It’s my life

“It’s my life

It’s now or never

But I ain’t gonna live forever

I just want to live while I’m alive”

 “It’s My Life” by Bon Jovi released in the beginning of the millennium is an anthemic rock song that encourages personal empowerment and living life to the fullest. Interestingly the phrase finds mention and reference in the recent ruling authored by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, one of the Five Judges of Supreme Court who dealt with the issue of legal recognition of same sex marriage. Though his judgment was in minority alongside the judgment of C.J.I., Dr.D.Y.Chandrachud the reference added a cultural and emotional dimension to the legal perspective. Check his quote from the judgment Supriyo v. Union of India,-

“Legal recognition of non-heterosexual unions represents a step forward towards marriage equality. At the same time, marriage is not an end in itself. Our Constitution contemplates a holistic understanding of equality, which applies to all spheres of life. The practice of equality necessitates acceptance and protection of individual choices. The capacity of non-heterosexual couples for love, commitment and responsibility is no less worthy of regard than heterosexual couples. Let us preserve this autonomy, so long as it does not infringe on the rights of others. After all, “it’s my life.”

 The four lines of the song quoted as an end footnote convey a sense of personal empowerment and a desire to live life on one’s own terms, which resonates with the idea of personal autonomy and freedom emphasized in the judgment. Justice Kaul underscores the importance of recognizing individual choices and personal freedom in matters of love and relationships suggesting that individuals should have the right to make decisions about their lives and relationships without facing discrimination or restrictions based on their sexual orientation. The phrase “It’s My Life” serves to humanize and personalize the message, making it more relatable to a broader audience and highlights the emotional and human aspects of the legal issue at hand. It adds a layer of cultural relevance and underscores the universal desire for personal happiness and freedom in one’s life choices.

                                                                                          Short Edits by Ashly Harshad

                                                                                          Advocate, Supreme Court

Question of Condoning Delay in Preferring Claim Petition under Section 166 of M.V. Act in Kerala

(By A.S.Madhusudanan, Advocate, Thalasserry)

The Motor Vehicles Act was amended as per the Motor Vehicles (Amendment Act) 2019 and the amendment to Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act in respect of procedure for filing claim petitions came into force with effect from 01.04.2022. The amended
Section 166(3) introduced a period of limitation of six months for an accident victim or in case of his death his legal representatives to file a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The amended sub-section (3) of the Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act along with Section 166(4) (Section 166(4) was by and large present under the old un-amended Motor Vehicles Act also) presently reads as follows: -

Section 166-xxxxxxx

[(3) No application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident].

[(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under
[Section 159] as an application for compensation under this Act].

In Section 166 as it stood before Motor Vehicles Amendment Act, 2019, there was no provision for limitation since the provision providing for limitation, was deleted with effect from 14.11.1994 vide Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994. However, after the Motor Vehicles (Amendment Act), 2019, came into force,Section 166(3) has reintroduced a period of limitation of six months for preferring claim petition under Section 166. The sub-section (4)
of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that the detailed accidents report forwarded by the Investigating Officer shall be treated as an application for compensation under the Act.

The question is whether a claim petition can be filed beyond the prescribed period under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

In M.P. Steel Corporation v..Commissioner of Central Excise (2015 (2) KLT 996 (SC) = (2015) 7 SCC 58), the Apex Court held that -- Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals.

In ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company v. M.D.Davasia @ Jose & Anr.
(2019 (3) KLT 652 (F.B.)), the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court relying onVelunni
v. Vellakutty(1989 (2) KLT 227) and Asmath Khan v. Chandrahasa Bangara & Ors. (2006 (4) KLT 494) held that even though the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not a Court in the strict sense it has the trappings of the Court.

So if the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is considered as a Court, the Limitation Act can be made applicable to it and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act shall apply.

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act states:-

“29. Savings.—

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

Upon perusal of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, if a special Act or a Statute prescribes a different period of limitation from the period prescribed under the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, shall apply to such provision of the special Act or Statute only to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local laws.

In Akshay Raj & Ors. v. Ministry of Law and Justice Legislative Department & Ors.
(2023 (1) KLT 700) the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court held that -- There cannot be any bar for institution of the claim petition beyond the period of six months and that Section 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the Motor Vehicles Act. Hence when a claim petition is filed beyond six months, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal cannot dismiss the said petition in limine without issuing notice to the opposite party and without considering whether the delay is sufficiently explained.

What the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held vide the above decision is that the delay caused in filing a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act can be condoned by the Tribunal for if sufficient cause is shown for the delay caused in filing the claim petition.

A moot point to be considered is that by cursory reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act it is succinctly clear that the said provision applies only to appeals and applications other than an application for execution under Order XXI of the C.P.C. Hence Section 5 is not applicable to original proceedings and suits. It is highly doubtful that a claim petition can be considered merely as an application to bring it within the ambit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

However the said Judgment of the Kerala High Court has been subsequently
stayed by the Apex Court, vide Order dated 17.05.2023 in SLP(C) No.9152 of 2023.

In the light of the Apex Court staying the Judgment of the Honourable High Court of Kerala, it is doubtful whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal can entertain claim petitions under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act beyond six months.

It is worthwhile to peruse the decision of the Apex Court in Gohar Mohammed v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. (2022 (6) KLT OnLine 1192 (SC)) upon this aspect. The Apex Court in the above said Judgement has given several directions which can be broadly stated as follows--

●  Upon receiving information about an accident involving the use of a vehicle in a public place the Investigating Officer, investigating the accident must furnish the First Accident Report (FAR) in Form No.I within 48 hours; the Interim Accidents Report (IAR) in Form
No.V, within 50 days; complete the investigation within 60 days and file the Detailed Accidents Report (DAR) in Form No.VII within 90 days.

● Most importantly in paragraph No.40 of the said Judgment the Apex Court has observed that the claimant has three options in respect of claims under the Act. The first recourse is to claim for compensation in respect of no fault liability which is now under Section 164 of the Act. The second recourse is to file a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act which must be preferred within six months of the date of accident. Upon failure to seek the above two recourses, the third recourse is prescribed under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, wherein, the Detailed Accidents Report filed by the Investigating Officer shall be treated as an application under Section 166 of the Act and proceeded as provided under Section 166(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

● It was further held by the Apex Court that on filing the FAR, the Tribunal shall register a Miscellaneous Application and subsequently the IAR and the DAR shall be appended to the said application. The Claims Tribunal shall pass appropriate orders in the said application to carry out the purpose of Section 149 of the M.V. Amendment Act and the Rules. The designated officer of the insurer shall make an offer in respect of the claim.

● The Claim Tribunals have to satisfy themselves with the offer of the Designated Officer of the insurance company with an intent to award just and reasonable compensation. After recording such satisfaction, the settlement be recorded under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Amendment Act, subject to consent by the claimant(s). If the claimant(s) are not ready to accept the same, the date shall be fixed for hearing and affording an opportunity to produce the documents and other evidence seeking enhancement and the petition shall be decided. In the said event, the said enquiry shall be limited only to the extent of the enhancement of compensation, shifting onus on the claimant(s).

● The Apex Court has observed that in the event the victim has not opted to file an
claim petition within six months under Section 166 of the Act or an application under Section 164 of the Act, the option available under Section 149 of the Act is triggered and by treating the DAR as a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act, as provided by the Section 166(4) of the Act. In paragraph No.53 of the said Judgment the Apex Court has further stated that where the claimants have not filed an application under Section 166
of the Act, the miscellaneous application has to be treated as claim petition under
Section 166(4) of the M.V. Amendment Act and the Claims Tribunal is duty bound to decide such claim by following the procedure in accordance with law.

In the light of the directions made by the Apex Court in the said Judgment it is
apparent that in case where the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not filed within six months the alternative remedy may be to treat the Miscellaneous Application filed in pursuance of the FAR forwarded by the Investigating Officer after registering the FIR as the claim petition and under such an event where such a Miscellaneous Application is pending it is very doubtful whether the application filed beyond the prescribed period of six months can be entertained especially when the third option under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been triggered as laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court.

Old is Gold

Earlier mode of recruitment of Munsiff

And

Earlier mode of trial & Court proceedings

Some random thoughts solely based on practical experience at the bar

(By P.B. Menon, Advocate, Palakkad)

I got enrolled as an Advocate before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in 1950 and after nearly 2 years of practice before the High Court under my senior late K.Kuttikrishna Menon, the then Advocate General of Madras High Court, I came away to my native place Palakkad wherein I am practicing before the District and Subordinate Courts in Palakkad and this is my 74th year at the Bar.  I am still practicing in Palakkad Courts.

Regarding recruitment of Munsiff, a minimum of 7 years of experience at the Bar was the qualification for lawyer in earlier days i.e., in the course of 7 years with a senior one who is really interested in the profession can learn a lot of matters from the chambers of his senior as well as from the court, if one regularly attend the courts. Several matters not only concerning one’s own office of senior but from other seniors too, about as to how to behave inside the court and show respect to the court, how to address the Judge, the nature of cross examination which is a real art and discussion of case law etc.  One will be able to imbibe such practical aspects of the matter during this period.  For that one must be in the chamber of his senior as early as possible and in court from 11 A.M to 5 P.M. and not skulk away by lunch hour.  With this experience at the bar and with a little knowledge of law i.e., fundamentals of law which you imbibe from the court hall and senior’s chamber, you will be a fully qualified person to be recruited as a Munsiff.  I honestly believe that such a Munsiff will be an ideal successful Munsiff who will be able to dispose of the cases quickly and avoid docket explosion. To have a practical workable knowledge, experience at a trial court is ideal.  You will realise that the real foundation of a case is laid there in the trial court.  Three aspects are very important and vital in the proceedings of a case 1) pleadings, 2) cross exam, 3) arguments.  In earlier days I used to enjoy the thrill of cross exam and arguments which will be very short and to the points as that was the mode adopted by me.  Even now I continue but without the desired effect.  So when such a qualified person is appointed as Munsiff he will be able to understand the matter even at the stage of evidence recorded by him and after argument he will be fully equipped to dictate judgment. During the framing of issues such a trained qualified Munsiff will be able to understand what is matter involved in the suit i.e., a simple suit,  a suit without any substance or a complicated matter where question of law is involved and he can make some mark in the notes paper, so as to identify to which category such suit belongs to.

Regarding experience, let me refer to the recent judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2023(5) KLT 154 (SC) (Sivanandan v. High Court of Kerala) at page 172 - paragraph 48, which I may usefully quote:

“The Administrative Committee of the High Court apprehended that a candidate who performed well in the written examination, they though even fared badly in the viva voce would get selected to the post of District and Sessions Judge.  The Administrative Committee observed that recruitment of such candidates would be a dis-service to the public at large, because they possessed only “bookish” knowledge and lacked practical wisdom………...”.

Then what about green horns straight from the Law College without any practical knowledge or wisdom being recruited as Munsiff. Even after selection the so called training by the Kerala Judicial Academy is nothing but again lecture classes, I understand on various aspects of law and procedure.  Just like classes in the Law College.  Do they after such training get any experience of the working of the court i.e., practical knowledge, so as to effectually deal with the matter before them from a practical point of view. Can one say that such training course will be a proper substitute to their want of practical experience.  Hence I strongly feel that nothing but practical experience as a lawyer for a minimum period of 7 years under a senior lawyer should alone be the guiding factor in recruiting one as a Munsiff. Intelligence or bookish knowledge is not the criteria but only practical knowledge and experience.

In olden days a Munsiff will be promoted as a Sub Judge and conferred the power of unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction only after attaining the age of 45 years.  And that is based on the theory of maturity of a man or woman and not only intelligence.  In the present day that principle is seen followed only in appointing Family Court Judge who have to deal with family matters, with a human touch at the stage of retirement.

Now coming to trial of cases. I very strongly feel that the 1976 amended CPC was superb in the field and the worst is 2002 amended CPC; want of experience in a trial court is very well reflected therein.

Let us analyse and see whether the 2002 CPC or the old 1976 CPC trial is good and proper in the interest of justice with regard to a litigant.  First of all we have to understand that the court exist for them and not for lawyers and Judges.  It is their matter that is considered by a court of law.  Does a honest litigant get justice from the court is the prime matter to be considered as various courts exist to solve their problem and render justice. I strongly feel that it is not a fair trial that take place in a trial court in the present day but only a farce of a trial as per 2002 amendment of CPC.

Under the old code when the matter comes up for trial, the plaintiff opens his case and briefly summarise the facts and refer to documents on which he relies in support of his case.  Similarly the defendant too explain his case.  After such submissions are over the questions from the Judge, who has understood the matter as to what he has to decide, ask the counsel concerned, as to on what aspect the plaintiff or defendant want to adduce oral evidence if any i.e., matters not covered by the documents or any explanation or interpretation on the words or terms or other matters in the document. When the party or witness is put in the witness box the Judge will be able to curb and control unnecessary matters or questions being put to them. By the time entire evidence is over (trial will go on day to day and not like the present day a party or witness being examined during a period of week or after months) the Judge can dictate the judgment.  Unless there is some complicated facts or law involved in the case. This is the real mode of fair trial.

Justice ODGERS holds AIR 1927 Mad.524 that half of the case is heard when the evidence of the witnesses are recorded in open court.  In the olden days one would say that the Subordinate judiciary is the back bone of the entire judiciary.  It may not be out of place to mention that in olden days several judgments by Munsiff were being upheld by Privy Council after first, second and letters patent appeals are over. 

Now let me come to present day, a case is listed for trial and it comes up for hearing the plaintiff files a proof affidavit, it is nothing but the entire plaint as it is with the difference i.e., instead of plaintiff the wording is ‘I’.  when one such proof affidavit is received and copy served on the defendants an Advocate Commissioner is appointed to record the evidence of the party or witness and after recording, which often takes time, depending upon the convenience of the Commissioner and the counsel for both parties, the deposition and exhibits are submitted to court.

Very often the court is obliged to give direction to complete the recording of evidence within a particular time, this is regarding the evidence of the defendant also. When the entire evidence come to court the matter is posted for arguments. The present amended CPC provide for written arguments and so some Judges prefer oral submission, others written arguments or some both.  So if we analyse the procedure from the date of the plaint to reservation of judgment there is no oral submission by the counsel at any material stage of a case.  The court has only written matters before him to read and decide the matter in issue.  There is vast and vital difference in hearing a counsel regarding submission made by him and reading the recorded statements, like pleadings, deposition etc., nobody can dispute that fact; I believe.  Most probably, it saves time of the court but to what use, from the point of view of affected party, a litigant as we exist, for their sake to solve their problem and do justice to a litigant that, one should not forget.

Here also there is a peculiarity. In olden days whenever the matter is posted for arguments both sides will be there. Some times regarding misstatement of facts the other side intervene or during arguments the Judge will make a query or require an explanation.  All this takes place in the presence of the other counsel who is present in the court. So really it is a sort of all the three i.e., the two counsel and Judge being fully involved in a healthy discussion.  Now each counsel comes and argue at his convenience.When counsel at different dates argue the Judge may take down notes, but the real effect of mutual discussion in the presence of each other and clearing the doubts of the court is lost.  Suppose both parties file written argument after exchange of argument notes no sort of clarification, etc., take place and the concerned Judge who has to determine the matter reads both argument notes as well as the pleading and recorded evidence and give his/her verdict.  Thus is it a fair trial from the point of view of the litigant, who come to court for justice after paying court fee that take place at present.  Am I wrong, if I say that it is nothing but a farce of a trial. What else one can say about such a procedure prescribed for trial by 2002 CPC, want of experience of a trial court work is very much reflected therein under the guise of saving time.

One more aspect in this connection also arises.  After hearing both sides the matter is posted for judgment; the Judge after going through the case records and considering the arguments addressed, may feel that there is yet another aspect of the matter and so usually post the matter for clearing the doubts about the new legal aspect of the matter about which he had some doubts and which is not addressed to by both counsel. But at the present day it is reposted for judgment only for the purpose of getting time to pronounce judgment. In the olden days the date of delivery of judgment will be informed by written notice to each counsel and signature taken. This is for the purpose of calculating appeal time.  Now you have to go by A diary till it was changed to electronic device.

I strongly believe that this shortcut method arrangement in CPC is just to avoid docket explosion and not in the interest of justice.  But I am sure  that it had no desired effect and on the other hand it works great injustice to the litigants.

Regarding appointment of Commissioner in (1) partition work, (2) identity of property or other investigation work connected with that and 3) local inspection , what takes place in the present day in courts, really work hardship in certain matters.

One uniform practice adopted in olden days in appointing a Commissioner is:

(1) Commissioners are chosen from the counsel put in court hall (very often Commissioners are appointed from the panel before the court.  At present in view of the number of lawyers some totally proper criminal courts, but because their names are in the panel they are appointed Commissioner.  The result is, the party or counsel has to go in search of that individual and report him to take the warrant and inspect property if it is an urgent matter.

(2) Are any matter pending with you regarding commission work.

(3) To which office you are attached - this is to avoid the junior attached to the office where their senior appear in that case.

(4) to appoint Commissioners depending upon the nature of work.

True every lawyers office quotes Order XXVI Rule 9 for appointment of a commissioner, whether for local inspection, local investigation or partition work under F.D. Our Code provides for a provision for local inspection - See Order XXXIX Rule 7 and it is only for other matters one has to resort to Order XXVI Rule 8 C.P.C.

For any local inspection any counsel can be appointed with the work for they have to report, as to what they actually saw on the ground inspection and nothing else.

But it is not so for local investigation or partition work.  Service - seniors will be better and ideal for investigation or partition work.

I am sorry to state, that very many matters are pending in courts due to the lethargy of some Commissioners, of course non availability of Village Officer and Surveyor add to that situation.  So unless the Commissioner realises his duty to the court, it will cause unnecessary delay and hardship to litigants.  In this connection, I would like to refer to the observation of Hon’ble Justice B.Sudeendra Kumar in 2020(5) KLT 129 (Thankamani v. Vasanthi) para 16 regarding Kerala Judicial academy, which is really worthy of reading.

I always respect a court and Judges; it must be so I strongly believe.  I never criticize a Judge, but their judgments, I do.  On the basis and evaluation of the evidence and records they give their opinion or finding.  That will naturally be their understanding of the matter according to their standard of knowledge.  As they are equally qualified like a lawyer, one cannot attack the presiding officer for making a finding according to his views.  Hon’ble High Court and Apex Court Judges differ in their opinion .  Who can say who is right or who is wrong.  So as everybody knows, it is the finality of the decision of the Apex Court as on that date given and decide what the law is, on that point/aspect.

So in my humble opinion, we must always respect the court and the Judges of court with liberty to criticize their judgments but never the Judges.

Yet another aspect is about Section 89 CPC, that too does not have the desired effect.  The time consumed usually in the pretext of mediation is considerable.  Even otherwise without mediation or adalath, lawyers used to settle matter formerly.  Anyhow reference u/S.89 is not desirable as regards civil court matter but mediation, adalath etc., are good in motor accident cases etc.  If civil dispute are to be settled by Mediation, Conciliation or Arbitration then what is the necessity for various enactments relating to civil law.  Why should civil court exists.  We can have court of mediation, conciliation and arbitration who will decide all matters without recourse to the law involved in the case.  So if we go deep into the matter discussed above they are not in the interest of the litigant public.  What is really necessary is to curb the duration of civil cases by properly amending CPC.  Each State has power to amend provision of CPC and one who has practical experience of a trial court alone can efficiently deal with proper amendment of the code so as to cut short the life of a civil case.

I strongly feel that if we have a regular set of efficient trial court Judges, who have practical experience of a trial court and who has a little knowledge of fundamentals of law too, to a great extent the docket explosion could be successfully solved.

It is true that the present presiding officers of a court are over burdened with large number of cases before them every day. Calling alone consume considerable time till 12 or 12.30 P.M.  Then where is the time for trial work. Probably one working method will be to post only necessary few cases in the roster per day, so that trial could began by 11.30 A.M.  Of course in such a case, posting date will be far away after months of each case.  So best method will be more courts at each centre in the State of Kerala presided by experienced Judges.  Hon’ble High Court control the entire judiciary in the State and naturally necessary useful workable solutions have to be undertaken and adopted for efficient working of the subordinate courts, so that the litigant public will get justice.  At the filing stage itself if suits could be weeded out of course after giving an opportunity to the party a chance of hearing in support of his case in the interest of natural justice, it will considerably help docket explosion.

One who reads this article may accept, reject or differ according to his views on this subject, as what is presented herein is only my views based on personal experience.

Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession

(By Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam)

Abstract

●    When a claim of ‘Adverse Possession’ is raised in a suit, there lies difference
between (old) Limitation Act of 1908 and (new) Limitation Act of 1963, as regards (i) burden of proof and (ii) dispossession of true owner.

●    Under the 1963 Limitation Act –

      ● 1. The burden to prove Adverse Possession is upon the person who claims it.

      ● 2.“Dispossession of true owner“ is an important factor to attract Adverse Possession.

      ● 3. ‘Dispossession’ implies ouster itself. However, (i) the quality of evidence expected as to ‘dispossession’ in cases of adverse possession against a
co-owner, or in case of a permissive-possession, stands on a ‘higher footing’; and (ii) this is particularly discerned as ‘ouster’.

●    Under the old Limitation Act of 1908 –

    ●   1. The true owner lost the right to recover property if he did not come-forward   with a suit for recovery within 12 years (of losing possession).

    ●   2. Therefore, the burden to prove ‘possession within 12 years’ was upon the true owner.

   ●  3. “Dispossession” of true owner was not an essential element of Adverse Possession. However, the requirement of ouster, for attracting Adverse Possession,insisted in cases of permissive or joint possession.

The ‘Ingredients’ of Adverse Possession

The authoritative decisions of our Apex Court made it clear that the following are the basic elements (1963 Limitation Act) to attract Adverse Possession –

●    The claimant has been in ‘hostile and open, continuous uninterrupted as of right‘ possession of the land,

●    in denial of the title of the rightful owner,

●    adverselyto the interest of the owner of the land,

●    started with wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner,

●    exercising absolute rights of ownership in respect of the land, and

●    on and from.. . .. (date).

And, it is appropriate to plead ‘hostile and open’ possession as under:

●    Claimant’s acts werehostile enough to make the true owner aware of the adverse possession;

●    or, the claimant made the true owner knew as to his hostile acts or adverse possession (from the inception).

The celebrated decisions that analysed the ‘ingredients’ of Adverse Possession are –

●    Government of Kerala v. Joseph (2023 (5) KLT 74 (SC)).

●    Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur(2019 (3) KLT 865 (SC)).

●    P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007 (2) KLT OnLine 1115 (SC)).

●    T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa (2006 (3) KLT OnLine 1101 (SC)) and

●    Karnataka Board of Wakaf v. Government of India (2004 (1) KLT OnLine 1254 (SC)).

‘Dispossession‘ implies ouster

It is clear from the above decisions that ‘dispossession’ (of the true owner) implies ouster itself. However, (i) the quality of evidence expected as to ‘dispossession’, in cases of adverse possession against a co-owner, or in case of a permissive-possession, stands on a ‘higher footing’; and (ii) this is particularly discerned as ‘ouster’. (See: Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati  v. Prem Prakash (1995 (1) KLT OnLine 985 (SC).

What is ouster?

“Black’s Law Dictionary” explains ‘ouster’ as under:

●    “A putting out; dispossession; a motion of possession. A species of injuries to things real, by which the wrong-doer gains actual occupation of the land, and compels the rightful owner to seek his legal remedy in order to gain possession.

●    An ‘ouster’ is a wrongful dispossession or exclusion of a party from real property and involves a question of intent.

●    Notorious and unequivocal act by which one cotenant deprives another of right to common and equal possession and enjoyment of property.” 

Webster’s New World Law Dictionary expounds ‘ouster’ as under:

●    “Ouster: n. 1. The wrongful exclusion of a person from property or dispossession of same 2. The removing from office of a public or corporate official.”

In P.Ramanatha Aiyar’s “The Law Lexicon” with Legal Maxims, Latin Terms and Words & Phrases, (Second Edition 1997) it is laid down-

●    “Dispossession” implies ouster, and the essence of ouster lies in that the person ousting is in actual possession.

●    Dispossession implies some active element in the mind of a person in ousting or dislodging or depriving a person against his will or counsel and there must be some sort of action on his part.” (Quoted in: U.P. Gandhi Smarak Nidhi v. Aziz Mian (2013-3 ADJ 321, 2013-4 All LJ 149).

In “Mitra’s Legal and Commercial Dictionary” 5th Edition (1990) by A.N.Saha,‘Dis-possession’ is explained as under:

●    “The term ‘dispossession’ applies when a person comes in and drives out others from possession.It importsouster; a driving out of possession against the will of the person in actual possession.” (Quoted in:U.P.Gandhi Smarak Nidhi v. Aziz Mian (2013-3 ADJ 321, 2013-4 All LJ 149).

Legal Ramifications of ‘Ouster’ in Adverse Possession

The simple word meaning of the term ‘ouster‘ is dispossession, removal, eviction, deprivation etc. It is definite that “dispossession” is an important element in the 1963 Limitation Act to attract Adverse Possession.

Legal ramifications of ‘ouster‘ is examined inVidya Devi @ VidyaVati v. Prem Prakash (1995 (1) KLT OnLine 985 (SC)) It is held as under:

●    ”‘Ouster’ does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. It will, however,not be complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constituteadverse possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing theplea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are –

      ●  (i) declaration of hostile animus

      ●  (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster and

      ●  (iii)exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owner.

 ● Thus, a co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law.”

From Vidya Devi @ VidyaVati v. Prem Prakash it is clear that, in our law, ‘ouster‘ is a compendium of all ingredients to attract Adverse Possession.

Permissive Possession will not bring-forth Adverse Possession

When the old Limitation Act of 1908 reigned, our Apex Court, in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L.Lakshmi Reddy (1957 KLT OnLine 1401 (SC) following Debendra Lal Khan case
(1933-34) 61 IA 78 : AIR 1934 PC 23], observed as under :

● “4. … But it is well-settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one
co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ousterof the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse,should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir’s title. It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. … the burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession.” (Quoted in: Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikabhai Khengarbhai Harijan(2008 (4) KLT 357 (SC).

Amimus and Adverse Possession

●    InL.N.Aswathama v. P.Prakash (2009 (3) KLT Suppl.713 (SC) it is held – permissivepossessionor possession in the absence of Animus possidendi would not constitute the claim of adverse possession.

In Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1995 (1) KLT OnLine 902 (SC)  it is held – possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must showhostile animusand possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting thepermissive possession into adverse possession.

1908 Limitation Act – ‘Ouster’ Needed against co-owner (for adverse possession)

Under 1908 Limitation Act, the the true owner lost the right to recover property if he did not come-forward with a suit for recovery within 12 years.

●    ^{Note: (i) Under 1908 Limitation Act, ‘dispossession’ of true owner was not a necessary requirement to attract Adverse Possession. (ii) But, under 1963 Limitation Act, ‘dispossession’ of true owner is a decisive requisite to attract Adverse Possession.}

Permissive possession will not bring-in Adverse Possession. Therefore, under 1908 Limitation Act, plea and proof of ouster were insisted when one pleaded adverse possession against aco-owner; that is, positive and specific overt acts, ousting co-owner from possession, were imperative; and merehostile acts of adverse possession were not enough (See:Velliyottummel Sooppi v. Nadukandy Moossa (1969 KLT 121).

Privy Council in Coera v. Appuhamy(AIR 1914 PC 243) held as under:

●    “Entering into possession and having a lawful title to enter, he could not divest himself of that title by pretending that he had no title as all. His title must have ensured for the benefit of his co-proprietors.

●    The principle recognised by Wood, V.C. in Thomas v. Thomas (1856) 25 LJ Ch 159 (161): 110 RR 107 holds good: ‘Possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title’…..

●    His possession was, in law, the possession of his co-owners. It was not possible for him to put an end to that possession by any secret intention in his mind. Nothing short of ouster or something equivalent toouster could bring about that result.” (Quoted in: Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati v. Prem Prakash (1995 (1) KLT OnLine 985 (SC).See also: Kshithish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi (1981 KLT OnLine 1002 (SC).

Article 142 of the (Repealed) Limitation Act, 1908

Article 142 of the (repealed) Limitation Act, 1908, which dealt with Adverse Possession, did not put down the term ‘adverse’.

Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 reads as under:

Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided that the true owner would lose his right to recover the property from a trespasser if he failed to file a suit within the period of 12 years.

Article 65 of Limitation. Act, 1963

Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 brought-in completechange insofar as the onus of proof is concerned:

When these Provisions Attracted

●    Plaintiff must have been dispossessed by the defendant.

●    Both Acts deal with limitation for suits for recovery of possession.

Old Act of 1908 – Backdrop

●    Under the old Act of 1908, the true owner was bound to file suit for recovery (from a trespasser) within 12 years of losing possession (to continue the property).

●    In other words, under the old Act, the true owner would lose his right to recover the property if he failed to file a suit within the period of 12 years.

●    Under the 1908 Act, it was immaterial – whether the trespasser ‘acquired’ right of adverse possession against the true owner, knowing him and bringing his attention to the ‘trespass’ (as required in 1963 Act).

●    The requirement of ouster, for attracting Adverse Possession, needed only in case of permissive or joint possession, including that of aco-owner or of a licensee or of an agent.

New 1963 Act – Backdrop

●    Under the new Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 65), the true owner will lose title only if the trespasser proves ‘adverse’ possession for 12 years. Therefore the true owner has no burden to show possession within 12 years (as required under the old Act).

●    The new Act casts onus on the trespasser to prove claims of title by ‘adverse’ possession (knowing him and bringing his attention to the ‘trespass’).

●    Under the 1963 Act, adverse possession arises,only if dispossessionof true owner and only by the positive and hostile actsof the trespasser; and, mere possession is not sufficient (but, it must be ‘adverse’ to the true owner).

●   If no adverse possession, mere possession, of trespasser, however long, will not lose the right of the true owner (on the ground of limitation) to recover property on the basis of his title. (See: Government of Kerala v. Joseph (2023 (5) KLT 74 (SC); Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr.Nirmal Chander & Anr. (two-Judge Bench) (1984 KLT OnLine 1302 (SC), Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1995 (1) KLT OnLine 902 (SC),Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah (2019 (2) KLT online 3108 (SC).

Article 64 and 65 Analysed

Article 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read as under:

General

●    Plaintiff must have been dispossessed by the defendant (to attract both Articles).

●    Both articles deal with limitation for suits for recovery of possession.

●    Both are independent and apply two different situations.

●    In both cases the defendant can rely on his title or “perfection” of title by ‘adverse possession’ (without a counter claim – Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019 (3) KLT  865 (SC).

Article 64

●    Article 64 is based on previous possession of plaintiff (unlike Article 65 which speaks about Title).

●    Article 64 is not based on title of plaintiff (But, it can be possessory title).

●    Article 64 applies only if the plaintiff lost possession within 12 years (in other words, he must have been in possession of the property within twelve years prior to suit. (Tribeni v. Soaroop (AIR 1911 Raj.232).  

●    Under Article 64, it is unnecessary to inquire – whether the defendant’s possession was ‘adverse’. (Muhammad Amanullah v. Badan Singh (1889) ILR l7 Cal.137 (PC).

●    Under Article 64 the nature of the plaintiffs possession is not material. Article 65 specifically refers to “immovable property or any interest therein” whereas Article 64
mentions only “immovable property”. So the interest in immovable properly stands outside the scope of that article.

Article 65

●    Article 65 deals with recovery based on title.

●    Under Article 65 previous possession of plaintiff (within twelve years) need not be proved. It is immaterial. (Ramiah v. N.Narayana Reddy (2004 (2) KLT OnLine 1219 (SC), Jagannath Garnaik v. Sankar Samal (AIR 1990 Ori.124); State of Orissa v. Jhtnjhuntallo (1986 CLT 55).

●    Under Article 65, if plaintiff could prove his title, it would fail only if the defendant proves adverse possession over twelve years. (Bhushan Lal v. Suresh Kumar (AIR 1987 All.25), Manikyala Rao v. Narasimhaswrami (AIR 1996 SC 470).

●    Under Article 65, if plaintiff could not prove his title, he will fail (and in such a case, whether the defendant proves title or adverse possession is immaterial). (Ranjit Kumar Bhowmik v. Subodh Kumar Roy (2004) I WBLR 228 = (2004) 2 CHN 180).

●    Under Article 65, if only title of plaintiff is proved, then only adverse possession of defendant becomes a material point.

Burden/Onus of Proof – Complete change by Limitation Act, 1963

In the recent decision, Government of Kerala v. Joseph (2023 (5) KLT 74 (SC) our Apex Court observed that burden of proof rests on the person claiming adverse possession. The Court followed P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007 (2) KLT OnLine 1115 (SC)  which observed as under:

● “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned: once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession….”

Claim of Adverse Possession on Govt. Land – be Considered “More Seriously”

In the recent decision (August 9, 2023), Government of Kerala v. Joseph (2023 (5) KLT 74 (SC) our Apex Court has emphasised, that the Courts have to consider the question of adverse possession “more seriously” when it is claimed on a land that belongs to the Government. In this case, the judgment of the first appellate court which observed that ‘the title of the Government on land cannot be lost by placing reliance on “casual advertence” or on the basis of “scanty material” ’ was restored by the Apex Court. The Apex Court held –

●“When the land subject of proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to the Government, the Court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.”

Zo]mhen HmÀ½Ifn Hcp ]tcX³

(F³.APnXv, AUzt¡äv, ssltImÀ«v Hm^v tIcf, FdWmIpfw)

Rm³ ]me¡mSv Pnà IÃSnt¡mSv Awiw Icn¼ hntÃPv tZi¯v hmcns¯mSnbn ho«n ]mÀhXy¡mc³ ]ctaizc³ \mbÀ aI³ s]³jWÀ ZmtamZc³ \mbÀ Bbncp¶p cImbncmamIv \hw_À amkw hsc.

Xpem¸¯v Ignªv Ing¡³ ]mS¯p\n¶v hoip¶ XWp¯ Imäpw sImIv A¶p cm{Xn ]pX¸v H¶qsS hen¨v aqSn InS¶Xpam{Xw F\n¡v  HmÀ½bpIv. shfp¸n\v ktcmPn\n Im¸nbpambn h¶p hnfn¨t¸mÄ Rm³ FWoänÃ. A¶papX s]³jWÀ ZmtamZc³ \mbÀ ]tcX³ ZmtamZc³ \mbcmbn.

NS§pIsfms¡ Ignªv aI³ acWkÀ«n^n¡äpw sImIv FdWmIpf¯v h¡oens\ ImWm³ sN¶ncp¶Xv Rm³ At¶ Adnªncp¶p. BbIme¯v Hä¸mew ap³kn^v tImSXn apX hS¡v kp{]owtImSXn hsc A\´cmhIminIsf I£n tNÀ¡m³ HmSn \S¶n«pIv Rm³. A¡me¯v F{Xsb{X {]kvXmh\IfmWv kXyw kXyw F¶p ]dªv Rm³ kXyt¡mSXnIÄ ap¼msI lmPcm¡nbn«pÅXv Ft¶mÀ¡pt¼mÄ sNdnsbmcp hnjaw tXm¶mbvIbnÃ. tkh\Ime¯n\ptijw Xncnªpt\m«hpw acW¯n\ptijw Ip¼kmchpw \S¡nÃtÃm. Fsâ Imetijw aI³ _p²nap«cpXtÃm F¶p IcpXn FÃmw Ahs\ ap³Iq«n t_m[h¡cn¨ncp¶p. F´n\pw GXn\pw t_m[h¡cn¡p¶ Hcp Imeambncp¶tÃm AXv.

X\Xv I¿ncn¸v hlIfn sXs¡ I¿me apX Ing¡v Fs¯ a\ntÈcn IrjvW³ IÀ¯mhnsâ Nota\n¡Iw hscbpÅ aqt¶¡À hkvXp hm¡m ]Wbs¸Sp¯n N{µa¶mSnbmcpsS I¿o¶v ap¯Ñ³ Ipd¨v Imiv ISw hm§nbncp¶p. ta¸Sn hlIfpw kz´w hlIfpw H¶n¨v ssIhiw ImWn¨v kzm[o\ap]tbmKn¨v a¶mSnbmÀ thsdbpw hlIÄ]Xn¨phm§n F¶p am{Xaà Ime{Ia¯n ]WbhkvXp kwc£n¡msX A\ym[o\s¸Sm³ H¯misNbvXpsImSp¡pIbpw sNbvXp hnZzm³. ]WbhlIÄ _m²yXXoÀ¯v XncnsI ssIhiw Bhiys¸«Xv apX¡mWv AÑ\pw Rm\psams¡ hyhlmcnIfmbXv. A\ymbw  ^bem¡n A[nIw sshImsXXs¶ F\n¡v A\´cmhIminbmbn I£ntNcm³ lÀPn sImSpt¡Inh¶p. Aѳ A¡me¯v tPmemÀt¸« PwKvj\n _p¡n§v ¢À¡mbn tPmenbnembncp¶p. a{Zmkpw BÀt¡mWhpw tkehpw tPmemÀt¸«pw sdbnÂthbnse tPmenbpsaÃmw ]me¡ms« sNdp¸¡mcpsS Zp_mbnbmbncp¶p Rm³ A¶v IS¼gn¸pdw bp.]n. kv¡qfnepw ]me¡mSv tamb³knepw Hs¡ Bbn ]Tn¡p¶ Imew. an¡hmdpw Zo]mhen¡me¯mWv Aѳ Ipdt¨sd Znhkt¯¡v eoshSp¯v ho«n hcmdpÅXv. hcpt¼mÄ ssI\ndsb a[pc]elmc§fpw inhImin ]S¡§fpw ImWpw. h¶m ]ntä¶v \me©ps]«n eÍphpw Pnte_nbpsams¡bmbn t\sc FdWmIpft¯¡v Asæn Hä¸met¯¡v. h¡oe³amsc ImWm³ IqsS Fs¶bpw Iq«pw. Nnet¸mÄ tImSXnIfnepw tIdpw. XncnsI h¶m cm{XnIfn  tIÊpImcy§fpw tImSXn hntij§fpw h¡oe³amcpsS tIa¯c§fpw IYIfmbn Bthi¯n ]dªpXcpw. an¡hmdpw B IYIÄtI«v Rm³ Dd¡¯nte¡v hogpw. AXmbncp¶p ]Xnhv. Ip«n¡me¯v Rm³ tI« IYIfnse cma\pw cmhW\pw D¯c\pw AÀÖp\\pw IenZzm]c³amcpw FÃmw Xs¶ tImSXnIfpambn _Ôs¸«hcmbncp¶p. Fsâ a\Ênse tImkehpw anYnebpw KmÔmchpw Ipcpt£{Xhpw {]`mkXoÀ°hpsams¡¯s¶ It¨cnhf¸pIfmbncp¶p. CuizcawKes¯ tXhsc¡mÄ AÑ\v _lpam\w Hä¸mew kºvtImSXnbn A¶pImbncp¶ Hcp \¼oi³ PUvPnsb Bbncp¶p.

Hcn¡Â tImSXnbnÂsh¨v AÑsâ h¡oent\mSv "\n§Äs¡mcp tIÊpanÃ..... ssIt¿msSXÅm\pÅsXbpÅp...... shdpsX kabw sa\s¡Sp¯m³.......' Fs¶ms¡ ]pѯn ]cnlkn¨ FXnÀ`mKw h¡oent\mSv \¼oi³PUvPn ]dªpht{X..... "\½Ä I¿nseSp¡p¶ Hmtcm sI«nepw Hcp k¦SapIv. KXnb©pw ap«pt¼mgmWv HcmÄ AbmfpsS ssZ\ymhØ FgpXn¸nSn¸n¨v tImSXnbnse¯p¶Xv. CXnsem¶panà F¶p]dªv Hähm¡n tIÊvXÅm\à t\mt¡IXv. ]cn[n¡pÅnÂ\n¶p sImIv AbmfpsS {]iv\¯n Fs´¦nepw ]cnlmcw sNbvXv sImSp¡phm³ km[n¡ptam F¶mWv \½Ä  aq¶mfpw {iant¡IXv. AXv ad¶pIqSm ........

A¶psXm«v \¼oi³ PUvPn AÑ\v [À½tZhsâ AhXmcamWv........ AXnam\pj\mWv........ km[mcW P·§Ä¡p C{X DbÀ¶v Nn´n¡m\mhnÃt{X....

At§sc¸än ]dbpt¼mÄ AÑ\v \qdv \mhmbncp¶p. tIkvtZmjambn. tImSXn Nnehv klnXw XÅn. AXv thsd Imcyw. tIkv tZmjambXn AÑ\v H«pw a\kvXm]hpw DImbncp¶nÃ.

AÑsâ a\Ên \¼oi³ PUvPnsâ X«v XmWpXs¶bmbncp¶p acWw hscbpw.

AÑsâ A¸oen Ahkm\hmZw tIÄ¡mdmbt¸mtgbv¡pw Rm³ hnIvtSmdnbbn _ncpZ¯n\vtNÀ¶ncp¶p. hmZw tIÄ¡m³ Rm\pw t]mbncp¶p. ]me¡ms« tImSXnbn I®{¼¡mc\mbncp¶ Hcp D®nPUvPn BWv A¶v hmZw tI«ncp¶Xv. BZy Znhks¯ hmZw Ignªv \à I\apÅ sI«v Xmtg¡v sImSp¯t¸mÄ s_©v IvfmÀ¡v, Xr¸mfqcpImc³ Hcp i¦c³, sI«v hm§n Xmtg¡p Htcdv. D®nPUvPn B sI«v i¦cs\s¡mIpXs¶ FSp¸n¨p.

""i¦cm ......tIkvsI«v Xsâ If¯nse tX§ Fdnbp¶t]mse Fdnbm\pÅXÃ. AXmWv Xsâbpw Fsâbpw tNmdv. AXnseI£nIfpsS PohnXhpw, X\n¡p X«n¡fn¡m³ Xe¸´pt]mtc ...........hÃhtâw PohnXw thtWm...”

B tNmZyt¯msS D®nPUvPn\v Aѳ a\Ên cImas¯ A¼ew ]WnXv ]ßan«ncp¯n. hey tImSXoev Ft¯IBfmbncp¶p F¶v Aѳ CSbv¡nsS s\SphoÀ¸nSpw. A¡me¯v aI\mb F\n¡v ]n.Pn.¡v AUvanj³ In«m¯XneÃmbncp¶p AÑ\v at\mhnjaw. D®nPUvPn dn«bdmbn t]mbXnembncp¶p AÑ\v k¦Sw. Rm³ Ct§m«v t]m¶t¸mftà Imcy§Ä a\ÊnembXv. ]tcXmßm¡Ä¡p Xmakn¡m³ ^vfmäpIfpw hmbn¡m³ t]¸dpw Snhnbpw sse{dnbpsams¡ bnhnsSbpIv. ]tIacn¨pt]mb eo¨pw, thbvUpw, F´n\v `mjyw A¿¦mcpw Y¡dpw FÃmhcpw ChnSpIv. D®nPUvPv Ct¸mgpw aq¡ns¸mSn \nÀ¯nbn«nÃ.

AÑsâ tIkv Ime§tfmfw Xocpam\amImsX InS¶p. hniz\mY¿cpw inhi¦c¸Wn¡cpw Hs¡bmbncp¶p AÑ\pthIn hmZn¨Xv. A¡meambt¸mtfbv¡pw AÑ\v I®pw ImXpw a\Êpw icochpw Hcpt]mse £oWn¨ncp¶p. CwKvfojv tImSXnbmbXpsImIv ImÂkmbn¸mb Fs¶ IqsS Iq«mdpIv As¶ms¡. I®pw ImXpw t]mb [rXcmjv{Scmbn AÑ\pw XÂkab kwt{]jWw \S¯m³ kRvPb\mbn Rm\pw. ]eh«w amän sh¨v Ahkm\w almcY³amsc FÃmhscbpwIqSn H¯pIn«nbXv Hcp hymgmgvNbmbncp¶p. shÅnbmgvN GtXm Hch[n. Xn¦fmgvN Zo]mhen apS¡w.

s_©n tKm]me³ \¼ymÀ, aqÀ¯nA¿À kJyw tIkv tIÄ¡m³ X¿mdmbn Ccn¸mWv. FXnÀ `mK¯v tZhky h¡oen\pw ssX¡mSn\pw aqÀ¯n A¿À kzmansbbpw Pbnwkv h¡oens\bpw Hcpt]mse kpJn¸n¡Ww. A¶s¯ tIkv F§s\bpw amäWw.

""Zo]mhensbms¡btÃ........ tIkv ASp¯bmgvN tIÄ¡mw C¶p thI......amäWw''. aqÀ¯n kzman H¶v CfIn¨ncn¨p. ]XnhnÃmsX \¼ymÀ kmÀ aebmf¯n Hcp {]tbmKw.

"" h¡ote........\½psS ap¶nte¡v k¦Shpambn hcp¶ \qdpIW¡n\v BfpIfn HcmfpsSsb¦nepwapJ¯pw a\Ênepw kt´mj¯nsâ Hcp ssI¯ncn I¯n¡m³ Ignªm Bbncw XncnsImfp¯p¶ Zo]mhentb¡mÄ  Xnf¡w AXn\mhntÃ........ ]nt¶bv¡v hbvt¡I....... C¶pXs¶ tIt«¡mw..... XpS§nt¡mfq.....''.

apIfn \n¶v tI« hm¡pIÄ AtX]Sn Rm³ [rXcmjv{SÀ¡v ]dªptIĸn¨t¸mÄ I^wsImIv aªsI«nb B I®pIfn Hcp Xnf¡w Rm³ IIp. Fsâ I®pIfpw sNdpXmsbm¶v \\ªp. Bbnc§fpw ]Xn\mbnc§fpw tIÄ¡m³ B{Kln¡p¶ hm¡pIÄ.

hn[n\S¯v XpS§n A[nIImeambnà AXn\papt¼ tIkn Rm³ A\´cmhIminbmbn I£n tNÀ¶p. ....tPmenbn Ibdn....... hnhmlw Ign¨p........hoSpsh¨p..... aI³ P\n¨p. hkvXp Af¶pXncn¨v I¿nÂIn«nbXnsâ ]ntä¶v Aѳ ap¯Ñsâ cImw`mcybnepImb aI\mWv cImw hnhmlw km[phà Fs¶ms¡¸dªv tZhkzwt_mÀUnse iin lÀPnbn«p. AXp]ns¶ ]pInembn.......cIpaq¶ph«w FdWmIpft¯¡v htcInh¶p. B lÀPn XoÀ¸m¡m³. AXn\nSbv¡mWv A¶p]peÀt¨ Rm³ acn¨Xv. hlIÄ \S¯n¡n«nsb¶pw aI³ ssIt¿msS AsXms¡ skbvXmen¡v hnäv kwJy _m¦nens«¶psams¡ the´mhf¯vsh¨v temdn CSn¨pacn¨ Ipamc³ h¶p]dªt¸mgmWv AdnªXv. AÑs\¡mfpw Fs¶¡mfpw sNdpaI\v _p²nbpsI¶v t_m²yambn.

C¶pw Zo]mhen¡meambm Ccn¸pdbv¡nÃ. ]gb B cmwtaml³sIm«mcw C¶nÃ. lÀPn Xp¶ns¡«n s]«nbnen«v HmÀUÀ hm§n Ihdnen«v X¶ncp¶ A¨pth«³ ChnsS skmd ]dªncn¸pIv. ]Iv Xmsg hoW t]\ Ip\nsªSp¡m³ aSn¨ncp¶ in¦nSnIÄ I¼yq«dpw em]vtSm¸pw sImIv HmSn\S¶v ]WnsbSp¡p¶XpImWm³ Nne Znhk§fn aq¸cv B tImWn¨ph«n t]mbn \n¡p¶Xv ImWmw. Hmtcm Zo]mhen¡me¯pw Rm³ aqÀ¯nkzmanbpsS B Nncn I®nÂImWpw. \¼ymÀkmdnsâ B hm¡pIfpw.

"".........ap¶nte¡v k¦Shpambn hcp¶ \qdpIW¡n\v BfpIfn HcmfpsSsb¦nepw apJ¯pw a\Ênepw kt´mj¯nsâ Hcp ssI¯ncn I¯n¡m³ Ignªm Bbncw XncnsImfp¯p¶ Zo]mhentb¡mÄ  Xnf¡w AXn\mhntÃ........''.

HmÀ¡pt¼mÄ Cs¶sâ I®v \ndbmdnÃ. Ct§m«v t]m¶hÀ¡v hnImc§fnÃtÃm...........

FÃmhÀ¡pw Cu ]tcXsâ Zo]mhen BiwkIÄ.