On Mercy-Killing !

(By T.G. John, Advocate, Thrissur)

Fifty year old William Chanslor was a prominent attorney of Texas (U.S.A.) and was the President of the City's Trial Lawyers Association. He prepared his briefs well, had good forensic talents and had an amiable nature. In 1979 however he had a cruel blow- his pretty wife, 42 year old Susanne had a paralysing stroke and her suffering had a strange impact on him.

It was at this time that his legal research took him to a five volume set of books "How to Kill" written by John A. Minnery. In the book Minnery counselled on everything from the use of clubs to home made atomic weapons, wiring a urinal to accomplish swift electrocution, portable drills that can easily penetrate skulls, spines or heart muscles. Minnery advised killers to keep their crimes simple and stated that clobbering a victim over the head with a typewriter usually proved very effective. He also dealt with varying methods of poisoning. Morality played little part in Minnery's text but he claimed that the book was designed as an investigative aid to police officers and military personnel.

After reading the volumes, the Texas lawyer, got some 'ideas'. He had a bizarre plot to kill his wife by poisoning 'to end her agony'. He contracted the author of the book at his Ontario home. Between October and March of that year the two men had half a dozen telephone conversations about poison. Chanslor first enquired about killing animals and then revealed that his intended victim was human - 42 years old and partially paralysed and moving in a wheelchair.

When Chanslor asked Minnery to procure poison for him, Minnery went to the police. Chanslor and Minnery finally met in April at the Toranto Air port where Chanslor was introduced to another 'expert' on poisons - who was actually a policeman named Keith Simmons posing as a man with access to poisons. During an hour long conversation in the Air port lounge, taped and photographed by the Canadian Police, Chanslor detailed his mission. When asked whether the victim would co-operate by committing suicide Chanslor lamented "It is an impossibility......I am stick of waiting for this bitch is really getting on my nerves".

After discussing several poisons and rejecting them - because they leave traces - the men decided on ricin, a toxin more powerful than cobra venom; it is extremely rare and produces a slow convulsive death. It is also virtually impossible to detect: Minnery assured Chanslor that an autopsy would attribute the death only to a stroke, heart attack or uremic failure. Chanslor also said that he planned to give the poison to the victim at bed time and inquired how long he should wait before calling his neighbors for help -'Eight to ten hour's was Minnery's ready reply.

Two weeks later, P.C. Symmons who was posing as another poison expert, delivered to Chanslor a yellow capsule (which actually contained only some Vitamin B) along with a surgical mask, gloves and Tweezers to ensure that Chanslor did not touch or inhale the 'poison' at the time of administration! In the presence of Minnery, Chanslor paid the police constable 2000 dollars for the help. Fully satisfied with his plan, Chanslor stepped into his 1981 - Lincoln. And then it happened-the police surrounded the car and arrested him.

At the trial, the accused did not dispute the facts, only their interpretation- arguing that mercy, not murder, was on Chanslors' mind. The Jury however took only three hours to return its verdict. Susanne, the wife of Chanslor, took the stand and pleaded that her husband need not be sent to prison- 'I can't live without him' she wept. Her mercy mission had some effect. The jury rejected the prosecution's recommendation for 16 to 20 years in prison and awarded a sentence of only three years making him eligible for parole in one year.

Unconstitutional Walk-Out

(By T.P. Kelu Nambiar, B.A.M.L.)

We find news-papers reporting every day or every third day that the Opposition staged a walk-out from the Assembly for one reason or the other. This walk-out is certainly on exhortation by the Leader of the Opposition. Here, the Leader forgets the Constitutional oaths taken by him and his duties under the Constitution. On a survey of the matter, I am inclined to take the view that such walk-outs are unconstitutional. I should think that this topic is of tremendous validity in these days. Therefore I have decided to take it out of my casket of silence.

A member of the Legislative Assembly represents a particular territorial constituency as provided for in Article 170 of the Constitution of India. Let it be noted that a Member of the Legislative Assembly is not a representative of only the electors whose votes enabled him to succeed; once elected, he becomes the representative of the particular territorial constituency as such. Like that, when elections are held to all the territorial constituencies of the State, the members elected collectively represent the entire State.

When a person offers himself as a candidate for election to the Legislature of the State, he is bound to take a Constitutional oath/affirmation as provided for in the Third Schedule to the Constitution of India. The oath/affirmation is as follows:

"I,...............having been nominated as a candidate to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly, do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to die Constitution of India as by law established and that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India."

Before taking seat in the Legislative Assembly on his election, the elected Member has to take a Constitutional oath/affirmation. This is also provided for in the Third Schedule. The oath/affirmation is as follows:

"I,.........having been elected a member of the Legislative Assembly do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India and that I will faithfully discharge the duty upon which I am about to enter." (underlining supplied).

The Constitution includes within the functions of the Legislature, the function of expressing the opinion of the people, the function of informing the people of what it does, the function of properly teaching the public as well as the functions of legislation and finance. Bagehot has spoken of the expressive function, the teaching function and the informing function of the House of Commons. Same are the functions of a Legislature of a State. The Legislature "is a sounding-board" of the State's grievances and opinions; legislators are expected to create without destroying; and, according to John Stuart Mill, who spoke of the functions of the House of Commons, it is an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion. The Members of the Legislature who do not hold ministerial office need the political will to do more than simply sit in or quit from the Legislature. The proper office of a representative Assembly, in the words of Mill, is to watch and control the Government; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to censure them if found condemnable; and, if the men who compose the Government abuse their trust or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of die nation, to expel them from office. But, not to run away from the Legislature off and on. When the Opposition walks-out of the Assembly the political party/parties running the Government will not have to face any opposition; and several business would be taken up and completed in the absence of the Opposition, without any discussion and difficulty. That is facilitated by the intermittent out-door peregrinations of the Opposition. Nothing is gained by such exit; but many things are lost. No profit it derived; but huge loss is incurred. When the Legislative Assembly is in session, the duty of a Legislator is inside the Assembly, not out-side. True to his oath, he has to faithfully discharge the duty upon which he had entered, as a Member of the Legislative Assembly. He cannot run away from that duty, whatever be the subject of consideration, - be it pivotal or peripheral, major or marginal, profound or profane. Such act of running away is verily unconstitutional: and breach of the Constitutional oath. Running away from duty cannot be equated to registering a protest. As representatives of territorial constituencies, the Members of the Legislative Assembly owe duty to the people of the respective territories by representing them in the Assembly. This is a Constitutional duty.

Have the members of the Opposition ever considered the question as to whether their boycott of the Assembly is liked or disliked by the people who have facilitated their entry to the Assembly.

The above are some of my thoughts on an important constitutional aspect. In fact, this topic is fit to be made one for public discussion, because the public are the persons affected by the Legislators keeping away from the Legislative Assembly, thereby remaining on the wrong side of the Constitution.

I should even think that there should be a law enabling the people of the territorial constituency to call back their member who runs away from his duty to the people, and that, in violation of the Constitutional oath taken by him. When the Irish tenants joined together and declared that they had nothing to do with Captain Charles Boycott of Country Mayo in order to coerce him to lower rents in hard times, they would never have contemplated that future legislators in India would run away from their duties in the name of Captain Charles Boycott. Erskine May and Charles Boycott are verily strangers.

Negotiable Instruments Act, Chapter XVII Defeats the Purpose

(By Advocate S.A. Karim, Thiruvananthapuram)

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is century old one. By Amendment Act, 66 of 1988, Chapter 17 has been introduced in the main Act. This Chapter is only ten years old. It contains Ss.138 to 142. The amendment intends to discourage the unscrupulous dealings in cheque and to get back the cheque amount to the payee or the holder in due course. Before the amendment, the Act was under civil jurisdiction. After the amendment, it came to criminal jurisdiction. If one does not follow the section of this Chapter, remedy lies in the civil side. This chapter underwent various interpretations by various High Courts and the Supreme Court. Thus, this Chapter became the life blood of commerce and the Act itself. Still the real purpose is not served.

The drawer, drawee and the payee or holder in due course are the parties of a cheque. Normally, the victim is the payee or the holder in due course. This chapter intends to get back the cheque amount to the payee or the holder in due course. It never happens. S.138 reads-

"Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it, exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both".

Under this section, once an accused is found guilty, he shall be convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a term or impose fine. The payee or the holder in due course does not get the cheque amount. The case is instituted on a complaint by the payee or the holder in due course under S.142 of the same chapter. The Section further speaks the formalities to be followed. If he knows, he will not get the cheque amount, he will not file complaint and instead fall back to the civil side. The victim comes to the criminal court for speedy remedy and to get the amount and save money and time. The enlightened Parliament has never intended to make the treasury richer with private money. It is the undesired effect of this chapter. As this chapter comes under criminal jurisdiction, the Criminal Procedure Code applies. It is true S.357 of the Code provides compensation. It is only discretionary. In order to serve the intention of the Parliament, it requires a provision to get the cheque amount and expense to the payee or the holder in due course.

A Reply to "Abolish C.A.T. - Sooner the Better"

1998 (1) KLT 88 Journal

(By Advocate Govindh K. Bharathan)

The Article published in 1998 (1) KLT 88 - (Journal) purportedly written by Sri. K. Srinivasan Nair who claims to have been a former Judicial Officer and Additional Director of Public Prosecutions calling for abolishing the Central Administrative Tribunal is offensive in tone, erroneous in fact and law and is in contempt of the Honourable Central Administrative Tribunals of the land. It is obvious that the intention of the article is to offend and not to instruct. The sheer lack of investigation on the part of the author is reflected in the palpable errors of fact in the article. Erroneous facts and misconceived misapplications of the questions of law have been passed into service in support of the authors claim that Central Administrative Tribunals should be abolished as they are "while elephants" and have failed to fulfil the tasks for which they were created in the first instance.

By recommending the abolition of Tribunals and the transfer of all cases to the High Court, the author has apparently not understood the very concept of the development of Administrative Adjudication. The article recommends a great leap backward to the days when Administrative Tribunals were criticised by jurists like Dicey and Hewart. Those criticisms may have been valid at that stage of the development of law. But times have changed and the gargantuan growth of administrative law, which was a necessary concomitant of industrial progress, and the phenomenal growth of State control into all aspects of life changed the very basis of the rule of law. The immediate result was the growth of a vast bureaucratic set up. Matters relating to service conditions of employees of the State acquired proportions which the High Courts of the land found difficult to handle within the limits of the extra ordinary jurisdiction vested in them Art.226 of the Constitution. Again, the very texture of the contentions put forth by Government Servants regarding their service conditions, often defied the limitations inherent in the exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution, even taking into account the ever widening vistas that liberal interpretation had opened out to Court's power to issue high prerogative writs.

It was under these circumstances that Administrative Tribunals were created. Administrative Tribunals have come to stay as evident from an over-view of the development of law all over the world. Such Tribunals exist in the United States, the United Kingdom and France and their working has added a new facet to the very concept of the dispensation of justice. Their performance revealed a fresh and approach to the problems arising from service conditions of Government servants. They proved to be untrammelled by the strait-jackets of conventional Judicial process where the emphasis was on procedure and precedent, delaying and thereby denying the justice intended to be dispensed.

Perhaps the Author has not heard of Art.323-A of the Constitution whereby Parliament has been empowered to create Tribunals to deal with complaints regarding recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State. The makers of our Constitution obviously anticipated the necessity for such Tribunals, foreseeing phenomenal arrears which could clog the speedy and effective flow of justice. The recommendation in the article to abolish the Central Administrative Tribunal displays a dismal lack of knowledge of the way courts function. The conclusion of the author show that he is unfamiliar with the working of the Central Administrative Tribunals. He also appears not to have assimilated the tone, content and import of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandrakumar's case (AIR 1997 SC 1125).

In Chandrakumar's case, the 7 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court clearly laid down that the fact that some Tribunals were not functioning up to expectations could hardly be the basis for holding that their very creation was unnecessary and their foundation unsound. The Bench clearly laid down that the reasons for which the Tribunals were constituted still exist (para.89). There was also a clear finding that the views of the Malimath committee which recommended that alternative institutional mechanisms like Tribunals be abandoned and High Courts themselves be divided into separate divisions for different branches of law were not suitable to the present context. The 7 Judge Bench reiterated that the reasons for the constitution of the Tribunals not only continue to persist but have become even more pronounced in our times. While bringing Tribunals under the jurisdiction of High Courts under Arts.226 & 227 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court stressed that to hold that Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving Constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. The Bench laid down that while raising the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in High Courts under Art.226/227, it would ensure that frivolous claims were filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal and the High Court would also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which would be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. Thus, there is no legal, factual or reasonable basis to conclude, as has been done by the learned author of the article that "one more tyre" (sic) has been added to the system which will cause more delay.

The 5 Judge decision in Sampath Kumar's case (AIR 1987 SC 386) has been integrated and incorporated into the larger bench decision in Chandrakumar's case and the criticism regarding the working of Tribunals in Sampath Kumar's case has been blended into the final decision in Chandrakumar's case where the emphasis was on improving the quality of judicial review of Tribunals and not on their abolition. The subtleties of these two nodal rulings have evidently escaped the judicial appreciation of the learned author in the article. He has also failed to understand the constitutional mandate of .Art. 141 of the Constitution that the law laid down by the Supreme Court becomes the law of the land. To cite Chandrakumar's case in support of the learned author's recommendations to abolish Tribunals thus amounts to clear misinterpretation of this land mark ruling, which can be either a result of non-assimilation of the tone and content of the judgment or a deliberate attempt to misapply the ruling in an effort to substantiate a wrong proposition of law.

The attack in the article seems to be not so much against the Central Administrative Tribunals and their functioning as against the Chairman and members of the Tribunals and the perks and pay scales they enjoy. It seems that the Author is unaware of S. 6 of the Administrative Tribunal's Act, 1985. The position of Vice Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunals has been equated by the Author to the District Judges. S.6 of the Act lays down the qualifications for appointment of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Judicial Member of the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The relevant portion of S. 6 of the Act is reproduced below:

6. Qualifications for appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Members:-

(1)   A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Chairman unless he-

a)    is, or has been, a Judge of High Court; or

b)    has, for at least two years, held the office of Vice-Chairman: (xx)

c)     x           x             x             x

2)     A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Vice-Chairman unless he-

a)    is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of High Court; or

b)    has, for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India; or

(bb) has, for at least five years, held the post of an Additional Secretary to me Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Additional Secretary to the Government of India; or

d)    has, for a period of not less than three years, held office as (a Judicial Member or an Administrative Member).

3)     A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judicial Member unless he-

a)    is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of a High Court; or

b)    has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that Service for at least three years.

The Section is elaborate and exhaustive and would have merited at least a cursory reading by the author before he asserted that Vice Chairman of Central Administrative Tribunals are in the position of District Judges. And it is with this innocence of the Law that the Author presumes to recommend the abolition of Tribunals, which have been established under the mandate of Art.323 of the Constitution.

One cannot but discern the faint taste of sour grapes that pervades the article. But what is really distressing is the apparently disturbing attempt to quote wrong facts and to misinterpret the judgments of the Supreme Court and of our own High Court on this matter. For instance, it is patently wrong to state that 48,000 cases are pending adjudication before the Central Administrative Tribunals. This is obviously an incorrect and over-inflated figure and the statement that the figure has been taken from 'news paper reports' without mentioning the names of the news papers which are claimed to have so reported, shows a cavalier approach hardly becoming of a reasoned judicial opinion.

As a matter of fact, the actual position is totally different. The present pendency of cases before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench is in the vicinity of 1300 as on 1.8.1998 of which about 65% of the cases are one year old, 30% of the cases are 2 years old and barely 5 % of the cases are over two years old. Even assuming but not conceding that the improbable figure of 48,000 is anywhere near the correct figure, the pendency per Tribunal throughout the country would be about 2,800 cases since there are 17 Benches of the Tribunals in the various States. The pendency of cases before the High Courts on the other hand is about one lakh per High Court (on an average). Statistics is a dangerous weapon in the hands of the unscrupulous especially when cited with seeming confidence.

Before departing from the subject, one cannot shake off the impression that the concluding portions of the article constitute an oblique attack against the Chairman and Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal. These remarks are in effect half-truths and innuendo and should not have found a place in any article dealing with an important constitutional subject like the necessity for Administrative Adjudication through Tribunals.

I would conclude by saying that much more investigation and introspection should have gone into such an article before it was presented for publication. Whatever be the intention of the learned author, the effect of such an article on the litigating public is too serious to remain unrebutted.

Gender in Equality in Partition

(By Jacob P. Alex. VIII Semester Student, School of Indian Legal Thought, M.G. University, Kottayam)

Introduction

"All are equals but some are more equal than others", wrote Orwell decades back in Animal Farm. We are about to cross the 20th century and seeking the gate pass to enter into the 21st century. Political parties make occasional vibrations for codification of personal laws but, some community is against it and a major section favours it. Those who argue for codification of personal laws are silent about the gender discrimination created by S.23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Mrs. Mary Roy was successful in getting her right to partition of intestate property - notwithstanding the then existing Travancore Christian Succession Act and Cochin Christian Succession Act. The Apex Court of the land held that provisions of the Indian Succession Act will apply to Christians in Kerala. The personal law is to be untouched by the provisions of the Part III of the Constitution [1]. The Supreme Court has not given any reasons for this proposition and the declaration of the Supreme Court reasoned or unreasoned is always binding.

If Christian Law relating to succession in middle Travancore and erstwhile Cochin can be changed I wish to bring to the notice of the legal luminaries in the Bench and Bar, the Law Commission and the Parliament, the glaring discrimination created by S.23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which runs as follows:

Where a Hindu intestate has left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule and his or her property includes a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of his or her family then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the right of any such female heir to claim partition of the dwelling house shall not arise until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein, but the female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein.

Provided that where such female heir is daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow.

Object and Reasons - Whether a justification?

It is seemingly with the object of preventing fragmentation or disintegration of family dwelling house that the aforesaid provision is enacted. It is unnecessary to quote the plethora of decisions for brevity. In the under noted cases[2] it was very clearly mentioned that the sole object of S.23 is to prevent fragmentation of the dwelling house. Authoritative treatises on Hindu Law also repeat the very same object. But it should be noted that this enactment was passed in the year 1956 and the Parliament had in mind the provisions of Partition Act 1893. Yesteryear's India is not today's India. The Hindus particularly in Kerala and that too the so called "Janmies" (landlords) had extensive lands of immovable properties which were snatched away through the Land Reforms Act, a revolutionary change made by the State of Kerala. If this provision is retained the female heirs will find it very difficult to get their share unless the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares. In order to attract S.23 the following requirements should be satisfied (1) A male or female dies intestate. (2) The heirs include female heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule. (3) The deceased leaves a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of his or her family.

Dissection of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Anatomy of Gender Discrimination

1. If the object is to prevent fragmentation of the dwelling house the male members should also be prevented from claiming partition. Whether the fragmentation could happen only in the hands of female heirs? If S.23 is intended to prevent partition of the dwelling house then logically it should have been prevented both at the hands of male and female heirs. Unfortunately the wordings of S.23 being only designed against female heirs it ipso facto results in discrimination.

The expression "until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares" will result in a quite unhappy situation and the female heirs will be constrained to wait until all male heirs divide the property before enforcing her right to partition. The Smritikars[3] were of the view that the dwelling house should not be partitioned [4]. Though this was the clear and sole intention, gradually the unfortunate expression "'at the instance of female heirs" has been included which will be a violation of the equality principle. Even after the death of the father a female daughter cannot get her share of property on account of the stumbling block created by S.23. So the Section is manifestly discriminatory and still worse than the provisions of the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin Christian Succession Acts.

2. Recently the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narasimha Murihy v. Susheela Bai[5] gives a "thought provoking" logic behind S.23 and held that S.23 restricts the right of a female heir to claim partition of the family dwelling house so long as the male heirs do not choose to effect partition of the same, it was also held that due to marriage the daughter would leave the parental house and get transplanted into the matrimonial home. It is inferred that daughters will loose their affection towards their parental home after marriage.

Are daughters less anxious and less reverential to preserve the dwelling house to keep the parental memory alive than the male heirs? The object of preventing fragmentation can be thwarted or defeated by a male member and they can fragment the dwelling house which the female heir cannot. And I fear the paragraph Nos.14 to 18 of the above said decision in Murthy's case[6] would be criticized as an example of male chauvinism.

The object of preventing disintegration of a dwelling house at the instance of a female heir who may become an outsider by marriage cannot be fully achieved. The son of predeceased daughter who is a class 1 heir and who is an outsider of the family can claim partition under law. This section prevents only the daughter(s) or female heir(s) of the predeceased from claiming partition. If that is so how can the object of preventing fragmentation be achieved?

The statutory interdict which prevent females from claiming partition until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares is unfortunate. And in this situation, the law is leaning heavily in favour of males. If there is only one male heir, he can successfully obstruct the right of female heir(s) for ever by resorting to S.23 of the Act. In such situations the right to partition of a female will be permanently postponed and will be ultimately frustrated.

Hence, it is submitted that the object of S.23 cannot be fully achieved and the same will only result in denying the rights of female heirs. This section will only help to throttle the dream of equality.

3. The proviso of S.23 is a still more obnoxious provision which only offers stark contradictions and disparities. There are eight class 1 female heirs i.e., (i) daughter (ii) widow (iii) mother (iv) daughter of a predeceased son (v) daughter of a predeceased daughter (vi) widow of a predeceased son (vii) daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased son (viii) widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son.

But I am afraid whether the drafts-man was in deep slumber as there are many disparities. The object itself cannot be achieved in all situations and daughters are blatantly discriminated. So, I am forced to submit that the above retrograde provision which is outmoded must be given a decent burial.

1. Lastly I request the Parliamentarians to repeal S.23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

2. I request the Feminist Organisations and allied associations supporting them to take up this matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

3. I appeal to the Law Commission to recommend repeal of the obsolete provision.

_________________________________________________________________

Footnotes:

1. Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir (AIR 1980 SC 707)

2. a Janabai Amma v. Palani Mudaliar(T.A.S.1981 Mad.62)

  b V. Mallikarujuna Rao v. C. Sivasankara Prasad (AIR 1981 AP 84)

  c Mookkammal v. Chithravadiammal (AIR 1980 Mad.243)

  d Arun Kumar Senyal v. JnanendraNath SenyaI (AIR 1975 Cal.232)

  f Sanjaya Kumar Das v. Smt. Maya Dutta (AIR 982 Cal. 222)

  g Smt. Usha Majumdar v. Smt. Smrithi Basu (AlR l988 Cal.115)

3. Manu IX 219,MitaksharaI,IV, 16-17)

4. Mitakshara I,iv,21.

5. Narasimha Murthy v. Susheela Bai (AIR 1986 SC1826)

6. Ibid