-ÅXv F¶Xv hyà-a-Ã. Hcp tIkv GXv tImS-Xn-bpsS A[n-Imc ]cn-[n-bn hcp¶p F¶Xv B tIkn-\m-kv]-Z-amb IrXyw GXv tImS-Xn-bpsS A[n-Im-c-]-cn-[n-bn hcp¶ t]meokv tÌj³ AXnÀ¯n-bn  kw`-hn¨p F¶-Xns\ ASn-Øm-\-s¸-Sp-¯n-bm-Wv. ]cm-Xn-¡m-c-sâbpw FXr-I-£n-bp-sSbpw hmk-Ø-e-hp-ambn AXn\v bmsXmcp _Ô-hp-an-Ã.-  Hcp t]meokv tÌj³ ]cn-[n-bn hcp-¶-hÀ B t]meokv tÌj³ ]cn-[n-bn am{Xta Ipä-IrXyw sN¿p F¶v Icp-Xm³ Ign-bn-Ã. Xs¶-bp-aà {Inan-\ tIkp-I-fn km[m-c-W- K-Xn-bn ]cm-Xn-¡m-c³ Ønc-ambn tImS-Xn-bn lmP-cm-tII Bh-iy-an-Ã. aäv tIkp-I-fn kÀ¡m-cmWv hmZn-`m-K-¯v. `qcn-]£w  tIkp-I-fnepw {]Xn-IÄ A`-n`m-j-IÀ apJm-´ncw At]-£-sIm-Sp¯p tImS-Xn-bn lmP-cm-Ip-¶-Xn \n¶v Hgn-hm-Ip-I-bmWv sN¿p-¶-Xv. ^e-¯n tIknse I£n-IÄ¡pw CXp-sImIv {]tbm-P-\-an-Ãm-Xm-Ip-¶p. kwØm-\-¯nsâ hnhn-[-`m-K-§-fn-epÅ Pbn-ep--I-fn \n¶v IÌUn{]Xn-Isf Hmtcm Ah-[n¡pw tImS-Xn-bn lmP-cm-¡p-¶-Xn\v t]meo-kn\pw _p²n-ap«v t\cn-Sp-¶p. ]e XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-I-fnepw Øncw knänwKv CÃm-¯-Xn-\m AdÌv sN¿-s¸-Sp¶ {]Xn-Isf hnhn[ tImS-Xn-I-fn lmP-cm-t¡I_p²n-ap«v  t]meo-kp-ImÀ¡v DIm-hp-¶p. taÂt¡mS-Xn-I-fn \n¶v e`n-bv¡p¶ Pmayw Iogvt¡m-S-Xn-I-fn  \S-¸m¡pt¼mgpw A`-n-`m-j-IÀ¡pw I£n-IÄ¡pw Hcp-t]mse {]mtbm-KnI _p²n-ap-«p-IÄ A\p-`h-s¸-Sp-¶p. ^e-¯n XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn \nb-an-¡-s¸-«n«pÅ Poh-\-¡mÀ¡v HgnsI aämÀ¡pw Imcy-amb {]tbm-P-\-anà F¶p-Å-XmWv kXyw. hmkvX-h-¯n kÀ¡mcpw _pl-am-\-s¸« sslt¡m-S-Xnbpw sNt¿-In-bn-cp-¶Xv \ne-hn-epÅ tImS-Xn-I-fpsS ASn-Øm\ kuIcyw hÀ²n-¸n-¡p-I-bm-bn-cp-¶p. thW-sa-¦n \ne-hn-ep-ff tImSXn tI{µ-§-tfmSv tNÀ¶v ]pXp-Xmbn Ønc-amb aPn-kvt{Säv  tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡m-am-bn-cp-¶p. Aim-kv{Xo-b-amb ]cn-jvIm-c-§Ä aqew A`n-`m-j-I-tcbpw I£n-I-tfbpw t]mse tIkv ^b-ep-IÄ¡pw KXn-In-«msX tImS-Xn-I-fn \n¶v tImS-Xn-I-fn-te¡v Aeªv Xncn-tbIn hcp-¶p. tIhew aq¶v hÀj-¡m-e-t¯-¡mWv Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. AXn-\Iw tam£w In«m¯ tIkv ^b-ep-Ifpw, I£n-Ifpw  hoIpw X§-fpsS ]gb emh-W-¯n-te¡v aS-t§In hcp-¶p. bmsXmcp hn[ ]T-\-§fpw  \S-¯msXbmWv kÀ¡mÀ ]pXnb tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. Hmtcm  t]meo-kv tÌ-j-\nepw cPn-ÌÀ sN¿-s¸-Sp¶ ss{Iap-I-fpsS F®w F{X F¶p-t]mepw ]cn-tim-[n-¨n-«n-Ã.

]pXnb ]cn-jvI-c-W-§Ä aqew Ipd¨v A`n`m-j-IÀ¡v C¯-c-¯n-epÅ GsX-¦nepw tImS-Xn-I-fn tI{µo-I-cn¨v {]mIvSokv sNt¿In-h-cp-¶p. CXv Ah-cpsS `mhnsb {]Xn-Iq-e-ambn _m[n-¡p-sa-¶p-ÅXv XÀ¡-aä kwK-Xn-bm-Wv. Zqsc-bpÅ ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ tImS-Xn-I-fnse tIkv \S-¯n-b-Xn\p tijw PnÃ-tI-{µ-§fntebpw aäv Ønc tImS-Xn-I-fnepw h¶v tIkv \S-¯p-hm³ Ign-bmsX hcpw. X·qew C¯cw A`n-`m-j-IÀ¡v knhn tIkp-IÄ ssIImcyw sN¿p-¶-Xn-\pÅ Ah-k-chpw \jvS-am-Ip-¶p. tIc-f-¯nsâ `q{]Ir-Xn, `qhn-kvXrXn bm{X-ku-Icyw F¶nh aäv kwØm-\-§-fp-ambn Xmc-Xayw  sN¿p-t¼mÄ \½psS tImS-Xn-IÄ ]e Øe-§-fn-embn Øm]n-¡p-¶Xv H«pw A`n-Im-ay-a-Ã. XmevIm-enI tImSXn-I-fnse aPn-kvt{SävamÀ A\p-`h]cn-N-b-an-Ãm-¯-hcpw Xmev¡m-en-I-ambn \nb-an-¡-s¸-Sp-¶-h-cp-am-b-Xn-\m C¯cw tImS-Xn-I-fn t]meo-kp-ImÀ ta[m-hnXzw {]I-Sn-¸n-¡p-¶-Xn-\pw, aPn-kvt{S-äpw, t]meokpw Ahn-Sps¯ Ipd¨v A`n-`m-j-Icpw DÄs¸-Sp¶ Hcp Ahn-ip² Iq«-sI-«n\v hsc CXv Imc-W-am-Ipw. F´m-bmepw Ime-an-{Xbpw \½psS \oXn-]o-T-§Ä Im¯p-kq-£n¨ \njv]-£-X, hnizm-kyX Ch \ne \nÀ¯n apt¶m-«p-sImIp t]mIp-¶-Xn\v XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ Hcp shÃp-hn-fn-bm-Wv. hkvXp-X-IÄ  C§s\ Bbn-cns¡ tI{µ-kÀ¡mÀ A\p-h-Zn¨ ^Iv ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw sN¿m³ Ignªp F¶-sXm-gn-¨m BÀ¡p-thIn AsÃ-¦n F´n\p thIn-bmWv Cu A\m-hiy ]cn-jvIm-c-§Ä F¶Xpw hyà-a-Ã. Hcp ^Iv D]-tbm-Kn-¡p-¶-Xn\v thIn H«pw Imcy-hn-Nmcw \S-¯msX kÀ¡mÀ kzoI-cn¨ \S-]-Sn-IÄ¡v _lp-am-\-s¸« sslt¡m-S-Xnbpw A\-phmZw \ÂIn-bn-cn-¡p¶p F¶Xv ZpJ-I-c-am-Wv. hfsc \nÀ`m-Ky-I-c-amb Hcp kwKXn _Ô-s¸-«-h-cmcpw Xs¶ CXv  IInà AsÃ-¦n C¶m-«p-Im-c-Ãm-sb¶v \Sn-¡p-¶p. tImS-Xn-Isf kw_-Ôn¨v ]d-bp-t¼mÄ hnizmkw AXtà FÃmw. AXp-sImIvXs¶ _Ô-s¸-«-hÀ¡v B hnizm-k-¯n\v ]m¼³]m-e-¯nsâ Dd¸v hcp-t¯I_m[y-X-bp-Iv. Cu sshInb thf-bn-se-¦nepw _Ô-s¸-«-h-cn \n¶v A¯-c-¯nepÅ Hcp \S-]Sn s]mXp-k-aqlw {]Xo-£n-¡p-¶p.