2015(2) KLT 1 (SC) -- Shreya Singal v. Union of India–
Expressive  Overreach

(By P. Rajan, Advocate, Thalassery)

Accolades galore, lauded with- Superlatives like land mark, historic, momentous – are only few, described by netizens and media the judgment rendered by Supreme Court, when it struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as it is violative of Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution – also Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 by the same verdict as the provision is vague having a chilling effect on freedom of free speech. The judgment was relating to a public interest litigation, when two cases registered under Section 66A of the I.T.Act stirred a hornet’s nest some time back- arrest of two girls from Maharashtra for posting and liking a face book comment criticizing the shutdown of Mumbai Markets due to the death of Shiv Sena Supremo, Bal Thackerray and arrest of a Jadavpur University Professor for posting a cartoon in Cyber Network, Satirical though, allegedly ridiculed West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. 

Apex Court in the judgment considered mainly the principles laid down regarding freedom of speech as envisaged under the Constitution and the reasonable restriction theory detailed in Article 19(2), basing on case laws.  It is to be noted that the twin cases stated above registered under the I.T.Act as the facts revealed, it was nothing but police’ ignorance rather excess without scrutinizing the legal requirement to press in to service Section 66A of the I.T.Act, the comments allegedly made so also the contents. It is fundamental that, if the message or tweet became viral, intention was to cause annoyance or having menacing character under cyber law, Section 66A is the relevant provision to be applied against the offender and no protection can be claimed in the guise of constitutional rights.  Freedom of speech does not mean, liberty to propagate anything, one likes, by any means. I.T.Act 2000 was introduced after proper study of similar laws prevalent in countries like U.S.A., U.K. and Australia and after due consultation with several stake holders- standing committee of the Parliament also scrutinized before presenting the relevant bill.

Supreme Court in the verbose ruling considered identical provisions in the Penal Code when an offensive or known to be false message is published with the aid of computer resource, ie. Sections 294 and 499 I.P.C..  Section 499 I.P.C. is meant for two types of offences coming within the ambit of that provision, libel and slander.  The former can be proved with documentary evidence but the later is harder to prove by the aggrieved but cyber crime cannot be brought within the purview  of Section 499 I.P.C. because I.T.Act is strictly meant for cyber crimes only and no specific law is enacted to regulate and control cyber space use, like internet, face book being accessed by savy persons (paras. 42, 43).  In prosecutions under 499 I.P.C. if the subject matter is a printed material like news paper report there is P.R.B Act,  Press Council of India Regulations too, to monitor and favour  fair journalism.  Apart from I.T.Act there is only intermediary guidelines Rules 2011 to oversee cyber crimes, not meant to strangle fair practice of freedom of expression. To matters published in print media, access is not available to all but internet, face book, etc. can be accessed even by an illiterate as just a click is required.  Manifold increase of electronic media pave way for use and misuse by several and even national security would be affected unless mendacious messages are checked and men behind it are brought to book. Posts and tweets derogatory, black mailing affect even tolerant groups resultantly negative fallout would be the outcome. If there is no requisite penal provision to prosecute cyber crime offenders it would be a fear free period for imposters and persons who are active on social media with questionable intention.

In the two cases registered under Section 66A of the I.T.Act, mentioned earlier legality and maintainability were the issues came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. As stated, both the cases were registered not on legal grounds but on misconception of law or on extraneous considerations. The Court could have ordered termination of further proceedings in those cases on the ground of abuse of process of law, desirable to direct for re visit of the provision of law in question instead of scrapping the section as such, in effect thrown the baby away with the bath water.

Expressions in Section  66A are open ended and undefined according to the Apex Court, but the wordings of the sub clauses would go to show that the provision as a whole is self explanatory and by visualizing facts of each case, cases can be registered and proved by scientific evidence. Even simple messages through handsets are being stored in servers first and data could be procured by getting the details from mobile phone companies. Identical provision in the Kerala Police Act, Section 118 being in a state enactment words seem to be vague and in a way Section 66 A overrides Kerala Police Act, Section 118. The observations made by the Apex Court regarding this provision of Police Act are just and legal as it appeared to be not well defined, on the other hand Section 66A is self serving, satisfactorily worded capable of proper application.  As the provision is erased, masqueraders and imposters can avail social media as they wish for wrong reasons by spreading incorrect messages, to black mail persons, relating to national security matters also as no law regarding violation of cyber laws is available to bring to book such persons.

A lie can travel half way around the world, while the truth is putting on its shoes.                                                                                                                                 -- Mark Twain

A SECOND WIFE IS ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE OR NOT ?

(By Anzil Zachariah, Advocate, Pathanamthitta)

A woman gives herself to the man and takes the family life of the man. The man uses her as such. Thereafter he turns her out and pronounces that marriage is void After divorce or separation she becomes a destitute. The pertinent question here is can the husband be allowed to raise the contention of denial of a valid marriage when the second wife claims maintenance.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the present scenario and exhibit through the case laws the approach of the courts regarding maintenance provision. It is argued, in the course of the paper that a more functional and practical approach, would be a definite improvement to meet the ends of justice for neglected wives.

Ss.125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitute a complete Code in itself. It deals with adjudication as regards the liability to pay monthly allowance to the neglected wife and child. It also includes execution of order and the mode of execution.

S.125 of Code is "a measure of social justice “1. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife2. Neglect to maintain a wife or a child has not been made as an offence under these proceedings3. It's a law...

"...to compel a man to perform the moral obligation which he owes to society in respect of his wife and children, by providing a simple, speedy but limited relief. They seek to ensure that the neglected wife and children are not left beggared and destituted on the scrap-heap of society and thereby driven to a life of vagrancy, immorality and crime for their subsistence4."

A woman has two distinct rights for maintenance. S.125 of Cr. P.C. mentions only maintenance to a legally wedded wife unless she suffers from any of the disabilities indicated in S.25(4) of Cr. P.C. In another capacity, namely as a divorced wife, she is entitled to claim maintenance from the person of whom she was once the wife5.

The woman not having the legal status of a wife is brought within the inclusive definition of the term 'wife'. According to Explanation 'wife' "includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried". It is consistent with the objective. However, the second wife is disentitled from receiving maintenance from her husband as personal laws declare second marriage to be null and void. Marriage between the parties plays an integral part in deciding the question of maintenance. The right of a wife to maintenance is based upon the existence of the marital relations.

The personal laws applicable to the party determine the status of a wife. S.11 of the Hindu Marriage Act declares such a marriage to be illegal in the following terms:-

S.ll. Void marriages - "Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of S.5."

Clause (l)(i) of S.5 lays down, for a lawful marriage, the necessary condition that "neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage."

A marriage in contravention of this condition is null and void from its very inception. It is to be ignored as not existing in law. Hence a second wife is not entitled to maintenance under this provision, as she is not a legally wedded wife 6.

The sad reality is that the husbands negative the claim of the neglected wife. The husband argues and depicts her as a kept-mistress on the specious plea that he was already married. The 'Summit Court' of India affirmed those contentions in a number of cases.

First and foremost contention is that the terms- 'wife' or 'widow' in the context of marriage, maintenance etc.. is of restrictive legal character.It implies only legitimate relationships recognized by a legal mode of marriage. It does not include a relationship that is not recognized by law. Therefore the definition of wife cannot be stretched to include an abandoned mistress.

In Khemchand Om Prakash Shanna v. State of Gujarat & Anr7the Supreme Court held that the "during the subsistence of the first marriage, any second marriage is null and void" and High Court erred in granting maintenance in favour of second wife. Here applicant's first wife was alive. There has been no annulment of marriage by a decree of divorce or otherwise.

The Court held in Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav8case that marriage of a woman in accordance with Hindu rites with the man having a living spouse is complete nullity in the eye of law and she is not entitled the benefit of S.125 of the Code.

In Santosh (Smt) v. Naresh Pal9 the Supreme Court declared that "unless there is a legal marriage between the parties, order under S.125 Cr. P.C. cannot be passed."

In Vimla (K) v. Veeraswamy (K)10, the husband contended that the second marriage with the applicant-wife was void on the ground that her first marriage was subsisting. The Apex Court stated that-

"The law which disentitles the second wife from receiving maintenance from her husband for the sole reason that the marriage ceremony though performed in the customary form lacks legal sanctity can be applied only when the husband satisfactorily proves the subsistence of a legal and valid marriage..."

The term 'wife' in S.125 of the Code should be given a wider and extended meaning. It must include therein not only a lawfully wedded wife but also a woman married or lived together for a considerable time as wife. If a husband had married a woman without disclosing the existence of the first wife the marriage held in between both husband and wife is treated bad as per law. The media reports remind us of husbands marrying more than once for dowry etc. If the goddess of justice closes its eye, the destitute wives are deserted both by their husband as well as law. The maintenance is deprived for no reasons of her and for no wrong on her part. In such cases the marriage could only be treated as valid marriage, as the fact of the subsistence of first marriage had been suppressed11.

Such incidents do happen. The Explanation to sub-s.(3) of S.125 clearly foresees such incidents. The said explanation reads as follows: -

"If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. "

The dichotomy between "has contracted marriage with another wife" and "keeps mistress" is obvious. The verb 'keep' is used in present tense. In phrase contracting of marriage is concerned, the verb is present perfect- "has contracted". From this it is clear that the marriage might have been contracted at any time. It will refer to the first as well as the second marriage. It cannot be said that the just ground of a husband contracting marriage with another wife is only available to the first wife and not to second wife on the ground that the proviso is not made for the benefit of the second wife. The wife, second or third, must be entitled to grant of maintenance for her survival and sustenance in view of the prima facie finding of fact that the relation between a male and female are that of a husband and wife.

The Orissa High Court laid down that intricacies of the law are not required to be gone into and where the man and woman lived together as husband and wife and treated as such by the community and the man treated the woman as his wife, marriage between them has to be inferred for thelimited purpose of S. 125 of the Code12 Here both parties were scheduled tribes (Kandha community).

In Kumari Bai v. Anandram, the Madhya Pradesh High Court granted maintenance13 where the non-applicant married applicant wife (both Gond tribes) according to Chun custom but not by regular marriage and was kept her as Rakhel (keep). Both were married before too.

It is admitted that the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act do not apply to Scheduled Tribes as per Section 2(2) of the Act. -

"... nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Art.366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs."

The situation is grave in circumstances where maintenance is denied to an illiterate and unemployed woman. Being an illiterate and unemployed wife there exist no means for survival. She is liable to get an award of maintenance from the defaulting husband who played fraud to her. A husband who is healthy and able-bodied is held to have means to support his wife and children14. He escapes from his misdeeds by resorting to the contention that she is only his concubine or keep and not his legally wedded wife.

Secondly, it is argued that that the second marriage, though valid under customary traditions, is against public policy.It is admitted that no custom is valid if it is opposed to morality or public policy. Public policy is always against polyandry and polygamy. Monogamy as a valid marriage system is preferred in all legal systems including India. The intention of the legislation can be discerned from the enactment of S.494 of I.P.C.

Under Shastrik Hindu law polygamy is not strictly prohibited. In various communities under customs it continues. Divorces are common. They are governed by their personal customs. Marriage relationship under those customs in the communities is not sacrosanct.

It is hard to digest that maintenance be denied to a destitute wife to uphold the so-called morality. The society acts as a super cop of the morality against second wife. The 'living law' to abolish polygamy is not used against recalcitrant men folk. The mighty State is not authorised as our Big Brother to control our emotional and economic lives as in Orwell 1984. The present position of law and State only helps an unscrupulous married man. Dr. Werner F. Menski in his essay titled 'Reluctant Legislative Activism15 mocks at this hypocritical self.

"Almost 50 years down the line, we are forced to realise that Indian courts have been administering and regulating Hindu polygamy and its consequences, rather than punishing Hindu polygamists as criminalsfor having several wives. For polygamy continues to exist...in reality it seems, and not just in Kerala, almost all Indian men are getting away with making polygamous arrangements..."

It is also significant to remember that recognition by the society is not a pre-condition for marital status. Marriage is a personal right of the spouses. They are entitled to live together. After marriage they live together. It is open to the knowledge of the community in which they live. They acquire marital status by such living. In the case of Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University16in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows-

"The immediate question arises whether recognition of the community is a pre-condition ? ...It is common knowledge that with education or advance of economic status, young men and women marry against the wishes of parents and in many a case consent or recognition would scarcely be given by either or both of the parties or parents of both spouses. Recognition by family or community is not a pre-condition for married status."

Moreover, the order of the court granting maintenance acts as a deterrent weapon upon husbands, marrying during their first marriages and throwing poor women to pavements. Men are reminded of their legal and moral obligations. If not, the law stands in favour of the husband who evades the obligation to maintain the wife and children by raising unreasonable argument that she is only a second wife.

Thirdly, it is argued that the Legislature upholds the legitimacy of the paternity of a child born out of a void marriage and not the second wife.A similar protection as legitimizing paternity of a child of void marriage is not extended in respect of the mother of the child.

In Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav case it is observed that even in a summary proceeding under Section 125 Cr. P.C, the Court is required to find out whether applicant-wife was lawfully wedded wife or not17. The Court considered the point whether a Hindu woman who has married after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, with a man having a lawfully wedded wife, can maintain an application for maintenance under S.125 Cr. P.C. The Court confirmed that the Legislature decided to bestow the benefit of S.125 Cr. P.C. even on an illegitimate child by expressed words but none are bound to apply to a de facto wife where the marriage is void ab initio.

The existence of a second or third marriage cannot be declared as illegal or immoral in modern times. Legal pronouncements also hint at it. The Allahabad High Court, while upholding the constitutional right of the citizens as enshrined in Arts.19 and 21 of the Constitution of India in the case of Payal Katara v. Superintendent, Nari Niketan, Kalindri Vthar, Agra & Ors.18held that the petitioner, a lady of about 21 years of age being a major, has right to go anywhere and that anyone- man and woman even without getting married can live together if they wish. If such a right is recognized then maintenance can also be claimed.

The Legislature has to consider the present day circumstances in amending the law. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001 and the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 are positive signs of legislative activism. Matrimonial laws still need a fresh look. It is obvious from spiraling divorce rates in family courts. The parties now readily choose to opt out of the marriage if they are unhappy. John Milton's essay laughs at matrimonial laws even long time back for interference in personal, emotional lives. The essay19 published in 1643 deplore matrimonial laws that imprisoned the unhappily married in 'a drooping and disconsolate household captivity, without refuge or redemption'. Every law is permitted and designed to sub serve the ends of justice. It always aims at rendering the substantial justice. The litigants look for justice and not injustice. The manner and mode of implementation of this provision makes our courts graveyards for the exploited ones and playgrounds for the offenders.

The court must consider the palpable injustice being suffered by the womenfolk though no fault on their side. It is desirable to remove the hardship by extending the benefit of theprovisions of the section to a dejected and driven away woman who is a second wife so long as she did not remarry and live in adultery.

The Apex Court in a case observed that "the provision under S.I 25 is not to be utilised for defeating the rights conferred by the legislature to the destitute women, children or parents who are victims of social environment20. Here the husband's contention was there's no valid marriage as essential rites were not performed.

In another case- Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal & Ors.21, the court held that "social justice is not constitutional claptrap but fighting faith that enlivens legislative texts with militant meaning." The scope of S.125 Cr. PC has been exhaustively dealt with Krishna Iyer, J. in the case at paragraph 9 of the judgment thus: -

"This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional sweep of Art.] 5(3) reinforced by Art.39. We have no doubt those sections of statutes calling for consideration by courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfill. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out the interpretation but of two alternatives which advances the cause -the cause of the derelicts."

Cultural perceptions of women have led to distorted attitudes about them. The religious orthodox and social patriarchs always undermine them. She and her family are vulnerable to socio-economic pressures. The Supreme Court acknowledged it in Mohd Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum22"undoubtedly the Muslim husband enjoys the privilege of being able to discard his wife whenever he chooses to do so, for reason good, bad or indifferent, indeed for no reasons at all". In Re Amino23Justice D.R. Dhanuka said, "It is impossible to ignore the patent discrimination resulting from some of the provisions of personal laws sought to be enforced in our courts."

It is time to think whether a destitute second wife is entitled to maintenance under the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. The Act provides that certain persons mentioned therein are entitled-to maintenance. There is nothing in the said Act, which provides other person from claiming maintenance and being awarded on principles of justice, equity and good reason. Granting of maintenance allowance is always aimed at preserving the existence of an individual who is not in a position to support her. In Obula Konda Reddy v. Peda Venkata Lakshmana24it was held that S. 18 would include a wife whose marriage is solemnized though the marriage is void. This judgment was widely criticized.

The Court is not a silent spectator. It must sympathetically and imaginatively discover the true purpose and object of the provision by filling gaps, clearing doubts, and mitigating hardships, harshness or unfair consequences25. It is the duty of the courts to grant and provide benefit of this benevolent law to the destitute of the present day. In Carew and Company v. Union of India26, the Supreme Court declared,

"If the language used in a statute can be construed widely so as to salvage the remedial intendment, the court must adopt it. Of course, if the language of a statute does not admit of the construction sought, wishful thinking is no substitute, and then, not the court but the legislature is to blame for enacting a damp squib statute."

In short, the law looks at 21st century with the punitive system of 19th century to create a very suppressive and conservative sexual morality. The legislature and legal forces has to respond to changes. They wrongly assume its role as a super cop of the morality. A woman has to be treated with dignity, as she does not play a subsidiary role in the life of a man. She cannot be expected to live like a church mouse in the days of yore. A wife is an epitome of the cementing factor in the domestic life and embodiment of sacrificing synthesis in social fabric. She is a symbol of virtue, an emblem of Olympian calmness and an embodiment of Himalayan poise. This being the position of a wife, it is undesirable to conceive that she must live in distress because she is only a second wife. A complete transformation is required in our jurisprudential thought where the agenda of the judiciary and legislature should be to strengthen civil society and protect legal and human rights.

________________________________________________________________________

Foot Note:

1. U.L. Bhat J. in Balanv. Valsamma, 1986 K.L.T. 1378. (F.B.).

2. Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K), (1991) 2 SCC 375.

3. Ramfool Mina v. Smt. Jagrati, 2001 Cr. L.J. 920.

4. Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamala Devi, AIR 1975 SC 83 (para. 11).

5. Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri, 2000 Cr.L.J. 1498 (SC).

6. Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K), (1991) 2 SCC 375.

7. (2000)3 SCC 753.

8. 1988 (l) RCR (Crl.)322:l988 (2) SCR 809.

9. (1998) 8 SCC 477:1999 AIR SCW 4700.

10. 1991 (2) SCC 375.

11. Mallika and Anr. v. Kulandai, 2000 Crl. J. 142.

12. Anupama Pradium v. Sultan Pradhan, 1991 Crl. J. 3216 (Orissa) para. 9.

13. Kumari Bai v. Anandram, 1998 CrL. J. 4100. Sreedharan v. Pushpa Bai, 1978 K.LT. 26.

14. Durga Singh Lodhi v. Prembhai, 1990 Cr. L.J. 2065 M.P.H.C.

15. 2004(1) KLT 35.

16. 1996 (1) KLT 169 (SC) = AIR 1996 SC 1011

17. 1988(l) RCR (Crl.)322:1988 (2) SCR 809.

18. http://pib.nic.in/archievs/Ireing/Iyr 220/mar 2002/04032002.

19. Doctrine & Discipline of Divorce.s

20. Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit, 2000 Cr. L.J. 1.

21. AIR 1978 SC 1807:1979 Cr.L.J.3.

22. AIR 1985 SC 945.

23. AIR 1992 Bom.214.

24. AIR 1976 AP 43.

25. Motor Owners' Insurance Company Limited v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi and Ors. (1981) 4 SCC 660(paras.l4, 15 and l6).

26. 1975 (2) SCC 791.

\oXn]oT¯nsâ ImcpWyhÀjw

(ByAUzt¡äv H. lmcokv, Imbw-Ipfw)

kaql¯n A¨S¡hpw {Iakam[m\hpw sI«pd¸pw DImIp¶Xn\v \nbaw BhiyamWv. a\pjyÀ¡v kam[m\t¯msS Ignbp¶Xn\mWv \nba§Ä \nÀ½n¡p¶Xv. kmaqlnI PohnX¯nsâ DuSpw ]mhpamWv \nba§Ä. \nba¯n\v ap¶n FÃmhcpw ka³amcmsW¶v ]dbmdpIv. \oXn tXSnbpÅ am\hsâ ssP{Xbm{Xbv¡v a\pjyhwi¯nsâ A{XXs¶ ]g¡apIv. \oXnam³amcmb cmPm¡³amÀ Ncn{X¯n btim[hmeyw cNn¨hcmWv. Ncn{Xw BhÀ¯n¡pt¼mÄ C¯cw Hfna§m¯ HmÀ½IÄ \½sf NnesXms¡ DWÀ¯p¶p. A¯c¯n Gähpw {it²b§fmb \oXn]oT¯nsâ cIv hyXykvX ImcpWyhÀj IY kao]Ime¯v \ap¡v A\p`hnt¡Inh¶p.

P\m[n]Xy¯nsâ s\SpwXqWpIfn H¶mWtÃm PpUojdn. CXnsâ Gähpw {][m\s¸« t]mcmbvabmbn ImWp¶Xv tIkpIfn hn[nI¸n¡p¶XnepImIp¶ ImeXmakamWv. aÀ¯yÀ¡nSbn \oXn e`yam¡m\mWv \nba§Ä hmÀs¯Sp¡p¶Xv. \oXn sshIp¶Xv AXv \ntj[n¡p¶Xn\v Xpeyambn IW¡m¡p¶p. BImiw CSnªv hoWmepw \oXn \S¸m¡pw F¶mWv tIcf sslt¡mSXnbpsS s\dpIbn tcJs¸Sp¯nbncn¡p¶Xv.

AXnÀ¯nIm¡pw amaeIÄ t]mse Dbc¯n sI«nInS¡p¶ tIkpsI«pIfpsS Iq¼mcw Ipdbv¡p¶Xn\mbn IsI¯nb \ho\ amÀ¤amWv AZme¯pIÄ. X§fptSXÃm¯ ImcW§ÄsImIv tIkpsI«nsâ NcSn\I¯v AIs¸« At\Imbncw a\pjyÀ \ap¡nSbn hkn¡p¶p. AsXm¶gns¨Sp¡m³ AXnsâ ]nSnsbm¶v hnSphn¡m³ Xsâ BbpÊpw BtcmKyhpw k¼¯pw IjvS¸mSpw hn\ntbmKnt¡In hcp¶ lX`mKyÀ  kaql¯n [mcmfapIv. A¯c¯n AIs¸«hsc ]Zhn ad¶v ImcpWy¯nsâ tX³agsNmcnª cIv thdn« \ymbm[n]³amcpsS kvt\tlm³apJamb hnkvXmcamWv XpSsc tImdnbnSp¶Xv. kvt\lapJapÅ Hcp \oXnIY F¶ t]cn ]pd¯ph¶ hSIcbnse Hcp \ymbm[n]³ s]mXpkaql¯n\v Im«nsImSp¯ amXrI \oXn]oT¯nsâ biÊv hÀ²n¸n¡p¶Xmbncp¶p. Xq¡pIbdpw PbnÂin£bpw ]ngbpw am{Xw hn[nsbgpXp¶ Ic§fn \n¶v kvt\l¯nsâbpw ImcpWy¯nsâbpw kzm´\¯nsâbpw Xmcm«v tI«t¸mÄ \oXn]oT§Ä¡v am{Xaà s]mXpa\Ênepw IpfnÀag s]bvXp.

Hcp ]mhs¸« a\pjy³ _m¦n \n¶pw hmbv]sbSp¯v IS¯n ap§n hmbv] XpI Xncn¨S¡m³ \nhr¯nbnÃmsX h¶t¸mÄ P]vXnIbÀ Igp¯n apdpIn izmkw ap«nb B a\pjy\v s\SphoÀ¸nSm³ thIn Xsâ i¼f¯n \n¶pw ]Xn\¿mbncw cq] \ÂIn Hcp IpSpw_s¯  c£s¸Sp¯nb hSIc ap³kn^v tImSXnbnse Achnµv kn. CSbmSn F¶ \ymbm[n]\v ta ImcpWy tIcf¯nsâ kvt\lm{iphÀjw s]menªp. hSIc eoK kÀÆokkv AtXmcnänbpsS B`napJy¯n \S¯nb AZme¯n hfbw Npgen \¼ymÀIp¶pta Ipamcsâ tIknemWv Cu a\pjysâ th]Yp \ngen¨ PohnXw \ymbm[n]³ IIXv. 2008 Ipamc³ Im\d_m¦n ]md¡Shv imJbn \n¶pw hmbv]bmbn FSp¯ Ccp]¯¿mbncw cq] ]enibS¡w ap¸¯¿mbnc¯n Fgp¶qän A¼Xv cq]bmbn hÀ²n¡pIbpw _m¦v Ipamcs\Xnsc tIkv ^b sN¿pIbpw sNbvXp. hn[n ssh]cnXy¯n PohnXt¢iw t\cnSpIbpw A]IS¯nÂs¸«pImb km¼¯nI ]cm[o\Xbpw ImcWw hmbv] XpI Xncn¨S¡m³ Ipamc\v IgnªnÃ. XpSÀ¶v _m¦v P]vXnbS¡w \nba\S]Sn kzoIcn¨p.

XpI Xncn¨S¡m³ IgnbmsX hn§ns¸m«nb Ipamcsâ \nÊlmbhØ a\Ênem¡nb Cu \ymbm[n]³ _m¦v DtZymKسamcpambn kwkmcn¨v tIkv H¯pXoÀ¸m¡n HSpt¡Ip¶ _m¡n XpI Ipamc\pthIn \ymbm[n]³ kz´w t]m¡än \n¶pw \ÂInbmWv amXrI Im«nbXv. Ipamcsâ s\©nse XobW¡m³ Ignsª¶ NmcpXmÀ°y¯n kvt\lkv]Àinbmb \ymbm[n]³ Xm³ sNbvXXv shdpsamcp \nÊmcImcyambn IcpXn ASp¯ tIkpsI«nse NcSv Agn¡pIbmbncp¶p.

GXm\pw Znhk§Ä¡v ap¼v asämcp ImcpWyhÀjhpw \oXn]oT¯n \n¶v \ap¡v A\p`hnt¡In h¶p. AXv IpS¸\IfpsS \mSmb ]me¡mSv \n¶mbncp¶p. cIv ]XnämIv ap¼v \S¶ hml\m]IS¯n Ggp hbÊpÅ aI³ \jvSs¸«  amXm]nXm¡Ä¡v \jvS]cnlmcXpI \ÂIp¶Xnte¡pImb ImeXmakamWv tamt«mÀ BIvknUâv s¢bnwkv ss{S_qW PUvPn  Xsâ i¼f¯n \n¶pw Hcpe£w cq] \ÂIn amXrI Im«nbXv. ]cmXn¡mc\v \oXn\ymb kwhn[m\¯nepÅ hnizmkw \jvSs¸SmXncn¡m\mWv Xm³ amXrI Im«nbsX¶v PUvPn ]dbp¶p.

1993 sabv 10 \v ]pXp¸cnbmc¯v DImb hml\m]IS¯n hm¡n ]d¼n kpµcsâ aI³ acn¨ tIkn \jvS]cnlmcw Bhiys¸«v \ÂInb lÀPn 1996  G{]n 16\v hn[nbmbn. hn[n XpIbn \n¶v Ccp]¯¿mbncw cq] BZyL«¯n lÀPn¡mc\v e`n¨ncp¶p. _m¡nXpIbpw ]enibpw C³jpd³kv I¼\n tImSXnbn sI«nsh¨p. Cu XpI kpµcsâbpw `mcybpsSbpw t]cn \nt£]n¡phm³ tImSXn D¯chnSpIbpw sNbvXp. F¶m tImSXn Poh\¡mÀ XpI kpµc\v ]Icw sImÃwtImSv s\³ta\n kztZinbmb cmaIrjvW³ F¶ Bfnsâ t]cnepÅ A¡uInemWv _m¦n \nt£]n¨Xv. tImSXn Poh\¡mÀ¡v kw`hn¨ ]niImWv A¡uIv \¼À amdn XpI \nt£]n¡m³ ImcWw. ]n¶oSv Hcp hml\m]IS¯n cmaIrjvW³ acWaSbpIbpw sNbvXp.

X§Ä¡v \jvS]cnlmcXpI e`n¨n«nsöv ImWn¨v ]cmXnbpambn kpµc\pw IpSpw_hpw tImSXnsb kao]n¨p. XpSÀ¶v \S¯nb At\zjW¯nemWv XpI cmaIrjvW³ ]n³hen¨Xmbn _m¦ptcJIfn IsI¯nbXv. C¡mcyw NqIn¡m«n taÂtImSXnbn kpµc³ A¸o lÀPn t_m[n¸ns¨¦nepw AXv XÅpIbmbncp¶p. HSphn sslt¡mSXnsb kao]n¨ kpµct\mSv IngvtImSXnbn dnhyplÀPn t_m[n¸n¡m\mWv D¯chpImbXv. Cu tIknsâ hmZw tI« PUvPn at\mlÀ InWn lÀPn¡mcsâ Bhiyw A\phZn¡m\mhnsöv IsI¯nsb¦nepw lÀPn¡mc\v \oXn e`n¡Wsa¦n am\pjnI ]cnKW\ \ÂIWsa¶v IImWv \ymbm[n]sâ ImcpWylkvXw kpµc\pw IpSpw_¯ntebv¡pw \o«nbXv. hn[n¡v D¯cw \ÂIphm³ Bcpansöv t_m[ys¸« PUvPn lÀPn¡mc\v \oXn e`n¡m³ Xsâ kz´w JP\mhv Xpdt¡In h¶p. Ft¶m hn[n¨ \jvS]cnlmcXpI tImSXn Poh\¡mcpsS ssI¸ng aqew A\p`hn¡m³ e`n¡m¯Xv  ImcWw \oXn \ntj[n¡s¸ScpsX¶v IcpXnbmWv \ymbm[n]sâ \S]Sn. \oXnbpsS Bizmkw kpµc\pw IpSpw_¯n\pw {]Xo£n¡m¯ Hc\p`hambn amdn. C\nbpw C¯cw Ddhhäm¯  ImcpWyhÀj¯n\mbn \ap¡v Im¯ncn¡mw.

MRS. & MR. JOHN MUST WAIT

(By M.R. Hariraj, Advocate, Ernakulam)

"Orders are often issued under Art.226 as if emanating from a slot machine at the drop of a coin and pulling of a handle. This must stop".1

The lament of the then Chief Justice appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Partly due to the mounting burden of longer lists, partly due to lack of proper assistance for which we at the Bar must take the blame, orders are issued by the High Court under its extra ordinary jurisdiction just for the asking, at times without regard to even the most fundamental principles governing exercise of the said jurisdiction. With respect, the judgment in John Roji v. Marriage Officer2is a typical instance of 'hurried justice' resulting in "buried justice'.

The petitioners in the said case, having celebrated their marriage according to church ceremonies, applied for registration of their marriage under S. 15 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The application was made because the marriage certificate issued by the Church was not accepted by the Consulates for the purpose of VISA. Marriage Officer would issue the certificate, but only after the statutory notice period and after making sure that there is no objection. But the petitioners had no time to wait. They wanted the certificate urgently and hence prayed for a mandamus to dispense with the statutory notice and issuance of the certificate.

Apparently on the first day of posting itself, when the case came up for admission,3 the Honourable Court allowed the Writ Petition. The reasoning is that Church conducts the marriages only after proper scrutiny. It is directed that the Marriage Officer shall issue the certificate after obtaining sworn statements from the petitioners and registering the marriage. The judgment further provides that after such issuance the Marriage Officer may wait for objections for the statutory period and if any valid objection is there, he may recall the order. On such order being issued petitioners are directed to surrender the original certificate.

It is submitted that the judgment is totally wrong and beyond the jurisdiction of the Honourable High Court. Mandamus is issued in this case against the express statutory provisions.

Chapter III of the Act deals with Registration of marriages celebrated. S. 16 laying down the procedure for registration reads:

"Upon receipt of an application signed by both the parties to the marriage for the registration of their marriage under this chapter, the Marriage Officer shall give public notice thereof in such manner as may be prescribed and after allowing a period of thirty days for objections and after hearing any objection received within that period, shall, if satisfied that all the conditions mentioned in Section 15 are fulfilled, enter a certificate of the marriage in Marriage Certificate Book in the form specified in the Fifth Schedule, and such certificate shall be signed by the parties to the marriage and by three witnesses", (emphasis supplied)

It cannot be gainsaid that the notice period of thirty days, as also hearing the objections are mandatory statutory preconditions to registration. In case of solemnisation of marriage under the Act also, similar words are used by the Legislature. Solemnising the marriage without such a notice makes the Marriage Officer criminally liable under S.46 of the Act.

The Honourable High Court does not have a jurisdiction to issue a direction against law. This position is settled beyond any doubt. It has been held:

"Under the constitution Mandamus can be issued by the court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party againstwhom the mandamus is sought... But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law”4

In Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd.,5 the Honourable Supreme Court observed:

"The power conferred by Arts.226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law ".

It was further held that:

"We cannot imagine anything more destructive to the rule of law than a direction by the court to disobey the laws".6

Humanitarian or equitable considerations also cannot be sufficient ground to ignore law and mandate its violation.

"Consideration of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a High Court to pass an order contrary to the law "7

Courts are bound to render justice in accordance with law. True we do find at times law and justice are distant neighbours. That is no reason to ignore law. If law is unjust, capricious, and arbitrary, there may be good ground to strike them down as unconstitutional. If permissible, they can be read down to fit in to the constitutional mould. But it is impermissible for the court to ignore law or to make law. To quote Justice Holms of the Supreme Court of the United States of America,

"... Judges must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially - they are confined to from molar to molecular motion "8

The judgment not only ignores the existing statutory provisions, but also ventures to add on to the statute a procedure which was never contemplated by the legislature. The Marriage Officer has no power under the statute to recall the certificate once issued. He is permitted to correct "any error in the form or substance of any entry in the Marriage Certificate Book " as per S.49 of the Act. The said provision cannot be stretched to include a power to recall or cancel a certificate.

Further, the Honourable High Court appear to have overlooked the provision in the Act dealing with a situation where a registration is made in contravention of any conditions specifiedin clauses (a) to (e) of S. 15. Under S. 24(2) of the Act, a declaration can be made that registration of such marriage is of "no effect". The jurisdiction for such a declaration is with the District Court as per S. 31 of the Act. In a bid to cater to the urgency of the newly wed, the Honourable High Court has conferred on the Marriage Officer, the power and jurisdiction otherwise vested in the District Court.

The power to review can only be conferred by statute and in the absence of an enabling provision, there cannot be a direction to exercise such a jurisdiction.9 Court cannot by its fiat create a non-existent jurisdiction.10

It may be noted that the Honourable Court has issued mandamus believing that Church Marriages are always flawless and done after scrutiny. The emigration authorities of other nations do not appear to be naive enough to have the same belief. It is a matter to be seen how they would accept a certificate issued by the Marriage Officer without the statutory procedure. If the church could be so believed with closed eyes, why are the emigration authorities reluctant to accept their certificate? If we reach a stage where the certificate issued by the Marriage Officer is also not acceptable to the emigration authorities, whose certificate will we have to produce to prove the marriage?

Viewed in this angle, does not the ruling do the general public more harm than good? Was it logical to compromise the executive's caution mandated by legislative wisdom on the ground of individual urgency?

Was it not better to require Mrs. & Mr. John Roji to wait?

_________________________________________________________________________

Foot Note:

1. Jayachandran v. State of Kerala, 2002 (3) KLT 125.

2. 2004 (1) KLT 687

3. I drew this inference because the judgment is dated 5.1.2004, the date on which the High Court reopened after the Christmas holidays and the case number (WP (C) 93/2004) indicates that it was filed on or after 1.1.2004.

4. State of U. P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309; See also Chingelput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Co., (1984) 3 SCC 258; U.P. Sales Tax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association, (1995) 5 SCC 716; CBSE v. Sunil Kumar, 1998 (1) KLT 929 (SC).

5. (1996) 4 SCC 453.

6. APCME Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 1490.

7. Council for Indian School Certificate Examination v. Isha Mittal and Anr. (2000) 7 SCC 512; State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph's Teachers' Training Institute, (1991) 3 SCC 87.

8. South Pacific v. Jensen, 244 US 205 (1917).

9. Chiranjilal Sahailal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 507; Sivakumar v. Sreekumar 2002 (2) KLT 354 (DB).

10. A.R.Anthulayv.S.Nayak,(1988) 2 SCC 602.

C´y³ \oXn-\ymb hyh-Øbv¡v
XmÂIm-enI aPn-kvt{S«v tImS-Xn-IÄ Hcp shÃp-hnfn

(ByFw.-F-³ a·-Y³, AUz-t¡äv, `mc-Xob A`n-`m-j-I- ]-co-£¯v kwØm\ kanXn AwKw)

kwØm\ kÀ¡mcnsâ 13.05.2014se 94/2014þmw \¼À Kkäv hnÚm-]\ {]Imcw kwØm-\¯v 27 Xmev¡m-enI aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡p-hm³ Xocp-am-\n-¡p-Ibpw Ah-bn ]e tImS-Xn-Ifpw {]hÀ¯\w XpS-§p-I-bp-ap-Im-bn. 13þmw [\-Imcy I½o-j³ cmPy¯v kmbmÓ tImS-Xn-Ifpw {]tXyI tImS-Xn-Ifpw Øm]n-¡p-¶-Xn\v A\p-h-Zn-¨n-«pÅ ^Ip]-tbm-Kn-¨mWv ta ]dª XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡p-¶-Xv. 27 XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-Ifn 24 F®w FhnsSÃmamWv F¶Xpw Sn hnÚm-]-\-¯n ]dªn«p-Iv.

24 tImS-Xn-I-fn ]Xn-\©v F®hpw Fd-Wm-Ipfw PnÃ-bn-em-Wv. Ah-bn H¶p-t]mepw \ne-hn-epÅ tImSXn tI{µ-§-tfmSv tNÀ¶n-«-Ã-Xm-\pw. \ne-hn-epÅ tIkp-I-Ä F{Xbpw s]s«¶v XoÀ¸v Iev]n¨v sI«n InS-¡p¶ tIkp-I-fpsS F®w Ipd¨v s]mXp P\-§-fpsS  _p²n-ap-«p-IÄ Ipdbv¡pI F¶p-Å-XmWv {]Jym-]nX e£yw. F¶m ]pXp-Xmbn PnÃ-bpsS hnhn[ `mK-§-fn-embnØm]n-¨n-«pÅ Xmev¡m-enI aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-IÄ ta ]dª {]Jym-]nX e£ywssIh-cn-¡p-¶-Xn\v ]cym-]vX-a-öpw adn¨v `cWLS\ hncp-²hpw ISp¯ a\p-jym-h-ImiewL-\-§Ä¡v  Imc-W-am-Ip-¶-Xpam-Wv. F´psImImWv \ne-hn-epÅ Øncw tImS-Xn-I-tfmSv tNÀ¶v ta ]dª tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡m-¯Xv F¶p-Å-Xns\ kw_-Ôn¨v ta ]dª hnÚm-]\w au\w ]men-¡p-¶p. s]mXp P\-§-fpsS kuI-cymÀ°-amWv hnhn[ t]meokv tÌj-³ ]cn-[n-I-fn tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡p-hm³ ImcWw F¶mWv A\u-tZym-KnIambn ]dªp tIÄ¡p-¶-Xv. F¶m tImS-Xn-IÄ {]tXy-In¨v {Inan-\ tImS-Xn-IÄ hnhn[ Øe-§-fnembn Øm]n-¡p-¶Xv sImIv s]mXpP\-§Ä¡v kuI-cy-t¯-¡m-tfsd km¼-¯n-I-ambpw AÃm-sXbpw IqSp-X _p²n-ap-«p-IÄ krjvSn-¡p-I-am-{X-amWv sN¿p-¶-Xv. ^e-¯n {]Jym-]nX e£yw ssIh-cn-¡p-¶-Xn\v ]Icw 13þmw [\-Imcy I½o-j³ A\p-h-Zn-¨n-«pÅ ^Insâ ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw am{X-amWv kw`-hn-¡p-¶-Xv. Hcp {]tXyI e£yw ssIh-cn-¡p-¶-Xn\v A\p-h-Zn-¡p¶ ^Iv e£ywad¶v GsX-¦nepw hn[¯n hn\n-tbm-Kn-¡p-¶Xv ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw am{X-am-Wv. Hmtcm tImS-Xn-IÄ  Øm]n-¡p-¶-Xn\pw Ahn-Sps¯ ASn-Øm\ kuI-cy-§Ä GÀs¸-Sp-¯p-¶-Xn\pw e£ IW-¡n\v cq]-bmWv D]-tbm-Kn-¡p-¶-Xv. \ne-hn-epÅ tImS-Xn-I-fnse ASn-Øm\ kuI-cy-§Ä hÀ²n-¸n¨pw Ah-tbmSv tNÀ¶v thW-sa-¦n IqSp-X tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n¨pw ssIh-cn-¡m-am-bn-cp¶ e£yw ad-¶mWv C¯-c-¯n s]mXpapX ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw sN¿p-¶-Xv.

Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-Ifpw {]tXy-In¨v Xmev¡m-enI \ymbm-[n-]³amcpw C´y³ \oXn-\ymb hyh-Øbv¡v A\p-Nn-Xhpw AXnsâ hnizm-ky-Xbv¡v If¦w DIm-¡p-¶-Xp-am-Wv.  sslt¡m-S-Xn-bpsS \nb-{´-W-¯n \S-¯-s¸-Sp¶ Fgp¯p ]co-£-bp-sSbpw CâÀhyq-hn-sâbpw ASnØm-\-¯n sXc-sª-Sp-¡-s¸-Sp¶ tbmKy-cmb \nb-a-_n-cpZ[mcn-IÄ¡v ZoÀL-Im-es¯ ]cn-io-e\w \ÂIn-b-Xn\p tij-amWv \ne-hn IogvtIm-S-Xn-I-fn ap³kn^v/aPn-kvt{Sävamcmbn \nb-a\w \ÂIp-¶-Xv. AhÀ¡v \nb-a-\-¯n\v ap³]v \ne-hn-epÅ \ymbm-[n-]³am-cpsS IqsS tImS-Xn-I-fn Ccp¯n tImSXn \S-]Sn {Ia-§-sf-¡p-dn¨v ]cn-io-e\w \ÂIp-¶p-Iv. F¶m ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ Xm¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn _lp`qcn-]-£-¯nepw \nb-a -_n-cp-Z-[m-cn-I-fmb tImSXn Poh-\-¡m-tcbpw aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-I-fnse F.-]n.-]n. amtcbpw BWv \ymbm-[n-]³am-cmbn \nb-an-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. CXv `c-W-L-S-\m-hn-cp-²hpw ISp¯ a\p-jym-h-Imi ewL-\-§Ä¡v Imc-W-am-Ip-¶-Xm-Wv. \ne-hn-epÅ Øncw tImS-Xn-I-fnepw ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ Xm¡m-enI tImSXnIfnepw Htc-X-c-¯n-epÅ tIkp-IÄ BWv ssIImcyw sN¿p-¶-Xv. ]ns¶ F´p-sImImWv Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn ]cm-Xn-¡m-c-\mtbm {]Xn-bmtbm lmP-cm-tIIn hcp-¶-h-tcmSv C¯-c-¯n-epÅ Hcp hnth-N-\-w Im«p-¶Xv F¶v hyà-a-Ã. \½psS `c-W-L-S\ A\p-im-kn-¡p¶ XpeyÀ¡v Xpey-]-cn-K-W\ F¶ auen-Im-h-Im-i-¯nsâ ewL-\-am-Wv. Øncw tImS-Xn-I-fnse \ymbm-[n-]³amsc Xnc-sª-Sp-¡p-¶-Xn\v thIn sslt¡m-SXn t\cn«v \S-¯nb Fgp¯p ]co-£-bnse aqey-\nÀ®-b-¯nse ]mI-]n-g-Isf tNmZyw sN¿p¶ tIkp-IÄ kp{]ow tImSXn hsc F¯n-\n-ev¡p-¶p F¶ ]c-amÀ°w \ap¡v hnkva-cn-¨pIqSm. Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fnse \ymbm-[n-]sâ ]cn-io-e-\-¡p-dthm AdnhvtISv sImtIm Pmayw \ntj-[n-bv¡-s¸t«m in£n-¡-s¸t«m PbnÂhmkw  A\p-`-hn-t¡In-h-cp¶ Hcp ]ucsâbSp¯v a\p-jym-h-Imi ewL-\-¯n\v BcmWv kam-[m\w ]d-bp-I. CXv `c-W-L-S\ A\p-im-kn-¡p¶ Hcp ]ucsâ Pohn-¡p-hm-\pÅ auen-Im-h-Im-i-¯nsâ IqSn ewL-\-am-Wv. ImcWw Pohn-¡p-hm-\pÅ Ah-Imiw F¶Xv sImIv am\y-ambpw FÃm \nb-a-]-cnc£-tbmSv IqSnbpw Pohn-¡pI F¶Xv IqSn-bmWv Dt±-in-¡p-¶-Xv. tImSXn Poh-\-¡m-tcbpw F.-]n.-]n.amtcbpw C¯-c-¯n \ymbm-[n-]³am-cmbn \nb-an-¡p-¶Xv t£{X-¯nse Ig-I-¡m-cs\ im´n-¡m-c-\mbn \nb-an-¡p-¶-Xp-t]m-setbm aqÀ¯n-bmbn {]Xn-jvTn-¡p-¶Xp t]msetbm BWv. aq¶v hÀj-¡m-e-t¯-¡mWv Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-Ifpw Ahn-Sps¯ Xmev¡m-enI \ymbm-[n-]³am-tcbpw \nb-an-¡p-¶-Xv. AXv Ign-ªm AhÀ¡v hoIpw ]gb Øe-t¯¡v aS-t§-In-h-cp-¶Xpw F´v A]-lm-ky-am-Wv. Hcp Iogvt¡m-SXn \ymbm-[n-]-\n \n¶v \mw {]Xo-£n-¡p¶ \njv]-£X, hnizm-kyX taÂt¡m-S-Xn-I-tfm-SpÅ {]Xn-]-¯nbpw Hcp Xmev¡m-enI \ymbm-[n-]-\n \n¶v DIm-Ip-sa¶v \ap¡v hniz-kn-¡p-hmt\m {]Xo£n¡phmt\m Ign-bn-Ã. AXp-sImIvXs¶ Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-Ifpw \ymbm-[n-]³amcpw C´y³ \oXn ]oT-§Ä¡v \ne-hn-epÅ hnizm-ky-Xbv¡v If¦w krjvSn¡pw F¶p-ÅXv XÀ¡-aä kwK-Xn-bm-Wv.

]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ Hmtcm tImS-Xn-I-fnepw  \ymbm-[n-]³am-cpÄs¸sS 10 Poh-\-¡m-sc-bmWv A\p-h-Zn-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. AXn ssS¸nÌv DÄs¸sS Bdv t]À 179 Znh-k-t¯¡v  IcmÀ ASn-Øm-\-¯n \nb-an-¡-s¸-Sp-¶-h-cm-Wv. \½psS tImS-Xn-I-fn Hcn-¡-se-¦nepw kµÀin-¨n-«p-Å-hÀ¡v Adnbmw F{X emL-h-t¯m-sS-bmWv sXmIn apX-ep-IÄ AhnsS kq£n-¨n-«p-Å-sX¶v.  knhn tIkp-I-fn \jvS-s¸-Sp¶ dn¡mÀUpIÄ ]p\xkwL-Sn-¸n-¡m-hp-¶-Xm-Wv. F¶m {Inan-\ tIkp-I-fnse sXmInap-X-ep-IÄ \jvS-s¸-Sp-Itbm amän ]Icw hbv¡pItbm sNbvXm-ep-Im-Ip¶ AhØ F´mWv  F¶p-ÅXv \ap¡v Adn-hp-Å-Xm-Wv. IcmÀ ASn-Øm-\-¯n tIhew 179  Znh-k-t¯¡v \nb-an-¡-s¸-Sp¶ Poh-\-¡m-cn \n¶v IqSp-X kpc-£n-XXzw \ap¡v {]Xo-£n-¨p-Iq-Sm. ]e _lp-cmjv{S I¼-\n-Ifpw Øncw Poh-\-¡msc \nb-an-¡p-¶Xpaqe-apÅ km¼-¯nI _m[yX Hgn-hm-¡p-¶-Xn\pw tPmen-IÄ F{Xbpw s]s«¶v sNbvXp XoÀ¡p-¶-Xn\pw ]pdw IcmÀ sImSp-¡m-dpIv. F¶m A¯cw \S-]-Sn-IÄ km[m-c-W-¡m-csâ Ah-km\ B{i-b-amb tImS-Xn-IÄ¡v H«pw tNÀ¶-X-Ã. tImS-Xn-bnse ¢dn-¡Â Ìm^n-s\bpw aäv Poh-\-¡m-tcbpw AhÀ¡v F´v hnZym-`ymk tbmKy-X-bp-Iv F¶ Hä- Im-c-W-¯m Ahsc \ymbm-[n-]³am-cmbn \nb-an-¡p-¶Xv s]mXp kaq-l-t¯m-SpÅ ISp¯ shÃp-hn-fn-bm-Wv. ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n¨ ]e Xmev¡m-enI aPn-kvt{Säv  tImS-Xn-I-fnepw FÃm- Zn-h-khpw knän-§p-IÄ DIm-Im-dn-Ã. Hcp aPn-kvt{Säv BgvN-bn Ht¶m ctIm Znhkw Hcp tImS-Xn-bnepw ASp¯ Znh-k-§-fn asämcp tImSXn-bnepw \ymbm-[n-]-\mbn Ccn-t¡-In-h-cp-¶p. Hcp aPn-kvt{Säv Hmtcm Znh-khpw Hmtcm tImS-Xn-bn Ccp-¶m sI«n-In-S-¡p¶ tIkp-I-fpsS F®w Ipd-bv¡p-hm³ Ign-bp-I-bn-Ã. ^e-¯n {]Jym-]n-X-e£yw ssIh-cn-¡m³ ]pXnb Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ¡v Ign-bp-I-bn-Ã. Xs¶-bp-aà kÀ¡m-dns\  {]Xn-\o-[o-I-cn-bv¡p¶ ]»n¡v t{]mkn-¡p-«-dpsS tkh\w Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn FÃm Znh-khpw e`y-aÃ. X·qew Pmaym-t]-£-IÄ t]mepw FÃm Znh-khpw ]cn-K-Wn-¡p-¶-Xn\v Ign-bm¯ Ah-Ø-bm-Wv. Hcp ]»n¡v t{]mkn-Iy-«ÀXs¶ ]e Øe-§-fn-epÅ aäv aPn-kvt{Säv tImS-Xn-I-fnepw t]mIWw X·qew Hcp tImS-Xn-bn-tebpw \S-]-Sn-IÄ icnbmb coXn-bn \S-¡p-I-bn-Ã. Hcp Znhkw am{Xw aPn-kvt{Säv  DÅ tImS-Xn-I-fn aäv Znh-k-§-fn Poh-\-¡mÀ¡v bmsXm¶pw sN¿m-\n-Ãm¯ Ah-Ø-bm-Wv.  F´p-sIm-ImWv ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n¨ tImS-Xn-IÄ PnÃ-bpsS hnhn[ `mK-§-fn A`n-`m-j-IÀ¡pw tIknse I£n-IÄ¡pw F¯n-tN-cm³ Hcp-t]mse _p²n-ap-«pÅ Øe-§-fn Øm]n-¨n-«p-ÅXv F¶Xv hyà-a-Ã. Hcp tIkv GXv tImS-Xn-bpsS A[n-Imc ]cn-[n-bn hcp¶p F¶Xv B tIkn-\m-kv]-Z-amb IrXyw GXv tImS-Xn-bpsS A[n-Im-c-]-cn-[n-bn hcp¶ t]meokv tÌj³ AXnÀ¯n-bn  kw`-hn¨p F¶-Xns\ ASn-Øm-\-s¸-Sp-¯n-bm-Wv. ]cm-Xn-¡m-c-sâbpw FXr-I-£n-bp-sSbpw hmk-Ø-e-hp-ambn AXn\v bmsXmcp _Ô-hp-an-Ã.-  Hcp t]meokv tÌj³ ]cn-[n-bn hcp-¶-hÀ B t]meokv tÌj³ ]cn-[n-bn am{Xta Ipä-IrXyw sN¿p F¶v Icp-Xm³ Ign-bn-Ã. Xs¶-bp-aà {Inan-\ tIkp-I-fn km[m-c-W- K-Xn-bn ]cm-Xn-¡m-c³ Ønc-ambn tImS-Xn-bn lmP-cm-tII Bh-iy-an-Ã. aäv tIkp-I-fn kÀ¡m-cmWv hmZn-`m-K-¯v. `qcn-]£w  tIkp-I-fnepw {]Xn-IÄ A`-n`m-j-IÀ apJm-´ncw At]-£-sIm-Sp¯p tImS-Xn-bn lmP-cm-Ip-¶-Xn \n¶v Hgn-hm-Ip-I-bmWv sN¿p-¶-Xv. ^e-¯n tIknse I£n-IÄ¡pw CXp-sImIv {]tbm-P-\-an-Ãm-Xm-Ip-¶p. kwØm-\-¯nsâ hnhn-[-`m-K-§-fn-epÅ Pbn-ep--I-fn \n¶v IÌUn{]Xn-Isf Hmtcm Ah-[n¡pw tImS-Xn-bn lmP-cm-¡p-¶-Xn\v t]meo-kn\pw _p²n-ap«v t\cn-Sp-¶p. ]e XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-I-fnepw Øncw knänwKv CÃm-¯-Xn-\m AdÌv sN¿-s¸-Sp¶ {]Xn-Isf hnhn[ tImS-Xn-I-fn lmP-cm-t¡I_p²n-ap«v  t]meo-kp-ImÀ¡v DIm-hp-¶p. taÂt¡mS-Xn-I-fn \n¶v e`n-bv¡p¶ Pmayw Iogvt¡m-S-Xn-I-fn  \S-¸m¡pt¼mgpw A`-n-`m-j-IÀ¡pw I£n-IÄ¡pw Hcp-t]mse {]mtbm-KnI _p²n-ap-«p-IÄ A\p-`h-s¸-Sp-¶p. ^e-¯n XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-I-fn \nb-an-¡-s¸-«n«pÅ Poh-\-¡mÀ¡v HgnsI aämÀ¡pw Imcy-amb {]tbm-P-\-anà F¶p-Å-XmWv kXyw. hmkvX-h-¯n kÀ¡mcpw _pl-am-\-s¸« sslt¡m-S-Xnbpw sNt¿-In-bn-cp-¶Xv \ne-hn-epÅ tImS-Xn-I-fpsS ASn-Øm\ kuIcyw hÀ²n-¸n-¡p-I-bm-bn-cp-¶p. thW-sa-¦n \ne-hn-ep-ff tImSXn tI{µ-§-tfmSv tNÀ¶v ]pXp-Xmbn Ønc-amb aPn-kvt{Säv  tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¡m-am-bn-cp-¶p. Aim-kv{Xo-b-amb ]cn-jvIm-c-§Ä aqew A`n-`m-j-I-tcbpw I£n-I-tfbpw t]mse tIkv ^b-ep-IÄ¡pw KXn-In-«msX tImS-Xn-I-fn \n¶v tImS-Xn-I-fn-te¡v Aeªv Xncn-tbIn hcp-¶p. tIhew aq¶v hÀj-¡m-e-t¯-¡mWv Xmev¡m-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. AXn-\Iw tam£w In«m¯ tIkv ^b-ep-Ifpw, I£n-Ifpw  hoIpw X§-fpsS ]gb emh-W-¯n-te¡v aS-t§In hcp-¶p. bmsXmcp hn[ ]T-\-§fpw  \S-¯msXbmWv kÀ¡mÀ ]pXnb tImS-Xn-IÄ Øm]n-¨n-«p-Å-Xv. Hmtcm  t]meo-kv tÌ-j-\nepw cPn-ÌÀ sN¿-s¸-Sp¶ ss{Iap-I-fpsS F®w F{X F¶p-t]mepw ]cn-tim-[n-¨n-«n-Ã.

]pXnb ]cn-jvI-c-W-§Ä aqew Ipd¨v A`n`m-j-IÀ¡v C¯-c-¯n-epÅ GsX-¦nepw tImS-Xn-I-fn tI{µo-I-cn¨v {]mIvSokv sNt¿In-h-cp-¶p. CXv Ah-cpsS `mhnsb {]Xn-Iq-e-ambn _m[n-¡p-sa-¶p-ÅXv XÀ¡-aä kwK-Xn-bm-Wv. Zqsc-bpÅ ]pXp-Xmbn Øm]n-¨n-«pÅ tImS-Xn-I-fnse tIkv \S-¯n-b-Xn\p tijw PnÃ-tI-{µ-§fntebpw aäv Ønc tImS-Xn-I-fnepw h¶v tIkv \S-¯p-hm³ Ign-bmsX hcpw. X·qew C¯cw A`n-`m-j-IÀ¡v knhn tIkp-IÄ ssIImcyw sN¿p-¶-Xn-\pÅ Ah-k-chpw \jvS-am-Ip-¶p. tIc-f-¯nsâ `q{]Ir-Xn, `qhn-kvXrXn bm{X-ku-Icyw F¶nh aäv kwØm-\-§-fp-ambn Xmc-Xayw  sN¿p-t¼mÄ \½psS tImS-Xn-IÄ ]e Øe-§-fn-embn Øm]n-¡p-¶Xv H«pw A`n-Im-ay-a-Ã. XmevIm-enI tImSXn-I-fnse aPn-kvt{SävamÀ A\p-`h]cn-N-b-an-Ãm-¯-hcpw Xmev¡m-en-I-ambn \nb-an-¡-s¸-Sp-¶-h-cp-am-b-Xn-\m C¯cw tImS-Xn-I-fn t]meo-kp-ImÀ ta[m-hnXzw {]I-Sn-¸n-¡p-¶-Xn-\pw, aPn-kvt{S-äpw, t]meokpw Ahn-Sps¯ Ipd¨v A`n-`m-j-Icpw DÄs¸-Sp¶ Hcp Ahn-ip² Iq«-sI-«n\v hsc CXv Imc-W-am-Ipw. F´m-bmepw Ime-an-{Xbpw \½psS \oXn-]o-T-§Ä Im¯p-kq-£n¨ \njv]-£-X, hnizm-kyX Ch \ne \nÀ¯n apt¶m-«p-sImIp t]mIp-¶-Xn\v XmevIm-enI tImS-Xn-IÄ Hcp shÃp-hn-fn-bm-Wv. hkvXp-X-IÄ  C§s\ Bbn-cns¡ tI{µ-kÀ¡mÀ A\p-h-Zn¨ ^Iv ZpÀhn-\n-tbmKw sN¿m³ Ignªp F¶-sXm-gn-¨m BÀ¡p-thIn AsÃ-¦n F´n\p thIn-bmWv Cu A\m-hiy ]cn-jvIm-c-§Ä F¶Xpw hyà-a-Ã. Hcp ^Iv D]-tbm-Kn-¡p-¶-Xn\v thIn H«pw Imcy-hn-Nmcw \S-¯msX kÀ¡mÀ kzoI-cn¨ \S-]-Sn-IÄ¡v _lp-am-\-s¸« sslt¡m-S-Xnbpw A\-phmZw \ÂIn-bn-cn-¡p¶p F¶Xv ZpJ-I-c-am-Wv. hfsc \nÀ`m-Ky-I-c-amb Hcp kwKXn _Ô-s¸-«-h-cmcpw Xs¶ CXv  IInà AsÃ-¦n C¶m-«p-Im-c-Ãm-sb¶v \Sn-¡p-¶p. tImS-Xn-Isf kw_-Ôn¨v ]d-bp-t¼mÄ hnizmkw AXtà FÃmw. AXp-sImIvXs¶ _Ô-s¸-«-hÀ¡v B hnizm-k-¯n\v ]m¼³]m-e-¯nsâ Dd¸v hcp-t¯I_m[y-X-bp-Iv. Cu sshInb thf-bn-se-¦nepw _Ô-s¸-«-h-cn \n¶v A¯-c-¯nepÅ Hcp \S-]Sn s]mXp-k-aqlw {]Xo-£n-¡p-¶p.