Christians and the Family Courts

(Sebastian Champappilly, Advocate, Ernakulam)

The Law Commission of India, in its 59th Report (at Page 13) suggested that the States should think of establishing Family Courts which will give more emphasis on the settlement of matrimonial disputes by way of conciliation rather than the normal mode of trial. It may be pertinent to note at this juncture that the Law Commission was not mainly concerned with the proposal of institution of Family Courts. It was mainly examining the need for amendments required under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Obviously the 59th Report was not concerned with the Indian Divorce Act or the marriage and divorce laws applicable to Muslims and Parsis. Nor, in the circumstances can one consider this Report, a comprehensive study about the need, relevance, nature etc. of Family Courts in India. But the Government of India thought it necessary to bring in a legislation for the establishment of Family Courts, on the representations made by various Women's Organisations and individuals and the Parliament enacted the Family Courts Act, 1984. It was brought into force in Kerala from 21-10-1989 and Family Courts at Thiruvananthapuram, (for Thiruvananthapuram and Kollam Districts), Ernakulam (for Ernakulam and Thrissur Districts) and Kozhikode (for Kozhikode and Wayanad Districts) have been established on 6-6-1992.

The Family Court exercises all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings in the nature of suits for declaration of nullity of marriages, restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation or dissolution of marriage and such other reliefs as provided under S.7 of the Act. It also exercises powers under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore it can be said that the Family Court is a Civil Court of District Courts' stature when exercising jurisdiction under S.7(1) of the Act and a Criminal Court of Judicial 1st Class Magistrate's Stature when exercising jurisdiction under Chap. IX of Cr. P.C. (Munna Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1991 All. 189).

The Act was indeed enacted with the object of promoting conciliation in, and securing speedy settlement of disputes, relating to marriage and family affairs and matters connected therewith. This Act supposedly covers the whole area of matrimonial jurisdiction. S.20 of the Act starts with a non-obstante clause, whereby provisions of the Act are given over-riding effect on all other laws for the time being in force.

But it appears that these provisions may not have any impact on the provisions contained under the Indian Divorce Act, which regulate divorce among Christians. The Family Courts are invested with only the powers of the District Courts and Courts subordinate (hereto as is clear from S.7. Therefore, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Courts in matters of matrimonial jurisdiction. And under the Indian Divorce Act, it is the District Courts and the High Court which have concurrent jurisdiction to deal with questions of marriage and divorce among Christians. In other words, the High Court's jurisdiction to deal with matrimonial causes of Christians is not at all affected by the provisions of the Family Courts Act. The Bombay High Court's decision in Kamal V.M. Allaudin v. Raja Shaikh (AIR 1990 Bom. 299) wherein the court which also exercises Letters Patent jurisdiction, expressed no final opinion as regards the High Court's jurisdiction in matters matrimonial to which the Indian Divorce Act and the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act are applicable. The Court has however hastened to add that, such matter will continue to be cognisable by the High Court until jurisdiction in that respect is conferred by express statutory provision upon the Family Court. Further the Act does not contemplate transfer of proceedings instituted or entertained by the High Court itself to the Family Court. It will mean that as far as Christians are concerned a different court in the shape of Original side of the High Court will be there within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. The Bombay High Court is therefore correct when it observes that it may seemingly appear to be incongruent after the advent of the Constitution that Communities of different religious persuasions should be required to approach different forums for obtaining similar matrimonial reliefs and that position is the result of existing laws which have not so far been consolidated. As the law stands now, the invoking of the jurisdiction either of the High Court or the District Court (Family Court) is left to the petitioner though. Since the provisions of the Family Courts Act do not take away the jurisdiction of the High Courts, in matters matrimonial, the persons professing the Christian religion are left free to choose the forum either the High Court or the Family Court for rederessal of their grievances. If one chooses the High Court, the application of the Family Courts Act could be excluded. The position emerging out of the present situation can be summed up as follows. A petition for divorce under S.10 of the Indian Divorce Act, and petitions under Ss.l8 and 19 for declaration of nullity of marriage and petition under S.23 for judicial separation and petition under S.32 for restitution of conjugal rights etc. can be filed before the High Court, inspite of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

Apart from this, the Family Court is conferred with the jurisdiction and powers of a District Judge alone, confirmation by the High Court of the decrees passed by the District Courts is however mandatory under S.17and 20 of the Indian Divorce Act. Even if a Christian gets a decree of divorce from the present Family Court, he has to seek confirmation from the High Court. Thus, the Christians are being singled out in such matters. This position becomes all the more important when we appreciate another situation. Under the last proviso to S.17 of the Indian Divorce Act, "any person" is at liberty to file a petition before the High Court for transfer of the case from the District Court to the High Court on the ground that any of the parties to the suit are or have been acting in collusion for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. In other words, even in a case where the parties did not elect to go to the High Court, a third party can drag them to go to the High Court, on the ground of collusion and thus defeat the avowed purpose of the Family Courts Act so far as Christians are concerned.

The Family Courts Act presents another question also in the Kerala context. A decree passed by a High Court in its original jurisdiction can be executed by the court of the lowest grade under R.275 of the Civil Rules of Practice. Under S.18(1) of the Family Courts Act, that court is given power only to execute its decrees or orders. S.18(3) makes it clear that the power of the ordinary Civil Court for execution of decrees is not excluded by the Act. Therefore, as far as execution proceedings are concerned, the powers of the ordinary Civil Courts would remain unaffected. Again, under S.45 of the Indian Divorce Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is made applicable to the proceedings under that Act. Now another question that arises is whether the execution proceedings now pending before the ordinary civil courts would get transferred to the Family Courts. Under S.8(a), of the Family Courts Act, jurisdiction of other Courts are excluded only in respect of suits or proceedings of the nature referred to in Explanation under S.7(l). Since S.7(1) or the Explanation does not deal with execution proceedings and since S.18(3) makes its clear that the powers of the ordinary Civil Court for execution still prevail, the pending execution proceedings are to be dealt with by the ordinary civil courts and this is particularly so if they arise from decrees made by the High Court in its Original jurisdiction under the Indian Divorce Act.

In short, as far as Christians are concerned, the advent of the Family Court is not going to have any impact and they are still shackled by the provisions of the obsolete law on marriage and divorce. This is again a case signifying the crying need of reform of the personal law of Christians.

The Battered Woman Syndrome

(T.G. John, Advocate, Trichur)

Of recent interest is the ruling of an English Court where an Indian woman, Kiranjit Ahluwalia who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of her husband was acquitted on retrial. The court of appeal quashed her conviction and ordered retrial in the light of fresh evidence regarding her 'state of mind'. At the retrial after hearing her evidence about the abuse she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the time she had served in jail was considered sufficient since the court found that she had committed the offence irrationally due to the strain of living with a violent man!

In May, 1989, Kiranjit poured a tin of petrol over her husband while he was asleep and set fire. The husband was reduced to ashes. It was in evidence that she was constantly beaten up by her husband, sometimes with his waist-belt. On one occasion she was pushed from the stairs. The husband, it was reported, was a sadist and constantly inflicted brutalities on her for years continuously. The retrial was ordered when the women's rights Campaigners took the matter up.

The above judgment gives a new dimension of defence for lawyers in murder cases. Under what head does this new exemption come? It cannot be grave and sudden provocation because she had been undergoing it for so many years. For a layman this criminal act of Kiranjit can be understood only as a retaliatory measure. She had various other courses open to her. She could have reported the matter to the police, to her relatives or even taken steps for a divorce. But refraining from all these, she stoops to murder her husband in the most grotesque fashion. The taw and the lawyer fondly terms it as 'The Battered Woman Syndrome'" If this principle is recognised, it can very well apply to other specific categories also. If a married man has to suffer long from his nagging wife, and after several years, of suffering, he kills his wife, the action can safely be called 'Battered Man's Syndrome'. And again if an employee who had to suffer for long, for number of years under his cruel employer, finally murders him can it be 'Battered Employee's Syndrome'? In short the trend will be to put every murder or manslaughter under a particular 'Syndrome'.

'Syndrome' only means 'a symptom, characteristic or set of symptoms or characteristics indicating the existence of a condition or problem'.

x    x          x          x          x          x          x          x          x

Just think about a job where you are required to wear not only a long gown, neckbands and a sash but also a bulky horse hair wig. That is the uniform most British Judges have worn since the late 17th century - seeming with pleasure and at the tax payer's expense (as much as Pounds 7000 per costume). Additional ceremonial garments including knee breeches, gold buckled shoes and a fur trimmed robe are worn on special occasions. Britain's new Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor has set out to answer the question. 'Is this really necessary for the administration of Justice?' Many Britons maintain that the costumes only encourage judicial arrogance and widen the gap between the public and the so-called public servant. Lord Taylor and the Lord Chancellor-Lord Mackay has issued this August, a consultation paper asking interested parties from lawyer to police officers to speak openly their views about the above issue.

Appropriation of Payments under Decree

(V.K. Sathyavan Nair, Advocate, Kottayam)

1. This is to point out an erroneous practice followed by decree holders, especially, banks and other financing companies, in the matter of appropriation of payments under decree, totally disregarding the amended provisions of Order 21, R.1 C.P.C. More often than not, this practice bears the stamp of approval of the execution Courts.

Principal sum

2. Interest is the premium for the money used and is quite distinct from 'principal sum adjudged'. Section 34 C.P.C empowers Court to award interest pendente lite and for post decretal period on the 'principal sum adjudged'. In 1974 KLT 853 a Division Bench has held that if as per the agreement between the parties the interest that has accrued due at the end of the quarter is added on to the principal and becomes the principal the interest so added never thereafter ceases to be the principal. The Court was considering the mode of calculating principal amount at the time of filing the suit. But the principal sum referred to in S.34 does not include interest except in cases were interest accrued prior to the filing of the suit and added on to the principal in accordance with the agreement between the parties. It may also be noted that under the amendment of S.34 by Act 66 of 1956 post-decree interest can be allowed only on the principal and not on the aggregate amount adjudged.

Part payment

3. The judgment debtor is bound to pay the decretal debt in one of the modes specified in R.1of Order 21. A payment into court towards the decree debt operates as a discharge of debt to that extent. The words "all money payable under a decree do not mean the entire amount payable under the decree. Even if a portion of the decretal amount is paid into court, it will be a valid payment. The question is whether such part payments shall be credited towards principal sum or interest.

Section 60 of the Contract Act

4. The normal rule is that, in the absence of any definite indication on the part of the debtor, when money is paid it is to be credited first towards interest and the balance if any, towards the principal. The Contract Act does not contain any express provision regarding appropriation towards interest. What S.60 says is that where the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due. Strictly S.60 contemplates distinct debts and the law of appropriation is not attracted to single debt. Nevertheless the principle underlying S.60 of the Contract Act was held to be applicable to interest as well. So in the case of a debt due with interest, any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal. The apex Court held in AIR 1970 SC 161 that where  mortgagor-judgment debtor  made deposits in Court from time to time, the amounts so paid could be appropriated first towards interest and then towards the principal due in the absence of evidence of the mortgagee having accepted the amounts towards the principal. Unless the mortgagee was informed that payment was towards principal and not towards interest and the mortgagee agreed to the conditional deposit, normal rule of appropriation would apply to payments under decree. However in the light of the amended provisions of R.1 of Order 21, the above said principal can no longer be held applicable to payment of money under decree.

1976 Amendment

5. Order 21 Rule 1 was amended by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act No.104 of 1976. Before the amendment there was no express provision regarding appropriation of payments or cessation of interest. Sub-rule (2) of R.(1) provides that where any payment is made under Clause (a) of Sub-rule (1), notice of such payment shall be given to the decree holder. It is held in 1968 KLT 136 that the decree holder is entitled to interest till the date of notice.

Modes of payment

6. After the amendment there are significant changes in R.(1) of Order 21. By the amendment the judgment debtors have been given an opportunity to send money to the Court by money order or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing. The modes of payment under decree has been enlarged and the present rule envisages the following modes.

1. By deposit in court.

2. By sending money to the Court by postal money order or through bank.

3. By paying to the decree holder out of Court by postal money order or through bank.

4. By paying to the decree holder out of Court by any other mode evidenced in writing.

5. Any other mode as the Court which passed the decree directs.

Notice of payment

7. It is also provided that where payments are made to the Court or by any other mode as the Court which passed the decree directs, the decree holder shall be given notice either through court or directly to him by registered post acknowledgment due. When payments are made to the decree holder himself no notice is necessary.

Statement of particulars

8. If money is sent to the court or to the decree holder by money order or through bank, the money order or the payment, as the case may be, shall contain an accurate statement of particulars specified in Sub-rule (3) of R.1. Clause (c) of Sub-rule (3) stipulates that it shall contain a statement regarding how the money remitted, is to be adjusted, that is to say, whether it is towards principal, interest or costs.

Cessation of interest

9. Sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (5) are introduced by the amendment. These rules provide that interest shall cease to run from the date of payment to the decree holder or date of service of notice on him, as the case maybe. The new provision regarding cessation of interest on the amount paid is very clear and specific and there is hardly any scope for conflicting views. If any amount is paid under decree interest shall cease to run on that amount, that is to say, the amount paid shall be credited towards principal sum. The meaning of the provision is quite plain and unambiguous and it is not capable of any other interpretation.

Objects and reasons

10. In this context the objects and reasons for the amendment may give added force to the above literal interpretation "The committee note that there is no provision in the code in relation to cessation of interest on the money paid under a decree out of court to a decree holder by postal money order or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing. The committee are of the view that in such a case, the interest should cease to run from the date of such payment. In case the decree holder refuses to accept the postal money order or payment through a bank interest should cease to run from the date on which the money was tendered to him in ordinary-course of business of the postal authorities or bank sub-rule (5) in Rule 1 of Order XXI has been inserted accordingly."

Valid tender

11. It is clear from a bare reading of the provisions that judgment debtor is entitled to cessation of interest on any amount paid under the decree whatever be the mode of payment. If that be the case, the stipulation contained in clause (c) of sub-rule (3) regarding the manner of appropriation appears to be unnecessary. The reason for such a requirement is not quite clear. But that is no ground to deviate from the literal interpretation to be given to sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (5). Clause (c) of sub-rule (3) cannot be said to govern and restrict the definite and unambiguous meaning of sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (5). Non-compliance with requirement contained in clause (c) of sub-rule (3) may affect the validity of the tender, but it has no significance in construing sub-rule (4) and (5).

Order 24 Rule 3

12. Even during the stage of trial if any amount is paid it has to be adjusted towards principal. Rule 3 of Order 24 provides that no interest shall be allowed to the plaintiff or any sum deposited by the defendant from the date of receipt of notice, whether the sum deposited is in full by the claim or falls short thereof. The same principle is applied to payment under decree also by substituting sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (5) in R.1 of Order 21.

AIR 1988 P& H 33

13. This question was considered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Prem Sagar the Court held that part payment under decree shall be credited towards principal (AIR 1988 P & H 33).

Conclusion

14. Unfortunately the mode of calculating balance amount due from a judgment debtor ignores the above said principle and often an incorrect method by appropriating payments towards the aggregate amount is followed. Quite obviously such wrong method of calculation works out inequitable results allowing realisation of interest on interest, penalising the judgment debtors denying them the benefits conferred by the express provisions contained in sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (5) of Rule 1 of Order 21.

Power of Court to Summon Records from Income-Tax Department

Siby Mathew, Chief Editor, KLT

As early as in 1976 Shri P.K. Ravindranatha Menon wrote in 1976 KLT (Journal) 45:

"With the omission of S.137 and amendment of S.138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961,by the Finance Act, 1964, the declaration of confidential nature of records, the embargo against a court requiring a public servant to produce such records or to give evidence before it in respect thereof and the prohibition against a public servant making a disclosure of any particulars in the said documents have all been totally omitted and the provisions of the Evidence Act came into play with effect from April 1,1964, and the courts trying a suit can call for such records from the income tax department, if it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case justify such summoning and if it is in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act".

The above view of Mr. Menon was against the view of Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court, reported in (1974) 95 ITR 34. (Trilok Chand Jain v. Dagiram Pindi Lal).

In a recent decision rendered on 4-2-1992 and reported in (1992) 194 ITR 228, the Supreme Court, reversing the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Part, held:

"The repeal of S.137clearly disclosed the legislative intent that it was felt by the legislature that it was no more necessary to keep the records of assessment by the Income-tax Department relating to an assessee as confidential from the courts and the bar with regard to the production of any part of the record was removed in so far as courts were concerned. The finality which has been attached to the order of the Commissioner under S.138(1)(b) is, thus restricted to the cases where the information etc., as contemplated by the Section is called for by any person other than a court of law by a judicial order. Section 138(1)(b) does not affect the powers of courts to require production of documents filed by an assessee before the Income tax authorities after 1st April, 1964, relating to assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1964-65 onwards or the assessment records of such years or the disclosure of any information therefrom to them, in a case pending before the court when the court, by a judicial order, requires the production of the record considered relevant by it for decision of a case pending before it." (from the head note at page 230 of 194 ITR 228).

The Family Courts Act, 1984 - A Critical Appreciation

(By R. Lakshmi Narayan, Advocate, Ernakulam)

Family is the basic unit of the Society. Formation of the State and its evolution can be traced out from this small unit called Family. Man is a social animal. Being a social animal, he respects society, bound by the relationships created by the society and governed by rules framed by the society.

The first association created by man may be his family. This association is necessitated by the various factors like inter-dependence and personal security. So the family, as a basic unit of the society, has to be protected and preserved. For this, the relationships between the members of the family has to be regularised in order to keep a balance. For that purpose, the instrument of law is the only solution.

It is quite natural that the relation between members of family may strain due to ever so many reasons. So the law, as a protector of rights, and as an instrument to enforce duties arising out of matrimonial bond, gain significance. By applying law, the right and duties are enforced and then imbalance in family relations are settled.

For the settlement of dispute between the members of a family, there should be a procedure. The procedure must be effective and speedy one. Otherwise the imbalance in the family unit may bring trouble to the Society as a whole. So administration of justice in this field needs a special care. Taking into consideration of this special character of family and its significance in the society, the Government has come forward to enact a special Act which constitutes Family Courts in order to render speedy justice.

The word family means household or parent and their children who live in one house. The Family Courts Act of 1984 has not defined the word 'Family'. But going' through the provisions contained in that Act one can gather the meaning. Family in the context mean those persons who are bound by the matrimonial bond. Even though the Act has been passed as early in 1984, the implementation has started this year. So it will not be out of context to analyse some of the important provisions in the Act and to evaluate the practical side of its implementation.

Before the implementation of this Act, Civil Courts were exercising the jurisdiction over this subject. Now the Civil Courts are no more having the jurisdiction to entertain any case which falls within the four corners of S.7 of the Family Courts Act. Power of the Magistrates Court, under S.125 Cr. P.C. also has been abrogated and transferred to the Family Court.

S.7 of the Act deals with the jurisdiction of the Family Courts. It reads as follows:

"S.7-JURISDICTION-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall --

(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and

(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.

Explanation:-The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:--

(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree for nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;

(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;

(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them;

(d) a suit or proceeding for an order of injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;

(e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;

(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;

(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.

(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise--

(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 of 1974); and

(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment.

A mere reading of this section is enough to understand that every possible dispute between the parties to a marriage and those things which arise out of said marriage will come under the purview of Family Court. A dispute between parties to the marriage as regards their property will come under the purview of this Act even if such dispute is not arising out of matrimonial bond. So it can be seen that the Parliament has entrusted a difficult task on the shoulders of the Family Court. To discharge this, necessary powers also are granted. Now the only thing which remains to be seen is its working. The question at this juncture is whether it will be a success or not in fulfilling the object of the Act.

Under S.9 of the Act, the court is duty bound to make efforts for settlement of dispute. It should assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the suit. S.9(2) also empowers the Court to adjourn the case if there is a reasonable possibility of a settlement between the parties. The section maybe misused by the parties to drag the proceedings. S.11 directs the court to conduct the proceedings in camera if the court so desires or if either party so desires. This provision may sometime encourage the parties to initiate unnecessary proceedings without the fear of public opinion.

S.13 says that no party to the-suit before a Family Court shall be entitled, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner. This may hamper speedy disposal because parties are not familiar with the provisions of law or well settled position of law. They may not be in a position to convince the court, their points. If the parties are compelled to plead their case personally there is every chance of aggrevating the disputes, because unnecessary allegation may be levelled against each other by the influx of emotions. Appointment of Advocates as amicus curiae is no substitute for engagement of lawyers by the parties. The Family Courts (Kerala) Rules of 1989 permits the parties to have legal advice with the permission of the court. Even then the right to have legal advice depends solely at the discretion of the court.

As per the Act there shall be Counselling Centre attached to each Family Court. Principal Counsellor is its head. The court, after the appearance of the party, should direct them to the Counsellor, for the purpose of counselling. The Counsellor has enormous duties. He has to help the parties to arrive at a reconciliation. He is entitled to pay home visits to the homes of any of the parties. He can interview relatives, friends and acquaintances of parties. He can seek information from the employer of any of the parties. He can refer the parties to an expert in any other area such as medicine or psychiatry. After completing the above mentioned process he should submit a report to" the court. If the matter is settled the court will pass a decree according to the terms of settlement arrived at before the Counsellor. The Counsellor has a right to supervise custody of children and supervise, guide or assist reconciled couples. One is afraid whether such procedure will be helpful for a speedy disposal of the cases.

After getting the report from the Counsellor, the Chief Ministerial Officer shall call a meeting of the parties to fix a date of hearing of the petition. The Chief Ministerial Officer after consultation should fix a date and time of hearing before the court. The court after this takes evidence and decides the case. So it is a lengthy procedure which consumes much time. Even though the Act is meant to avoid technicality of procedure 5 as in the ordinary civil court, the object may not be attained as long as the lengthy proceedings before the Counsellor, Chief Ministerial Officer and" the court, are contemplated. Thus unavoidable delay in this procedure may aggravate the strains between the parties and stand in the way of just solution of problems. The parties in these type of cases are coming to the court only after availing all possible mediation and counselling through the well wishers, friends' and relatives. So they may not be interested to settle their dispute through Counsellors under the Act, who are totally strangers to the, parties and who have no special interest in them. This will only help to delay the adjudication of dispute.

Now only 3 Courts are established under this Act in the whole State of Kerala, i.e.,... in Trivandrurn, Ernakulam and Calicut. So the difficulty faced by the litigants in other Districts in Kerala is apparent. They will be put to difficulties until courts are established in their own Districts under the Act. Until then it will be better if the civil courts are empowered to continue their jurisdiction over these matters covered by the Family Courts Act.

The Preamble of the Act reads as follows:--

"An Act to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith".

When a special Statute is enacted it should be for removing the defects and difficulties that existed in the general law or procedure. If that aim is not achieved, the special enactment is of no use. So the Act as it now stands is facing a big challenge in the province of practicality. Only time can tell whether it succeeds or not in attaining its goal enshrined in the Preamble of the Act.