A Comment on 1995 (2) KLT 659 - Poulose v. State of Kerala

(Crl. R.P. No. 524 of 1992 Decided on 21st September 1995)

(A.K. Radhakrishnan Librarian, Advocate General's Office,  Ernakulam)

It is seen from the above judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala that the petitioner in the Crl. R.P. (Accused) was acquitted by the Hon'ble High Court for the offence u/S.279 I.P.C. for the only reason that the prosecution did not examine any doctor to prove the nature of the injuries sustained by the injured in the accident. This is clear from the last sentence in Para.7 of the judgment which reads thus "As the prosecution did not examine any doctor to prove the nature of injuries sustained by the injured the petitioner is entitled for an acquittal u/S.279 I.P.C. also."

It may be recalled that in order to prove an offence u/S.279 I.P.C. the prosecution is not bound to prove the injury sustained by the injured. As a matter of fact the offence u/S.279 IPC is not for causing any injury but for rash or negligent driving on a public way. This is evident from Section 279 I.P.C. which reads thus "Rash driving or riding on a public way:- whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both". On a reading of the section it cannot be stated that hurt or injury is to be caused in order to attract the offence. Nowhere In the section it is stated so. To constitute an offence u/S.279 IPC it must be established that the accused was driving a vehicle on a public way in a rash or negligent manner to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. So, mere rash or negligent driving or riding likely to cause hurt or injury is sufficient. Bare negligence involving risk of injury need be established. In other words, bare negligence involving risk of injury is punishable criminally u/S.279 IPC eventhough nobody is actually hurt by it. What is made punishable u/S.279 IPC is the manner of riding or driving of any vehicle on public way. In order to attract the offence u/S.279 IPC it is not at all necessary that the rash or negligent act should result in injury to life and property. It is also not even necessary that any person was on the road at the time. The court may take into consideration the probability of person using it being placed in danger. If that so, there cannot be any acquittal for the offence u/S 279 I.P.C merely for the failure of the prosecution to prove the nature of the injuries sustained to the injured. The question of causing hurt or injury does not arise at all. In order to prove an offence the prosecution need only prove that the accused drove the vehicle on a public way in a rash or negligent manner as to endanger human life or to likely to cause hurt to any other person. It may be recalled that the Hon'ble High Court has not stated in the judgment that the prosecution failed to prove that. On the other hand it was only for non examination of the doctor to prove the nature of the injuries sustained by the injured the accused was acquitted.

In this context it is relevant to note that for causing hurt to any person by doing an act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life one is punishable u/S.337 IPC. There is also provision for punishing the offender for causing grievous hurt in the manner stated above. The same is punishable u/S.338 IPC. In these circumstances it is respectfully submitted that one is not entitled for acquittal for an offence u/S.279 I.P.C. merely for failure of the prosecution to examine any doctor to prove the nature of the injuries sustained by the injured.

Can the Supreme Court Issue a Writ of Mandamus

to the Legislature or to its Delegate

(K. Balakrishnan, Advocate, Kochi)

It is settled law that the Courts cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Legislature to enact any legislation or to amend any legislation in any particular manner. The same principle will apply in issuing directions to the Government, while it is acting as a delegate of the Legislature. This submission is supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1971 SC 2399 (Narindar v. Lt. Governor, U. T. of Himachal Pradesh). The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:—

"The power to impose a tax is undoubtedly a legislative power. That power can be exercised by the legislature directly or subject to certain conditions, the legislature may delegate that power to some other authority. But the exercise of that power, whether by the legislature or by its delegate is an exercise of a legislative power. The fact that the power was delegated to the executive does not convert that power into an executive or administrative power. No court can issue a mandate to a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly no court can direct a subordinate legislative body to enact or not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact"             (para.7)

No one can have any dispute that the service conditions of subordinate judicial officers should be improved and they must be free from wants so that they can be truely independent. No man can be independent, unless he is free. Therefore, the directions issued by the Supreme Court to improve the service conditions of judicial officers in All India Judges Association's Cases ((1992) 1 SCC 119 and (1993) 4 SCC 288) are the need of the hour. But can the Supreme Court go to the extent of saying that the Rules governing service conditions including that of age of retirement should be suitably amended to give effect to those directions. Rejecting the arguments on behalf of the State Governments, the Supreme Court has reiterated that it can issue directions to the Governments and the Legislatures to amend the Rules relating to service conditions of judicial officers.

It is most respectfully submitted that the said proposition laid down by the Supreme Court does not appear to be correct. The legislature does not owe to any one any duty to frame any law in any particular manner and no one can claim any right to the performance of such a duty by the Legislature. Therefore, the pre-requisites for the issue of a mandamus are absent. Further, courts do not issue futile writs. In the light of the privileges contained in Arts.105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution of India, the members of the legislature are not answerable to any court for voting in any particular manner inside the House. So, a mandamus issued against a Legislature can in no way be enforced as no contempt proceedings can be initiated against a member of the Legislature for voting or for not voting in any particular manner inside the House.

The same principle will apply to subordinate legislation also. Suppose the Supreme Court directs our State Government to amend Rule 60 of Part 1 KSR by making a provision that the age of retirement of Judicial Officers shall be 60 and the Government framed a Rule to that effect and placed it before the Legislative assembly as mandated under S.2(2) of the Kerala Public Service Act, 1968. If the Legislature passes a resolution disapproving the said amendment, the court will be helpless to enforce its writ against the members of the House who disapproved the proposed amendment.

The Apex Court may make a declaration that the Rule regarding the existing age of retirement of Judicial Officers is unconstitutional on the ground that it is treating unequals equally and thereby violating Arts.14 & 16 oftheConstitutionofIndia.lt may also make a declaration that, since the Constitution has respectively provided the age of 65 and 62 for retirement, for the Supreme Court Judges and High Court Judges, a retirement age comparable to them alone will satisfy the requirement of Arts.14& 16. It may even declare that the prescription of age limit below 60 will be clearly unreasonable. But the direct issuance of a mandamus against the Legislature or its delegate will amount to transgressing the constitutional limits demarcating the respective fields for the different organs of the State.

Christian Law of Succession

(By Sebastian Champappilly, M.A., LL.M., Advocate, Ernakulam)

Intestate succession among Travancore-Cochin Christians has been a subject of public debate ever since the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mary Roy's case [1]. It appears that the decision has created considerable confusion not only among the members of the Christian community in Kerala-, but also among the lawyers. Till the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Travancore Christians were governed by the provisions of the Travancore Christian Succession Act, 1916 and (he Cochin Christians were governed by the provisions of the Cochin Christian Succession Act, 1921. Christians in other parts of India were governed by the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 with such exceptions as provided in the Act. It was in this settled state of affairs that the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered the decision in Mary Roy.

Mary Roy and its Reasoning

The question that arose, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, for consideration was whether the provisions of the Travancore Christian Succession Act were ultra vires the Constitution. Another related question that was raised before the court was as to the impact of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951, on the Travancore Act. The court decided the case holding that the Part B States (Laws) Act excluded the operation of the Travancore Act and thereby obviated the need for examining the first question on the constitutionality of the Act. It took the view that by virtue of Section 6 [2] of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951, and the inclusion of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in the schedule to that Act, the Travancore Christian Succession Act stood repealed from the appointed day under the Part B States (Laws) Act, i.e., 1-4-1951. Hence, it reasoned, the law applicable to intestate succession among Christians of Travancore area of the State of Kerala is the Indian Succession Act, 1925, from 1-4-1951. Following this decision, the High Court of Kerala ruled that the Cochin Christian Succession Act, 1921 also stood repealed by Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 [3]. Though these courts did not expressly give retrospective effect to the judgments, the mere declaration that the Travancore and Cochin Acts stood repealed on 1-4-1951, gave these judgments retrospective effect overturning the then existing law and practice among the Travancore-Cochin Christians.

Problems Arising out of Retrospective Effect

The Christians of Travancore and Cochin conducted their property transactions in the belief that they were governed by the provisions of the Acts of 1916 and 1921, respectively. The Travancore-Cochin High Court in 1951 [4] and the Madras High Court in 1978 [5] affirmed and reaffirmed that the Travancore Act still remained in force, inspite of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951. When the Hon'ble Supreme Court declared in 1986 that, that was not the law, the property transactions of Christians in both testamentary and intestate happen to be illegal.

These decisions have had another impact. Under the Travancore-Cochin Acts probating of wills was not mandatorily applicable to the Travancore-Cochin Christians. But under S.213 of the Indian Succession Act it was mandatory for the Christians to get their wills probated. Therefore, as a consequence of the decision, family settlement deeds based on wills that were not probated have suddenly become invalid in view of the application of S.213 with effect from 1-4-1951 [6]. In the case of intestate succession partitions or family settlements made in accordance with the pro visions of the Travancore Act also became defective. Such documents, now, cannot be used as securities for financial transactions, and further, daughters (sisters) who were excluded from the share, (under the provisions of the Travancore or Cochin Acts) can now re-open the matter both for genuine and mala fide reasons. In short, many a title deed in the hands of Christians remain defective and this would adversely affect the stability and progress of the community, as all the settled property relations may have to be unsettled and resettled.

An argument has been advanced that there are not many cases arising in the matter of Christian intestate succession consequent on the decision of the Supreme Court, and that the law of limitation would put an end to all surviving claims and the matter is only to be ignored, as now the Christian community is not opposed to giving equal share to women in the matter of intestate succession. This complacent conclusion is not sustainable as evidenced by case law. The High Court of Kerala recently upheld the claim of a women for share in the property of her father, though she was married in the year 1950 and intestacy occurred in the year 1944. The matter came up for consideration before the High Court in 1988. [7] In yet another case, the High Court upheld the right of the woman for streedhanom alone [8]. There seems to be no consistancy in the approach of the court in these matters. The problems created by Mary Roy are thus still alive. There are instances of misuse too. In a recent case, a brother who excluded his sister from the sharing of property, pledged the document relating to his property as security for a loan. On default of payment, the bank instituted a suit and the property was sold in execution. When delivery of the property was to be effected, the sister, apparently at the instance of her brother, filed a suit claiming her rights in the property and moved for stay of delivery of the property [9]. In short, there are difficulties arising out of the decision in Mary Roy, as limitation cannot be effectively established in many cases.

Historical Background

In this context, in order to have a better appreciation, it may be appropriate to look into the historical background of the development of the law of succession among Christians of the former princely states of Travancore and Cochin. The Christians [10] of Travancore and Cochin followed the Hindu Law in matters of succession. Christian women, whether married or not, were excluded from inheritance, even if they had no brothers. Thus, the parent's property passed over to males belonging to a very remote degree of consanguinity and even in the transverse line. This is evident from the decrees of the Synod of Diamper, 1599 [11]. The Synod by its 20th decree, declared that this mode of succession to be contrary to natural equity and wholly unlawful and decreed that the property must be equally distributed among sons and daughters, [12] Disobedience to this decree was declared to be a sin and whoever refused to observe this law or to make restitution was to be excommunicated beyond all hope of absolution, until he obeyed the decree and made restitution [13]. The mode of succession was one of the chief customs which the Synod tried to change. The letters written by Francis Roz, the first Latin Bishop of the native Christians, to his religious superior in Aquaviva, recount that it was not possible to get the native Christians to observe the decrees of the Synod which related to ancestral customs. Thus inspite of a threat of the highest form of religious punishment, the native Christians of Travancore and Cochin could not be compelled to change their customs relating to succession to property and the community continued to follow their own customs in matters of succession.

While so, in 1906, the Travancore High Court had an occasion to consider the customary law of succession among Christians [14]. In this case the widow of a Syrian Christian, who died intestate without issue, claimed to be the sole heir to his estate. The mother also claimed to be the sole heir and the court found that there was no specific rule to resolve the dispute. Therefore, the court decided the matter by applying the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1865. In the very same year in another case [15] a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court held that in matters of succession, the principles of the Indian Succession Act would apply. This was followed in another decision [16] in the year 1907 also. By now, the court have had occasions to consider the questions of succession relating to almost all Christian denominations and the final position of law as established by the precedent was that though there was no enacted legislation, as a matter of applying the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the principles embodied in the Indian Succession Act, 1865 would apply to the Christians in matters of Succession.

Codification of the Law

It was in these circumstances that the law was codified in Travancore by the Travancore Christian Succession Act, 1916 and in Cochin, by the Cochin Christian Succession Act, 1921. Obviously the legislature had in mind the earlier decisions rendered by the court and codified the law in accordance with the customs prevailing in the Christian communities. This is evident from the preamble to the Act, which categorically declared that it was being enacted to consolidate and amend the rules of law applicable to intestate succession among Indian Christians [17]. These enactments could thus be deemed to have been made after considering the customary law as well as the decisions rendered by the Courts, applying Indian Succession Act, 1865 wherever relevant to the Christians. Therefore it could be concluded that by the time these provincial enactments consolidating the then existing law and practice came into force, the Indian Succession Act, 1865 was hot to be applicable to the Travancore-Cochin Christians.

The Advent of the Indian Succession Act

In this context it is worth-while to examine the circumstances under which the Indian Succession Act, 1865 came to be enacted. When the British settled down to govern India, they found that there was no ascertainable law in the matter of succession for communities other than Hindus and Muslims. This vacuum came to be noticed as a result of the decision of the Privy Council to the effect that a Hindu renouncing his religion and becoming a convert to Christian Succession [18]. It was to fill this gap that the Indian Succession Act of 1865 was enacted. It provided inter alia for intestate succession of the Christians of India (and also of Parsis). It may be pertinent to note at this juncture that the Travancore Christian Succession Act 1916 and Cochin Christian Succession Act 1921 were enacted when the Indian Succession Act, 1865 was in operation. In other words these acts consolidated the position in the context of the 1865 Act as applied to Christians in Travancore and Cochin.

The Indian Succession Act, 1865 was repealed and the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was enacted, consolidating various other enactments in the matter of testate and testamentary succession. This Act was not to be applied to the Christians in the whole of India. It contained many a provision signifying its restrictive and cautious application. This Act does not contain an "extend clause". Further, S.3 empowered the State Government to exempt any race, sect or tribe or any part of such race, sect or tribe from the operation of the Act, by way of a notification. Again, by Section 29(2), existing law (law for the time being in force) was saved. So far as its application to the Christians in Travancore and Cochin, it may be noted that these were princely States over which the British had no sovereignty or law-making authority. Thus neither did the Act apply-directly to the Christians in these princely States nor was it specifically made applicable to them. In fact by virtue of S.29(2) it could be argued that the Indian Succession Act did not apply to the Christians in the Travancore and Cochin areas. The above conclusion was reinforced by the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court and the Madras High Court as discussed below.

Independence & Thereafter

When India became independent in 1947, the Travancore and Cochin States continued to be princely States. Those States became Part of the Indian Union when the respective Maharajas signed the Instruments of Accession in 1949, making them Part B State of Travancore-Cochin. Thereafter, Parliament enacted the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951. Section 3 of the Act provided for extending the enactments mentioned in the Schedule thereto, to the Part B States. And Section 6, provided that any law in force in these States corresponding to any of the Acts extended to Part B States, would stand repealed. It was in this context, the question whether the Travancore Christian Succession Act stood repealed was raised. The Travancore-Cochin High Court where it was raised for the first time [19] held in 1956 that the Travancore Christian Succession Act was not repealed and it was the law applicable to Christians. Again the same question came up for decision in the Madras High Court in 1974 [20] wherein it was held that the Travancore Christian Succession Act stood repealed. But a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held otherwise [21] in 1977. Thus, it could be said that the position of law settled by the decisions of the Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was also to the effect that the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was not applicable to the Travancore Cochin Christians. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mary Roy must be viewed in the light of the above position.

Mary Roy & the Supreme Court

It may be appropriate here to examine the constitutional, procedural and jurisdictional issues involved in Mary Roy's case. Tire proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were instituted under Art.32 of the Constitution of India. Article 32 is a fundamental right to enforce a fundamental right or to avert a threat to a fundamental right. That being so, Art.32 cannot be pressed into service for determining the validity of an enactment, unless that enactment infringes the fundamental rights. This has been the consistent view of the Supreme Court [22]The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated its view in Khyerbani Tea Company's Case, [23] thus:

"In dealing with petition under Article 32, this court naturally confine the petitioners to the provisions of the impugned Act by which their fundamental rights are either affected or threatened".

A petition under Art.32 is thus maintainable only if it causes restriction on the enjoyment of fundamental rights. If a right is not a fundamental right conferred by part Ill of the Constitution, it is outside the purview of Article 32 for enforcement. In such cases, the petitioner may not invoke Art.32. It is open to the petitioner to approach the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution.

Therefore, the mere declaratory judgment of the Supreme Court in Mary Roy, was passed ignoring the procedural and jurisdictional limitations of the court. This was contrary to the practice of the court. The only course open to the court was to examine the validity of the Travancore Act on the touch stone of the Constitution, and the impact of its judgments would then naturally have been prospective.

Constitution & Continuity of Laws

That apart, the Supreme Court had not looked into the Constitutional provisions relating to existing law and its continued applicability after its commencement. Art.372(1) declares that:

"all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority".

And the President of India was given the power to make such adaptation or modification of the Law in force so as to bring them in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. This could be done before the first day of November 1957 as is provided under Art.372-A of the Constitution. Further Art.13(1) provides that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the constitution, in so far as they are inconsistant with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, shall to the extent of such inconsistancy, be void. Obviously these provisions relating to the law in force have been enacted to make the law in tune with the principles of International law and Public Law. For example, according to the principles of State Succession under International law, though the people change their allegiance, their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved, their relation to each other, and their rights of property remain undisturbed [24].

Also it is a general rule of public law, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new sovereign. [25] When such is the position in international law and the Constitution of India has contemplated the situation and provided for meeting such a contingency by Arts.372 and 13, the failure of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in not adverting to the constitutional provisions in deciding the case on hand was unfortunate.

The Interpretative Dilemma

Laws with regard to touchy issues like succession etc. should reflect customs and practices for its acceptance and sustenance. In this sense the Travancore Act was a well balanced legislation inasmuch as its Ss.24, 28 and 29 were explicitly made inapplicable to certain sections of Christians living in certain Taluks. Indeed, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 also contains a safety valve in its sections 3 and 29(2) to make it relevant in the society. It is obvious that it was with a view to make it workable in the society that these provisions were included.

Now by the judgment in Mary Roy, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in toto is made applicable to the Travancore area on the ground that it is expressly mentioned in the Schedule to Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951. While doing so, the court repudiated the strong argument that if the Act is wholly applicable its S.29(2) saving the existing laws (including the Travancore Act) should also be applicable [26]. Going by the precedents created by the Supreme Court itself, [27] S.29(2) should have been held applicable, thereby saving the Travancore Christian Succession Act, 1916. It could therefore be argued that, what the Supreme Court did was not interpretation in the true sense of the word, but a policy choice, which is the realm of the Legislature or the Executive. In short the reasoning and the decision of the court cannot be sustained on any ground. Had the court examined the issue in the constitutional context, retrospective operation of the decision would have been avoided. On the other hand, if S.29(2) was given effect to Travancore Act would have been saved. In both cases the present difficulties would have been avoided.

The Response of the Community

The decision has had, however, a positive response from the community. Christians in Kerala, by and large, welcomed the decision of the Supreme court with certain reservations. Now the majority of Christians do not seem to be opposed to giving equal share to women in the matter of intestate succession [28]. The consensus of opinion emerging at various seminars and discussions on the subject is that it is a welcome decision, if prospective effect is given to it. [29]

Some Suggestions

As the problems are still alive, it has become necessary to look for some solutions, in the constitutional context. As "intestacy and succession" is a subject included in the Concurrent List (Entry 5 of List III of the 7th Schedule) of the Constitution, the State Legislature is competent under Article 246, to exercise its legislative power and it can perhaps enact a validating Act, whereby the transactions arising out of testamentary and intestate succession in accordance with the provisions of the Travancore and Cochin Acts, made by Christians, from 1st April 1951 to 24-2-1986, could be validated. This view finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Singh, [30] wherein the Court held that the Legislature has power to validate actions under an earlier Act and that the Legislature is competent to enact a legislation with full retrospective operation. Such a course of action would not be an affront on the judicial power. This is so, because there is distinction between legislative and judicial functions. In I.N. Saksena, [31] the Supreme Court held:

"In view of this distinction between legislative and judicial functions, the legislature cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reverse or override a judicial decision, it may, at any time in exercise of the plenary powers conferred on it by Arts.245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based".

As pointed out by Ray, C.J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [32] the rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent courts and tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes for ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power. Therefore a validating Act for the aforesaid purpose would be legal. When such a validating Act is enacted, the interests of those persons who would otherwise be entitled to institute a suit for partition or for claiming streedhanam can also be protected. They can be given a grace period by the provisions of the validating Act itself, within which period, they can institute the suit [33].Thus bona fide transactions made by Christians and even others can be legalised and those aggrieved could be given an opportunity to redress their grievances.

Yet another option for the State Legislature is to enact a State Amendment to the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Whether it is a validating Act or a State Amendment, il must receive the assent of the President of India, for its validity, as is provided under Art.254(2) of the Constitution. If the President assents to a State law which has been reserved for his assent (under Art.200), the State law will prevail over an earlier law of the Union, not withstanding its repugnancy to the Union law [34], if both the laws deal with a concurrent subject [35]. The result of obtaining the assent of the President to a State Act is that it would prevail in that State and it will have overriding effect on the provisions of the Central Act [36]. Therefore, there may not be any legal infirmity for such a course of action.

The State Government has yet another option open to it.lt can issue a notification exercising its powers conferred under S.3 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 to serve the purpose. At any rate it is only just and proper that either the State Government/State Legislature or Parliament should resort to appropriate legislation to solve the problems created by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mary Roy.

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Footnotes:

1. Mary Roy and others v. State of Kerala and others. (1986) 2S.C.C. 209 = AIR 1986 SC 1011.

2. Section 6 lays down: "Repeals and savings-If immediately before the appointed day, there is in force in any Part B State any law corresponding to any of the Acts or Ordinances now extended to that State, that law shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, stand repealed".

3. V.M. Mathew v. Eliswa, 1988 (1) KLT 310 (D.B.). Also Joseph v. Mary 1988 (2) KLT 27 (DB).

4. Kurian Augusthy v. Devassy Aley, AIR 1957 T.C.1 = 1956 K.L.T.559

5. D. Chelliah v. G. Lalitha Bai, AIR 1978 Mad.66.

6. For a detailed discussion see Sebastian Champappilly, "Christian Succession and Probate of Wills -- Need for Change" - 1993 (2) KLT (Journal) 32.

7. Joseph v. Mary, 1988 (2) KLT 27 (DB). This case is a classic example as to how the settled property relations can be unsettled even after so many years.

8. Sosa v. Varghese, 1993 (2) KLT 798.

9. Judgment dated 28-10-1993 in CMA.No.169 of 1993, of the High Court of Kerala.

10. These Christians of Travancore and Cochin are called Syrian Christians or St. Thomas Christians.

11. The Syrian Christians of Travancore, Cochin and Malabar were under the ecclesiastical control of the Bishops sent from Mesopotamia. On the death of Mar Abraham the Syrian Bishop of the See of Angamali in 1597, the Archbishop of Goa, Menezes, managed to take control over the Syrian Christians and brought them under the direct control of the Pope, using Portuguese support, and he burnt all the collection of books and documents relating to the Syrian Christians maintained in the churches, and this is why we have so little written evidence of the history of the Syrian Christians in India before the 16th century. As part of his strategy to gain control over the Syrian Christians, he called all the representatives of the Syrian Christians from all the parish churches to a Synod at Diamper in 1599. See: CD. Firth "An Introduction to Indian Church History". (1976 Revised Edition) 89.

12. Cardinal Eugene Tisserant, "Eastern Christianity in India". (1957 Edition) 163.

13. Actio 9, Decretum 20, Bullarium Patronatus Portugalliae Regum, App.I.

14. Geevarghese Maria v. Kochukurian Maria, 22 TLR 192.

15. Ouseph Mathai v. Ouseph Kora, 22 TLR 205 (FB)

16. Cheriyan Achanpillai v. Cheriyathu Kuruvila, 23 TLR 84.

17. See Preamble of Travancore Christian Succession Act, 1916.

18. Abraham v. Abraham, 9 M.I.A. 195.

19. Kurian Augusthy v. Devassy Aley, AIR 1957 T.C.1; 1956 K.L.T. 559.

20. Solomon v. Muthiah, (1974) 1 MU 53.

21. D. Chelliah v. G. Lalitha Bai, AIR 1978 Mad. 66.

22. The Supreme Court in Chiranjit Lai v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 at para.44-45, observed: "Art.32 is not directly concerned with the determination of constitutional validity of particular legislative enactments. What it aims at, is the enforcing of fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution, no matter whether the necessity for enforcement arises out of an action of the executive or of the legislature... the sole object of the Article is the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution... A proceeding under this Article cannot really have any affinity to what is known as a declaratory suit". Also see Lakshmanappa H.J. v. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 3, Rain Chandra Palai v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 298.

23. Khyerbani Tea Company Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1964 SC 925 para.43.

24. See Chief Justice Marshall's famous observations in United States v. Percherman, 7 Pet.51, 86. (Peter's Prince Edward Island Reports, Chancery -1857) (1850-1872).

25. See German settlers in Poland-Permanent Court of International Justice. (1923) P.C. I.J. Series B. No.6.

26. Section 29(2) enacts: "Save as provided in sub-section (1) or by any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Part shall constitute the law of (India)* in all cases of intestacy".

*Substituted by Ac: No.III of 1951.

27. In fact this has been the view of the Supreme Court as it observed in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh. (AIR 1955 SC 84 at page 88). "Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in S.6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, hut whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that S.6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. S.6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material".

28. This opinion is based on the tentative conclusion made by the present writer after an analysis of the empirical data collected in connection with his Ph.D. Programme in CUSAT.

29. See the report in the vernacular daily "Deepika" dated 1-11-93 wherein, Mar Antony Padiyara (the Major Archbishop and Cardinal) expressed the view that the retrospective effect causes hardships for the community. A further report in the vernacular daily "Malayala Manorama" dated 15-11-93 reported that the All Kerala Catholic Women's Organisation had called upon the Government to implement the Indian Succession Act, from 1986 only.

30. Hari Singh v. The Military Estate Officer (1972) 2 SCC 239 = AIR 1972 SC 2205.

31. I.N. Saksena v. State of M.P. (1976) 4 SCC 750 para.22 = AIR 1976 SC 2250. Also see, D.D. Patil v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1989 Bom.286.

32. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp. SCC 1.

33. When the Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted, such a provision was made by S.30 of the Act

34. U.P. Eke. Supply Co. v. R.K. Shukla, AIR 1970 SC 237 at 239.

35. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 898 (para.8)

36. Narayanan Namboodiri v. Chinna, 1993 (2) KLT 848 at 851.

Labouring the point — A critique of

Thomas Eapen v. Asst. Labour Officer reported

in 1993 (2) KLT 241

(S. Parameswarctn, Advocate, High Court of Kerala)

1. Law is ubiquitous in important ways, that crude numbers cannot possibly capture. Many rules of law, after all, are general commands intended or supposed to serve as long-term guides to good behaviour. These rules of law cannot be measured or counted as if these one spot events, puffs of smoke that vanish into thin air in the wind. Measuring lines and pages, weighing volumes and counting laws, rules, cases and so on does not give a true sense of the import and impact of the legal words and their structures. One must look for other ways to assess the consequences of the rules set in motion by legal and judicial institutions. A decision of the Supreme Court in a Privy Purse case, in a Bank Nationalisation case, in an Indian Express case, in a Mary Roy Case, in a Shah Bano case, in an Air Corporation case, in a Maneka Gandhi's case, in a Bandhwa Mukti Morchas case, in an M.C. Mehta case, or a Christian Medical College case, or an act of Parliament giving rise to a consumer protection enactment or a National Legal Aid System are generally events whose effects ripple out in society and bring about institutional consequences; counting the words tells us nothing.

2 During the last two decades, particularly during the time of Chief Justice Gajendragadkar and in the Eighties during the period of Justices V.R Krishna lyer, D.A. Desai, Chinnappa Reddy, P.N. Bhagawati and, to some extent Y.V. Chandrachood, law-judge-made law to be more precise-increased its scope and scale in at least one important field-Industrial jurisprudence. There are few zones of immunity from law, fewer areas of life which are totally unregulated, totally beyond the potential reach of law now. This is not merely a phenomenon of legislation but of judicial activism, and it has detected often in cries of alaram a la "wolf that there is a colonisation of law in every walk of life. When the other two pillars of democracy, namely, the Legislature and the Executive have not risen upto our expectations and have undergone a deviation from heritage and propriety in recent times atleast in this part of the world, it is too natural if people look forward to the third wing of the Government, namely the judiciary, as the bulwark of democracy. As Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri observed in V.G. Row's case, AIR 1954 SC 240 the judiciary acts as the sentinel on the qui Vive.

3. As was observed by the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh v. Kamala Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152) the interpretation of socio-economic legislation should further the object and purpose of the legislation and the legislative history becomes irrelevant when the Act seeks to usher in a new order. Again as the Supreme Court observed in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 "the goal of-the legislation must make its presence felt, when the judicial choice of meaning of the words of ambigous import or the plurality of signification is made".

4. Again, as the Supreme Court reiterated in Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal reported in (1979) 2 SCC 274 "Statutory construction, so long as law is at the service of life, cannot be divorced from the social setting. That is why, welfare legislation like the present one must be interpreted in a Third World perspective. When interpreting the context of such provisions, the Court should favour the weaker and poor clients".

5. Again, as the Supreme Court observed in Shiveshwar Prasad Naramsingh v. Ghurah (1979) 3 SCC 23) "it is a well-settled cannon of construction that when two constructions are possible, one which advanced the object of the legislation must be preferred to one which may retard or frustrate the object of the legislation". The further principle is that in all doubtful matters the beneficial should be preferred. It is embodied in the Latin expression Semper in dubis benigniora praeferanda".

6. Viewed in this background, it is disheartening - to see the Kerala High Court giving an object-defeating interpretation to a piece of labour legislation in two decisions - Thomas Eapen v. Asst. Labour Officer (1993) 2 KLT 241) by P.K. Shamsuddin, J. and Sherthallai Sree Narayana Medical Mission General Hospital v. Damodaran Krishnan Unni (1975 KLT 572) by G. Viswanatha Iyer, J.

7. The Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 has been enacted, as the preambular proclamation reveals, to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the regulation of conditions of work and employment in Shops and Commercial Establishments in the State of Kerala. It came into force on 1-3-1962, under a notification dated 15-1-1962 published in the Kerala Gazette dated 6-2-1962. By a notification dated 3-4-1979 published in the Kerala Gazette dated 5-6-1979, all the provisions of the Act have been extended to the whole State. Under S. 5 of the Act, the Government is empowered by notification in the Gazette to exempt an establishment pemanently or temporarily from all or any of the provisions of the Act conditionally or unconditionally. This, it can do if it is specified that public interest so requires or that circumstances of the case are such that it would be just and proper to do so having regard to the nature and capacity of the shop. As has been observed while interpreting the Madras enactment in Sudarsanan v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1957 Mad. 144, this clause is not intended to undo the whole Act itself, but for properly administering the Act.

8. S. 3 grants exemption specifically to persons and establishments enumerated therein. S. 4 empowers the Government to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act even in such cases. From this, it will be clear that what is intended under S. 5 is not a permanent, perpetual, perennial exemption from the provisions and purview of the proletarian-oriented statute, but a temporary interregnum from its operation in circumstances justifying or warranting it. S. 36 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 provides for repeal of certain enactments which includes the Travancore Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125. There is a proviso to the section which reads as follows:—

Repeal of certain enactments:—

On and from the date of the commencement of this Act in any area, the enactments, specified in the Schedule shall stand repealed in so far as they apply to such area:

Provided that anything done under the said enactments which could have been done under this Act, if it had then been in force shall be deemed to have been done under this Act".

9. What is intended by the expression is any step or action taken by the Authorities in pursuance of the enactment which was in force earlier and which cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be extended to an executive order like a notification issued by the Government. It is, therefore, clear that a notification issued by a repealed enactment cannot have any validity in the eye of law, once the new enactment namely the Kerala Act, has come into force. But, Hon'ble Justice P.K. Shamsuddin has held to the contra, while considering a case in relation to maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961. In that case, the provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act were not complied with in relation to three nurses employed by the Kadampuzha Hospital, Kanjirappally and they took up the matter before the Assistant Labour Officer, who issued notices to the hospital authorities. The hospital authorities sent a reply stating that the provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act will not be applicable to hospitals which are not covered by the enactment and thereupon a show cause notice was sent asking why the prescribed amount should not be directed to be paid towards maternity benefits, and medical bonus to one of the nurses. It culminated in the order directing payment to the three nurses under S. 17 of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961. That order was challenged in a writ petition before the Hon' ble High Court of Kerala and relying on the decisions of Justice G. Viswanatha Iyer in Sherthallai Sreenarayana Medical Mission General Hospital v. Damodaran Krishnan Unni reported in 1975 KLT 572 and by Janaki Amma, J. in State of Kerala v. Athichan Sasi 1975 KLT 839 which had arisen under the Travancore Forest Act and the Kerala Forest Act, Justice Shamsuddin, allowed the writ petition observing as follows:

"It is true that by virtue of this Notification the provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act have been made applicable to all the establishments as defined in CI.(8) of S.2. S.2 says that v establishment' means a commercial establishment. It is not disputed that this expression will take in hospitals, nursing homes and dispensaries .But, the contention raised is that permanent exemption is granted for hospitals, nursing homes and dispensaries by virtue of Notification No: L. Dis. 2186/57/LAD dated 17-4-1957 quoted above and the said Notification has not been cancelled. It is true that the Travancore Cochin Shops & Establishments Act, 1125 was repealed and re-enacted by the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. A provision similar to S.6 of the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125 is enacted in S.6 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960. So this notification will be consistent with the provisions of the latter Act and so long as the said notification has not been cancelled, it may be taken as having been issued under the latter Act by virtue of S.23 and shall continue in force until it is cancelled. Moreover, proviso to S .36 states that any tiling done under the repealed Act which could have been done under the latter Act shall be deemed to have been done under the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act".

10. It may be noted that the learned Single Judge has referred in para.7 of the judgment to the Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Jayaprakash v. State of Kerala reported in 1984 KLT 903, but attempted to distinguish it. The said decision, it is respectfully submitted, has been rendered by a Bench which consisted of an eminent Labour Judge. It considered and construed the expression 'establishment' in . its ambit and amplitude in the text and the context of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and held that private hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies will come under the purview of Establishment'. The Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice K. Bhaskaran and Justice M.P. Menon observed as follows:—

"It is true that the employment in private hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies did not find a place in the Schedule to the Act under S.2(g) as it was enacted by Parliament. However, in exercise of the powers conferred by S.27 of the Act, the Schedule to the Act has been amended by Government of Kerala, to be operative in this State, by adding Item No.21. Item No.21 in the Schedule to the Act is "employment in shops and establishments (including hotels and restaurants)". It is reasonable to presume that what the Government had in mind, while adding item 21 to the Schedule to the Act, was to bring within the fold of scheduled employment all shops and establishments which would fall within the ambit of those expressions as understood in common parlance. A hospital, dispensary or pharmacy would be understood in common parlance either as an establishment or as a shop. The dictionary meaning of the expression establishment' is comprehensive enough to bring within its sweep a hospital, dispensary or a pharmacy, inasmuch as each one of them might fall within the expression "fixed state, a permanent civil or military force, a business, a settlement".

11. Justice Iyer's decision in Sherthallai Sreenarayana Medical Mission General Hospital Case (1975 KLT 572), it is respectfully submitted, has been rendered totally ignoring, the effect and impact of the repealing provision namely, S.36 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960. That case arose from a suit for arrears of salary by an employee of a hospital where the question was raised whether there was bar to a suit of that nature. The Payment of Wages Act, particularly, S.22 thereof, was considered by the Court, which came to the rescue of the employees and against the Management, which curiously enough sought the aid of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 read with the Kerala Shops & Commercial Establishments Act to deny benefit to its employees. Justice G. V. Iyer observed as follows:—

"The Notification issued under S.6 of the Travancore Cochin Shops and Commercial Establishments Act (Act 1 of 1125 M.E.) by the Kerala Government exempting nursing homes, hospitals and other institutions for treatment or care of the sick, the infirm, the destitute or the mentally unfit has not been cancelled subsequently. A provision similar to S.6 of the Travancore Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125 is enacted in S.5 of the Kerala Act, 1960. So long as, the said notification has not been cancelled, it would be taken as having been issued under the latter Act by virtue of S.23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 and treated as in force until cancelled. Therefore, the Shops and Commercial Establishments -Act does not apply to an employee of a nursing home and the provisions of Payment of Wages Act also will not apply".

12. The reliance placed on S.23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act 1125 of Travancore Cochin may not be acceptable, or correct, it is respectfully submitted. When the repealing Section itself is making provision, we do not have to go in for a reference to, or reliance on, the General Clauses Act. In any case, it was totally incorrect on the part of Justice Iyer to have placed reliance on S.23 of the Interpretation of General Clauses Act 1125, when the General Clauses Act (Central Enactment) was the Act that was applied to Kerala after the formation of Kerala State in a number of cases.

13. Justice P. Janaki Amma's decision in State of Kerala v. Adithian Sasi (1975 KLT 839) was clearly distinguishable on facts and in law. There the question was whether a notification regarding Reserved Forests issued under the Travancore Forests Act, 1068 could be deemed to be a notification under S.19 of the Kerala Act. There also S.23 of the Interpretation of General Clauses Act, 1125 was relied on, in my respectful submission not correctly. The rationale of the decision is when the Travancore Cochin Forests Act came into force, by virtue of S. 101 (3) of the said Act the notification issued under the Travancore Forests Act could be deemed to be notification issued under Travancore Cochin Forests Act and therefore logically the one issued under the Travancore Forest Act could be again deemed to be under the Kerala Act. This does not lend validity, or support, to the reasoning of Justice Shamsuddin.

14. Even a Devaswom establishment has been held to be an establishment coming within the purview of the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act by the Kerala High Court by Justice Gopalan Nambiar, in Supdt. v. Kunjan Kartha (1967 KLT 941). Interpreting S.2(4) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act 1960 and construing its scope and ambit, Justice Nambiar observed:—

"The words "an establishment or administrative service in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work" in the definition of the term commercial establishment' are peculiar to the Kerala Act and nothing corresponding to them is to be found either in the Madras Act or in the Travancore Cochin Act on the subject. It seems that with the above statutory definition, the only question is whether the Devaswom fills me bill for the limited purpose of the Act, and not whether it can be said to be a commercial establishment for all purposes whatsoever. On me terms of the statute taken along with the facts as found, the conclusion seems to be inescapable that me Devaswom satisfies the definition of a commercial establishment for the purposes of the Act".

15. As held in New India Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR 1963 SCI 207, is a recognised rule of interpretation of statute that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning, the court would be justified in assuming that the legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its powers invalid. In interpreting a statute, the Court cannot ignore its aim and object".

16. When two intepretations are feasible, that which advance the remedy and suppresses the evil as the legislature envisioned must find favour with the Court and the definitions in the Act are a sort of statutory dictionary to be followed, when the context strongly suggests (Carew & Co. v. Union of India, reported in (1975) 2 SCC 791). This was again emphasized in State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh reported in (1975) 2 SCC 810) where the Court held that it is settled law that Court should favour an interpretation that promotes the general purpose of the Act rather than the one that does not. Public law in our pie-bald economy and pluralist society responds to social challenges and constitutional changes. To miss the ideological thrust of our Constitution and economic orientation of our nation while construing the legislation relating to public law and scanning them for their validity is to fail in understanding the social philosophy that puts life and meaning into the provisions of the Act. The Law, being realistic, reckons with the socialist sector favouring State and Co-operative enterprises. Again, as the Supreme Court stated with emphasis in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. (1977) 1 SCC 155) the goal of the legislation must make its presence felt while the judicial choice of meanings of words of ambiguous import or plurality of signification is made. "To be literal or be blinkered by some rigid canon or restriction may be to miss the life of law itself. The context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project a particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. That is why even definition clauses allow themselves to be modified by contextual compulsions". The Shops and Commercial Establishments Act being such a social-economic piece of legislation should be elaborately construed so as to advance the object of the Act and fulfill the importance to be achieved thereby. Cutting through this legal thicket of confusion what remains to be established are the beneficient intention and the benefits that flow from the legislation. While approaching the construction of a legislation having sociological relevance, judges would do well to remember the words of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes when he began the conference in the Yehovah 's Witnesses case, "I come up to this case like a skittish horse to a brass band".

17. Law, as Justice Holmes and Justice Cardozo used to emphasise, is an effective instrument of social engineering. It is not an ivory-tower abstraction. Law must be on speaking terms with life and socio-economic legislation has to be interpreted with a purposive approach. While Judges need not be less passive or more obstrusive personae, they could at least resist the temptation to put the clock back.

18. It is true that Courts cannot just pluck interesting issues out of the air and decide them for the benefit of future generations. When the Court's agenda changes, as it surely does in the area of industrial jurisprudence, the change is most frequently a delayed response to change in the nation's agenda. It is dictated by external forces - the actions of other branches. The Court is only rarely in the forefront of establishing new major legal standards, and its articulation of principles of social policy has typically been within the bounds of general public perception at the time. The story of the labour and the Constitution is illustrative.

19. Judges interpreting socially purposive legislation would do well to recall the words of Lord Denning in Nothman v. London Borough of Barner (1978)1 All. E.R. 1243(C.A.)):—

"Faced with glaring injustice, the judges are, it is said, impatient, incapable and sterile. Not so with us in this Court—Whenever the strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurd and unjust situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it by reading words in, if necessary, so as to do what Parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind."

or the following observations in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Ashes ((1949)2 All E.R. 155(C.A.)) quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in M. Pentiah (AIR 1961 SC 1107), "when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding out the intention of Parliament and then he must supplement the written words so as to give "force and life' to the intention of the Legislature. A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out. He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases".

20. Tail piece:—The Government of the State of .Kerala is understood to have since issued a Notification bringing hospitals within the purview of the Act.

Advocates and Doctors -- Profession and Business

(S. Ananthasubrahmanian, Advocate, Ernakulam)

In S Mohan Lal v. R. Kondiah (1979 (3) SCR 12 = AIR 1979 SC 1132) the Supreme Court held that the expression "business" in S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is used in a wide sense so as to include the practice of profession of an Advocate.

The Supreme Court has in Civil Appeal No. 1066 of 1987 - Dr. Jess Raphael v. Mrs. K.L. Regina Joseph, (Reported in 1994(1) KLT 852 (SC)) adopting the reasoning and dictum in 5. Mohan Lal's case said: "If this is the law with reference to an Advocate, the case on hand is a fortiorari" and set aside the judgment of the learned District Judge and the High Court allowing the Doctor-tenant's appeal.

Civil Appeal No.1066 of 1987 originated from R.C.P.115 of 1977 of the Rent Control (Principal Munsiff s) Court, Ernakulam and is with reference to the second proviso to S. 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. It was decided on 18-1-1994.

The decision of the High Court of Kerala to the contrary in Hassan v. Mohammed - 1994 (1) KLT 502 rendered on 25-1-1994, one week later and reported in the issue of KLT dated 21-3-1994 would have been otherwise if the decision of the Supreme Court was noticed.

Here is the need for the computer.